The Risk of Freedom Briefing

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Questioning belief: the opportunity of Sept. 11

We had been lulled into thinking that the world is a vast open market, secure from danger, with all risks taken care of by the State. But on September 11th that changed. The heroism of the New York firemen, and of those who averted the fourth attack at the cost of their lives, reminded us that, in true emergencies, it is the risk-takers who are needed, and that the more we transfer our risks to the State, the more exposed are we to the real and non-transferable dangers. In this issue we highlight instances where people have been drawn to utter uncomfortable truths, and to take sides against the unreality of our current legislative programmes. Freedom is worth the risk: but the risk must be born by the same people who seek the freedom.

Liberté, Risque et Responsabilité

Paris, Institut Français des Relations Internationales 13 November 2001

Conference Report by Roger Scruton

Noting the 'visceral desire at the heart of modern societies, to hold others to account for every risk', **Bertrand de la Chapelle** introduced a wide-ranging discussion devoted to risk-taking, risk-aversion and the role of the state, in the wake of the terrorist atrocities. Speakers from medical, media, industrial and civil service milieus addressed the problems of estimating risk, and of balancing risk-reducing strategies against the human desire for enterprise and danger.

Patrick Peugeot, of the insurance company Mondiale, warned against the new litigiousness, in which prior reduction of risk is displaced by subsequent gain through compensation. Our courts are now tending towards 'responsibility without fault', so transferring to the insurer all the liabilities that ought to rest with the individual. A recent decision of the *Cour de Cassation* has even held an assurer liable for faults in a building, the effects of which appeared only years after it was built, and years after the policy had expired and the premiums ceased. The long-term economic effect of this decision will be to destroy the possibility of building insurance, since liability will be unlimited.

Much discussion centred on the internet, and the difficulty of regulating the internet-server, so as to reduce the risk of harbouring socially malign uses in ways that evade local jurisdictions: terrorism, racist agitation, pornography, paedophilia and so on. The British solution of a self-regulatory code of practice (amusingly called *déontologie*) appealed to many of the speakers, as a quick way to identify those who are not prepared to play by the rules. But it was recognized that the internet brings many risks which are not self-imposed by the user, and that the breaking down of barriers by the free flow of information (where 'information' includes the riveting speeches of Osama bin Laden) has effectively internationalised the risks to which we are exposed.

The conference began with a speech from the philosopher **Luc Ferry**, taking as his starting point the changed attitude to risk as analysed by Ulrich Beck in *The Risk Society*. The Enlightenment saw nature as risky and science as our defence — as in the reaction of the *philosophes* to the Lisbon earthquake of 1755. The modern romantic sees nature as benign, and science as risky. Moreover, risk has been internationalised, as we see from Chernobyl and from the events of September 11th. The nation state appeals to us, because it draws a veil over global dangers and fosters the belief that risks can be confined within a defensible territory. But this belief is an illusion. Nevertheless, we must recognize that the universalist ideals of the Enlightenment — including that of human rights — create a framework for international politics that is merely formal. The content lies in those other things — attachment, loyalty, membership, sacrifice — which the terrorist craves. Ferry concluded by distinguishing two great critiques of modernity/Enlightenment — the romantic fear of science, which is now archaic for us, and the hyper-modern critique in the name of science, as in deep ecology. He expressed his alarm at this new development, with its potential for totalitarian thought and action.

The final speech by **Jean-Louis Bruguière**, the *juge d'instruction* charged with the pursuit of terrorists, who has through his courage brought many of the criminals to justice, was a penetrating survey of Islamism, of its effect on the North-African immigrants in France, and of the very real danger to which France, Germany and Britain, along with the US, are now exposed. He argued that anti-terrorist legislation is not the answer. Such legislation is always contestable in the courts and the media, and the terrorist threat will always change to accommodate it. The camps of al-Qa'eda give courses in European law to their recruits, telling them how to claim asylum, how to use human rights legislation, how to get legal aid, and how in general to use our legal systems (and especially the idea — insane to any Islamist, but useful nevertheless — of human rights) as weapons in the fight against us. They come to the West armed with a legal knowledge that would astonish us in any of our students.

