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OPENING STATEMENT OF COUNSEL
TRIBUNAL OF INQUIRY INTO THE FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE FATAL SHOOTING OF JOHN CARTHY AT ABBEYLARA,
COUNTY LONGFORD ON THE 20TH OF APRIL, 2000 AND RELATED MATTERS. INTRODUCTION Sir, this Tribunal has been established under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Acts, 1921 to 2002 by Resolution of Dáil Éireann on the 17th of April, 2002, and of Seanad Éireann on the 18th of April, 2002, to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding the fatal shooting of John Carthy at Abbeylara, County Longford on the 20th of April, 2000, and to report to the Clerk of Dáil Éireann and to make such findings and recommendations as it sees fit in relation to these matters. During the course of its preliminary investigations the Tribunal has been furnished with over 200 witness statements. It has also been furnished with further information by An Garda Siochana, interested parties, members of the public and by experts retained by the Tribunal. What follows is the Tribunal legal team’s preliminary understanding of events as they unfolded at Abbeylara on the 19th and 20th of April, 2000 and as gleaned from the documents furnished to the Tribunal. It is not intended to be a statement of assumed or accepted facts. The evidence of witnesses will be considered during the course of oral hearings and will be tested through examination and cross-examination. The finding of facts is entirely a matter for you, Sir. This opening statement has been prepared by all members of the legal team, Mr Raymond Comyn S.C., Mr Patrick O’Dwyer B.L. and me, with the considerable assistance of our legal researcher, Ms Jenny Bulbulia B.L. and solicitor Mr John Nolan. Sir, on the formal opening of the Inquiry at the Four Courts, Dublin on the 7th of January, 2003, you indicated that the facts and issues which the Tribunal perceives arise out of the fatal shooting of John Carthy, and covered by the resolutions of the Houses of the Oireachtas, would be addressed in a series of six modules, the contents of which were set out in broad outline in that statement. This statement, which is now presented to the Tribunal, refers in some detail to the information so far received dealing with the issues addressed in a number of those modules. The modules referred to by you are as follows: 1. First Module – Background to the fatal shooting of John Carthy; 2. Second Module – The circumstances of the fatal shooting of John Carthy; 3. Third Module – The Garda Emergency Response Unit; 4. Fourth Module – The cause of John Carthy’s death and injuries sustained by him at Abbeylara; and the possibility of an effective alternative approach or approaches which might have been adopted by An Garda Siochana before or after John Carthy emerged from his house prior to being fatally injured. 5. Fifth Module – An examination of how the police in comparable jurisdictions (for example Scotland, Canada, New Zeland and Australia) deal with similar situations where an armed gunman is believed to be activated by mental illness, psychiatric disorder or other such disability; 6. Sixth Module – Review of the Statute Law in Ireland regarding gun licences, the right of citizens to possess and use firearms and a review of relevant police training. This opening statement is primarily concerned with matters contained in the First and Second Modules. In due course, the remaining modules will be opened on a more complete basis. Nevertheless, it will be necessary to touch on each of the modules during the course of this statement. The Tribunal legal team has been furnished
with statements, the vast majority of which were taken by members of An Garda
Siochana during the course of an investigation carried out by Chief
Superintendent (now Assistant Commissioner) Adrian Culligan. Potentially relevant witnesses have been
furnished with a copy of their statements and have been requested to consider
the statement made, and to clarify or add any matter deemed to be of
relevance. In most cases statements have
been returned approved and without amendment.
Some individuals have made alterations, in most cases such amendments do
not appear to be of major significance.
