Westray Mine
Public Inquiry
Commission

Stellarton, Nova Scotia

Day 28

7 February 1996
Morning Session

Index to online transcript, Westray Mine Public Inquiry

HEARD BEFORE
The Honourable Justice K. Peter Richard, Commissioner

PLACE
Stellarton, Nova Scotia

COUNSEL
Solicitor for the Commission
Associate Counsel
Ms. Jocelyn Campbell
Document Coordinator
Ms. Ena MacDonald

Solicitor for the Department of Justice Canada
Ms. Lynn Gillis

Solicitors for the Department of Justice Nova Scotia
Mr. R. Endres, Q.C.

Solicitor for the United Steelworkers of America
and the Nova Scotia Federation of Labour
Mr. David Roberts

Solicitor for the Westray Families Group
Mr. B. Hebert

Representing the United Mine Workers
Mr. Hugh MacArthur

Representing the Canadian Union of Public Employees
Mr. Robert Wells

Representing the Town of Stellarton
Mr. Clarence Porter, Mayor

INDEX for DAY 28
(Pages 5758 - 6039 in the official printed transcript)
Page Day
Witness: Mr. Shaun Comish
Westray Miner
Examination by Ms. Campbell 5758 28
Examination by Mr. Roberts 5850 28
Examination by Mr. Hebert 5864 28
Examination by Mr. MacArthur 5874 28
Examination by Mr. Wells 5881 28
Examination by Mr. Endres 5886 28
Examination by Ms. Campbell 5910 28
Examination by Commissioner 5915 28
Witness: Mr. Aaron Conklin
Westray Miner
Examination by Ms. Campbell 5921 28
Examination by Mr. Roberts 5983 28
Examination by Mr. Hebert 5992 28
Examination by Mr. MacArthur 6004 28
Examination by Mr. Wells 6009 28
Examination by Mr. Endres 6015 28
Examination by Ms. Campbell 6030 28

February 7, 1996 - 9:33 a.m.

COMMISSIONER Good morning.

ALL Good morning.

COMMISSIONER Ms. Campbell.

MS. CAMPBELL Thank you.

MR. SHAUN COMISH, sworn, testified as follows:

THE CLERK Please state and spell your name for the record?

A. Shaun David Comish, S-H-A-U-N.

THE CLERK Thank you.

EXAMINATION BY MS. CAMPBELL

Q. Mr. Comish, where do live at present?

A. Dartmouth.

Q. You live in Dartmouth.

A. 7 Forest Court.

Q. And where are you working?

A. I work for Emcorp Information Consultants.

Q. Sorry?

A. Emcorp Information Consultants.

Q. And what do you do with them?

A. Programmer, computer programmer.

Q. Right. Have long have you been there?

A. I've been full time with them now since December 1st.

Q. December –

A. December 1st.

Q. You commenced employment with Westray Coal on September 3, 1991?

A. Yes.

Q. Where did you work prior to going to Westray Coal?

A. I was at Seabright Resources, which actually was Westminer at that time, in Gays River.

Q. Hard rock mining?

A. Yes.

Q. And in total, how many years did you hard rock mine?

A. Twelve.

Q. Twelve years. And was it always with Seabright?

A. No, no. No, I started in 1980 in northern Ontario. I worked there for six years, and then I came home to Nova Scotia in '86.

Q. Now prior to going to Westray, did you have any experience working in a coal mine?

A. No.

Q. Now while you were – while you were at or employed over a course of 12 years with hard rock mines, were you involved in mine rescue training?

A. I was involved in mine rescue training – when I came back to Nova Scotia, I got into it.

Q. Did you become certified mine rescue?

A. Yes.

Q. And how does that process work? How did you get certified? What did you have to do?

A. We had to do training, go through a manual, write a test, do your first aid.

Q. Now what did – first off, how long did the – what did the training consist of? How long a period of time did it take you to train before you were certified?

A. I actually trained in two different – two different workplaces. So I was training in one for probably three or four months and then probably the same in the other, so about six months.

Q. And so would that be like a total of 12 months? Is that what you're saying?

A. No, six.

Q. A total of six months, I'm sorry. Now how did your – the training you received in mine rescue prepare you for work underground at Westray Coal?

A. It really didn't except for knowing about gas. That's it.

Q. Well, what did you learn about gas?

A. Just the different thresholds of – well, with coal mining, it would be with the methane.

Q. And what did you learn about methane in mine rescue training?

A. That it was explosive between 2.5 and five percent.

Q. Now was methane the only gas you learned about in mine rescue?

A. No, no. There's – well, there's a whole list of them, actually. There's CO –

Q. Carbon monoxide?

A. Carbon monoxide. The – we learned about the sulphides, dioxide.

Q. It's been suggested that an individual who was trained in mine rescue would come fairly well equipped to know about life in a coal mine. What do you say to that?

A. I don't agree with it.

Q. Did you learn anything about mine ventilation in mine rescue training?

A. The training in mine rescue, you were taught to re-establish mine ventilation. You were really taught about the mine ventilation.

Q. And what does it mean – what do you mean when you say you were taught to re-establish mine ventilation?

A. After an incident –

Q. Yes?

A. – you would go in and re-establish. You just basically did what the team leader told you to do.

Q. What the team leader told you to do. And did you learn in mine rescue anything about how a working coal mine should be ventilated?

A. No.

Q. Did you learn anything in mine rescue training about methane layering?

A. No, just that methane is lighter than air and it rises to the top.

Q. Would you have learned anything about coal dust –

A. No.

Q. – in mine rescue training?

A. No.

Q. So it wouldn't be fair to conclude that mine rescue would prepare an individual for work underground in a coal mine?

A. No, I can't see how it would.

Q. Did you study from a manual that was – that produced – was produced in Ontario?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall today what the contents of that manual were?

A. Some of it. Not all of it, that's for sure. I've been away from it for four years now.

Q. Okay. Just prior to going to – being hired at Westray, were you collecting unemployment insurance?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. And how was it that you came to get work at Westray Coal?

A. I just drove up with Lennie one day and filled out an application. I was hired on the spot.

Q. Is that Lennie Bonner?

A. Yes.

Q. And you say you were hired on the spot?

A. Yeah.

Q. Who hired you?

A. That would be Gerald Phillips and – we had to actually go see Gerald Phillips and Roger Parry both.

Q. And do you recall any of the conversation or discussion that you had with either of those gentlemen?

A. No, they just basically said what a great place it was and welcome aboard. You know, we have many applications they told us, so we were lucky to get a job.

Q. So when you were hired, what did you understand you were being hired to do?

A. Mining, just hired as a miner. Not a helper, not a – anything else, just a miner.

Q. Were you given any indication as to how long you could expect to be employed?

A. Well, they said – they had a contract, I think they said, for 15 years, so I was pretty well guaranteed 15 years' employment.

Q. Now what type of orientation did you receive for your work at the mine?

A. Prior to going underground?

Q. Prior to going underground, yes?

A. We got dressed, went out into the waiting area and then went underground. Told us who to go with and we went.

Q. That was your orientation?

A. That was my orientation.

Q. Were you issued some equipment?

A. Just your regular mining – your lamp, your self-rescuer.

Q. You had used the self-rescuer before in your mine rescue training?

A. We had trained with them, yes.

Q. So you knew how to use one?

A. Yes.

Q. Nobody at Westray gave you a demonstration or explained to you how –

A. Never gave me a demonstration, no.

Q. But you didn't need it, did you?

A. Not really.

Q. So were you in this group of individuals with Mr. Bonner, Mr. Gos- –

A. Gosbee.

Q. – Wyman Gosbee, Steven Cyr, and yourself, do you recall –

A. And –

Q. – that you were all –

A. – Robert Walsh, I think, was there too.

Q. Okay. Now you went underground on your first day. Were you assigned to some particular crew or what were you doing?

A. There was about probably 10 of us putting up arches.

Q. Yes?

A. Just in the mains.

Q. And how long did you do that?

A. We worked at that, I think, for the first couple, three days, I guess.

Q. And were you eventually assigned to a crew?

A. We were put with Roy Pasemko –

Q. Yes?

A. – and Grant – I can't remember his – Palmer, on the bolting crew, just getting bolts for the screen, supplies.

Q. Now who was the shift boss on that crew?

A. That would have been Arnie Smith.

Q. Okay. Now how long did you spend with Mr. Pasemko and Mr. Grant on the bolter?

A. Probably a good month anyway. And then we – you know, like they would eventually let us take over the drills and drill and stuff.

Q. How long were you there before you got to take over the drills and do some drilling?

A. Not very long, a couple weeks.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. Yes.

Q. Did you feel – had you ever used a piece of equipment like that in the hard rock mine?

A. Not that exact type, but I have used drills, yes. I used drills for years.

Q. And when you – did you feel that you had received adequate training at Westray to use the bolter you were using?

A. Well, actually, you hadn't – you didn't receive any training. It was just on the job.

Q. Right.

A. You take this, this lever does this, this does this and away you go.

Q. But someone would teach you how to do that on the job?

A. Yeah.

Q. Is that correct?

A. The operators.

Q. Yeah. It was sort of like on-the-job training?

A. Exactly.

Q. Did you feel that that was adequate?

A. For myself I did, yeah.

Q. For yourself you did?

A. For myself, yes. But not for somebody new to mining.

Q. Are you saying because you had some type of similar experience in hard rock mining that it was adequate for you?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you bolt – did you continue to bolt from time to time during your time at Westray?

A. Yes, yeah.

Q. Did you move on from the bolter eventually to another piece of equipment?

A. Yeah, I went from the bolter to the shuttle car. And then from the shuttle car to the miner.

Q. How did you make the transition? How would you know that you were going to come off the bolter and go onto the shuttle car?

A. You just kept asking to be moved up because, of course, the –

Q. You would ask?

A. – the more you did, the higher your pay.

Q. Other witnesses have mentioned that the more pieces of equipment you could operate, the more pay you received?

A. Yeah. That's right.

Q. Is that true?

A. Yeah.

Q. So was that an incentive to you to learn to operate as many pieces of equipment as you could?

A. Definitely.

Q. So when you moved from the bolter to the shuttle car, what training did you receive on the shuttle car?

A. That was – there was no training, I just got on it, and he showed me what levers to move and what was your brake and what was your throttle and away you go.

Q. We've heard other gentlemen testify that that was kind of a tricky piece of equipment to learn –

A. Very.

Q. – how to –

A. It's four-wheel steering, and it's quite long, quite wide. And I tore up some vent tubing and stuff that was sitting along the side and bolts and –

Q. You did that?

A. Oh, yeah.

Q. Do you feel there would have been a better place for you to have learned how to operate the shuttle car?

A. The surface would have been nice.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. Yeah.

Q. And you could have gotten the –

A. Yeah, because you didn't have anything to smash into. I mean, you had a big parking lot there, you could just set up pylons and have a training course.

Q. Was there any equipment similar at all to the shuttle car in any of the hard rock mines?

A. To the shuttle car? I don't believe so.

Q. In hard rock mines, I understand they had equipment such as scoops. Did you drive a scoop in the hard rock mine?

A. Oh, yes. Yeah.

Q. Where did you learn how to drive that piece of equipment?

A. That I learned up in northern Ontario.

Q. Right. Would that be – did you learn to drive that underground or above ground?

A. You were – they actually had a place underground that you were trained. You went with a guy and you learned – like, you learned the machine from front to back. You learned all its controls. You drove it a little bit. Then you learned to muck. You were never in production, you just –

Q. I see.

A. – it was a training area.

Q. So it was a designated training area where people –

A. Yeah.

Q. – were taught?

A. Yeah.

Q. Did they have any type of similar designated training area underground at Westray?

A. No.

Q. So when you were actually learning to drive the shuttle car, it was in production –

A. Yes.

Q. – if we can use that term?

A. Yes. With Chester Taje and Bud Robinson.

Q. So they were operating –

A. Yeah, Bud –

Q. – the miner?

A. – was cutting and I was running the shuttle car.

Q. Okay. Now when – how long did you stay on the shuttle car?

A. Well, actually I was on it steady for probably a month and a half, I'm not sure.

Q. Okay. So –

A. But you would run it at other times too, right?

Q. Sure.

A. For me to run the shuttle car.

Q. So you went in the mine and you arched for three or four days. Then you say you went to the bolter for about a month, then to the shuttle car for about – did you say a month?

A. Yeah. But you could be on the bolter also within that month.

Q. You would sort of rotate around?

A. Yeah. Just – if they needed you here, they put you here; if they needed you over there, then you went there.

Q. Okay. You eventually went to the shuttle car, sorry, the continuous –

A. The miner.

Q. – miner?

A. Right.

Q. And how did that evolution come about? How did you get from shuttle car to continuous miner?

A. Well, they needed people to run the miners. I mean, you know, we were opening up more and more heads, more and more headings, and he asked me if I was interested. And I said, "definitely."

Q. Who asked if you were interested?

A. Donnie. Donnie Dooley.

Q. Donnie Dooley?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Was he another fire boss on this crew?

A. He was then, at that time, my fire boss, yes.

Q. Okay. So had Mr. Smith left that crew or there was two fire bosses, one –

A. No, there's two fire bosses, right.

Q. One for each section of the mine?

A. Right.

Q. So was Mr. Dooley down in the North Mains?

A. Yes.

Q. Or what we now know to be the North Mains?

A. North Mains, yes.

Q. Yes, okay. So what type of training did you receive to operate the continuous miner?

A. Actually the continuous miner, there was a little bit more involvement. But, there again, it was trial and error. You went in and you started using equipment.

Q. Well, who trained you to drive and operate the continuous miner?

A. Well, I watched the operator. I was second operator for awhile, and I just kept watching what he was doing. And –

Q. Who was the first operator?

A. John McIsaac. And I was second operator on that one. And then I just went over to – where were we? No. 2 North Main.

Q. There's a –

A. Sorry. Where are we? Yeah, we were right – just turning in here, as a matter of fact.

Q. Can you describe the location – you've got a – describe the location, Mr. Comish?

A. Just turning onto what is 2 North Main off of the No. 2 exhaust.

Q. That's where you were when you were learning to drive –

A. That's the first time I ever drove it, yeah.

Q. Were – did you operate the Joy or the DOSCO miner?

A. Both.

Q. Both of them?

A. Yeah.

Q. And once you could drive or operate one, was it pretty well the same to operate the other?

A. They were different in the way they operated, in the way they cut, I should say. But they were basically the same in the way they operated.

Q. Was the DOSCO used to cut through the harder materials?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you use that in the North Mains, do you recall?

A. We used it in the No. 1 intake. We used it for awhile there. And then we had it down on A Road, down at the bottom.

Q. Okay. A Road near the face?

A. Right at the face, actually.

COMMISSIONER There's a pointer there on your desk, if you want to use that.

A. Okay.

COMMISSIONER It's –

MS. CAMPBELL The red light.

COMMISSIONER – right there.

A. The red light.

COMMISSIONER Yeah. There you go.

A. Oh, okay. Right there.

MS. CAMPBELL Okay. I would like to talk a little bit about some of the equipment that was on the continuous miner. I understand there was dust collector on the continuous miner?

A. Yes, but it was never used.

Q. The dust – well, what was the dust – what did you understand the dust collector was for?

A. Collecting dust. It's a screen. Like, there was a filter in it to filter out dust.

Q. And why wasn't the dust collector used?

A. Because they didn't have any filters.

Q. Now can you explain for us what you mean by "there wasn't any filters"? What was the filter for?

A. There was no filters in storage.

Q. There was –

A. So the only way you could change the filter or to take it out was to take the side panel off and put in a new filter. But if there's no new filters, the old ones stayed in there and they just – they were clogged so there was no – all it was doing was making noise.

Q. Were these filters washable filters?

A. I don't know; we never changed one.

Q. They were never changed. So how long did you operate the continuous miner, in total, do you think?

A. Probably from October on.

Q. October of '91?

A. '91 on.

Q. Until the end?

A. Yeah.

Q. Did you ever speak with anybody about the fact that the dust collectors couldn't be used because they were plugged?

A. I had asked the – I believe it was the electricians about it.

Q. And –

A. They were mostly the ones that worked on those, or the mechanics. And they just said there wasn't any filters.

Q. Did they ever express to you that they had made efforts to get some purchased or acquired?

A. I believe one of them – one guy told me one time that they were ordered, but they had –

Q. That they were on order?

A. – yeah, they hadn't come in.

Q. So do you ever remember a time from October to May when you used your dust collector?

A. I remember times turning it on –

Q. Yes?

A. – but then just turning it off because it was useless.

Q. How would you –

A. It wasn't doing its job.

Q. And how would you be able to tell that it wasn't doing its job?

A. There was – it was just making noise and nothing was, you know, it wasn't filtering anything.

Q. Okay.

COMMISSIONER I would like to follow up on that point. There has been some evidence that the dust collector was shut off because of the noise and because the operator couldn't hear the roof working. Now would the – my point is, was the noise related to the clogged filter or was that just a natural of the collector?