The only safeguards against the terrorist networks are vigilance, penetration and international cooperation. Globalisation has led to the 'sanctuarisation' of Western states — Canada, for example, where francophone terrorists can quickly disappear into the capillaries of society. Destroying sanctuaries in Afghanistan is of little long-term effect, since we are not fighting a state, or an organisation, or a person, but a *process*. Liberal capitalism, the dogmatic belief in human rights, the dangerous myth of growth, and the indolence that accompanies the convenience culture have all contributed to the fact that we are unwilling to perceive the threat, still less to act against it.

The delegates went away glum-faced into the streets of Paris, and it was some twenty minutes before they could sit down to the champagne, oysters, Chateaubriand and burgundy that are, after all, the natural reward for spending all day in a conference.

Our theme

Uncomfortable Truths

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The Price of Freedom

Alun Chalfont

If I had been opening a discussion on the price of freedom before September 11th, I might have wanted to talk about such things as the marginalization of Parliament and the growing intrusion of European institutions into our political system. But it would be fatuous now to pretend that we are not faced with a much more apocalyptic threat to our freedom, and that the price of freedom is now much higher.

What sort of freedom are we talking about? To use a simplistic formula, is it freedom to or freedom from, or both? Are we talking about freedom as a set of economic and social benefits in the modern social democratic sense – the freedom to work, to engage in demonstrations, to enjoy human relationships of diverse kinds? Or are we talking more about freedom from constraint – freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom from the fear of oppressive and intolerant regimes? Perhaps these concepts are so intertwined and interrelated that it is impossible to make any meaningful distinction between them. But we need to have a point of departure for a discussion of this kind.

I suggest that we might find some common ground in Edmund Burke's concept of 'a manly, moral, regulated liberty'combined , as he said, with such things as a good government, the discipline and obedience of armies. In other words, an absence of arbitrary constraints – guarantee of a body of individual rights, together with the general right to participate in government. What are the threats to that kind of freedom?

Towards the end of the last century, a study was carried out at Harvard University into the future pattern of world conflict and the changing security environment in the post Cold War climate. It resulted in a report by a Harvard Professor, Samuel Huntington, called '*The Clash of Civilizations*'. Its hypothesis was that future conflict would not be primarily ideological or economic. It would be between nations and groups belonging to different civilizations, and different religious faiths.

At the time, Professor Huntington's critics – and I was one of them – tended to dismiss his thesis as the work of an unreconstructed hawk looking for a new enemy to replace the vanished spectre of world communism. After the events of September 11th in the United States, it might be in order to engage in a little reassessment, and to ask ourselves what we think the future pattern of conflict might be. I think the first thing to do might be to blow away some of the nonsense which always resurfaces at these times about the definition of a terrorist – with the usual clichés being spouted about 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter'. I would suggest as a reasonable working proposition that one definition of a terrorist is a person who commits an act of terror – and there should be no difficulty about recognising that. However I have been confused by this talk of a 'war against terrorism'. It is rather like talking about a war against tanks or ballistic missiles. Terrorism is a means of waging war. Suicide bombers are its foot-soldiers and Osama bin Laden is just one of its field commanders. What we have to ask ourselves is – who is using this instrument of war against us? If we are honest, I don't think that question will be too difficult to answer, especially if we can overcome our natural reluctance to believe that people who say that our Western civilization is evil and must be destroyed may actually mean what they say.

We should beware, I think, of a failing to which we were all too prone in the days of the Cold War – reluctance to believe that people who say hostile things about the West might actually mean what they say. We shall be very foolish indeed, if we believe that all that we are facing is simply a network of terrorist cells controlled by a murderous fanatic. As Bernard Lewis, the distinguished Arab scholar has said: 'We are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations – the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judaeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the world-wide expansion of both.'

My proposition is that the West must indeed be prepared for this developing clash of civilizations which we do not seek, but in which the very concept of freedom is under threat. Of course, our immediate concern must be to respond to the murderous events of 11th September, and to punish those who perpetrated them and those who stand behind them providing finance, support and safe haven. The United States is right to regard this as the first priority and we are right to support them in every way. But let us not believe that this will be the end of the matter, it is only the beginning.