In addition the Tribunal has been furnished with documentation submitted
to the Oireachtas Sub-Committee established to investigate the Abbeylara
Incident. This documentation was
supplied to the Tribunal following the passing of appropriate resolutions of
both Houses of the Oireachtas. ooo000ooo Sir, in May, 1997, the Toronto Chief of Police established a Committee to review all aspects of police use of force in that city. A report was prepared in May, 1998. The following quotation is reproduced in the introduction to that report: “Death at the hands of the police
prompts confusing emotions for the victim’s family, fellow police officers,
government officials and the public who must stand in judgement of the
events. Given that the highest calling
in police duty is to protect life, a sense that something has gone wrong is
appropriate, even if the death proves to have been legally justifiable. Many are left to wonder whether there was not some other way the situation could have been resolved ..... “ (Scott, M.S & Geller, W.A) Some might feel that these comments are apposite in the context of what occurred at Abbeylara on the 20th of April, 2000. The sentiments expressed in the quotation, in the context of this jurisdiction, must be seen against a background of a country which is proud of its tradition of having a generally unarmed police force. In September 1922, Commissioner Michael Staines stated that : “The Civic Guard will succeed not by force of arms, or numbers, but on their moral authority as servants of the people”. The decision to send out unarmed policemen has been described by Liam McNiffe in his “A History of the Garda Siochana” (Wolfhound Press, 1997, Dublin) as both “courageous and ambitious”. McNiffe states that: “In many respects, the new force had modelled itself very closely on its predecessor, the RIC, but this was a clear break with tradition. This decision influenced the public perception of the force and greatly facilitated its acceptance by all sides of the community. It was perhaps the most significant decision taken by any government concerning the Garda Siochana in the period 1922-52.” However, the issuing to and possession of firearms by non uniformed members of An Garda Siochana is now long established. Garda Regulations deal with the procedures and circumstances for such issue and use. It is specifically provided by those Regulations that : “whenever a member of the force is required to carry firearms on duty
the member should do so only when wearing plain clothes. Members should not carry firearms when in
uniform.” The circumstances in which such firearms have been used in the past has been limited to very exceptional situations. Thankfully, in this jurisdiction, the circumstances in which such force has been used with fatal effect have been even more limited. Perhaps, therefore, Sir, when a fatality does take place at the hands of armed Gardai the “sense that something has gone wrong”, whether such “sense” is justified or not, is placed more sharply in focus. Thus, Sir, this Tribunal has been established and it is hoped that when the evidence has been concluded, the Tribunal will be in a position to report on what happened, why it happened and what recommendations, if any, should be made. ooo000ooo The late John Carthy was born on the 9th of October, 1972. He was the only son of Rose Carthy and the late John Carthy, Senior. He had one sister Marie. His father died on the 12th day of April, 1990. He resided in a three bed roomed house with his mother at Toneymore, Abbeylara, County Longford. It was his home. In addition to the 3 bedrooms, the house had a kitchen, porch and bathroom. The house was at right angles to the public road. The gable end at which the kitchen was located faced onto that road. A new house had been constructed on the same site by Longford County Council under a rural housing scheme. The Carthys were about to move from the old house to the new house when the incident the subject matter of this Inquiry occurred. The old house has since been demolished. This was demolished within a number of weeks of the incident. John Carthy was diagnosed with depression in 1992 and subsequently as a manic depressive with bipolar affective disorder. He continued in treatment up to the date of his death. Generally speaking, his employment was in the building trade. On Wednesday the 19th of April, 2000, John Carthy was at home with his mother. It is understood that he was in the house all day. It appears that a discussion took place between them. In a statement furnished to the Tribunal by Mrs Carthy, it has been indicated that the discussion centred around the Carthys moving from their old house to the new one. John was reluctant to move. The County Council’s scheme involved the acquisition of the entire site and the demolition of the old house. John Carthy was the owner of a shot gun. This was a Russian made Baikal model 43M. It was a double barrel breach loading side by side 