A. Well, it's a fan, so it would be noisy. But –

COMMISSIONER So it wouldn't matter whether it was clogged or –

A. I – yeah, I don't know if it – because it was always clogged.

COMMISSIONER Oh, I see.

A. So I don't know what it was like when it wasn't clogged.

COMMISSIONER Oh, I see. Okay, thank you.

MS. CAMPBELL The picks on the continuous miner heads, Mr. Comish, and I think –

A. There's one there.

Q. – yeah, I think that's a pick. Who was responsible for changing the picks on the continuous miner?

A. We changed them.

Q. The operator?

A. We did, the operator or the helper.

Q. How would – how often were they changed?

A. I guess we wore them down quite far before we ever changed them, but they were changed when needed. You couldn't really mine effectively with dull picks.

Q. This pick that's on the table here, if you want to take a look at it, is that a worn down one or is that – is that a new one?

A. That looks fairly good.

Q. That one's –

A. Yeah.

Q. – in pretty good shape?

A. Yeah.

Q. When you said you would wear them down, I forget the exact word you used but you said, "We would wear them down fairly good?"

A. Yeah, fairly well. Fairly well worn.

Q. Yeah.

A. Yeah.

Q. Before you would change them?

A. The carbides on the front.

Q. Were you ever provided with any direction as to how often you should or should not change them?

A. No.

Q. How would you decide when it was time to change the picks on your miner?

A. Basically, by looking at them.

Q. By looking at them?

A. Yeah.

Q. Would it be more difficult to cut coal or would you be getting sparks or would the machine be doing something in particular if the picks were dull?

A. Well, if you hit a little bit of hard band, you would wreck your pick, so you know to change them.

Q. Right.

A. It would jump a bit, the machine. When it was mining, it would start to –

Q. And you would know your picks were getting dull?

A. Gone, yeah.

Q. When you describe what you said, if you had hit a hard band, would there be sparks generated at that time?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you – did you ever experience that?

A. I had seen sparks, yeah.

Q. And what are we describing? What type of sparks? Are you able to –

A. Just –

Q. – characterize them at all?

A. Okay, yeah. Like, if you took flint and hit flint –

Q. Yes?

A. – the same thing.

Q. Okay. Were you ever in a situation where sparks would come back and go into your cab?

A. No.

Q. No?

A. I don't believe.

Q. Now there were also some water sprays on the continuous miner?

A. Yes.

Q. And they were located where? There's a picture over here. If you can – you can use your red pointer.

A. Yeah, and use my mind. The water sprays were off to the side – actually, I will go over. It's easier. Oh, the red pointer. They were, I believe, up in this area of the head, up in here.

Q. Okay. So they were to the side of the cutting heads?

A. And there was some on top, I do believe.

Q. Some of top of the –

A. Yeah.

Q. – cutting heads as well?

A. I think so.

Q. And what was the practice with respect to use of the – well, first off, what did you understand the water sprays were for?

A. Dust control.

Q. Dust control? And what was – what direction or guidance did you receive as to when you should use them?

A. What guidance did I – none, really. Just if it got too dusty, use them.

Q. When did you use them?

A. When it got real dusty.

Q. Did you use a lot of water or did you use a little bit of water?

A. No, you couldn't use a lot of water.

Q. Why?

A. Because you would get your machine stuck. If you used too much water, you would just create a sump at the face and you would get stuck.

Q. Would it be sort of like a mucky coal?

A. Very.

Q. Were there any other problems associated with using too much water, to the best of your knowledge, besides the machine getting stuck?

A. Ah –

Q. Were there ever any problems with coal sliding off the belt?

A. That would – not – I don't think from mining.

Q. No, no, I mean once it's heading –

A. With just water in general?

Q. Yes?

A. Yes. You would – if you put too much water on the belt, then the coal would just slide.

Q. Okay. But, generally speaking, when you had your cutting heads on, was it your practice to have the water on?

A. Yeah.

Q. It was?

A. Yeah, generally.

Q. But there were times when you would cut without using the water sprays?

A. Not for very long because they get too dusty.

Q. Okay. So when you're saying you didn't use a lot of water, what do you mean? Like, you always –

A. You used – you would use the sprays while you were cutting and as soon as the shuttle car left, shut them off.

Q. Oh, I see. Okay.

A. And the only other time you would use water then would be if you gassed out.

Q. And why would you use water if –

A. Just to move the air.

Q. – you gassed out?

A. Just to move the air.

Q. Okay. So you wouldn't – that would sort of circulate the air around and clear the gas, is that what you're saying?

A. Sometimes.

Q. Now the methanometer on the continuous miner was located where?

A. On the right side of the miner. The operator's side of the miner, I do believe.

Q. Okay. In that picture, is the operator – side is on the far side.

A. The far side.

Q. And that's where the methanometer was?

A. Right.

Q. Was it located –

A. Or the sniffer was there.

Q. Yes, the sensor?

A. Yeah.

Q. And with the aid of your red light, are you able to point out where the sensor was? I know it won't be on the right side, but relative –

A. Okay. Up in that area.

Q. Kind of where that black dot is?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. Not the round dot, the other one.

Q. Right. Now was there ever a time when that sensor was moved, to your knowledge? No?

A. I don't think.

Q. Okay.

Q. We heard some evidence, Mr. Comish, about an override button in the cab of the continuous miner. Do you –

A. Trip switch.

Q. The trip switch. So you know what I'm referring to when I talk about –

A. Yes.

Q. – "override button"? Did you ever use the override button –

A. Yes.

Q. – or the trip switch to cut coal?

A. Not to cut coal.

Q. Well, what do you mean "not to cut coal"?

A. Well, you – as far as I know, you cannot coal using the trip switch.

Q. Why is that?

A. Because it only lasts about a couple of seconds, five, six seconds, and then it would shut off again anyway. And as soon as you hit the face and shut off, it would stop dead, so –

Q. Well, did you ever use the trip switch to restart the miner after it had cut out?

A. Yes.

Q. But you're telling me you didn't cut coal. What are you telling me?

A. I'm telling you that I'd start the heads to make air movement. And, also, the only time – and I don't class it as cutting coal, is to fill the spade.

Q. Well, how would you fill the spade?

A. I can show you. I can go up and show you; it's probably better.

Q. Those pictures are coming in handy.

COMMISSIONER Yes, they sure are.

A. Yes. Yes, they sure are. Okay, you would have your coal sitting here in front of your spade, [Witness indicating on photograph of continuous miner] but you wouldn't have enough to fill the shuttle car, and it kicked out. So you just bring your head down, trip the switch, and kick some coal back into the spade – into the gathering arms.

MS. CAMPBELL So –

A. Enough to fill the car and he could leave.

Q. So are you saying that there would have been coal down near the spade?

A. Oh yeah, this – yeah, there would be coal out in front.

Q. Yes.

A. Out here.

COMMISSIONER That's using it more like a sweeper then, sort of thing?

A. Well, yeah, just –

COMMISSIONER Yeah, yeah.

A. – to scoop some back onto the spade and then just – the arms would gather it and fill the car enough and he could go.

MS. CAMPBELL Where does the conveyor start, is it right –

A. It's in here. [Witness indicating on photograph of continuous miner]

Q. So are you saying you wanted to get the coal that was on the floor in front –

A. In the front.

Q. – of you –

A. Yeah –

Q. – up there?

A. – the broken coal here. Just throw it back in here and then the gathering arms would pull it onto the conveyor, and it would go back out over the conveyor, out over the tail.

Q. Right, okay. Mr. Comish, I'd like to take you to –

COMMISSIONER Just one point. Mr. Comish, would you go over there and show me where you would be with – on that machine, with respect to your height. You know, where – how big is that machine relative to a person? It's hard to tell –

A. This goes up about – I think it's 14 feet, 12 feet.

COMMISSIONER Okay, if you were standing on the ground, like, around there [Commissioner indicates on photograph of continuous miner] you – where would your head be?

A. Okay, use the cab.

COMMISSIONER Yeah.

A. Probably about here.

COMMISSIONER So the –

A. Then, I'm only five foot nine.

COMMISSIONER – main superstructure then would be about six feet high? Oh, about that – okay, about five feet. Yeah.

A. Five and a half feet high.

COMMISSIONER Good, okay. Thank you.

MS. CAMPBELL So as I understand your evidence, Mr. Comish, you were telling me that you never used the override button to cut coal, that you would use it to bring coal that had already been cut into your spade to fill the shuttle car?

A. That's right.

Q. Okay. I'd like to take you to your transcript, the Commission transcript, which is Exhibit 111, at the first tab. I'd like to bring you to page 80. I'm looking at line 19 and the question is: "Is that why you tripped out, to get the air moving or to continue cutting?" When I read those answers and questions, you seem to be on the one hand saying you would cut the face, but on another hand saying that you were only doing it as you just described.

A. Right. Well, to get the face cut, you would have to get the shuttle car out of the there; to get the shuttle car out of there, you would have to clean up in front to get him a full car so he could leave. Once he leaves, you've got all kinds of time for the air to clear because he's gone up to the Stamler. He would be back in five minutes or so. The air would be cleared.

Q. So in that last exchange, you're talking about the fact that the only way you could move on to the next phase is if you get the shuttle car filled and out of there –

A. Well –

Q. – is that what you're telling me?

A. Yeah, because you wouldn't want to sit and wait for the air to clear just to scoop, you know, another half a tonne into the car so we would have a full car.

Q. So what this passage is indi – you say this passage supports what you just described?

A. That – yeah.

Q. Well, can I take you to your RCMP statement which is tab 3.

A. Page?

Q. Page 3, sorry. And the question – it's about mid down the page. When I read that, it seems to say something different than what you've described. You say "I have tripped the heads to continue..."

A. I think –

Q. "...cutting."

A. Yeah, okay. Well, I'm cutting – I'm – you're – in effect, you're cutting coal when it's on the floor. You're still – you're not cutting the face, but you're cutting – you're kicking coal back, so you are cutting.

Q. So you – are you telling me today that when you are just gathering the coal into your spade that's already been cut off the face, that that is considered –

A. Cutting.

Q. – cutting coal?

A. Yeah.

Q. Well, did you understand that that's something that you perhaps should not be doing if your machine had tripped out?

A. I guess I didn't at the time. It was just the way it was done – just fill the car and let it go.

Q. Did you understand that when your machine tripped out, you shouldn't cut coal from the face?

A. Oh yeah. Well, you couldn't cut coal from the face.

Q. And why couldn't you?

A. Because it would just keep – six seconds, five seconds, it would stop, so what's the sense?

Q. In your mind, was there any difference between cutting coal from the face and doing what you were doing to –

A. Oh, definitely.

Q. And can you explain to me what the difference was?

A. Well, you're not trying to cut the face. To me, there was no sense in trying to cut the face. To scoop up some in front, that's fine, just to the fill car. But to cut the face, it didn't make any sense. They wouldn't – the heads wouldn't stay on long enough to do any good.

Q. But they would stay on long enough for you to fill your –

A. Just – yeah, just five, six seconds, just to scoop some back.

Q. Did you ever have problems with the cable to the continuous miner, Mr. Comish? With there – it being damaged and –

A. The electrical cable, yes.

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. And do you remember any specific instances where you had a difficulty with it?

A. The one that comes to mind right away is when the plug pulled out.

Q. I'm sorry?

A. The big plug. There's a big plug on the miner. You can't see it there, but it's a big bayonet-type plug; it's huge. It weighs probably 80 pounds or so. It takes two men to put it together. And it pulled out. And it – like a big explosion. Poof!

Q. Was that the connector to bring the power to the bolter?

A. Right.

Q. And how did it pull out?

A. The miner.

Q. The miner, sorry. How did it pull out?

A. The operator was going down to the face and the cable had drawn tight. And, of course, when that happens you shake your light at him like this, [Witness demonstrates] and he will stop. But he didn't see the light, and he just kept going and it pulled out.

Q. And was there any sort of an arc or a flame?

A. Oh, it was – yeah. It was loud; it was a big explosion.

Q. Where was that, by the way?

A. That would have been – let's see this little light here. That was down in here.

Q. 1 North Main –

A. Actually, I think it was up about here.

Q. Which crosscut is that near, Mr. Comish?

A. N-2.

Q. So was there nothing on – was there no monitor in the continuous miner that at all gave the operator any ability to know how far his cable was extended?

A. No, we were the monitor.

Q. So that he had to always rely on the second operator?

A. Yeah, and the shuttle car driver.

Q. And the shuttle car driver. And on this time he didn't see the –

A. Light.

Q. – light which was being communicated to him? But he would be facing away from –

A. Yeah, he would be going this way and you would be behind him, of course, pulling the cable. Make sure the cable is not being caught on anything.

Q. So how would he be able to see a light that was flashing –

A. Well –

Q. – behind –

A. – if you –

Q. – him?

A. – if you shine your light, of course, it's going to go past him –

Q. Okay.

A. – and he will see it.

Q. Now as far as where you were to cut on a day-to-day basis, when you went on your shift every day, how did you know where to make your cut, as a continuous miner operator?

A. There was two ways: either the previous shift had shot a line or you would shoot a line.

Q. Now what do you mean when you say you would "shoot a line"?

A. Well, they – the surveyors would come in, put plugs in the roof.

Q. Were those strings?

A. Strings or little chains, yeah. And you would line them up and you would just basically aim them like you would a sight on a rifle. Draw your paint line on the face and on the roof.

Q. And that would be the centre?

A. That would be the centre.

Q. And you would cut on one side –

A. Then the other.

Q. – and then on the other?

A. Right.

Q. Now did you ever find that you would get conflicting directions on where you should cut or how you should cut?

A. Yeah, when I first started.

Q. And what was the difficulty that you encountered?

A. One day Roger came in and said cut the floor down a foot, and the next shift he came in and said bring it up a foot, and then the next down, and then the next up. Four days in a row. So I –

Q. So it was up, down, up, down? And I assume that would make for a fairly wavy roadway?

A. Roller-coaster-type roadway, yeah.

Q. Now did you have any understanding why Mr. Parry was asking you to do it like that?

A. Absolutely none.

Q. Were you – where was that happening, by the way?

A. That was along – where are we? That would have been along this section here, I think, or here. [Witness indicating on map]

Q. So that's No. 1 side between 10 and 11?

A. Yeah. That's when I first started. Because we were down here when I first started, and then we came back up around – no, it must have been in here then, sorry.

Q. So it's past No. 11 Crosscut?

A. Right.

Q. Was that the only time that you recall that you sort of got directions like that or were there other times when you would be told to go one way one day and another way another day?

A. When we went into this area here – we came in this way and we're coming up.

Q. Can you refer to the road names, please?

A. 2 North Main.

Q. But you came in through the crosscut off –

A. 1.

Q. – 1 into 2 North Main, yes?

A. Right. And we were mining up this way. That was all, basically, rock.

Q. So you cut back towards No. 2 exhaust?

A. Yes.

Q. So mining backwards, if I can call it that?

A. Actually, it would have been No. 1. We were coming up to No. 1, cutting through, I believe, it was here. It was a real steep hill we were going – we were mining uphill.

Q. And you were mining sort of – instead of mining forward, you were going in and mining back towards the main. Is that because it was so steep?

A. They had had a major cave-in back that way, and I just assumed that that was to establish air.

Q. Generally, how did you find the roadways? You cut a lot of them, I guess? Did you get a lot of this waviness that you described?

A. Not for the most part. No.

Q. But there were times when you did?

A. Yeah, because it was a very steep decline.

Q. Mr. Comish, were you ever shown at the beginning of a set – you say the first day on your four-day set, were you ever – did you ever get sat down in deployment and anyone say to you, "Here's the plan, Mr. Comish, this is what we're going to do. This is what we're aiming for this week"?

A. No.

Q. Before every shift, even in deployment, would your shift boss or somebody come and say: "Gentlemen, this is the plan for the night; here's where we're going to go"?