This is not to suggest that we are on the brink of a third world war; it is, however, to suggest that we may have to contemplate a future in which the structure of world power is based upon an ultimate calculation of interests in what has been called the 'West versus the Rest'. This may run counter to Utopian concepts of a universal civilization of brotherly love (largely a Western pipedream), but the events in New York and Washington must surely cause even the most enthusiastic do-gooders to modify their enthusiasm. We are now faced with a stark choice: are we prepared to defend our values of democracy, tolerance, compassion and individual freedom; or are we prepared to see them, in the long term, destroyed and replaced by something else? If, as I hope and believe, we are prepared to defend our civilization, it will not be enough to issue ultimatums to the Taliban regime, or neutralise murderous fanatics like Osama bin Laden. We shall need a long term and sustainable strategy. It will depend upon a number of clear objectives, and some practical strategies.

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In the new environment, we shall have to reconsider our whole attitude to the organization and use of armed forces. This means a radical reassessment, going far deeper than any Strategic Defence Review. Of course, it is axiomatic that there must be no further reduction in our military strength and we must think hard about how our armed forces are organized and equipped. To meet the new threat, do we still need armoured divisions and heavy artillery – and if so, how much? Should we not be increasing the strength of our special forces? And what do we need in the way of rapid reaction units – not to hand out food parcels in the Balkans, but to deal with terrorist attacks at home? Can we afford to cut the strength of our Territorial Army, given the real threat to the security of our home base?

And then, of course, there is the resource without which none of these can be effective – Intelligence. We shall need to spend much more on an effective intelligence system. In the context of a terrorist threat, this means much more than electronic and satellite systems. The two main elements in intelligence assessment of an enemy are his capabilities and his intentions. Capabilities can often be judged from, for example, satellite photography, but intentions – getting into the mind of an enemy – needs human intelligence, a resource which needs far more attention than it gets.

But this will not be entirely, or even principally, a military conflict. We must nourish, and even strengthen, the transatlantic axis and the Commonwealth framework upon which the strength of our democratic civilization rests; we must look with a cold and disillusioned eye upon the balance between security and individual freedom and recognise that we shall have to make sacrifices in that context. We may even have to suppress some of our liberal instincts and take stronger action against violent demonstrations in our streets. With all this we shall have to increase our efforts to understand the psychology of other religions and civilizations, and the bitterness and hatred which they sometimes manifest towards us.

The price of freedom is high, and we shall be paying it for a long time.

Lord Chalfont OBE MC PC was formerly Minister of State Foreign and Commonwealth Office in a Labour government; he now sits in the House of Lords as an Independent; he is President of the House of Lords All Party Defence Group.

These thoughts were presented at a Forum organised by the Institute of United States Studies, London, 20/11/01.

False assumptions and war in Afghanistan
Sir Michael Howard

The best reasoning, and the most flawless logic, is of little value if it starts from false assumptions. I have no doubt that voices were raised both in Washington and in Whitehall questioning the need and pointing out the dangers of immediate military action; but if they were, they were at once drowned out by the thunderous political imperative: *Something Must be Done*. The same voices no doubt also questioned the wisdom, if not the accuracy, of identifying bin Laden as the central and indispensable figure in the terrorist network; demonising him for some people, but for others giving him the heroic status enjoyed by 'freedom-fighters'.

We are now in a horrible dilemma. If we 'bring him to justice' and put him on trial we will provide him with a platform for global propaganda. If we assassinate him — perhaps 'shot while trying to escape' — he will be a martyr. If he escapes he will be a Robin Hood. He can't lose. And even if he is eliminated, it is hard to believe that a global network, apparently consisting of people as intelligent and well-educated as they are dedicated and ruthless, will not continue to function effectively until they are retraced and dug out by patient and long-term operations of police and intelligence forces, whose activities will not, and certainly should not, hit the headlines.

An extract from Sir Michael Howard's speech to the Royal United Services Institute on 30th October 2001. Sir Michael is Professor of Modern History and a Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford

The Deceit of Durban
Arch Puddington

In the days just prior to the assault on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, the World Conference Against Racism (WCAR), held under the UN symposium in Durban, was very much in the news, and for reasons that are altogether relevant to the mass murder that took place on September 11. At Durban, democracy's ability to evolve and accommodate the coexistence of peoples of differing races and cultures, was hardly mentioned.