12 gauge shot gun. He was the holder of a firearms certificate. He was issued with an unlimited firearms certificate on the 30th of October, 1992 in respect of his shotgun. This certificate was renewed on the 20th of August, 1993, 23rd of September, 1994 and 14th of October, 1995. He applied for and was granted a limited certificate on the 3rd of November, 1996 and again on the 3rd of October, 1997. His firearm was seized in August 1998 and returned to him on 14th November 1998. Therefore, prior to the seizure of his firearm in August 1998, John Carthy was the holder of a limited firearms certificate. In November, 1998, the certificate was changed to an unlimited type and this was subsequently renewed on the 29th of August, 1999. ooo000ooo 19TH & 20TH OF APRIL, 2000 Mrs. Carthy has informed the Tribunal that at approximately 3.40 p.m. on Wednesday the 19th of April, 2000, John went to the hall where his gun was locked away in a cabinet. He removed his gun and brought it back to the kitchen. He also had a full box of cartridges and a gun belt. It appears that he was remonstrating that “no one was going to put him out of his house” and that he was going to stay. He loaded the gun with two cartridges, went outside the hall door and discharged two shots. On returning to the kitchen he sat beside the range. What happened next is not entirely clear. According to Mrs. Carthy, after some time, she decided to go to her sister, Nancy Walsh, who lived two doors up the road, approximately 100 yards from Carthy’s house. The Carthy household is situated in a rural environment on the outskirts of Abbeylara. There are a small number of houses on this road. A map has been prepared illustrating the location of each of these houses. This will be introduced into evidence during the course of the oral hearings. These houses are on the right hand side just beyond the speed limit sign on the outskirts of Abbeylara. The first house that one meets is Nancy Walsh’s. The next house is Burkes, the next Carthys and the last of the four houses, Farrells. The Tribunal proposes to call engineering evidence to establish in greater detail the distances between these houses and the general topography of the area. Suffice at this stage to note, that, generally speaking, the land at the side of the road where Carthy’s house is situated falls towards the road. The ground at roadway level inclines towards Abbeylara village. At points on the roadway between Farrells and Burkes, this incline is significant. According to those to whom Mrs. Carthy reported at the scene, she had been put out of her house by John. Mrs. Carthy has stated that John did not throw her out of the house and she has informed the Tribunal that when she left her house, John’s gun had not been reloaded. However, she was worried about her son. At Walsh’s she met her sister Nancy; her niece Ann Walsh and a neighbour, Alice Farrell. Alice Farrell had known John Carthy since he was born. Mrs. Carthy expressed concern that John was in the house with his gun and cartridges, and that she was worried that he might do harm to himself. She therefore asked the occupants of Nancy Walsh’s house to phone the Gardai in Granard as she wanted the guards to come out to the house and to “take the gun from John”. According to statements obtained from the persons then present in the Walsh household, Mrs. Carthy was certainly concerned. According to Ann Walsh and Alice Farrell, she was hysterical. It appears that the primary concern at that stage was that John would shoot himself. At 5.20 p.m. Ann Walsh telephoned the Gardai at Granard. This was not a “999” call, rather it was made to the station’s local telephone number. She handed the phone to Mrs. Carthy who spoke to the member of An Garda Siochana. This Garda has been identified as Garda Maeve Gorman who, on the 19th of April, 2000, was the Station Orderly and Member in Charge at Granard Garda Station. Garda Gorman has confirmed in a statement to the Tribunal that at 5.25 p.m. she received a call from Mrs. Carthy who informed her that John had put her out of the house, that he had locked himself into the house and had with him a loaded shotgun. That telephone call has been recorded in the incident book at Granard Garda Station. As a result of this telephone call, Garda Gorman contacted Garda John Gibbons and Garda Colin White who were based at Granard Garda Station and assigned to patrol car duty. She requested them to attend the scene. According to Ann Walsh’s statement there were two more telephone calls made to Granard Garda Station at 5.32 p.m. and 5.34 p.m. and that at least one of the telephone calls was made because they “were in fear”. It appears that Garda Gibbons knew John Carthy. Whilst in Granard Garda Station, before going to the scene, he took with him an official issue .38 Smith & Wesson revolver and some ammunition. He also obtained a Garda flak jacket and put on, what has been described as, a “civilian jacket” over the flak