A. This is where we're cutting or this is where you're bolting.

Q. So you would be told that on a nightly –

A. Where you –

Q. – basis?

A. – were going.

Q. On a nightly basis? But was there ever a case when there was a week-long or a two-week-long forecast, "Here's –

A. No –

Q. – our plan"?

A. – not like in hard rock mining.

Q. No.

A. No.

Q. In hard – why do you say "not like in hard rock mining"?

A. In hard rock mining, we were given a blueprint, and we basically went in and we knew where we were going. Geologists – or surveyors, sorry, would come in and check your line every week or so, but they knew – you know, you knew where you were going. You knew what you had to do.

Q. You had a long-term plan?

A. Oh, definitely.

Q. You didn't have anything like that at Westray?

A. No. Day-to-day.

Q. Now you had some – I understand there were frequent rock falls –

A. Yes.

Q. – at Westray? And you had some close calls, if I can call them that?

A. You may. Yeah.

Q. Do you recall specifically, here today, any ones in particular?

A. Well, yeah.

Q. Do you want to –

A. Again, we were breaking through here, at this intersection of 1 intake and 2 North Main. And we were actually on the No. 1 intake, and we – I broke it through here and it was a nice smooth roof. And then – I think it was Albert – what's his last – Leclair?

Q. Yes.

A. He told me to pull back under the arches, get back quick. And I pulled the machine back, got out of the machine, and the whole roof caved in. The whole – the whole thing just –

Q. How long had you been out of there before it caved?

A. A couple of seconds. Maybe 30 seconds, 20 seconds.

Q. Any others come to mind?

A. The one where it caved in on the back of the miner and Donnie was back there.

Q. Is that Mr. –

A. Donnie Dooley.

Q. Yes. And what was going on there?

A. He was going to get the mechanic, and I was going to help John McIsaac. So I went around the front of the miner; he went around back. And we had been discussing the screen, the pressure coming on the screen, and dripping –

Q. You and Mr. Dooley?

A. Yes. And we decided we had better get the miner out of there. And he went around back; I went around front, and it caved in. And, like, to this day, I don't know how he got out of there, but he did and –

Q. That's Mr. Dooley?

A. Yeah. It buried the back end of the miner.

Q. And that was supported ground?

A. That was – yeah, it was screened, bolted.

Q. Was Mr. Dooley a shift boss at the time?

A. Yes.

Q. How frequently would you say there were rock falls at Westray?

A. There would be at least two every four days of your shift.

Q. So two every set?

A. Anyway, yeah.

Q. Now what type of – what amount of falls are we talking about?

A. Some not so significant but others were quite significant.

Q. And would they gen – would they be – would they both be supported and unsupported ground?

A. Either/or, yes.

Q. Now was there ever an occasion when you saw somebody using a camera underground?

A. Yes.

Q. And can you –

A. Normal flash.

Q. What do you mean?

A. Just a normal flash camera, yes.

Q. What, a 35-millimetre?

A. Whatever, yeah.

Q. And do you recall when that was?

A. I don't remember the exact dates of it or anything, but I do remember they were from a newspaper. They had come down and – I don't know if Steve was there or not. John was there.

Q. Who's Steve?

A. Steve Cyr.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. And John McIsaac and myself, Gerald Phillips, and these guys from the press.

Q. Do you know who these guys were?

A. No, I don't.

Q. Okay.

A. And Gerald told them it would be okay just to take – you know, take a picture. Go ahead this one time; it would be all right.

Q. That's what Mr. Phillips said?

A. Yeah.

Q. Did he express to them that, typically, that's something you shouldn't do?

A. He had mentioned something about, you know, "You shouldn't really do it, but it's okay this one time; go ahead."

Q. Did you pose for the picture?

A. I was in the picture.

Q. That's what I mean.

A. Yes.

Q. And where was the picture taken? Was it taken in front of a piece of equipment?

A. Actually, at the back of the miner.

Q. Do you know if Mr. Phillips was in the picture?

A. I can't recall if he was or not.

Q. Okay. We've heard quite a bit of evidence, Mr. Comish, about Roger Parry.

A. Um-hmm.

Q. How did you get on with Roger Parry?

A. Some days good, some days not so good. He was – you didn't know – Jekyll/Hyde type of thing. He could be in a good mood and then just change. We had one altercation. I had to go to the washroom, so I took the tractor and I went to surface and I went to the washroom. And –

Q. What tractor did you go on?

A. Actually, it was his.

Q. You took Mr. Parry's tractor?

A. Right. Well, it's Westray's tractor.

Q. Right.

A. So it was there and I took it and I went to surface. I came back down. I was coming down the main – No. 1 Main, and I saw a light coming up – another tractor coming up. So I pulled over so he could go by, because he's coming uphill, and it was Roger, and he started cursing and screaming and hollering at me. So I just drove away.

Q. Because you had taken his tractor?

A. Yeah.

Q. Well, we – a lot of people have talked about Mr. Parry intimidating them. Did he intimidate you?

A. I think he intimidated every person at the mine. Just by his demeanour. He was – you didn't know – he was explosive.

Q. He was explosive?

A. Oh, yeah.

Q. You say he was a Jekyll and Hyde?

A. Um-hmm.

Q. What, you didn't know if he was going to be Jekyll or Hyde on a particular –

A. Right.

Q. – day?

A. You could be working and he could come in and chew you out or he could come in and, "How's it going," you know, and then leave.

Q. But getting back to my question. Were – did you feel intimidated by Roger Parry?

A. Yes.

Q. Why?

A. Just for that reason I said.

Q. What, you were afraid to approach him because you didn't know whether – which – whether he would –

A. Yeah.

Q. – be having a good day or a bad day?

A. Exactly. Not even a day, just a good hour.

Q. But can you point me to any specific instances where you were actually intimidated by Roger Parry?

A. Um –

Q. Other than this tractor one?

A. Yeah, well, he got us to do some things that normally I don't think I would have done. Like –

Q. Such as?

A. – push a 45-gallon barrel of oil up the hill to the miner when you could have just taken the miner and drove it down to the 45-gallon barrel.

Q. Where was this?

A. This was, I believe, down in this area right here was the oil, I believe. [Witness indicating on map]

Q. What's that crosscut number?

A. N-5.

Q. North 5 Crosscut?

A. Yeah.

Q. And you say that –

A. And –

Q. – he got you, I assume somebody was with you, to push –

A. Oh, yes.

Q. – a 45 –

A. Gallon barrel.

Q. Was that uphill, downhill?

A. Uphill.

Q. Uphill. And you didn't want to do that?

A. No.

Q. Why not?

A. I don't know the weight of a 45-gallon barrel, but I know it's heavy. And it doesn't make any sense to push – you know, bring to Mohammed to the mountain not the mountain to Mohammed.

Q. So he wanted you to push it to the miner instead of tramming the miner out to the –

A. Just down. Yeah. I think it was about maybe – maybe 100 feet.

Q. How long would it have taken the miner to tram 100 feet?

A. Probably less than a minute.

Q. How long did it take you and whoever helped you to push the 45-gallon drum of –

A. About five minutes.

Q. – oil? And did you have some discussion with Mr. Parry about not wanting to do that?

A. Yeah, we argued about it. I said it didn't make any sense. Why risk – for one thing, why risk hurting somebody to move a barrel to a machine that is perfectly capable of driving down to the barrel.

Q. Did he explain to you why he didn't want to drive the machine down to the barrel of oil?

A. No. He just said, "Do it."

Q. And you did it?

A. And we did it.

Q. Now did you get designated lunch breaks?

A. No.

Q. You didn't?

A. No.

Q. And so when would you – or how would you get to take your lunch?

A. Some days you didn't really get a lunch; other days you just – you sat down and started eating on the side of the drift.

Q. Would there be days, Mr. Comish, when you would work a 12-hour shift without getting to take your lunch?

A. Um-hmm.

Q. Would that happen often?

A. Either that or you ate your lunch on the machine while you were working.

Q. Why wouldn't you just stop and take a break?

A. They didn't like it.

Q. Who didn't like it?

A. Management.

Q. Do you ever remember any occasions when people would be sitting in the drift?

A. Yes. We would be sitting eating our lunch, and they would see a light coming and they would all just scramble like rats, go back to work, because they didn't know, you know, if it was Roger coming or –

Q. And if it was Mr. Parry coming, what would the result be if people were sitting in the rib eating their lunch?

A. There it depended again on what mood he was in. If he was in a bad mood, he would, you know, start hollering, you know, "You've got to work done around here" and stuff like that. If he was in a good mood, he might sit down and talk to you for five minutes.

Q. At the beginning of your shift when you would go underground, Mr. Donnie Dooley was your shift boss?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. Would he precede you into the heading to check for gas?

A. Sometimes, not all times, but sometimes.

Q. And if you didn't, how would you check for gas?

A. If you were on the miner, you know know it was – just turn the miner –

Q. Just look at the miner?

A. Yeah, just see what it is.

Q. What about maintenance on the continuous miner, Mr. Comish? As a continuous miner operator, were you aware of there being any scheduled downtime –

A. No.

Q. For the machine?

A. No.

Q. To be maintenanced?

A. No.

Q. Did that ever cause problems for you, the fact that there was no scheduled downtime for maintenance?

A. Not really any problem. I mean, if it broke down, then they'd have to fix it.

Q. Was that the only time that there was work done on the miner, to your knowledge was if it broke down?

A. No, the electricians would come once in a while. The mechanics would come and grease it.

Q. Was that a regular occurrence? You used the term "once in a while."

A. Well, I only seen them once in a while. I mean, it may have been a regular scheduled thing. I don't know.

Q. Because you don't know what might have been happening on other shifts?

A. Right.

Q. But during the day on the shifts that you were operating the continuous miner, you say that some days you ate your lunch at the controls. So that machine would not stop for the twelve hours that you were there?

A. Right, if everything went well, yeah, we wouldn't stop.

Q. Did you drive the scoop underground at Westray?

A. Oh, yeah, I operated the scoop there too.

Q. And we've heard that some vehicles were fuelled underground. Do you have any knowledge of the scoop ever being fuelled underground?

A. Yeah, while I was running it.

Q. Were you operating it?

A. I was operating it.

Q. And what went on there?

A. We were working the heads, so of course I was watching the guys ahead. He'd sit in the scoop, see, you sit sideways in it, and you're looking ahead. And then I just caught out of the corner of my eye, a light, down on the other side. And that's where the fuel tank is.

Q. Right.

A. And the mechanic was there fuelling it up while I was working, while it was running. So I got off and I asked him, you know, what are you doing? Because, you know, the fuel was spilling out and it was going on the ground and – he said, "This is what we do; get used to it."

Q. Do you remember who that mechanic was?

A. Cheverie.

Q. Wayne Cheverie?

A. Yeah.

Q. Aside from the fact that a machine was being fuelled underground, was there any other danger, to your mind?

A. I could have crushed him.

Q. You could have crushed him?

A. I could have crushed him against the wall very easily. That machine articulates in the middle.

Q. Articulates in the middle.

A. If I had turned this way, he would have been crushed.

Q. Was the machine running at the time?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it commonplace for those machines to remain running underground?

A. Yes.

Q. They wouldn't be turned off?

A. No.

Q. Do you think Mr. Cheverie was aware that you were sitting in the driver's seat?

A. He might have been; I can't say.

Q. What did you think about the ventilation? Well, let me back up a bit. Did you basically work mostly in the North Mains?

A. Yes, well, in the A Road, B Road, D Road, that area, yeah, down in this area here.

Q. And did you work in the Southeast section as well?

A. Here?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes, I did some bolting in here until we got to about here.

Q. So you mainly worked down – well, I will refer to that area as the North Mains as opposed to the Southwest?

A. Yes.

Q. How did you find the ventilation in the North Mains?

A. In the mains themselves, they were fine.

Q. Well, let's start with the main –

A. It was cold so there was air coming in.

Q. Where was it cold?

A. In the North Mains, like, right in this area.

Q. That's 1 North Main, 2 North Main?

A. Yeah.

Q. You say it was cold. How cold was it?

A. Not much warmer than outside at whatever the temperature was outside.

Q. So did that cold temperature tell you that the ventilation was good?

A. I don't know about "good," but it was telling me that the place wasn't heated.

Q. And you –

A. I mean, really, because the other mines I worked at, they heated the air.

Q. But you knew there was air coming through that mine?

A. Yeah, oh, yeah.

Q. Now you say you worked up in A Road, B Road and D Road. What did you find the ventilation to be like up there?

A. It was warmer up there.

Q. It was warmer.

A. Definitely warmer.

Q. Would you operate the continuous miner in those headings?

A. Yes, yeah. The last shift was here.

Q. In D Road?

A. Right.

Q. And were you able to cut a lot of coal when you were working in those headings with the continuous miner?

A. Cut a face, I mean, just – you'd gas out, of course, but you could cut a face.

Q. How often would you be gassing out in those headings?

A. Quite often.

Q. Quite often, and did that tell you anything about the ventilation?

A. Oh, yeah, that it wasn't being drawn out. The bad air wasn't being drawn out.

Q. Of –

A. Sufficiently.

Q. And you're referring to A Road, B Road and D Road?

A. D Road, down in here, in this area. North 6 Crosscut.

Q. North 6 Crosscut. Now do you recall – are you able to recall here today any specific readings you got while working in those areas, say, A Road, B Road, D Road or –

A. On the miner?

Q. Yes.

A. 2.9, 2.8.

Q. You recall getting that?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Is that about the highest you remember getting?

A. The highest I remember, yeah, on the miner.

Q. On the miner? So while there would seem to be a lot of air in 1 North Main and 2 North Main, would it be fair to say that it didn't seem to be moving into the working headings?

A. That would be fair to say, yes.

Q. Mr. Comish, do you remember what it was like when you worked in the Southeast section? Do you have any recollection at all of what the air was like in there?

A. Southeast. What are they calling the Southeast? Down in here.

Q. 1 East, 2 East.

A. Yeah, okay, there again it was warmer.

Q. It was warmer down in that area?

A. Yeah, yeah.

Q. Was it warmer down in that area than it was up in A, B, and D Road?

A. Yeah.

Q. Yes?

A. Yeah.

Q. Now what about coal dust? How did you find – let's divide it. Let's talk about airborne coal dust first.

A. Okay.

Q. How did you find airborne coal dust in the North Mains?

A. Right in the mains themselves it wasn't bad. Like, it was still there. You could see it, but, like, it wasn't as bad as in the other areas, especially where you were mining.

Q. And you're talking about A Road, B Road, and D Road?

A. Right, where you were mining.

Q. And you found it worse in there?

A. Where you were mining, oh, definitely.

Q. Did you ever wear face masks?

A. All the time.

Q. All the time?

A. The white masks, yes, all the time.

Q. And would you just use one per shift?

A. No, no, six, ten.

Q. And you would do that because the dust was so bad?

A. Yeah, well, they'd get so clogged, you couldn't breathe and you'd have to take it off. Once they got clogged, then they get wet inside and then they clog worse, so you just turf it out and get another one.

Q. Do you recall whether you wore those face masks when you were down working in the Southeast section?

A. Yeah, because I always had them with me, always.

Q. Did –

A. Unless they ran out on surface.

Q. So they did have those on surface?

A. Yes.

Q. What about the dust on the floor? How did you find the dust on the floor?

A. There was a lot.

Q. Now what do you mean by "a lot"?

A. I guess I could compare it so that you would understand it, a bit more than the snow that's outside right now.

Q. More than the snow?

A. No, six, eight inches.

Q. And is this throughout the whole North section?

A. Some places it was heavier than others.

Q. Where do you recall places it was heavier than others?

A. Really heavy was between here. What do they call this, B Road and C Road.

Q. So on 1 –

A. Yeah, 9 and 10.

Q. Between 9 and 10 on No. 1 side?

A. Yeah.

Q. What about down in the northern section of the mine? For instance, A Road, B Road and D Road, what was the dust like down there on the ground?

A. Oh, it was thick everywhere. I mean, it was – some places it was a couple of feet deep on the sides.

Q. Where would you see it a couple of feet deep on the sides?

A. Pretty well anywhere.

Q. You mean on the sides of the roads?

A. Yeah, it would build up on the sides from your shuttle car moving it off to the sides.

Q. What the wheels making the ruts?

A. And there was a drag bar on the shuttle car.

Q. And it would push it off?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they put that drag bar on the shuttle car after a period of time?