What we witnessed instead was a rejection of the democratic idea itself as morally or politically superior to systems of oppression. This was, after all, a forum where the foreign minister of South Africa could describe Cuba as the 'most democratic country in the world,' where Fidel Castro was treated as a hero, and where American political representatives, some of whom were elected because of policies designed to expand opportunities for racial minorities, attacked their own country as racist.

The conference's omissions in this regard are worth noting. As the delegates assembled in Durban, Afghanistan's Taliban leaders were placing on trial foreign and Afghan relief workers for the crime of preaching Christianity. Robert Mugabe, the president of Zimbabwe and a militant advocate of reparations, was spearheading a violent campaign to drive white farmers from their lands. Egypt was jailing intellectuals who spoke out against anti-Christian discrimination. Sudan's Muslim government was prosecuting a brutal war against Christians and animists in the country's southern region.

Nothing was said about these abuses, except for a few vague references criticizing the contemporary slave trade. Instead, the justice minister of Sudan was on hand to assure participants that in his country minority rights were guaranteed in conformity with international law. Although Paul Kagame, the president of Rwanda, was among a handful of heads of state in attendance, nothing was said of the genocidal tribal conflicts in his country either, except for a demand from the Organization of African Unity that the United States pay $800 million for having failed to intervene to stop the killing.

Also ignored was another current African ethnic conflict, in Nigeria, where massacres have occurred in those provinces where Muslims have imposed Islamic law. No one thought to cite the mass expulsion of Asians from black African countries, a relatively recent occurrence. Nor did China's occupation of Tibet, as obvious an example of cultural oppression as exists in the world, provoke the WCAR's concern. Having regularly used intimidation to deflect criticism of its human-rights record at UN forums, Beijing succeeded not only in keeping the Tibet question off the agenda but also in restricting to a handful the number of Tibetan human-rights advocates in attendance. It goes without saying that no one thought to mention the killing of Israeli Jews by terrorists trained by Osama bin Laden, crimes that clearly qualify as acts of religious and ethnic 'xenophobia,'to use the WCAR's term.

As delegates to the WCAR wrangled over whether Israel was guilty of war crimes and apartheid, terrorist acts were being planned or carried out by Palestinian groups with the objective of killing as many Jewish civilians in Israel as possible. By the standards established by the Durban conferees, these attacks constituted a form of racist murder. Yet not only was this not on the WCAR agenda, a critical mass of Durban participants privately applauded the suicide bombings taking place in Israel.

It is but a small step from cheering acts of terrorism against Israel to finding satisfaction in terrorism against Israel's ally, the United States. For this reason, Durban must be recorded not merely as a farce and a failure, but as an event whose message, whose achievements, and whose legacy are uniquely monstrous.

A full version of this piece was published in November 2001 issue of the American journal, *Commentary* www.commentary.com

We got it so wrong
Ros Coward

The events of September 11 dealt a terrible blow to our self-perception as western liberals. We've tended to believe that conflict and difference can ultimately be resolved by talking, by rationality, by negotiating, by treating all sides decently and fairly. Even if, as has been the case with America's realpolitik, these rules are not observed, we still expect countries to try to play by them. But the attack on the World Trade Centre bypassed all that.

Looking back, it seems we never truly assimilated what the Holocaust meant. With Bosnia and Rwanda, we didn't look at the issue of what humanity was capable of, only what had caused the events in these circumstances. We always blame fascist regimes. But fascist regimes are human regimes.

We seem to have left ourselves at risk by denying the shadow and darkness which Martin Amis in this paper described as species shame. This is not a question of evil versus good, but of a collective sense of what we as a species are capable of doing. We are equally deluded in our notion that humanity is inexorably advancing from primitive violence towards democratic tolerance.

Somehow our collective failure to interrogate what has been brewing in fundamentalism marks another failure of liberalism. It now seems utterly naive that delicacy about 'other faiths' meant we weren't able to recognise fascistic tendencies.

These are serious blows to our sense of who we are, what we expect of the world and of our interactions with others. They require mental shifts, perhaps an awakening.

A full version was published in *The Guardian*. 25/9/01

Peace be with Yale and Oxford

Avik Roy on the powers that be at Yale:

As if we needed more evidence that academics are insulated from reality: At Yale, a faculty panel was held on September 17 to discuss the previous week's attacks. The panel members unanimously argued that America needs to sympathize with the 'desperate, angry, and bereaved' perpetrators of the September 11 attacks [Strobe Talbott, director of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization], and realize that its 'offensive cultural messages'provoke an understandably violent reaction from the Islamic world [Paul Kennedy, Professor of History].