jacket. Garda White has stated that he was unarmed and in uniform. He took up duty as the driver of a marked garda car. Garda Gibbons accompanied Garda White to Toneymore. The Carthy’s home is approximately two and a half miles from Granard. They first proceeded to Burke’s house, on the Abbeylara side. Garda Gibbons then made his way to Walsh’s house where Mrs. Carthy was present. According to Garda Gibbons, all persons present in the house were frightened and some questioned “why John had been given back the gun”. The taking possession and return of John Carthy’s firearm in 1998 will be addressed later. Garda Gibbons in a statement to the Tribunal confirms that he attempted to calm the situation and to obtain as much information about John Carthy as possible. He was informed that John had been on antidepressant tablets and that he obtained them on a monthly basis. He made enquiries regarding the possibility of phoning the house. At that time there was a land line to the house, but it was not connected. It was confirmed however, that John Carthy had a mobile phone and that number was given to Garda White. He has informed the Tribunal that Mrs. Carthy was somewhat reluctant to provide a telephone number as she was concerned that John would find out that she had given the Gardai the number. Garda Gibbons made enquiries as to who might be the best person to talk to John. The name of Thomas Walsh emerged. He had been a lifetime friend. He was also a first cousin and neighbour. He was working in Cork at that time and attempts were made to contact him. Gardai Gibbons and White decided to proceed to Carthy’s house. At approximately 5.55 p.m. Garda White drove the patrol car up the driveway of the house. As he was about to stop the vehicle he heard a single gunshot followed by a second in, what he describes as, “quick succession”. He did not see who had fired the shots or in what direction they had been fired. He feared for his safety. He reversed the patrol car out of the Carthy driveway and headed in the direction of Abbeylara. Gardai White and Gibbons observed the Carthy household from what they described as a “safe distance”. Subsequently they drove past the house in an attempt to assess the situation. Detective Garda James Campbell, who was attached to Granard Garda Station, and who was due to commence work at 6.00 p.m. on the 19th of April, 2000, received a telephone call from Garda Gorman at approximately 5.30 p.m., informing him that a shot had been discharged by John Carthy of Abbeylara. D/Garda Campbell drove to Granard Garda Station where he collected an unmarked patrol car attached to the District Detective Unit. He was carrying his personal issue Smith & Wesson revolver. John Carthy’s General Medical Practitioner, Dr. Patrick Cullen of Coole had been contacted by another cousin of John Carthy, Rosaleen Mahon. John Carthy had been a patient of Dr. Cullen since approximately 1988. Dr Cullen agreed to come to the scene immediately. He had just finished surgery and in his statement to the Tribunal has confirmed that Rosaleen Mahon, a cousin of John’s, informed him that John was “high”, that he had had a row with his mother and that he had “put her out of the house”. He was informed that John was firing a shotgun. Dr. Cullen left his surgery and went straight to Abbeylara. He drove past the Carthy household and parked his car outside Farrell’s house. He called to Farrell’s house, there was no answer. He waited in his car. It was during this time that the Gardai arrived. According to Dr. Cullen approximately ten shots “were fired out the back of the house” during a five minute period. When Dr. Cullen saw the marked police car he got out of his own car and introduced himself to Gardai Gibbons and White. He got into the back of the patrol car and all three proceeded to Walsh’s house. At that stage the unmarked car which was being driven by D/Garda Campbell arrived. Dr. Cullen has informed the Tribunal in his statement that he told the Gardai that he thought that John Carthy might be aggressive to them in view of what he describes as the “previous incident and [sic] alleged Garda assault” and also the fact that John Carthy might have consumed alcohol. Garda White, who was unarmed and in uniform, and Dr. Cullen, remained in the marked patrol car. Garda Gibbons got into the unmarked patrol car with D/Garda Campbell. Both of these gardai were armed. They decided to approach the house. It may be of significance that the house was now being approached by two armed gardai in circumstances where there was information to the effect that John Carthy had been on anti-depressant tablets, was not holding any hostage, had discharged his weapon on a number of occasions, and that he might be aggressive to them because they were gardai. This approach was by two members of the force who were in plain clothes and both of whom were armed. Detective Garda Campbell has informed the Tribunal that he was concerned that John Carthy