A. They were, I think, always on there since I was there anyway.

Q. Was the drag board, do you know whether that had anything to do with trying to keep the roadway free of ruts?

A. Flat, yeah.

Q. Keep it flat. And you're saying the effect of that was to push –

A. Everything off to the side. It's got to go somewhere.

Q. So it was pushing it off to the side of the rib?

A. Right.

Q. And you say that would be a couple of feet deep?

A. Yeah. It was deep enough to bury a bundle of rock bolts. And bundle of rock bolts would be probably this big around, maybe bigger. And it was deep enough to bury it. [Witness holds arms about 18 inches apart]

Q. So did you lose rock bolts in that dust?

A. Oh, yeah, there's probably bundles of rock bolts down there.

Q. Now did you ever see anybody cleaning – making any efforts to clean up this coal dust that was so deep?

A. No.

Q. Never?

A. No, just straight ahead. Go ahead; don't go back. There was no clean-up. Like, there was no, "Okay, guys, go in and clean this up." There was none of that. The miner operator would go along the sides maybe and clean it up, but that was only near the working face.

Q. Right, not in the –

A. And it would eventually get filled back up anyway.

Q. Right. During your time at the mine, did you ever see any vent tube blocked off?

A. In our area, if you weren't working in the heading and the fans were back significantly, they would block it off, but nobody would be working there. Or it wasn't roped off, but nobody was in there.

Q. So there would be – you say it wouldn't be roped off. There was never any sign put up not to enter that road?

A. No.

Q. Or any –

A. Just –

Q. – indication that it wasn't ventilated?

A. No.

Q. And you say in your work area, the only time it would be blocked off would be if there was nobody working in the heading?

A. Right.

Q. Did you ever see vent tube blocked off anywhere when there were individuals working in a heading?

A. Not that I recall.

Q. No? Now I had been asking you about whether you ever saw coal dust cleaned up. Was there a time in the Southwest section when you were involved in a belt being raised?

A. Yes, there was.

Q. And was there an effort at that time made to clean up some coal dust?

A. It wasn't actually an effort to clean up the coal dust. It was basically so we could get the belt – get high enough under the belt. But it wasn't a clean-up. I moved 17 buckets of dust.

Q. Can you describe for me then what you did?

A. We were at this intersection.

Q. Can you describe that?

A. The Southwest 1, 2 Crosscut and B Road.

Q. And Southwest 2 B Road. You were at that intersection?

A. Right, and the belt was along B Road. And they wanted the belt raised up over.

Q. Over what?

A. Over the intersection so you could get up underneath of it.

Q. What, so you could put vehicles underneath it?

A. Underneath, yeah.

Q. And we got it up pretty well as high as it could go, and the only other thing to do then was to go down. So we know there was lots of dust, so we just pushed it ahead.

Q. Where was the dust?

A. On the floor.

Q. Underneath the belt?

A. Well, in the whole drift.

Q. – that you had raised?

A. Yeah, underneath that.

Q. And you say you moved –

A. Seventeen of those right there.

Q. You filled that –

A. Three and half yard bucket.

Q. You filled the bucket on the scoop tram 17 times with coal dust?

A. Yeah.

Q. And where did you put that coal dust?

A. Just pushed it ahead.

Q. And where did you push it ahead to?

A. To down in here.

Q. Into Southwest 1, 2 Crosscut?

A. Not even the crosscut, just down in past the crosscut.

Q. So you just pushed it ahead on the belt road?

A. Not the belt road. What are they calling that one? Southwest 2 Crosscut, but I don't know what they're calling it. Okay, Southwest Mains 1.

Q. So you put it down into Southwest Mains 1. I see. Who directed you to do that?

A. Nobody, really. We just – we had to get room under there, so that's the only way to do it was to move –

Q. Was there somebody, a supervisor directing you at that time to do that work?

A. They had set us up to do it, but he wasn't there.

Q. Did someone say "You're going to have to move some of this coal dust"?

A. No.

Q. That was part of the job?

A. Yeah.

Q. Now did you ever think that it might be an idea to take that coal dust out of the mine?

A. No.

Q. Why not?

A. How would you get it out? You'd have to drive the scoop to surface. Seventeen buckets would take you probably 12 hours.

Q. And, well, did you know that it was not wise to keep this coal dust in the mine?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you think to go and talk to anybody and say "Look, we've got all this coal dust. We should get it out."

A. Oh, well, the supervisor would come and look at what you'd done. So he knew it was there.

Q. Who was the supervisor?

A. That would be Arnie up in that section.

Q. Mr. Smith?

A. Yes.

Q. Why wouldn't you have just dropped it onto the belt?

A. The belt wasn't operating, and besides that, you couldn't drop it onto the belt. The belt was raised.

Q. The belt was too high?

A. Yeah, you couldn't get your bucket up and dump it in there.

Q. Why not take it and dump it in a shuttle car who would then take it –

A. There was no shuttle cars around. Production had moved on.

Q. So in any event, 17 bucketfuls of, you call it, three and a quarter yards?

A. Three and a half yards.

Q. Three and a half yards, were taken and dumped down on Southwest 2, 1 Main, Southwest Mains 1?

A. Right, spread out over the –

Q. Now do you recall when you did this, Mr. Comish?

A. The month?

Q. Yeah.

A. No.

Q. Do you recall whether you spoke to Mr. Smith that day?

A. I did go up. He was up in – up around here somewhere.

Q. Southwest 2.

A. Or maybe even up higher. But I know it was quite a ways up the hill.

Q. Southwest 2, A Road.

A. He had another scoop up there.

Q. Another scoop tram?

A. Yeah.

Q. What was he doing with it?

A. He had some rock dust in the bucket, bags of rock dust, and he was throwing it on the transformers.

Q. This was Mr. Smith?

A. Yes.

Q. So was he actually using the sprayer hooked up to the –

A. No, no, just throwing it by hand. I think that sprayer broke down because I never seen it used very much after we first started there.

Q. And did you tell me when you thought this was?

A. No, I didn't.

Q. Are you able to – you don't remember when it was?

A. The time frame, no.

Q. You thought there was a fair bit of coal dust in this mine, I take it?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you concerned about the amount of coal dust in the mine?

A. I was more concerned about getting trapped in a cave-in. That was paramount.

Q. Your biggest concern was the roof?

A. Yeah.

Q. But did you have a feeling that there was more coal dust in and about this mine than there should have been?

A. Oh, yeah, because the guys from Grande Cache were saying how, you know, the coal dust was unreal.

Q. And did you accept what they were telling you, that there was too much coal dust in the mine?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. So what did you do about it? Did you complain to anybody about it?

A. I complained to my immediate supervisor.

Q. Who was whom?

A. That would be – well, actually it was Arnie and Donnie both.

Q. You're talking about Arnold Smith and Donnie Dooley?

A. Right. And then Roger and –

Q. That's Roger Parry?

A. – Gerald. And Gerald Phillips.

Q. And what would you say to these men?

A. I would just say there's an un – you know, how come there's so much coal dust and stuff. Like, why is there such a mess?

Q. And what would they say?

A. "Well, we're working on it."

Q. "We're working on it."

A. "We're working on it."

Q. Well, the day that you moved 17 buckets of coal dust into Southwest Mains 1, you went up and spoke to Mr. Smith you say that same day.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Did you mention to him, like, "Arnie, I just put 17 bucketfuls of coal dust..."

A. I may have. I don't remember actually saying it, but I may have. I probably did.

Q. Were you aware of the necessity to stone dust the coal mine, Mr. Comish?

A. I was aware of it because I was told of it, yeah.

Q. Who told you about it?

A. Just the other miners, Grande Cache guys.

Q. And the Grande Cache guys, who specifically are you referring to?

A. Well, Buddy. Buddy was, I guess, like a leader, Chester Taje.

Q. Buddy Robinson, Chester Taje. So you learned through them. And what were they telling you? Were they telling you that there wasn't enough stone dust?

A. They were telling me that this place was the shits is what their words.

Q. And did you believe them?

A. Yeah.

Q. Well –

A. At first I thought maybe, well, they're just a couple of old miners complaining, but you know, it didn't take long to figure it out.

Q. So you figured out that it wasn't such a good place?

A. Yeah.

Q. Did you see any stone dusting being done in the mine?

A. When I first started, yeah. They would ask me to stay over and use that machine and spray the drifts and stuff, right?

Q. Was that with the scoop tram?

A. Right.

Q. So when you first started, that was in September?

A. Right.

Q. So in September you were being asked to stay over and –

A. We were asked, myself, Lennie Bonner, and Wyman Gosbee were asked to stay over on our four days, like, just an hour or so to stone dust.

Q. To stay between shifts?

A. Right. And all four days they cancelled it.

Q. Why was it cancelled?

A. I have no idea; they just said, you know, "We're not going to do it today."

Q. So you were asked, agreed to do it, and then at the end of your shift you were told it was not going to be done today.

A. Forget it, yeah.

Q. You're saying this was early on. You were hired in September. Are you saying this was in September?

A. October, September, late September.

Q. Were you ever asked to stay over again?

A. [Witness nods "no"]

Q. Never?

A. No.

Q. How much stone dusting did you ever see done in the North Mains?

A. I'd only seen it, like I say, when I first started. There was some stone dusting going on, maybe, I don't know, four times, five times, maybe.

Q. And so after September, October, is your evidence here today you never saw stone dusting going on in the North Mains?

A. After that?

Q. Uh-huh.

A. Not that I recall.

Q. You say you saw Mr. Smith throwing this stone dust around by hand?

A. Yes.

Q. This particular day.

A. Yeah.

Q. Were you aware if there was anybody coming in of any –

A. Inspectors, bankers, type of thing?

Q. Did you know that day –

A. I didn't know that for a fact, but it was assumed.

Q. You assumed. Why would you assume that?

A. Because that's the only time we ever seen a bag of rock dust is when somebody of importance was coming.

Q. Uh-huh. And do you recall that day when you saw Mr. Smith throwing the rock dust around the section up in the Southwest? You said it was around Southwest 2-A Road?

A. It's where the transformers were. He was throwing it on the transformers.

Q. He was throwing it on the transformers. Do you recall whether there was an inspector come around at all at that time?

A. I can't honestly say.

Q. Did you work much overtime?

A. No, one shift.

Q. You worked one shift overtime?

A. Yeah.

Q. The whole time you were at the mine?

A. Yeah.

Q. Could I get you to take a look at Exhibit 120, Mr. Comish? I believe page 18.

A. 18? Uh-huh.

Q. Do you see your name there?

A. Right at the top, yeah.

Q. Page 18. You see your name there at the top?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. And this is a document that's been generated by the company?

A. Right.

Q. It indicates that from December 23, 1991, until May 10 that you worked 66 hours of overtime.

A. Right.

Q. Now you're telling me here today that you only worked –

A. One shift.

Q. One over – that would be 12 hours, would it not?

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you know where this 66 hours would come from?

A. I can only assume where it came from.

Q. What do you assume it came from?

A. As arching bonus.

Q. What was this – we've heard –

A. You put up so many arches and then for every arch put up after that, they gave you so many hours of overtime – or so many hours.

Q. And you're thinking that this is where some of these 66 hours –

A. Had to.

Q. Why are you so certain that you only worked one hour over – one –

A. One.

Q. – shift overtime?

A. I know when I worked one shift overtime because I went home to Dartmouth or to Fall River at the time –

Q. Oh, you were travelling back and –

A. Yeah.

Q. – forth?

A. Yeah. So if I stayed over, I stayed over. Like overnight, and worked again, then went home.

Q. And you only remember ever doing that once?

A. Ever doing it once.

Q. Now I understand that – and there's been some evidence that there were some union drives –

A. Right.

Q. – at the mine?

A. Two.

Q. Two. The first one was with the United Mine Workers?

A. Right.

Q. Did you have any involvement in that?

A. No, I went to one meeting with them at the hotel. I can't even remember the name of the hotel. It's on the other side there.

Q. We've heard a lot of evidence, Mr. Comish, about how bad this coal mine was.

A. Right.

Q. And I guess, myself, I'm curious as to why the union drive was unsuccessful if things were really as bad as people are telling this Inquiry they were?

A. Well, from my point of view, the drive was a little flamboyant.

Q. Oh.

A. And I still voted for them anyway.

Q. Sorry?

A. I voted for them anyway.

Q. You voted for the union?

A. Sure.

Q. Now you never were certified, got your coal miner's certificate?

A. No.

Q. If I could take you to Exhibit number 75, tab 11.

A. Okay.

Q. That is an application for certification of competency, and it looks like it's been filled out by you. And if you go to page four, it's been signed by you.

A. Right.

Q. So you had made application to take it?

A. Right.

Q. Were you scheduled to take the test?

A. Yes.

Q. And why didn't you?

A. Because I thought it wasn't worth the paper it was written on.

Q. Why –

A. And I wasn't going to drive from Fall River for a five-minute test.

Q. Well, let's backtrack a little bit there. Why do you say you weren't going to drive from Fall River for a five-minute test?

A. Prior to that, I had talked to somebody who had taken the test, and they told me what was involved with the test. And it was just a farce.

Q. And why did you make the comment, "It wasn't worth the paper it was written on?"

A. Because it wasn't really a test. It wasn't a test of your competency as a miner. My test as competency of a miner was I had been mining for 12 years, and I was still around.

Q. You were hard rock mining for 12 years. Uh-huh. Would you get paid any more money if you got your Certificate of Competency?

A. No, I was making top dollar then.

Q. So it didn't matter whether you had it or not?

A. Not to me.

Q. Did you feel you were going to learn anything more about coal mining if you took the test?

A. Definitely not.

Q. I take it from you're telling me, Mr. Comish, that you didn't think that the mine was a very good place?

A. It was run rather poorly.

Q. Did you think it was safe?

A. No.

Q. Why didn't you think it was safe?

A. Because of the numerous amounts of cave-ins.

Q. Uh-huh. Is that it?

A. No, equipment that shouldn't have been underground was underground.

Q. Like what?

A. Tractors with open exhausts. The boom truck. Bolters didn't have methanometers on them.

Q. You were aware of all this before May 9th?

A. Yes.

Q. You knew that there was equipment underground that shouldn't have been underground?

A. Well, I was told that they had temporary permits for this equipment.

Q. Okay. So I'm just trying to understand what the state of your knowledge was. Did you learn after the fact that this stuff wasn't supposed to be underground or did you have or suspect, before the explosion, that it shouldn't have been?

A. I suspected, but my suspicions were cleared up by their saying that they had temporary permits for these pieces of equipment to be underground.

Q. Well, who would tell you that they had temporary permits?

A. I believe it was Gerald Phillips one day told me that.

Q. In relation to what?

A. Sorry?

Q. What did he tell you he had a temporary permit for?

A. Oh, for the tractors.

Q. But is it fair for me to say, Mr. Comish, that you did, nevertheless, have concerns about what was going on in that mine?

A. Oh, yeah. Because of – especially one incident with the boom truck where the light caught fire.

Q. The light caught fire on the boom truck. When did that happen?

A. I don't remember when it was, I just remember when – like, that it happened.

Q. And why did that concern you?

A. Because you're in a coal mine and there was an open flame.

Q. And did they have to use an extinguisher to put that out?

A. No, we just put it out.

Q. You just put it out?

A. With a rag, I think.

Q. Did you report that to anybody?

A. I didn't. I wasn't the boom truck operator. But I think – I believe it was Robbie that was driving it.

Q. Would that be –

A. And he may have.

Q. – Robert Johnson?

A. No, no. Robbie Doyle.

Q. Robbie Doyle, okay. Well, so you did have some concerns about what was happening underground in this coal mine?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you aware that there was an occupational health and safety committee in the coal mine?

A. I was aware of it, but I didn't know who was on it.

Q. You were aware there was a committee, but you didn't know who was on it?

A. The only one I knew who was on it was Randy Facette.

Q. Randy Facette.

A. Who I didn't really know that well at that time.

Q. Well, did you ever consider going to Mr. Facette and expressing your concerns to him?

A. I never seen Mr. Facette.

Q. Why wouldn't you ever see Mr. Facette?

A. There's four crews.

Q. Yes?

A. Those two worked together and our two worked together, days/nights. So we never seen them.

Q. Well, I understand and we've heard from Lennie Bonner that he was on the occupational health and safety committee.

A. Yeah.

Q. And you and he, I understand, were fairly friendly?

A. Yeah.

Q. Why didn't you ever go to Mr. Bonner and ask – express your concerns to him?

A. I don't know. We talked, but –

Q. You talked. You and Mr. Bonner would talk about your respective concerns?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Did you think perhaps that as a member of the Committee that he would be advancing the concerns that you had as well because of the discussions –

A. He may have.

Q. – you had had with him?

A. He may have.

Q. You came from a hard rock mine?

A. Yes.

Q. And my understanding is that the occupational health and safety committee in those mines are quite active?

A. Right.

Q. And was that – is that a fair statement?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. Did you ever go and speak to anybody in mine management and say how come we don't have an occupational health and safety committee that's more active?