When Justin Zaremby, a Yale undergraduate, asked why the panel couldn't bring itself to issue an explicit condemnation of terrorism, Yale College Dean Richard Brodhead snapped: 'We believe in academic freedom here.'

This prompted conservative Yale historian Donald Kagan, who was pointedly left off the panel, to lament the unanimity of the event, for diversity of opinion 'seems to be one kind of diversity hard to find here.' The *Wall Street Journal*, in its editorial pages, called Prof. Kennedy to task for his appeasing rhetoric.

Prof. Kennedy, who was last seen arguing in the early 1990s that America was a power in steep decline, responded by publishing his full remarks in the *Journal*, claiming that his remarks had been taken out of context. Instead, Kennedy only dug himself into a deeper hole, as his extended statement made clear his belief that American policy was directly to blame for the September 11 attacks. Time will tell if the subsequent outraged reaction of the *Journal's* readers brings Prof. Kennedy back down to earth. [see publications column]

Dr. Avik Roy was formerly the editor of a Yale student magazine *Light & Truth.*

An Oxford undergraduate writes to the Telegraph:

I share Chelsea Clinton's dismay over the current attitude of Oxford academics towards the war in Afghanistan (report, Nov. 9).

As a fresher who supports Anglo-American policy, Itoo have been disheartened to discover that the most vocal members of Oxford University oppose the war. However, I do not believe this is the view of the majority of students. Those of us who are in favour of the war are not being heard.

Maybe Miss Clinton should use her privileged position as Oxford's most famous student to re-adjust this imbalance and make our voices heard? I for one would be behind her.

Jonathan Walters, Keble College, Oxford

Globalisation and the uncomfortable truth

Tony Curzon Price

No one believes Osama Bin Laden and his followers arise from improbable, exceptional circumstances. The attitudes of resentment, anger, disgust, sacrilege invited by the West will continue to be invited by our civilisation, wrapped in some ideology or other, for centuries to come. In any complicated hierarchy, there is always some group for whom there is tremendous glory in absolute opposition. The barbarians were at the *gates* precisely because they did not want to be citizens of Rome.

The West's relative power, wealth, tolerance and decadence can make us look to declining Rome for comfort: valuable parts of the Roman legacy are with us today — law, religion, culture — and these kernels survived some rocky centuries. Before this parallel settles our worries too far, note a crucial difference: the fanatics and ideologues who will camp at our gates for the next few centuries will have technology of destruction in a different league from any Visigoth's. One of our opponents, one of these days, will almost surely wreak catastrophic damage to our earth and civilisation.

Can it be avoided? The globalisers thought that WTO-backed free world trade would do it — the free movement of goods and capital would materially enrich all, to the point of blunting any source of resentment and turning the planet uniformly Western. This has not worked, because there are unimaginably many detailed processes that invalidate the competitive market model that the hope was originally based on.

An uncomfortable truth.

Tony Curzon Price is an academic economist and entrepreneur. He can be discovered at http://price.econ.ucl.ac.uk

Globalisation and the growth in Identity politics

Thomas Hylland Eriksen

In the age of the jet plane and satellite dish, of global capitalism, ubiquitous markets and global mass media, various commentators have claimed that the world is rapidly becoming a single place. Although this slightly exaggerated description has an important point to make, a perhaps even more striking aspect of the post-cold war world is the emergence — seemingly everywhere — of identity politics whose explicit aim is the restoration of rooted tradition, religious fervour and/or commitment to ethnic or national identities.

It is doubtless true that globalisation is a pervasive tendency influencing the lives of people everywhere – from the Amazon rainforest to Japanese cities. The concept became fashionable during the 1990s, and as a result, its meaning became fuzzy. I would propose, therefore, a view of globalisation as all the socio-cultural processes that contribute to making distance irrelevant. It has important economic, political and cultural dimensions, as well as equally important ethical implications.