may have taken his own life. It was not at this stage thought necessary to seek back up or support prior to approaching the house. D/Garda Campbell drove the unmarked patrol car up the driveway of Carthy’s house, both gardai got out of the car and approached the house from the front gable side. They adopted a crouched position. D/Garda Campbell has stated that he attempted to engage John Carthy in conversation. He identified himself and said that he was a Garda attached to Granard Garda Station. As he did so, he has described how he heard glass breaking behind him, he heard a shot from a shot gun which was discharged from a window between the door and the front gable of the house. Garda Gibbons and D/Garda Campbell then took up position at the gable of the house next to the rear garden. He has advised the Tribunal that he attempted once again to engage in conversation with John Carthy in an effort to establish if he was alone or if he was injured. D/Garda Campbell in his statement says that John Carthy replied with an expletive and threatened to blow his head off. Two further shots were then discharged from inside the house, though the direction of these shots is unclear. D/Garda Campbell informed John Carthy that his doctor, Dr. Cullen was present and wished to speak to him. He requested him to throw out the shotgun and told him that he would come to no harm. At that another shot was discharged from a window at the rear of the house. This shot was discharged into the left front wing of the unmarked patrol car which had been parked in the driveway. Damage was caused to the front wing of the car. The car was unoccupied when struck by the shot. Further discussions ensued and two more shots were fired to the rear of the house. Garda Gibbons and D/Garda Campbell then took cover behind a mound of clay in the rear garden. At this stage D/Garda Campbell phoned Garda Gorman from his mobile phone. He informed her of what was happening and requested her to contact Superintendent Michael Byrne, who was the then Superintendent in charge of Granard Sub-District, which includes Abbeylara. Garda Gibbons and D/Garda Campbell remained under cover at the rear of the house until further Garda support arrived at the scene. The Tribunal legal team’s preliminary investigations indicate that at approximately 6.20 p.m. Garda Gorman telephoned Superintendent Byrne at home. He was informed that an incident involving the firing of gunshots was in progress at Abbeylara, that D/Garda Campbell and Gardai Gibbons and White had been fired upon, and that the unmarked patrol car had been damaged by gunfire. He instructed Garda Gorman to contact Superintendent Joseph Shelly who is and was attached to Mullingar Garda Station. Superintendent Byrne in turn contacted Inspector (now Superintendent) Martin Maguire of Longford who was acting as District Officer at Granard. Following this telephone call, Garda Gorman contacted Superintendent Shelly at his office at Mullingar. Superintendent Shelly in his statement to the Tribunal has indicated that as a result of his conversation with Garda Gorman he became aware that an incident involving the unlawful discharge of a firearm at the Gardai was in progress at Abbeylara, County Longford. He states that he was also made aware that a garda patrol car had been hit by gunfire when the Gardai investigating the incident had approached the scene. He was also informed that no one had been injured as a result of what had happened. Superintendent Shelly made contact with a number of other Gardai based at Mullingar Garda Station namely D/Garda Eugene Dunne and Garda Shane Nolan. He also contacted D/Sergeant Aidan Foley of Athlone Garda Station and instructed him to assemble a party of armed Gardai from his area, namely Garda Eugene Boland, D/Garda John Quinn and Garda William Mulligan, and to proceed as soon as possible to the scene. On route to Granard Garda Station, Superintendent Shelly had a further discussion with Superintendent Byrne and requested that armed gardai from Longford be sent to Abbeylara. Following a further conversation between Inspector Maguire and Superintendent Byrne, Inspector Maguire directed other detectives who were based at Longford Garda Station, to attend at Abbeylara. He then prepared to travel to Granard. Therefore, it appears that by 6.30 p.m., following the discharge of shots, the damaging of the unmarked garda patrol car, and the request for assistance, gardai from Athlone, Mullingar and Longford stations, including armed detectives, were on their way to the scene. Most of these arrived between 6.30 and 7.00 p.m.. In the meantime, preliminary evidence suggests that at approximately 6.45 p.m. the Divisional Officer for the Garda Division of Longford/Westmeath, Chief Superintendent Patrick Tansey who was at his offices in Mullingar, became aware of the incident. The Divisional Clerk, Sergeant John Feeney had left a note outlining details of the incident on Chief Superintendent