A. No.

Q. Why not?

A. I just didn't.

Q. Now you told us that you raised some concerns about coal dust with Mr. Phillips, Mr. Parry, and Donnie Dooley. Do you ever recall discussing with Mr. Dooley, your shift boss, any other concerns you had?

A. About roof conditions. Probably more than once about methane because I was the miner operator.

Q. Now did you know who the mine's inspector was?

A. Albert McLean.

Q. Yes. And did you see Mr. McLean underground from time to time?

A. Yes.

Q. And –

A. A couple times.

Q. A couple of times? And did you ever think to talk to Mr. McLean about any of the concerns you had?

A. Not there at the time.

Q. What do you mean, "not there at the time?"

A. Well, Roger would be standing there glaring at you, so you didn't dare say anything.

Q. Why wouldn't you say anything to Mr. McLean just because Mr. Parry was there?

A. Probably out of fear for your job.

Q. Uh-huh. Now do you recall ever making any comments to Mr. McLean?

A. Yes.

Q. What do you recall?

A. I was just getting ready to leave. I had just done my shift and he was coming in. He was at the front – front booth there.

Q. So you're both aboveground?

A. Yeah.

Q. Yes?

A. I had just finished showering and I was leaving to the car. And I said to him, "Oh, you're in for another inspection?" I asked him if he had his blinders with him.

Q. I missed the first part. You said –

A. He was in for another inspection.

Q. Yes.

A. I asked him if he had his blinders with him.

Q. Why would you ask Mr. McLean if he had his blinders with him?

A. Because nothing ever got done. It's like they didn't see anything.

Q. So you thought when he went in the mine, he had blinders on?

A. Yeah.

Q. And did Mr. McLean make any reply to you?

A. He got – he said, you know, "Don't be like that." That was about it, and I just walked out.

Q. Were there any other occasions when you talked to Mr. McLean?

A. Underground.

Q. And –

A. "How's it going?" "Not bad." "Don't bullshit me." That's basically the conversation.

Q. Hold it now, you and Mr. McLean were both underground?

A. Right.

Q. Where were you at the time?

A. We were on the bolter at the time. And I can't remember exactly where in the mine we were, but we were on the bolter.

Q. Yes?

A. And he came in and said, "How is it going?"

Q. Now was he by himself this time?

A. No, no. No, I had –

Q. Who was –

A. – never seen the inspector by himself.

Q. And who was with him?

A. Roger.

Q. Mr. Parry?

A. And I think one other.

Q. Yes. Now so he asked you how it was going?

A. Right.

Q. And what did you say?

A. "Not bad."

Q. And then he made the comment –

A. Yeah, "Don't bullshit me." That was it. Just a real quick exchange, and that was about the end of it.

Q. Well, when he said that expression to you, what did you think he meant?

A. Well, he knew what was going on. He had to. I mean, that's his job to know what's going on.

Q. Well, why didn't you say, "Mr. McLean, things are going rotten here"?

A. I don't know.

Q. Because he said –

A. Like I say, probably fear for your job.

Q. Because he gave you an opportunity because he said, "How are things going?"

A. Yeah. Yeah, he did give me an opportunity.

Q. And you said "Not too bad?"

A. Yeah.

Q. But his comment back to you told you that he knew things weren't really going that well?

A. Right.

Q. Did you ever think about making anonymous call?

A. No, not really.

Q. Why not?

A. I just never thought of it.

Q. Did you ever think about quitting?

A. All the time.

Q. And why didn't you?

A. Every – every four days on I thought about quitting. And I didn't because I had to put a roof over our heads, food in our stomachs. There's no jobs out there. There's no mining jobs out there.

Q. Were you trained in any other capacity –

A. Not really.

Q. – at that time?

A. Not really.

Q. Did you look for any other jobs?

A. Oh, you always made calls. You always checked to see what's going on, see if something's happening. But then again, it meant leaving my family. If I got a job, it would be probably on the west coast.

Q. So you would have to leave your family, work, and –

A. Six weeks out, two weeks home.

Q. And this way you could see them every four days?

A. Right. Actually, if I wanted to suffer through the drive, I could see them every day. But, you know, it was an hour-and-a-half drive, so –

Q. Mr. Commissioner, did you want to take a break at this time?

COMMISSIONER Yeah, fine. Yeah, thank you. Take 15 minutes.

INQUIRY RECESSED (TIME: 11:03 a.m.)

INQUIRY RESUMED (TIME: 11:20 a.m.)

COMMISSIONER Ms. Campbell?

MS. CAMPBELL Thank you. Mr. Comish, when you were hired on at Westray, were you told that you were going to be working 12-hour shifts?

A. Yeah, they mentioned 12-hour shifts.

Q. And had you worked 12-hour shifts in the hard rock mine?

A. In one.

Q. In one?

A. Actually, they were 11-hour shifts. They gave us an hour to travel.

Q. Right. Was that in the hard rock mine in Nova Scotia?

A. That was in Beaver Dam, yeah.

Q. Okay. What did you think of the 12-hour shifts?

A. Well, they're long. Eight hours is long underground.

Q. But you were used to them, somewhat, working underground in a hard rock mine for 11 hours?

A. I only worked the 11-hour shift for probably half a year, if that.

Q. In your statement to the Department of Labour, in your interview with them –

A. Uh-huh.

Q. – you refer to the fact that you found the 12-hour shift psychologically damaging?

A. Yeah.

Q. What did you mean by that?

A. Well, at 4:00 you would see all the eight-hour shift guys go home –

Q. Yes?

A. – and you knew you had to stay there for another four after that, right?

Q. So what –

A. It just – I guess it played on your mind, you know, these lucky guys are going home, and we've got to stay here.

Q. Did you find that, you know, you would be fatigued by the end of a 12-hour shift?

A. Oh, yeah.

Q. Did you ever complain to anybody about the fact that you were finding 12-hour shifts too long?

A. I know we probably complained to each other about it, but I don't know if I complained to anybody in management about it.

Q. When you worked these 11-hour shifts in the hard rock mine, I assume that the conditions would be different?

A. Definitely.

Q. And that would be, I assume, the dust in the air?

A. The dust, the air, the fact that they had designated lunch rooms. Actually, in that mine, we came to surface and ate in a lunch room. A lunch room with a microwave, fridge, heat.

Q. Now this might seem like a bit of a silly question, but are the hard rock mines lit underground?

A. Some sections they do light but, for the most part, no. Like your – for instance, your refuelling stations, your garages, your lunch rooms, they were all –

Q. They were all lit?

A. Yeah.

Q. And there was designated lunch rooms?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Did you find that, as a continuous miner operator, that the 12-hour shift affected – near the end of the shift, did it affect your ability to carry out your job?

A. That's a hard one. I guess, if you had to get up and start doing vent tubing and stuff like that, definitely. Anything real physical.

Q. Would you, you know, find that as you got near the end of the shift that you would less concerned about safety and things of that nature?

A. You would be thinking more of getting out of there –

Q. Then getting –

A. – so I guess you –

Q. – the job?

A. – would be thinking less of safety. You were thinking more of getting out of there.

Q. Now you worked day shift on May 4 – 4, 5 – no, 5, 6, 7 and 8?

A. Right.

Q. Right. Now – and you were working down in the North Mains area?

A. Right.

Q. Were you aware that there was something going on with the methanometer on the continuous miner in the Southwest section?

A. On the 8th?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. And what did you understand was going on?

A. That it was broke. It wasn't working; it wasn't functioning. And I mentioned that to Donnie on surface.

Q. What did you and Donnie – this is Mr. Dooley, is it?

A. Yes.

Q. Donnie Dooley?

A. Yes.

Q. And what did you and Mr. Dooley talk about?

A. We were just sitting on the tractor, and I said, you know, "You know the methanometer is not working on that miner in the Southwest section." And, just jokingly, I said, "If we get killed, I will never speak to you again"

Q. You said that to –

A. – type of thing.

Q. – Mr. Dooley?

A. Yeah, it was just a – yeah.

Q. You said that jokingly?

A. Yeah.

Q. Now as your shift wore on on May the 8th, did you start to feel in less of a joking mood?

A. Actually, I – yeah, I felt – I didn't feel right. I didn't feel right at all.

Q. On May the 8th?

A. On May the 8th. I left early May the 8th. I made up a story I had to go get my car fixed, and I left early at 5:00.

Q. Why didn't you feel right?

A. I don't know. I just didn't want to be there. I just knew I didn't want to be there.

Q. So you say you made up a story?

A. Yeah.

Q. And who did you make this story up to?

A. Donnie Dooley.

Q. And what did you tell Mr. Dooley?

A. I told him I had to go get my car fixed before I drove home.

Q. To Fall River?

A. Yeah.

Q. So how early did you leave the mine?

A. 5:00.

Q. Was that story true?

A. No.

Q. Did Mr. Dooley let you leave the mine?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. And I take it, for some reason, you just wanted to get out of there?

A. Yeah.

Q. Can you at all explain why you wanted to get out of there?

A. No, I can't. I just knew I wanted to get out of there.

Q. You didn't have a good feeling?

A. Right.

Q. And you don't know why?

A. No.

Q. Those are all the questions I have for Mr. Comish, Mr. Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER Thank you. Mr. Roberts?

EXAMINATION BY MR. ROBERTS

Q. Mr. Comish, just if I could first go back over some of the evidence you gave concerning the operation of the continuous miner.

A. Okay.

Q. You described sparks that you would sometimes see generated from the cutting heads of the miner?

A. Yes.

Q. I'm wondering would those sparks be like a stream or a shower?

A. No just –

Q. Can you describe them?

A. Just sporadic. Just there would be a spark here or a spark there. No shower of sparks.

Q. What would the colour of the sparks be?

A. Just a dull orange. Just like flint. If you hit flint, the same thing.

Q. Okay. And how long would they glow before they would extinguish?

A. Well, you wouldn't see them that long because they would fall down in front and then the water sprays and everything. You couldn't really – so I don't know if they were still ignited or ambers when they hit the floor or not.

Q. And you said you yourself had never seen them come as far back as the cap?

A. No, not that I recall.

Q. Do you ever – had you ever noticed them going up into the – into the top, the roof of the –

A. Yeah, they fly up.

Q. – section?

A. Just fly up off the face, type of thing. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Now the cutting heads, in fact, turn down –

A. Turn – yeah –

Q. – do they?

A. – turn down. Right.

Q. So that would tend to direct the sparks down as well?

A. Yeah. Well, if they were sparking anywheres from probably eight or ten inches past the contact of the picks, you probably wouldn't see the sparks unless one happened to pop up that way.

Q. And I just want to be clear on your evidence about the sprays. You say that whenever you were into the face, you would use the spray?

A. Yeah. Whenever you were actually cutting the face, yeah.

Q. But when you were performing other operations with the miner, you might not have it on?

A. No, right.

Q. Okay. And in terms of the evidence of cutting coal, as you said it, cutting coal that was already on the floor –

A. Yeah.

Q. – with the reset button.

A. I guess that was a bad choice of words. I should have said scooping coal.

Q. But you would break up – the coal would be broken up as well by the motion of the heads on the floor?

A. Oh, yeah. Definitely.

Q. In that operation you're describing? And –

A. Throwing it back onto the spade.

Q. Right.

A. Yeah.

Q. Because it comes off the face in a fairly – often in large chunks. And they should be broken up before they're scooped into the conveyor?

A. They – yeah, they wouldn't go through the opening of the conveyor belt.

Q. So by lowering the heads down onto the coal that's already cut, you're breaking it up and then it's coming back into the – into the system?

A. Into the spade, yeah.

Q. And you say that you couldn't actually sump into the head – the face –

A. Into the face, no.

Q. – with the miner on the reset button?

A. No. I never did. I don't know if somebody could, but I can't see any sense in doing it. Like I say – like I said, six seconds, what's the good of that?

Q. Because six seconds would be barely enough time to get the heads –

A. Yeah.

Q. – rotating and into the –

A. Yeah.

Q. – face before it would stop again?

A. Yeah.

Q. Is that what you're saying?

A. Yes.

Q. And you say that you never did it. You can't see how it was – how it could be done. Did you ever see anybody do it, any other mine operator sump into the face on the reset button?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever see any other miner operator perform the function you described of breaking up coal that's already on the floor and –

A. Yes.

Q. – scooping it in on the reset button?

A. Yes.

Q. And who would have showed you how to perform –

A. That would have –

Q. – that function?

A. That would have been John McIsaac.

Q. So Mr. McIsaac showed you how you could lower the head down, break up – use it to break up coal that was on the floor and scoop it into the machine?

A. Yeah.

Q. All right.

A. I don't think he actually came out and said this is what you do here. I just watched him.

Q. You saw him do it?

A. Right. You learn by example.

Q. And how far would you have the vent tube advanced at the face when you were cutting?

A. You were supposed to have it at the end of the last screen. So when you finish cutting, you would probably be 20 feet from the face.

Q. And is that as far as you could physically – as close as you could physically get it?

A. Yes.

Q. And did your – what was the attitude that your crew had in terms of maintaining that distance from the face?

A. We kept it pretty well up as far as we could get it, and I actually had a few arguments with people about the shift before not putting it up prior to cutting the face. Prior to us coming in. So we would have to put their length and then our length too, so we had a few arguments about that.

Q. But you were careful yourselves to maintain the distance – to keep the tube as close as you could –

A. Yeah, if you didn't, you would be gassed out all the time. You wouldn't be able to work.

Q. Okay. You described the occasion where you were operating the scoop and Mr. Cheverie, you discovered, was refuelling it –

A. Uh-huh.

Q. – as you were operating it. You're aware that, in fact, the management of Westray had instructed the mechanics to refuel the scoops underground while they were operating?

A. On the fly, yeah.

Q. And that was something that had been – they had been directed to do?

A. Right.

Q. And you discussed that, I believe, with Mr. Cheverie, did you not?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And what did he tell you? Why – what was his explanation for doing what he – what you found him doing?

A. Time.

Q. Pardon me?

A. Time to take the machines out and fuel them.

Q. That was something he had been told by the employer?

A. Yes.

Q. That it would take too long to –

A. Right.

Q. – take the machines out to refuel them, so he had been directed to –

A. Fuel them there.

Q. – fuel them there.

A. And they didn't want them shut off.

Q. Because they were difficult to start, I take it?

A. Well, yeah. And a lot of times services were never kept up, air and water.

Q. Air services to the – in the areas where you were working?

A. In the pipes, extend the pipes, yeah, and water. The water could be back three, 400 feet from the miner.

Q. And in order to start that machine, you had to find a compressed air location?

A. Right.

Q. Okay. You operated the bolter?

A. Yes.

Q. You – we've had some evidence of the bolter operator standing on a canopy in order to reach the roof, on occasion?

A. Mostly the helper. The operator would stay in the control compartment. The helper would go on top of the canopy. He raised up to put the resin into the roof.

Q. Can you – I'm just – it would be useful if you could show us on the photograph we have. Where would you stand?

A. Up here.

Q. And that – now that is not in the raised position as we see it, is it?

A. No. That one is behind it. Well, actually, the boom is up. The canopy is not. The canopy is up about probably six feet because you can stand under them.

Q. Now –

A. That's what they were for was to protect you from falling rock.

Q. But it would be necessary to stand on the top of the canopy and then have it extended?

A. Yeah. Sometimes you had to extend it the full height of the boom, plus the full height of the canopy to get up to the roof.

Q. And how high would you estimate that would be?

A. Twenty-five, 30 feet. That's an estimate – that's a guess.

Q. So the helper, or whomever, would be 25 or 30 feet up and then they would be trying to –

A. Standing under unbolted ground.

Q. Unbolted ground.

A. Putting resin in the hole, yes.

Q. And was that something that was a common occurrence or an uncommon occurrence?

A. Common. Very common.

Q. You discussed your concerns about rock dust and you described how – or sorry, coal dust, and you described how you had raised those concerns with your shift boss, Mr. Dooley, and with Mr. Parry, and Mr. Phillips?

