DELLUMS: We will be operating under the 5-minute rule. Congressman Ryan?

RYAN: I was gratified by everything you said, Capt, and I think you have very well stated the necessity for the American people to examine themselves and the role it plays in Vietnam by representatives of the American people.

1 thing that struck me, and that was your reference to the wounded villager, that you asked he be evacuated and wasn't evacuated. Did you find or do you believe on the basis of your experience that we in Vietnam value less the lives of the Vietnamese than other lives? Did you find there was a certain amount of waste implicit in the attitude stated toward the Vietnamese?

LAUGHLIN: I would have to say we certainly valued American lives over Vietnamese.

However, I could certainly not go so far as to say the Vietnamese lives were valueless. I am afraid I can't answer it any further than that.

RYAN: How prevalent was the practice of measure the BODY COUNT by the evidence of an ear? Was that a prevalent practice? As you went from the jungle school into the field, did you find that practice prevailing?

LAUGHLIN: My units never took up this practice, and I don't now how many did.

The fact that it was promulgated in jungle warfare school I think is indicative of the feeling at the time: Okay, yes, we can't put out official policy to cut off people's ears. Our unit was guilty of throwing dead bodies on our APCs until it came down as a policy that we couldn't throw dead bodies under the APCs and parade them through town any more. That was a policy that was stopped about 3/4's through my tour. But the severing of members, I never saw it, but I heard it. It was a definite, informal, unwritten policy.

RYAN: Was the BODY COUNT exaggeration of finding 197 when there was actually 13, was that typical of the way the count was reported in your experience?

LAUGHLIN: In my opinion it was. I think the body count was used as a measure of success in Vietnam, a measure of a general's, a commander's success. They made every opportunity to get the BC.

RYAN: Thank you.

DELLUMS: Congressman Badillo?

BADILLO: The 2d incident that you mentioned where there was unauthorized firing upon the villagers, were you the platoon leader at that time?

LAUGHLIN: Yes.

BADILLO: Did you stress afterwards as to why there was an unauthorized firing on these villagers?

LAUGHLIN: No. I did not.

BADILLO: Why not?

LAUGHLIN: I don't know.

RYAN: Did it happen again?

LAUGHLIN: It did not.

REUSS: When did this incident with respect to the enemy BODY COUNT of the Able and Charlie companies occur?

LAUGHLIN: I think it was Junction City II, up Route 4 in later summer 1967.

I don't know the exact dates. I am sure the annals of the 2d Bn, 2d Infantry, will give the exact date. I would have to guess maybe the middle of September or late August.

REUSS: and these were companies A and C of the 2d Bn of the 2d Infantry regiment?

LAUGHLIN: Yes.

REUSS: and what Bgd and corps were they?

LAUGHLIN: I don't remember the Bgd that handled the operation. It was a multi-Bn operation where they are put under operational control of a Bgd commander. I don't remember which Bgd had operational control at that time.

REUSS: and you were a platoon leader in what company?

LAUGHLIN: I was the B company commander.

LAUGHLIN: Yes.

REUSS: and did you have an opportunity to observe personally the incident you described?

LAUGHLIN: I was commanding the fire base which was about a 1/2 mile from the incident and attended a staff meeting the next morning where the weapons and all the spoils were displayed from the battle. I did not participate directly in the battle that night, although there were minor skirmishes around our perimeter as a result of the battle.

REUSS: Who was the asst div commander who made the enlarged BODY COUNT that you described?

LAUGHLIN: It was a man by the name of General Hollingsworth.

REUSS: What is your source for saying he made this high BC?

LAUGHLIN: During the staff meeting the Bn commander told us at the time that it was the asst div commander's feeling that there were at least 197 bodies or 197 people killed. At that time it became very clear that was the number of people that were killed. Part of the reason I think was the Vietnamese supposedly have a habit of dragging away their dead bodies, and they found so much blood on the perimeters and somehow that gets translated into bodies. It was all quite creditable at the time.

REUSS: That is your source for saying that in fact body a total of 13 bodies were found in front of companies A and C?

LAUGHLIN: That again was a staff meeting. It was put out that 13 bodies were found. The case of beer was delivered by the man who lost the bet, and the score was tallied, and at that time even though the score had been tallied 8 to 5, the Bn commander said well, it is 197 because the asst div commander had proclaimed so.

REUSS: I am not sure I understand it. Did the Bn commander say at the Bn officer's staff meeting, 1, that the actual count was 8 and 5 or 13; and, 2, that the asst div'nal commander is claiming a count of more than 100?

LAUGHLIN: Yes, sir, to both questions.

REUSS: Did he by word or facial indication give any impression of what he thought of the discrepancy between those 2 figures?

LAUGHLIN: At the time, as I said, it was quite creditable. We all longed for success, and people in that type of situation, I would say, would tend to believe anything like that. It made us look good, and we were very happy to say 197 members were killed and somehow managed to forget there were only 13 bodies lying in front of the perimeter. There seemed to be no tongue in cheek, no raised eyebrows.

REUSS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

DELLUMS: Cngwmn Abzug?

ABZUG: I was interested in your statement that you reported to the commanding officer [CO] the existence of this wounded Vietnamese and there was no attention paid to it. What steps did you take with respect to that? Laughlin: I reported to him personally. I reported to him over the telephone that the man needed attention. I reported later that the man needed more than just attention, that he needed to be evacuated. The commander said that they couldn't get a chopper in to evacuate a Vietnamese. So, my medic and myself stayed up with the man and did what we could for him and he lost consciousness early in the morning and died shortly thereafter.

ABZUG: Did you have obvious experiences or other experiences with respect to the handling of wounded civilians or Vietnamese? If you did, would you describe what practice was with respect to there treatment and handling?

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