Tansey’s desk. At approximately 6.50 p.m. Chief Superintendent Tansey contacted Superintendent Shelly by telephone. Superintendent Shelly was on his way to, but had not yet arrived at the scene. This gave rise to further telephone calls which led to the decision to deploy members of the Emergency Response Unit (“E.R.U.”) to the scene. ooo000ooo DEPLOYMENT OF THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT (E.R.U.) The decision to seek the services of the E.R.U. and to request their deployment to the scene was made by Assistant Commissioner Tony Hickey. It will be of importance to assess the information which was available, and upon which, not only the decision to request the assistance of the E.R.U., but also the affirmative response was made. Examination of the preliminary evidence indicates that at approximately 7.00 p.m. Chief Superintendent Tansey contacted Assistant Commissioner Hickey by mobile telephone. According to the statement received from Assistant Commissioner Hickey, he was informed by Chief Superintendent Tansey that John Carthy had put his mother out of their house in Abbeylara, was in possession of a shotgun, had fired about eight shots, that he was a manic depressive, was on medication, had fired shots when the first gardai arrived on the scene, and had hit the front wing of the patrol car. Assistant Commissioner Hickey was also informed that John Carthy was contained in the house, that there was a stand off situation, that his G.P. was at the scene and that local gardai including D/Garda Jim Campbell were trying to negotiate with John Carthy without success. Assistant Commissioner Hickey was particularly concerned by the fact that John Carthy had fired up to eight shots and that it had not been possible to initiate dialogue with him. He informed Chief Superintendent Tansey that the services of the E.R.U. and a trained negotiator should be sought. He has informed the Tribunal that he was concerned for the safety of the local community, for the safety of the gardai and for the safety of John Carthy. He considered the deployment of the E.R.U. to be the best strategy to adopt to lead to a safe resolution. He contacted Assistant Commissioner Patrick O’Toole of Garda Headquarters, Phoenix Park, Dublin, the Officer who has responsibility for “C” Branch with national responsibility for Crime, Security and Traffic. Further, at Assistant Commissioner Hickey’s suggestion, Chief Superintendent Tansey contacted D/Chief Superintendent Basil Walsh, the officer in charge of the Special Detective Unit at Harcourt Square, Dublin. This Unit includes the E.R.U.. He in turn contacted D/Inspector Patrick Hogan the Inspector in charge of the E.R.U. and instructed him to send a unit from the E.R.U. to Abbeylara. He also requested that a negotiator, D/Sergeant Michael Jackson, should attend to assist local Gardai in the negotiations. D/Sergeant Jackson is also a member of the E.R.U.. Subsequently, D/Chief Superintendent Basil Walsh contacted Chief Superintendent Tansey and informed him that he was sending 6 members of the E.R.U. to Abbeylara. It should also be noted that in his statement to the Tribunal, D/Superintendent Peter Maguire of the Special Detective Unit states that he was on duty in Harcourt Square Police Station, Dublin, when he was informed by D/Inspector Hogan, that a request had been made for a unit of the E.R.U. to be dispatched to Abbeylara. D/Superintendent Maguire was informed of the proposal to send a unit of two D/Sergeants and five D/Gardai to the scene. One D/Sergeant and four D/Gardai were required to deal with the tactical matters. One D/Sergeant and an assistant were required to deal with negotiations. He confirmed that he approved of that proposal. Certain issues arise in relation to the appropriateness of deploying the E.R.U. in the circumstances which pertained. What additional function could they fulfil that local gardai could not perform? Was there available to the local gardai the services of a trained non E.R.U. negotiator? If there was, would it have been appropriate to seek his or her assistance? If there was no such person available, should there have been? Is it that the situation was considered too dangerous to engage non E.R.U. negotiators? Is it relevant to the decisions taken that John Carthy was not holding any hostage? Is it relevant to the decisions taken that he had discharged shots after the gardai arrived, some of which appear to have been discharged in the general direction of, or in close proximity to, members of An Garda Siochana? These are among the issues which arise for consideration. oo000oo EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT (E.R.U.) Background to the Emergency Response Unit The E.R.U. has its origins in the Special Task Force which was established in 1978, following a decision of Justice Ministers at the Ninth Council of the EEC at Brussels in 1975. The Special Task Force was based in Dublin and it formed part of the Special