A. Right.

Q. Can you recall any specific occasions when you would have discussed coal dust, first of all, with Mr. Dooley?

A. Nothing jumps right out at me. Nothing specific.

Q. What about Phillips or Parry?

A. I had mentioned it to them too.

Q. You're certain you mentioned it to them?

A. Oh yeah. Positive.

Q. And what was the response that you would get when you would mention it?

A. We're looking in – you know, "We're going to do something about it. We're looking at it."

Q. In your – sorry?

A. That was the response to everything.

Q. And in your time there, did you ever see anything done about the coal dust?

A. They started to put in a sprinkler system down by 9 and 10 – down between 9 and 10, I think, or maybe just above 9 Crosscut.

Q. In the main tunnel?

A. Right. In this area. [Witness indicates on map] Because it was really bad here. The coal dust was really, really bad there.

Q. And when was that? When were they putting that in?

A. That was last going off. Last couple of weeks, three weeks, I guess.

Q. Okay. Now you indicated that you were aware of the fact that there were two union drives at the mine –

A. Right.

Q. – and the first one, the UMW drive, was not successful?

A. Right.

Q. Although you supported it yourself?

A. Right.

Q. And the second one was a drive undertaken by the United Steelworkers, and you were more heavily involved in that?

A. Very, yeah.

Q. What was – what role did you play in that?

A. Well, initially, just getting guys to sign their cards and stuff. Then I was the interim president.

Q. Of the Local?

A. Right. And then vice-president.

Q. And you attended meetings in relation to both of those union drives?

A. The first one – like, I say, I went to one meeting they had at the hotel over here, and the other one I was quite often at meetings.

Q. And is it fair to say that at – in both union drives, safety concerns were matters that were raised by Westray employees?

A. They were the paramount thing, yes.

Q. And the miners were expressing their concerns about the safe – or unsafe working conditions to the union organizers who were present?

A. Right.

Q. And was it your hope that if one of those union drives was successful that something would be done about safety at Westray?

A. Yeah, I still believe it would have been. Something – you know, because alone – they were frightened together. Even though you're as alone as you were before they feel together, and they would have done something.

Q. And the drive that you were involved in, the Steelworkers, was under way at the time of the explosion?

A. Very much so.

Q. And, in fact, the Steelworkers were eventually certified?

A. Right.

Q. After the explosion. Now you testified that you left work early on the 8th –

A. Right.

Q. – of May and you went home? And – now you have your mine rescue certificate?

A. Yes.

Q. And, in fact, you were called back to Westray, were you not, to participate in the rescue?

A. Yes, Rosalie called me.

Q. And you got back here approximately –

A. Sat –

Q. – Saturday evening?

A. Saturday evening, yeah.

Q. And you made a number of entries into the mine over the next few days?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you recall how many?

A. I think it was five total.

Q. And those are under oxygen?

A. Oh, every time, yeah.

Q. And you were involved in recovering the bodies of a number of the victims as well?

A. We carried one body out of the Southwest; we were in there. One had been removed; there was still five there when we got in.

Q. Okay. And you made five entries yourself over how many days? When was your last –

A. Wednesday. Wednesday – I'm not – I can't even remember what time it was. I just came up and I said I've had it. And they shut it down Thursday.

Q. They shut the rescue attempt down on Thursday?

A. [No audible response]

Q. And today, Mr. Comish, you're – you work as a computer programmer?

A. Yes.

Q. I take it you haven't gone underground since your Westray experience?

A. No, I have not.

Q. Is that – is there a reason for that?

A. Yeah. I won't go back underground; I can't go back underground. I can't bring myself to go.

Q. Okay. And do you know if you – have you made any promises to anybody that you'll never do that again?

A. Oh, yeah, my mom, my wife, my family.

Q. Do you know if there are a number of the Westray miners who have had to seek professional counselling because of the experiences they've had?

A. About 15.

Q. Fifteen that you know of?

A. Yeah.

Q. And are you one of them?

A. Yes, I am.

Q. And are you still receiving counselling because of the experiences at Westray?

A. Yes, I am.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Comish.

A. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER Mr. Hebert?

MR. HEBERT Thank you.

EXAMINATION BY MR. HEBERT

Q. You had indicated that the DOSCO roadheader was being used down in the North section?

A. Right. Down –

Q. Was it –

A. The last going off?

Q. Yeah.

A. Yeah, it was here. It was sitting idle there for about, I don't know, a week.

Q. Was it actually being used to mine coal or –

A. No, we hit a band of rock there.

Q. Okay.

A. There was coal associated with it, but it was mostly rock face.

Q. All right. And were you assigned to a particular continuous mining machine?

A. Pretty well the same one every day.

Q. Do you remember which number that was?

A. Actually, I do. It's 2001, I believe the number was.

Q. Two thousand and one?

A. I think that was the number on it.

Q. And that was towards the end of the life of mine and was down in the North section, I take it?

A. Yeah.

Q. You mentioned an incident where the cable broke away from the continuous miner?

A. The power cord, yeah.

Q. The power cord.

A. The power cable, yes.

Q. Was that reported to anyone? Would that – I guess an electrician would have to come down and –

A. Oh – the electrician, the shift boss, yeah.

Q. All right.

A. Because it totally disabled the machine.

Q. Okay. You mention an incident where the back of the continuous miner had been buried and that Don Dooley narrowly escaped.

A. Right.

Q. Where was that? I'm not sure you pointed it out.

A. Right there in that wide area. [Witness indicating on map] That eventually all caved in and was built up around it. They actually built a drift of steel underneath of it.

Q. Okay, so that was the 3 North Main at the 1 East cross-section?

A. Right.

Q. Okay. You mentioned the incident where a newspaper person was taking a picture. Do you know – were any efforts – where was that first of all?

A. That was down in – that would be in No. 1 North Main.

Q. No. 1 North Main?

A. Right.

Q. And do you know if there was any efforts at that time to check for methane gas and –

A. No, because –

Q. – prior to –

A. – nobody had a methanometer on them. Except for the – the miner would have one on it, but I don't even know if we checked that.

Q. Was the miner in operation at the time?

A. We were just moving into the face at the time.

Q. All right. And that's when the picture was taken?

A. Right.

Q. All right. So it was right at – how – the person taking the picture and Mr. Phillips, how far away from the face would they be?

A. Full length of the miner anyway. Plus probably 10 feet.

Q. So very – very close. You mentioned that there was a lot of coal dust in the air to the point that you felt it necessary to wear a mask. Were other people wearing masks as well or –

A. When I first started there, no, but after a while, yeah. There seemed to be a growing number. Like, it was okay to wear them after a while, right?

Q. Did the dust in the air reach a point where visibility was diminished and were you unable to see other miners' lamps in the distance?

A. They would fade. They could be – like, obscure; you couldn't see them very well.

Q. All right. And how many feet would that be from –

A. Maybe a hundred.

Q. Okay.

A. Except if you were mining, of course.

Q. You mentioned some talk about people from Grande Cache. They had some concerns about the coal dust. And then you indicated that you brought this up with people, and said, you know, why is it so messy and this. What was the actual concern? Were they concerned with the mess, the dust?

A. The amount of dust.

Q. Well –

A. Both on the ground and airborne.

Q. And what was the risk?

A. Explosion.

Q. An explosion? Sure. So you were aware that this – the coal dust could possibly ignite and explode?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. Were you – did you have any idea of the magnitude of the –

A. No.

Q. – explosion? All right. I take it if you had equated the coal dust to gunpowder or something like that, you wouldn't be moving 17 buckets of it around in the scoop?

A. That was not airborne dust. That was the dust on the ground.

Q. It would be heavier?

A. No, it's just that it's down on the ground; it's not airborne. Airborne dust is what you would have to worry about, I think.

Q. In terms of –

A. Moreso than the dust on the ground.

Q. In terms of an explosion?

A. In terms of an explosion, yes.

Q. I noticed in the statement you gave to the Department of Labour, which is found in Exhibit 111, it's tab 2. I take it you had an opportunity to review that statement at some time, did you?

A. This one?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. All right. And it appears that there's a number of places where there was – the transcript seems to jump from one question to another or the parts are left out. Did you get that impression as well?

A. Actually, if you look at the very first page of it, the consent.

Q. Right.

A. The bottom –

Q. Okay, can you just read that for the record?

A. Actually, I can hardly see it here. But it's to the effect that there – it's –

Q. Let me try and just see if –

A. Yeah, go ahead.

Q. "The transcript given to me by the Department of Labour contains some inaccuracies as to typographical errors and a certain..."

MS. CAMPBELL "And sentence."

MR. HEBERT "...and sentence misplacement. I wish to note this should I be called upon to give evidence in court." So you were – and it's signed and I don't – the signature part is cut off my –

A. Cut off.

Q. – copy, but you signed that, I take it?

A. Right.

Q. So you had some concerns about some of the inaccuracies. Was anything material left out or –

A. Well, almost four years ago.

Q. You can't recall at this time?

A. Yeah, it's four years ago.

Q. All right.

A. Pretty well.

Q. At page 14 of the transcript – if you could turn to that page. I just want to read an answer, and I just wanted to make sure there wasn't a typo here or something left out. "On our shift Donnie Dooley would not allow that. He would allow blocking it off and the..." "It" referring to ventilation tubing.

A. Right.

Q. "...in an unworked heading to vent the miner better, but he wouldn't allow us to – like, he would allow the bolting crew in an unvented place. Donnie was smart enough to know that."

A. He wouldn't –

Q. Okay, so that was a –

A. – allow. Right.

Q. All right. There is a mention in here that at – from time to time you were able to put your hand in front of the end of the vent tube, and there would be almost no air being drawn through?

A. Exactly.

Q. Do you recall when that was in terms of – in relation to the explosion?

A. Couple of days before because we had moved – I believe we moved the fan up just before we went off shift.

Q. Moved the fan up closer to the –

A. Closer –

Q. – the face?

A. – to the working area.

Q. So at the time that you took the – you could put your hand in front of the tube –

A. Yeah, once you got so far away and so many vent tubes, of course, there wasn't any suction, right? Or less suction.

Q. All right.

A. Due to maybe small holes in the tube, bad joints, whatnot.

Q. And I also noted in your transcript that from time to time you yourself experienced dizziness while putting up arches?

A. Yes.

Q. And you related that to the methane gas?

A. Yes.

Q. At page 29 you talk about the intimidation by Mr. Parry and used somewhat more graphic language than you have today, which I won't repeat. But you made the comment that "He even intimidated Carl Guptill, who was a big man and he wasn't scared of anything."

A. Right.

Q. Now I just wanted to clarify, and I might have missed this in your earlier testimony, but at page 35 you were asked, "Did you ever see the mine inspectors underground?" You said, "Yeah." "Did you ever talk to him?" You said, "Yeah, on occasion." "Did you ever complain to him about conditions?" And you said, "Well, he came in one day and said, `how is the roof, boys?' and I just said, `oh, not bad.' He just said, `don't push it in.' Was that Albert?"

A. That's –

Q. "Albert, yeah."

A. That's definitely a typo.

Q. Okay, what – was that the incident that you described earlier –

A. Earlier, yes.

Q. – today? Okay.

COMMISSIONER "...don't push it in"?

A. Mmm.

COMMISSIONER I see. Use a little poetic licence here, and I think you would find out what it meant.

MR. HEBERT Who did you rely on in terms of the ventilation?

A. The layout of the ventilation? The installation of the ventilation? What?

Q. You indicated that – well, when you put your hand there and felt no air coming out –

A. Right.

Q. – I mean, was –

A. Well –

Q. – why were you doing that?

A. We were checking to see what kind of air was being drawn out, and then you would tell your supervisor, and he would make the decision to move the fan up.

Q. And was that normally your duties as mine op – or, continuous mine operator?

A. Sure.

Q. And the way that –

A. I don't know if it was a written duty, but –

Q. It was in your best interest to do it?

A. Exactly.

Q. And so – but the only method that you really had was to put your hand up and see what the air was –

A. Besides gassing out. You knew that you weren't getting the air.

Q. Were you aware of anybody else that was testing the ventilation at the heading from time to time?

A. No, I'm not aware of anybody that was there. Except for – your immediate supervisor would come in, do a gas check or something. Do the same thing I did.

Q. Put his hand over the –

A. Sure.

Q. Yeah. You've seen him do that from time to time?

A. [No audible response]

Q. Okay. Those are my questions, thank you.

COMMISSIONER Thank you, Mr. Hebert.

A. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER Mr. MacArthur? And I notice you were absent while this witness was saying all those nice things about your competitor union.

MR. MACARTHUR I heard, yeah.

COMMISSIONER Was that on purpose?

MR. MACARTHUR No, I was in the other room listening.

EXAMINATION BY MR. MACARTHUR

Q. I just want to go back to the machine, to the mining machine.

A. Right.

Q. Was there always picks available for a change out in the picks when you would have to change the picks?

A. Not always.

Q. So what would you do in a case when you wouldn't have picks available?

A. You wouldn't do anything.

Q. Would you –

A. You would just go and cut the next face and wait for picks.

Q. Okay. You would stop the machine?

A. No.

Q. Oh okay.

A. No, no, you went to the next face and you cut.

Q. Was it a – did you often see sparks coming from the machine while it cut at certain points?

A. Well, like I said, you saw sparks. Not that often, but, I mean, I did see them. The odd one flying up. I never seen a shower of sparks.

Q. No. You never ever ran into a situation where you may have thought you might have run into a pocket of methane and maybe had a small methane ignition?

A. No. You mean a blue –

Q. Yeah.

A. No.

Q. No. Okay. You were talking about you were involved in – or around a number of roof falls that occurred in the mine at different times in the mine. Did you ever notice the mine giving any sort of a warning prior to this fall happening?

A. Sometimes. You would see the – you would actually see the roof buckle down like that, and [Witness indicates with hands] push the screen to the point of breaking it.

Q. Were you aware that in mining, you know – I know older coal miners and miners I've talked to, and I've mined myself for years, being a hard rock miner probably you wouldn't be as much accustomed to the fact that – did you ever see dust coming from the roof prior to a mine fall, like, happening? Like –

A. At Westray?

Q. Yeah.

A. Well, yeah, you would see pieces breaking away, yeah.

Q. That was – yeah. That's one indication that you're going to have some kind of a fall at that particular –

A. Yeah, we –

Q. It wouldn't tell you how big –

A. We got real good at telling when it was going to fall.

Q. Exactly, yeah. That's what I was getting to. You'd become kind of an expert at that when you're – especially in a situation probably as Westray was where you were having so many falls. I mean, the guys must have been aware that – that's why you were able to get out of the way, I take it?

A. Most times.

Q. The support – there was many different support systems used in the Westray Mine. Was there any particular support system that you felt the men were – felt more secure with?

A. Probably the bigger the better. The bigger I-beams and stuff.

Q. So you're saying probably steel, then?

A. Oh – they were all steel.

Q. Yeah –

A. All arches.

Q. – steel – I mean, steel compared to roof bolts I'm getting at –

A. Oh, God, yeah. Yeah.

Q. Yeah. You guys felt much comfortable with the steel then?

A. Yes.

Q. The sprays on the machine, on the mining machine, while you were cutting, did you ever have problems with them plugging up on you with the – that the water wouldn't come out of them?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that an ongoing thing, like?

A. It was ongoing; it wasn't constant. But it – yeah, it happened.

Q. Like, you as an operator would probably have to go down and clear the spray?

A. Back the miner up and poke them out, or take them off and clean them.

Q. Did you find even after cleaning the sprays, like, that when you go in and cut in again they would –

A. The water would aim off to –

Q. Yeah, they would –

A. – yeah.

Q. – plug up quite quickly?

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you think it was probably a deterrent also because of the conditions you were working in with all the coal dust underground, and you talked about the machine getting stuck, that some of the operators may shut the sprays off rather than get stuck? You know what I mean.

A. I can't speak for the other operators.

Q. No. Well, did you ever –

A. But myself when I was cutting, I used the water spray, and when I wasn't I didn't.

Q. Okay. The methane was – you talked about – there was a lot of methane alarms in that mine, it seems like. Was this a constant every shift thing that you – that some time during the shift, or several times during the shift, that you would get a high methane reading?

A. At the miner?

Q. Yeah.

A. Oh yeah. You gas out.

Q. That was a regular routine –

A. Yeah.

Q. – every –

A. I don't remember cutting a face where it didn't gas out.

Q. Is that right?

A. Never.

Q. Were you extra nervous about methane? Were you – you know, I mean, were you yourself aware of the dangers of that high methane in the area?