Truly global processes affect the conditions of people living in particular localities, creating new opportunities and new forms of vulnerability. Risks are globally shared in the age of the nuclear bomb and potential ecological disasters. On the same note, the economic conditions in particular localities frequently (some would say always) depend on events taking place elsewhere in the global system. If there is an industrial boom in Taiwan, towns in the English Midlands will be affected. If oil prices rise, this implies salvation for the oil-exporting Trinidadian economy and disaster for the oil-importing Barbadian one.

Globalisation is, in other words, not merely another word for the growing transnational economy. It is true that it is largely driven by technology and economic interests, but it must be kept in mind that it encompasses a wide range of processes that are not in themselves technological or economic. Take the discourse of human rights, for example. In the course of the second half of the twentieth century, the ideas and values associated with human rights spread from educated elites worldwide (and not just, as some wrongly believe, in the West) to villagers and farmers in remote areas. The rapid dissemination of human rights ideas is probably one of the most spectacular successes of globalisation.

At the same time, we have in recent years witnessed the growth, in very many societies in all continents, of political movements seeking to strengthen the collective sense of uniqueness and cultural purity, often targeting globalisation processes, which are seen as a threat to local distinctiveness and self-determination. A European example with tragic consequences is the recent rise of ethnic nationalism in Croatia and Serbia. But even in the more prosperous and stable European Union, strong ethnic and nationalist movements have grown during the 1990s, ranging from Scottish separatism to the anti-immigration Front National in France. In Asia, two of the most powerful recent examples are the rise of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, and the meteoric success of the Hindu nationalist BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party, 'Party of the Indian People') in India; and many African countries have also seen a strong ethnification of their politics during the last decade, as well as the rise of political Islam in the north. In the Americas, various minority movements, from indigenous groups to African Americans, have with increasing success demanded cultural recognition and equal rights.

In sum, politics in the 1990s to a great extent meant identity politics. What is peculiar to the Al-Qa'eda and similar non-territorial networks is that they seem to have relinquished state-building aspirations, fighting for honour and glory rather than for conventional political power. This makes them difficult to understand, let alone combat, by states relying on a territorial globe. The Gulf War was still a war over territorial control; the present war is a war over people's minds.

This new political scene, difficult to fit into the old left–right divide, is interpreted in very different ways by the many academics and journalists who have studied them. This is partly because identity politics comes in many flavours.

Thomas Hylland Eriksen is a professor of social anthropology at the University of Oslo. A full version of this article first published in the UN Chronicle 1999 and can be found on *www.openDemocracy.net*.

Publications

The Risk Society, Towards a New Modernity by Ulrich Beck. First published in Germany in 1986, translated by Mark Ritter and published in London by Sage Publications in 1992. Offers a theory of modernity, the role of science and a definition of society as a 'risk society'. Also *What is Globalization?* (1999) in which Beck describes the political responses to globalization.

Islam: a Very Short Introduction by Malise Ruthven, Oxford Paperbacks, 2000, and *Islam in the World* by Malise Ruthven, Penguin Books, May 2000. Ruthven offers an introduction to the Islamic world - past and present -and to the challenges it presents to western society. See also openDemocracy website

The Age of Terror: America and the World After September 11, eds Strobe Talbott and Nayan Chanda, Basic Books in New York and by Perseus Press in London, Jan 2002. Published to perpetuate the discussion held in Yale soon after the attack. The authors of the book include Yale professors Abbas Amanat, Paul Bracken, John Gaddis, Charles Hill, Paul Kennedy and Harold Koh. Also contributing will be Oxford historian Niall Ferguson and scientist Maxine Singer.

American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us by Steven Emerson, Free Press, January 2002.

Silent No More: Confronting America's False Images of Islam by Paul Findley, Amana Publications, July 2001.

Dollars for Terror: The US and Islam by Richard Labeviere, Algora Publishing, 2000.

Culture, Globalisation and the World System ed. Anthony D. King, Palgrave, 1991.

Runaway World: How Globalisation is Reshaping Our Lives by Anthony Giddens, Profile Books, 1999.

Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America by Yossef Bodansky, Prima Publishing, September 2001. Explains the belief that America's modernising influence on Arab nations thwarts Islamic fundamentalist goals.

WWW.

www.openDemocracy.net has attracted many contributions on the causes and consequences of September 11th. See in particular Malise Ruthven explaining the uncomfortable truth about the history and nature of fundamentalism.