Detective Unit. This unit was renamed the Emergency Response Unit in 1987. The duties of the E.R.U. include: · Armed support during criminal/subversive operations. · Specialist search techniques including forced entry. It would appear that for operations within the Dublin Metropolitan area, a request is made by the Divisional Officer to the Detective Chief Superintendent of the Special Detective Unit. For operations outside the Dublin Metropolitan region, a request for the services of the E.R.U. is made by the Divisional Officer to the appropriate Assistant Commissioner. The membership of the unit consists exclusively of serving members of An Garda Siochana. The unit undergoes intensive training including proficiency in firearms, tactics, specialist skills, physical fitness and hostage rescue. Members of the unit, including those present at Abbeylara, received training with police forces in other countries, including the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom. D/Superintendent Peter Maguire in his statement has informed the Tribunal that “when responding to an incident or providing assitance to other units
of the Garda Siochana where armed resistance is anticipated, invariably the
unit will bring onto the scene, such weapons as it considers necessary to
achieve the lawful objective.” SCENE COMMANDER AND TACTICAL COMMANDER It is the Tribunal legal team’s preliminary understanding that when members of the E.R.U. are present at the scene of an incident, direct overall control of operations rests with the local divisional or district officer. During the course of operations, where circumstances dictate, tactical control shifts to the member in charge of the E.R.U., that is either the Detective Sergeant or Detective Inspector, whichever is present. Therefore, a distinction exists between overall command which lies with the Scene Commander and tactical command which rests with the member of the E.R.U. in charge of the unit at the scene. The Tribunal must also, therefore, consider this structure as it applied at Abbeylara. SCENE COMMANDER AT ABBEYLARA Superintendent in Charge Preliminary
investigations carried out suggest that between 7.00 p.m. on the 19th of April,
2000, and midnight, Superintendent Shelly was Scene Commander. From midnight to 9.00 a.m on the 20th of
April, 2000, Superintendent Byrne was the Scene Commander and at 9.00 a.m.
Superintendent Shelly resumed command. When Superintendent Shelly arrived at Granard Garda Station at approximately 7.00 p.m. he was briefed by members of the force who were present there. These included Garda Gorman, Inspector Maguire and a number of armed gardai from Longford. Superintendent Shelly directed that all these Gardai go to the scene. Following his briefing, Superintendent Shelly has informed the Tribunal that he was aware that the situation at Abbeylara was what he described as both “dangerous and volatile”. On arrival at the scene, he spoke with two other members of the force, Sergeant Tom Dooley of Edgeworthstown and Sergeant Mary Mangan of Granard, who briefed him on the then whereabouts of John Carthy, the number of shots which had been discharged and the positioning of the various gardai at the scene. A number of the adjoining houses had been evacuated prior to Superintendent Shelly’s arrival. He directed Sergeants Dooley and Mangan to visit Mrs. Carthy and to obtain as much information as possible about John Carthy. Policy of containment and negotiation - controlled and uncontrolled exit Superintendent Shelly felt that a policy of containment and negotiation was the appropriate course of action to follow. In his statement, he has informed the Tribunal that in addition to containing and negotiating with John Carthy his aim was to achieve a controlled exit by John Carthy from the house. This situation would arise if John Carthy came out of the house unarmed and submitted to search and arrest by Gardai in a safe manner. He has informed the Tribunal in his statement that the alternative which had to be considered and which might arise was an uncontrolled exit from the house. This would involve John Carthy coming out of the house armed with a shotgun. If this situation arose, it was Superintendent Shelly’s objective that members would confront and disarm him,if possible, and effect an arrest in a safe manner. The Tribunal has been informed that he was of the opinion that while John Carthy was contained in the house the likelihood of serious injury to persons was minimised. During this period, however, shots continued to be discharged by John Carthy from the house. ooo000ooo THE TIMING AND DIRECTION OF THE DISCHARGE OF SHOTS BY JOHN CARTHY From information received by the Tribunal it appears that approximately four shots were discharged by John Carthy from his firearm before the Gardai arrived at the scene. A further ten shots were discharged following the arrival of D/Garda Campbell, Garda White and Garda Gibbons and before the arrival of