A. I was aware of the danger, but I think I was more concerned with cave-ins.

Q. Yeah. Did you yourself ever witness a methane – did anybody ever show you on film or demonstrate to you a methane explosion or –

A. Nobody ever showed me, I saw on TV one time down – Pittsburgh, isn't it, they do the test mining down there.

Q. Yes.

A. Yeah. Yeah, I seen what it's like.

Q. I seen that one myself that was – it shows it with the methane, and then they add dust to it. They add coal dust –

A. Yeah.

Q. – to show the extra explosion you get with the coal dust.

A. Fireball.

Q. And you already stated that you have no desire to do any underground mining –

A. That's right.

Q. – since that particular incident?

A. Right.

Q. I much couldn't blame you either. Do you – the coal dust in the mine, did you ever come across bags of stone dust where they were piled up or stocked up or –

A. By the transformers in the mains there was about 15 bags, I think. But that's where they stayed, was stockpiled there.

Q. And nobody ever spread them around or –

A. No, no, they just stayed there. They were there. I don't know why they were there if they were just sitting there. Other than a place to sit is all the purpose they served.

Q. Okay. Thank you, that's all.

COMMISSIONER Okay. Ms. Gillis?

MS. GILLIS No questions.

COMMISSIONER Okay, Mr. Wells, you can take up the balance. Mr. MacArthur, you must have missed our graphic demonstration of a coal dust explosion here, did you?

MR. MACARTHUR Yeah, I missed it. Yeah.

COMMISSIONER Yeah, we had the people from the Cape Breton Coal Laboratory here, and they put on a very good display.

MR. MACARTHUR Okay. I seen it before and I seen it in the labs, but I wasn't here for that, no.

COMMISSIONER Okay. Mr. Wells?

MR. WELLS Thank you.

COMMISSIONER That didn't come out of your time.

MR. WELLS Oh, that's – I'm more relieved.

EXAMINATION BY MR. WELLS

Q. At the beginning of this morning's testimony you mentioned methane, and I may not have heard you right, but I thought you said it was explosive between 2.5 and 5.0 percent. Was that your understanding or was that just a slip?

A. That was probably a slip because I believe it's five and 15.

Q. Right, okay. I was also curious about the noise of the fan on the dust extractor which you say wasn't working because of the filters.

A. Right.

Q. Would the machine when you were cutting be quiet enough that you could hear the roof shifting some?

A. No.

Q. So the only –

A. I don't think so.

Q. So the only time that the fan would have been too noisy to run so that you wouldn't hear the – would be when you actually weren't cutting anyway?

A. Yeah. I wore earplugs anyway, so –

Q. Could you – I don't know if they've given you a copy of Exhibit 59, the post-explosion pictures?

A. No, I don't believe. Oh, wait now.

Q. No. 23 is a picture of the face.

A. Fifteen, seventeen, twenty-seven. Right, that's a half-cut face.

Q. Yes. Looking at the face, I'm wondering if you can give us any idea of the pattern of the cut, whether the picks might have been dull and maybe the head was bouncing at that point or does that look like a good, clean cut?

A. Except for up top here. It's a little rough.

Q. Well, that's what I was wondering, up top where it's kind of a little browner there.

A. Yeah, it looks like there's a chunk of rock or something in there, sandstone or something. I can't say for sure, but that's what it looks like.

Q. So the fact that there's like three scalloped, round or semi-round spots there, would that indicate to you that maybe the head was bouncing on that or would that be just that somebody came up and stopped or –

A. Here? Are we talking about here?

Q. Yes.

A. That's three different cuts.

Q. Three different cuts?

A. That's what that looks like, yeah.

Q. And just the way it stopped, do you think that that was a good, clean cut or were they having problems there?

A. It looks like he sumped in there, cut it down, moved ahead, sumped in, cut down, moved ahead, sumped in, cut down, moved ahead, sumped in, cut down.

Q. So no concern there that you can tell? Okay.

A. I see here though that he has – this drift has been cut down in size, by the look of it. You see the very top right corner?

Q. Yes.

A. It looks like the face is higher there. And then it drops down into this.

Q. Okay, thank you. I was curious about when you were operating the – well, any of the equipment, but particularly the scoop. The scoop would have lights on, so would you turn your miner's lamp off on your own helmet while you were on the scoop?

A. No.

Q. So I was thinking about the time when Mr. Cheverie was refuelling. You would have had your lamp on? So you know, he should have been able to see you in the operator's seat, presumably?

A. Well, maybe not. I was looking forward.

Q. Right.

A. Right, I mean, I'm faced this way, and he's back here. He may not have seen me.

Q. Okay, you've talked about them blocking vent tubing going into a dead heading where there was nobody working.

A. Right.

Q. How would they block that tubing?

A. With a piece of screen and piece of plastic.

Q. So that would have been done on the inbye end? So when they went to go back into that heading, what would be the procedure going back into that heading?

A. Drop the block, wait for it to clear, and then go in. It would have been checked, and then you bring your equipment.

Q. So your fire boss would go in with you or go in and do that or –

A. Or we would, go in and take it down, and then he would go in and check.

Q. But you would go in without taking readings on the way in?

A. Probably.

Q. How long a period of time would we be talking that some of these would have been blocked off?

A. A couple of hours, sometimes more.

Q. Sometimes more?

A. Yeah.

Q. Can you remember when Mr. Bonner went on the health and safety committee?

A. Actually, no, I don't remember.

Q. Were you actually aware – you didn't seem to think, you know, his name didn't come to your mind –

A. No.

Q. – earlier this morning, so you weren't really thinking about that, maybe even while you were working there? Were you really aware that he was on the committee?

A. I probably was aware. I mean, I stayed at his house, and we talked all the time.

Q. Did you feel that he was having any impact on that committee then?

A. Positive impact?

Q. Yes.

A. Lennie was a guy who would say his piece, and so he got labelled by them as a complainer. So if you said anything to Lennie and he said it to them, he was just complaining. If you said it to them, you were like Lennie.

Q. I suppose maybe also if you were to complain to him, you would feel that maybe he was going to get in trouble on your behalf?

A. He probably would have.

Q. You mentioned Albert McLean and the incident that was misquoted in the transcript, but his comment back to you, "Don't bullshit me" I think is the way you put it. Was he – did he stay there after that comment to allow you time to reply or was he moving on?

A. They were moving on.

Q. We also had testimony one day about the last shift going into the mine or the last shift that came out the morning of the 8th about discussion of an explosion or possible explosion, on the tractor on the way down. Mr. Eagles was on the tractor with them. Were you involved on that trip down?

A. No, no.

Q. Thank you, those are my questions.

COMMISSIONER Mr. Endres?

EXAMINATION BY MR. ENDRES

Q. Am I correct in assuming that you were one of the most experienced miners at Westray? Not in coal but in hard rock?

A. No, you're not.

Q. You had 12 years of experience in mining?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. And you were trained quite extensively, I think you gave a statement, extensively trained by Noranda?

A. Yes.

Q. And other companies in mining?

A. Yes.

Q. As a miner?

A. Right.

Q. You were certified as a mine rescuer?

A. Yes.

Q. Got your certificate in April of 1990?

A. I don't remember the date, but yeah. About five years –

Q. Just the point I want to make is it wasn't 20 years ago.

A. No.

Q. It was fairly –

A. Exactly.

Q. – recent. And in fact, you were acting as shift boss in one of your previous jobs?

A. In a couple of my previous jobs, yes.

Q. In one of your previous mining jobs?

A. Yes.

Q. And at Westminer you were a draegerman?

A. Yes.

Q. And in fact when you started working at Westray you received the Westray safety manual?

A. The blue –

Q. The booklet?

A. The blue booklet?

Q. Yeah, whatever colour it was.

A. Yeah.

Q. It was a safety manual. Do you remember that?

A. I don't remember a safety manual. I remember being given a manual, overview of the mine, overview of some of the rules.

Q. Do you recall signing for something in that regard?

A. No, I don't recall that, but –

Q. No? Do you recall signing for a document that's described in Exhibit 75 at tab 2, page 2, as the Westray Coal, a division of Curragh Resources Inc. handbook on safety and health regulations for employees?

A. Did you say tab 2?

Q. Yeah, 2.

MS. CAMPBELL Page 2.

A. Page 2. Yes, I signed this.

MR. ENDRES Does that refresh your memory?

A. No.

Q. Does it help you as to receiving something?

A. No, but I do – that's my signature.

Q. You did receive a copy of the Coal Mines Regulations Act?

A. Then? No.

Q. No, but you received it at some point?

A. Oh, yeah, eventually Donnie Dooley got me a copy.

Q. And you received a copy of the Occupational Health and Safety Act?

A. I don't remember having that. That one? Yes. Sorry, yes.

Q. Did you recall getting that as well?

A. I do have one, yes.

Q. And did you read any of those documents?

A. I browsed through some of them. I didn't read them from cover to cover, no.

Q. Well, why did you obtain them if you weren't going to read them?

A. As you just said, they issued them to me.

Q. You asked for the Coal Mines Regulation Act or the Occupational Health and Safety –

A. Oh, yes, yes, that I was reading.

Q. Why did you ask for it?

A. Because I was reading to study to be a fire boss.

Q. You had a fair sense of the danger that coal dust and methane in a coal mine presented?

A. A fair understanding, yes.

Q. You knew that methane was ignitable?

A. Yes.

Q. That it could burn? And you knew that coal dust could explode?

A. Yes.

Q. And burn?

A. Yes.

Q. Would it surprise you that some of the less experienced miners at Westray might have perhaps been looking to you for some guidance as to how they should conduct themselves because you'd been around?

A. It wouldn't surprise me, no.

Q. Did some people actually ask you about assistance or ask you for guidance or help or questions to you about certain aspects of the mine?

A. Probably through work, come up and talk, but I mean, they didn't actually make it a point of coming up to me outside of work or anything like that. Just –

Q. While you were working?

A. Learn from the guys with experience.

Q. Was it in fact the routine at Westray that the more experienced people were training the non-experienced people on the job, on the equipment?

A. That was a practice.

Q. And you did that yourself?

A. I did that myself, yes.

Q. You trained other people. You trained more junior miners in the use of equipment?

A. Yes.

Q. And presumably you passed along to them your knowledge about the safe operation as a coal miner?

A. I passed along the knowledge that was passed along to me.

Q. Well, is it fair for us to assume that you were a model of safety when it comes to coal mining, yourself?

A. I pride myself on being very safe underground.

Q. So you practiced safe coal mining yourself?

A. I practiced safe mining.

Q. Safe mining, but not safe coal mining?

A. Anywhere.

Q. Coal mining?

A. Coal mining, hard rock mining, asbestos.

Q. So you did not transgress any safety issues? You did not act in a manner that was unsafe?

A. No.

Q. Ever?

A. No.

Q. And does that include running the continuous miner on the trip switch?

A. That does include that, yes.

Q. That's not unsafe in your picture?

A. No, it's not.

Q. Does it include ignoring what you described as a considerable amount of coal dust throughout the mine, just leave it there, knowing that it has this propensity to explode?

A. I didn't ignore it.

Q. You did not ignore it?

A. No, sir.

Q. What did you do about it?

A. As I stated earlier, I had mentioned it to Donnie Dooley. I had mentioned it to Roger Parry, and I had mentioned it to Gerald Phillips.

Q. Did you ever do anything about cleaning it up?

A. I was not instructed to.

Q. Is there anything that stopped you from doing that?

A. Yes, there was, the shift boss, Roger Parry, and Gerald Phillips.

Q. So can I safely assume then that you once at least tried to do it, to clean up coal dust, and that you were physically or somehow stopped by one of your shift bosses?

A. We had discussed cleaning it up and then we were told you do your job.

Q. Well, tell me this then, you were aware of the practice of the closure or the partial closure of vent tubing?

A. Yes.

Q. In some other sections. Your shift boss, I take it, did not permit it to be done?

A. The closure of the vent tubing was done, but in an unworked area.

Q. In an unworked area?

A. In our section. Other sections I can only speculate what went on. I wasn't there.

Q. So was it always in unworked areas where this vent tubing was closed off or was it sometimes closed off in areas that were not in fact vacated or vacant?

A. In our area?

Q. Well, anywhere that you were aware of.

A. I don't know about anywhere. I know about our area. And the answer to that is no. If we were working these areas, this one would be blocked off.

Q. If you had come across safety concerns, you would have made them known?

A. We would discuss them.

Q. Amongst yourselves?

A. Amongst ourselves.

Q. Or amongst people that could do something about it?

A. Amongst ourselves, probably with Donnie.

Q. And that's your shift boss?

A. Yes.

Q. And would you say, "Donnie, look, this is unsafe. My life is more important than this. Do something about it or I'm out of here."

A. That conversation has probably taken place.

Q. And was something done about it?

A. No.

Q. And you continued to work?

A. We did to a point and then we refused.

Q. You what?

A. We refused.

Q. Refused what?

A. To work.

Q. Like when?

A. Right in that area there. We were – actually all along here. We were going in and putting up arches. And they weren't bolting and securing the ground first. We were working under open ground the whole time. We finally had enough of it. We said, "We're not doing it any more." And they had to bring the bolter in.

Q. What happened to you when you refused to work that job?

A. Oh, there was a bit of – you know, arguing back and forth, but then we just stood our ground and said, "We're not going to do it," and they had to bring the bolter in. They were really, really upset about that, but they brought the bolter around.

Q. Were you suspended? Did you lose pay? Were you threatened or fired?

A. No, sir.

Q. Anything of the kind?

A. No.

Q. So you knew that option existed, to stop work when you thought it was unsafe?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. – to proceed? If you go back to the cutting on the trip switch because I'm not quite clear on that yet. See if you can help me a little bit more with that.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. You're telling us now that when you say "cutting" – when you said "cutting" previously in your statements that you've given which we all have that you don't really mean cutting as such, cutting from the face or anything like that?

A. Not the face, no.

Q. It doesn't mean cutting from the face, it means –

A. No.

Q. – gathering the coal that's already been taken off the face?

A. Putting it back into the spade, yes, sir.

Q. And get it into the gathering arms?

A. Right.

Q. – so it can go into the conveyor? That's all?

A. That's all.

Q. That's all you've ever done?

A. Yes.

Q. You've never cut the face on the trip switch?

A. No, sir.

Q. You're sure about that?

A. I'm positive.

Q. Let me take you to something in one of your statements. This is at page 25 to 26 of your statement to the Department of Labour. And it starts with the question at – the question, "Was there any – somebody suggested that their times..." This is hard to read.

A. It is.

Q. "...that there was a button on the continuous miner that could hold in the trip button." Do you find that line?

A. Yes.

Q. The answer that you are recorded as having given is, "Yeah, trip or reset. Hold it in and away she goes."

A. Right.

Q. That's the question. And your answer, recorded, is "You press the reset and flick the two buttons to start the heading which would be the drum..."

A. That should be "the head."

Q. "The head," all right. "It will just go like – you start down around 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, right? Up until – there you go again. Then just trip it again. That's what we were doing, trip the reset."

A. Right.

Q. "How about the fellow operating the rock bolter?" It goes on then. Does that not indicate that you would do this repeatedly, that you would press the reset button. It would run for a few seconds, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, it would gas out again. You would retrip it, and do it again, and again, in order to continue to cut something.

A. Actually, you would do it once, then twice. But if it kept kicking out, there was no sense in – keep frigging with the reset button.

Q. And we've already, of course, looked at your statement given to Mr. Roberts where you say, "Cutting in that case didn't really mean cutting as such."

A. No, it just means putting it back into the spade.

Q. Are you familiar with the practice of continuing to cut on the face, from the face, on the trip switch?

A. No, I'm not.

Q. Now why would you do that anyway? The machine was gassed out.

A. Exactly.

Q. And it was a safety device.

MR. ROBERTS Wait a second now. Why would he do it anyway? The witness has already said that he never did it.

MR. ENDRES Well, why would you do whatever you did anyway? If the machine was gassed out; it had stopped.

A. Right.

Q. It had stopped because it was a bad situation. There was too much gas.

A. Right.

Q. And you knew about that, and then you overpowered that trip switch to continue to work anyway.

A. No, I –

Q. In a dangerous condition.

A. No, I overpowered the trip switch to fill the car, the shuttle car.

Q. No, but the point is the machine would be operating in order to fill the shuttle car.

A. Right.

Q. And the equipment had said no, it mustn't operate because it's unsafe for a job. You took it upon yourself to override that safety protection, which was for your benefit, and continue to do something which you shouldn't have done. Correct?

A. Perhaps.

Q. Anybody tell you to do it?

A. I was shown how to do it, yes.

Q. No, but did somebody stand there and say "I want you to do this"?

A. I don't think anybody actually stood there and said that, but it was understood.

Q. If I read your interviews correctly, Mr. Comish, tell me if I'm wrong, that I summarized it this way on ventilation, that there was a very good supply of air because it was so cold. It was so cold that you had to wear parkas underground. This is in the mains. Do you recall that?

A. Oh, yeah.

Q. Yes, you recall saying that?

A. I recall saying that there was very good ventilation in the mains, yes.

Q. And then you also said, "When kept up, the fan ventilation..." which would be the face ventilation.

A. Right.

Q. "...was good as well."

A. When kept up?

Q. Yes.

A. It was.

Q. You still stand by that today?

A. It was good enough to mine.

Q. Right. And you said most of the ducting and the seals were in good shape, correct?

A. Right.

Q. And you knew that the vent tubing was to be as close to the face as possible. And Mr. Roberts spoke to you about that earlier and you agreed with that as well?

A. Exactly.

Q. And if it was properly put up to the face, within 20 feet, as you mentioned, then there would have been sufficient air for you to continue to work?

A. Not necessarily.

Q. No. And what did you do when there wasn't?

A. You didn't do anything. It shut down.

Q. The machine would shut down, would gas out?

A. Yeah.

Q. And then would you do then?

A. Wait.

Q. Wait? How long?

A. Until the air cleared.

Q. How long would that take, usually.

A. It depended on, I guess, on the concentration of methane, but most times I'd give it a ballpark figure, five minutes.

Q. All right, you were aware of the practice of closing the vent tubing, and I touched on that a moment ago. And I want to come back to that. Correct? You were aware of it?

A. I was aware of it, yes.

Q. And I take it it wasn't done in your section per se?

COMMISSIONER If there were people there it wasn't done.

MR. ENDRES No, I will come to that. You were aware it was done, but you said it wasn't done in a working section?

A. Right.

Q. All right. Did you ever hear that it was done in a working section, that that practice was followed in a working section?

A. From someone else.

COMMISSIONER That's a "yes," I presume?

A. That is a yes, yes.

COMMISSIONER Thank you.

MR. ENDRES So you heard somebody else –

COMMISSIONER It doesn't record a nod.

MR. ENDRES So you did hear someone else say to you that air was partially or completely cut off in a working section?

A. Yes.

Q. And the men were still there?

A. Yes.

Q. Were still working?

A. Yes.

Q. And yet the air supply had been limited or perhaps totally closed off to them, correct?

A. Correct.

Q. You knew about that?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you do anything about it?

A. No, I didn't.

Q. You mentioned in your examination earlier that the good air did not always extend into the working headings.

A. Right.

Q. What would be the explanation for that, in your view?

A. I would only guess – it would only be a guess on my part, and that's just because the ventilation system wasn't set up properly.

Q. And in what manner wasn't it set up properly?

A. I don't know.

Q. Was it connected in any way, the fact that there wasn't perhaps sufficient air at the face, to the fact that the tubing hadn't been advanced?

A. At points I would imagine that could cause it, yeah.

Q. What else would cause it, if that isn't it?

A. Probably because the air was recirculated.

Q. Now that's the air that's coming through the mains.

A. Right.

Q. Correct? And you said there was good air in the mains.

A. Right.

Q. It was so cold you had to wear parkas. The air was as cold as the outside air. So why are you coming back to the recirculation now?

A. That's in the mains, sir.

Q. Yeah, sure.

A. I'm talking about the working areas.

Q. Yes, but surely the air comes from the mains. It doesn't come from the working area. It comes out of the mains.

A. It comes in the main.

Q. Yes, and that's cold air and it's good air. That's what you're saying.

A. Yeah. It's air from surface.

Q. Yeah, and somehow it gets to the face, so what's that have to do with recirculation? If there's good air in the mains –

A. Right.

Q. – then presumably there's good air available for the face.

A. No.

Q. Not at all?

A. I didn't say not at all. The air comes in the mains, goes here, then here, then here and back up into these areas. So therefore you've got air that's been recirculated.

Q. Oh, you mean recirculation –

A. – through.

Q. From one section into the other?

A. Exactly.

Q. And was that the case in the North where you were working?

A. I can assume that it was.

Q. Do you know?

A. It wasn't cold.

Q. It was not cold.

COMMISSIONER Mr. Endres, the witness just previously said he was just guessing on this.

MR. ENDRES Yeah. I understand that. I won't go on.

COMMISSIONER He's not a ventilation engineer, I don't think.

A. Not that I know of.

COMMISSIONER No, okay. Thank you.

A. I don't have any papers for it.

MR. ENDRES The reason I'm bringing back, and I will give you the citation if you wish, and that's the only reason I asked about this, Mr. Commissioner, is that Mr. Comish is reported as having said that when kept up, the fan ventilation was good. And he spoke about "kept up" meaning when the tube was advanced to the face.

A. The fan was advanced to the face, yeah.

COMMISSIONER All right.

Q. Yeah, the ventilation was –

A. Yeah.

Q. – good, period. I take it there was stone dusting done, to you knowledge, even after October of 1991? It didn't just stop in –

A. Not to my knowledge, there wasn't.

Q. No. Well, did you know –

A. Besides the throwing the chicken feed type thing.

Q. So there was some stone dusting done after October '91?

A. If you want to call that stone dusting, then there was stone dusting done.

Q. Well, it had to be because you also said in your statement that there was stone dusting done in order to make the mine look good for important people that were coming to see it.

A. Hand thrown stone dust. After October I don't believe I ever saw that machine.

Q. Right.

A. It was sitting down somewhere in the Southwest on the side of the drift. It could be buried, for all I know.

Q. Do you recall in your interview also speaking about watering down the roadways when somebody of importance was about to be coming?

A. Yeah, very – put a light spray down, yeah.

Q. Yeah. To keep the coal dust down, suspended?

A. Yeah. Well, if you put too much water, you would have too – you know, it would be just like putting –

Q. Why do you think that was done then, the stone dusting, the watering down? Was it to deceive someone?

A. More than likely.

Q. And to deceive –

A. It wasn't done on a regular occurrence so therefore it –

Q. To deceive those that are –

A. – be to deceive somebody.

Q. – that are important people, like the inspector?

A. Could be.

COMMISSIONER You're just about out of time, Mr. Endres.

MR. ENDRES I have one that I – oh, yeah, and then I will be quite happy to – if I may? And I think you probably want do want to hear from – on that. You had a golden opportunity, Mr. Comish, to speak to Albert McLean about your concerns in the area of safety?

A. Right.

Q. Safe operation. You told us that once on the surface, just as you were about to leave, you saw him. He was alone?

A. No, he wasn't alone.

Q. Parry was there?

A. No.

Q. No. Anybody else there?

A. The security guard, and I think Lennie was around or he had just left.

Q. And you recall that Albert said, "Don't be like that" when you told him about "Do you have your blinders with you?"

A. Yes.

Q. Would you agree that that was a good opportunity for you to stop and take a few minutes and say, "Look, Mr. McLean, here are the problems that I have with this, the way I see it"?

A. I would agree.

Q. But you did not take part? You did not take that opportunity?

A. No, I didn't.

Q. Were you in a rush to get out of there, get home or what – why didn't you?

A. I was always in a rush to get out of there.

Q. But what's the reason you didn't stop?

A. I don't know. Maybe I should have.

Q. You did indicate in your statements pervious that you were never allowed to talk and that you were intimidated, page 172?

A. Right.

Q. But this occasion you could have done it?

A. I could have, yes.

Q. And you made the comment that it would have been obvious to McLean – from the comment that he made, it was obvious to you that he understood that there were problems?

A. Yes.

Q. You remember you said in your evidence earlier, that his comment, "Don't bullshit me," told you that he knew there were problems, safety problems?

A. Right.

Q. And that was already referred to in part by Mr. Hebert, but I want to follow up on that, and that is my last question.

A. Sure.

Q. If we can just take a look at your – we don't have to go to it, if you want, page 35 and 36 of your interview with the Department of Labour. You spoke about Albert McLean, and do you recall essentially saying that Mr. McLean probably didn't know about safety violations. If he had, he would have done something about it?

A. That was my feeling.

MR. ROBERTS Are you quoting?

MR. ENDRES I'm paraphrasing.

COMMISSIONER Paraphrasing.

MR. ROBERTS What section are you paraphrasing?

MR. ENDRES Well, do you want the quotes? Here you go. It starts with the answer, "Albert..." at page 35 –

MR. ROBERTS Okay.

Q. "Albert, yeah..." And I – it's hard to read this stuff. You can read it for yourself; it's all there. Basically what you said is that any fool could see the coal dust and that would include Albert McLean, of course. But beyond that, unless he happened to come upon it, you said, and I am sure he would have said something. In other words, if he had come upon a safety transgression, you feel in your heart that McLean would have done something about it?

A. I think he would have.

Q. Was it just a good job done by everybody at the mine to hide the problems from McLean?

A. I don't know. Not everybody. I wouldn't say everybody.

Q. No, but it was a job well done, don't you see?

A. It was a job well done, I suppose.

Q. All right. Thanks very much.

COMMISSIONER Ms. Campbell?

MS. CAMPBELL Yes.

EXAMINATION BY MS. CAMPBELL

Q. Was there any feeling among the men – for instance, you worked in the North Mains section, Mr. Comish. Was there any feeling that if you men worked safely in your section of the mine that, you know, you would be okay, that you could – you would be protected from what might be happening in another section of the mine?

A. There's always the "it won't happen to me," right?

Q. Uh-huh.

A. But we – we looked after each other. Lennie and I had worked together for years, and we would watch each other's backs, always have.

Q. So you didn't have the feeling that if something was going wrong in the Southwest, that it wouldn't have any impact on you?

A. Sorry?

Q. I guess I'm not expressing it very well. Did you feel as long as you worked safely in the North Mains you would be okay, notwithstanding what might have been being done in the Southwest section?

A. Well, I always felt that if there was an explosion, it didn't matter where it was.

Q. So you knew what was being done in other sections of the mine could have an effect on you?

A. Yeah.

Q. Say the last month or two before the explosion, you were operating the continuous miner down in the North Mains?

A. Right.

Q. Were you getting much coal out of there, Mr. Comish?

A. Probably more rock than coal. There wasn't a lot of coal coming – they were behind.

Q. Was there a pressure on you, as a continuous operator – continuous miner operator, to get coal out of that mine?

A. Oh, yeah. That was – that's what they wanted, was the coal.

Q. But were there times when you recall the pressure being increased?

A. Not really.

Q. No.

A. No, I'm sorry, I just –

Q. I just noticed that at one – in one area where Mr. Endres referred you to, which I don't think I had noted before, when you were talking about the reset button –

A. Uh-huh.

Q. – on page 82 in the Commission transcript –

A. The name of the game, get the coal out?

Q. The question was, "What was the pressure on you to do that? Like, I mean, why would you do that?" And they're talking about the reset button and you said, "Well, to get the face cut and move on to the next one, get the coal out. That was the name of the game."

A. Right.

Q. Get the coal out. Did you feel a pressure all the time to get coal out?

A. You were – you put yourself into, I guess, high-speed mode when you got in there.

Q. Were you – feel there was any pressure put on you to compromise safety to get coal out of the mine?

A. A lot times we were sent into completely unsafe situations and we were to make them safe. But pressure to get the coal? I can't really say that I was – if you want to call that pressure to get the coal out, yeah, I guess.

Q. I don't know if you're telling me you felt it or you didn't feel it?

A. I – well, I will put it this way. They set up a bonus system for coal. The more coal you got out, you got a bonus. So I guess that's pressure.

Q. Okay. What did you think of – Did you think that the bonus system, when it was implemented, compromised or had any impact on safety?

A. Probably did.

Q. Why do you say "probably?"

A. Because they would want to – you would want to get out as much coal as you could to get paid for it.

Q. Now Mr. Endres asked you some questions about whether or not you transgressed any rules. And I'm just wondering if, after the explosion, did you gain any knowledge which made you realize you transgressed rules that you perhaps weren't aware of prior to the explosion?

A. I don't know.

Q. We've heard some people say that they didn't know about any restrictions on diesel equipment until after the explosion –

A. Yeah.

Q. – on their use in the mine?

A. Right.

Q. Did you know about restrictions on diesel equipment, the use –

A. Scrubbers?

Q. Well, tractors, boom truck?

A. No, but I mean scrubbers on the scoops. That's an exhaust arrest system, spark arrest system on the scoops. I knew about that. I knew that the tractors were not approved for underground –

Q. That –

A. – but they said they were.

Q. That was before –

A. They had a temporary –

Q. – the explosion?

A. Right.

Q. But you suspected before the explosion that they were not?

A. Right.

Q. The bonus that you talked about, the coal bonus for getting coal out, do you know whether the fire bosses got a bonus as well?

A. I don't know for sure, but I think they did.

Q. Okay. When you were on the – involved in the mine rescue –

A. Right.

Q. – you went up into the Southwest section?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you go up into the section where the continuous miner was?

A. Yes, that's where the six bodies were, the first six.

Q. Did you make any observation of the position of the heads on the continuous miner at that point?

A. I didn't mentally take any notice to it.

Q. Do you – are you able to say or did you make any observation about how close to the face the continuous miner was?

A. No. I did not go up to the continuous miner.

Q. Okay. Those are my questions.

EXAMINATION BY THE COMMISSIONER

Q. Just a couple of questions, Mr. Comish. You said that while you – it was a common practice to wear earplugs when you were operating the continuous miner?

A. For me it was, yes.

Q. But was that general, do you know?

A. A lot – most guys didn't.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. But I had wore them so long in the hard rock mines, I just –

Q. Oh, I see. Okay, fine.

A. – continued to wear them.

Q. So that was just sort of a, to use the word, a hangover from your hard rock experience. Yeah.

A. Exactly.

Q. Now when you were walking in the mains particularly, what would you – depending on which way you were walking, could you feel a breeze in your face?

A. If you were walking uphill.

Q. Toward – yeah.

A. Like, yeah, in number – in number – the main intake –

Q. Okay.

A. – you could feel air.

Q. You could feel a –

A. You could feel air.

Q. – distinct breeze. Yeah, okay.

A. Yeah. It's not going to move your hair or anything but –

Q. No, no. Oh, well, no. No. Just one more thing, when you were saying about the helper being on top of the –

A. Canopy.

Q. – the canopy in order to put the resin in, where would the temporary roof supports be at the time?

A. The TRS? The big –

Q. Would they be on the roof?

A. The big "T" in the middle?

Q. Yeah.

A. That would be up.

Q. It would be – that can extend far enough to get up to the roof, can it?

A. No, not all the time.

Q. Okay.

A. A lot of times you could extend that thing up as high as you wanted. You were still 15 feet from the back – from the roof.

Q. But at that time –

A. Because it caved in.

Q. At that time then the man couldn't reach up from the canopy either, could he?

A. Well, we had some pretty hairy times getting up there.

Q. I see.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. Guys –

Q. But all I'm suggesting or all I'm asking is that there are times when he wouldn't even have the support of the temporary roof support system on the bolter when he was up there bolting.

A. Whenever you were bolting in a caved-in area, you would not have the TRS.

Q. Okay. Thank you, that's all. We will recess until 1:30.

INQUIRY RECESSED (TIME: 12:33 p.m.)

INQUIRY RESUMED (TIME: 1:31 p.m.)

The electronic version of these documents is presented here for your information only. Care has been taken to transcribe the data accurately. However, in case of differences, the official version is the authoritative source.

The only known copy, accessible to the public, of the official Westray Mine Public Inquiry transcript is located in the Museum of Industry at Stellarton.

Order In Council
92-504

15 May 1992
establishing the
Westray Mine Public Inquiry Commission

Province of Nova Scotia
By His Honour
The Honourable Lloyd R. Crouse, Privy Councillor
Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia

WHEREAS it is deemed appropriate to cause inquiry to be made into and concerning the public matters hereinafter mentioned in relation to which the Legislature of Nova Scotia may make laws;

By and with the advice of the Executive Council of Nova Scotia, His Honour the Lieutenant Governor is pleased to appoint the Honourable K. Peter Richard, a Judge of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, to be, during pleasure, a Commissioner under the Public Inquiries Act, and a Special Examiner under the Coal Mines Regulation Act, with power to inquire into, report findings, and make recommendations to the Governor in Council and the people of Nova Scotia respecting:

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