Superintendent Shelly shortly after 7.00 p.m.. Between approximately 7.15 p.m. and prior to the arrival of the E.R.U. at 9.50 p.m. a further seven shots were fired. Following the arrival of the E.R.U. two further shots were discharged that night. During the course of the following day (20th of April, 2000) a further seven shots were discharged, the last shot being discharged at 5.06 p.m. Preliminary investigations reveal that, in total, thirty shots were discharged It is proposed to address the direction of discharge of these shots in more detail during the course of the evidence. Nevertheless preliminary evidence indicates that while a number of these shots were discharged randomly, it appears that a number of shots were fired in the general direction of members of An Garda Siochana and in particular were discharged at the front boundary wall behind which negotiators and other members of the E.R.U. were present. The Tribunal has been furnished with photographic evidence of, what we have been informed, are shot marks on that wall. Further it seems that one shot was discharged at and caused damage to the garda patrol car, as previously referred to. ooo000ooo CORDONS In addition to the policy of negotiation and containment, Superintendent Shelly established a system of cordons around the house. Armed gardai and uniformed unarmed gardai from different stations arrived at the scene and were deployed to different locations. Essentially, Superintendent Shelly directed that armed gardai were to maintain what is described as an inner cordon around the Carthy household, while the unarmed uniformed gardai were to be deployed to form an outer cordon to prevent unauthorised persons from entering the area. Superintendent Shelly felt that when the inner and outer cordons were in position negotiations with John Carthy could be conducted in a safe manner, his outer cordon consisting of a number of check points at both the Abbeylara and Springtown ends of the road. Uniformed gardai were deployed to various locations in the townland of Toneymore some distance from the Carthy house. Inspector (now Superintendent) Martin Maguire has informed the Tribunal that a decision was made to maintain a uniformed presence in the vicinity of the Carthy house so as to reduce the risk of John Carthy “panicking, if faced only by armed gardai in the event of him exiting the house in a controlled manner.” Lighting equipment was installed at approximately 9.00 p.m.. A written log of events was maintained by the Scene Commanders, Superintendents Shelly and Byrne. ooo000ooo ATTEMPTED NEGOTIATIONS PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE E.R.U. Location of negotiation post Prior to the arrival of the E.R.U. a number of Gardai including D/Garda James Campbell, Sergeant Tom Dooley and Superintendent Joseph Shelly had attempted to negotiate with John Carthy without success. D/Garda Campbell had sought to negotiate from within the bounds of the Carthy premises. Superintendent Shelly and Sergeant Dooley attempted to negotiate from an area proximate to an E.S.B. pole on the boundary of Burke/Carthy houses. At 11.00 p.m., following the arrival of the E.R.U., the position of the negotiation post was moved to the roadway adjacent to and behind a pillar at the front wall of the Carthy premises, almost directly opposite the kitchen window. Obtaining of further information In any attempt at negotiations it would appear that it is not only desirable but essential that the police be apprised of all relevant available information concerning the person with whom they propose to enter into negotiations; and information concerning the physical layout of the premises. The obtaining of information is therefore of vital importance. The incident at Abbeylara was no different. Members of An Garda Siochana have informed the Tribunal, through their statements, that they attempted to obtain as much additional information as possible. (i)
Information on John
Carthy. Superintendent Shelly has indicated in his statement that sometime after 8.00 p.m. Sergeants Dooley and Mangan, having interviewed Mrs. Carthy, informed him: a. That John Carthy was a manic depressive and that he had been prescribed Lithium; b. That he had been drinking; c. That he did not want to go to St. Loman’s Hospital in Mullingar; d. That he had an uncertain amount of ammunition; and e. That Mrs. Carthy could give no guarantee that he would not harm himself or others. Sergeant Dooley was also informed by others present at the scene of concerns in relation to the media coverage and the effect this might have. Further information regarding the fact that his father’s anniversary was on Holy Thursday (the following day) was later obtained. (ii) Information on layout of premises. Sergeant Dooley also obtained information regarding the layout of the house and established that there was only one exit door. Attempted negotiations conducted by gardai Before the
arrival of the E.R.U. and following the arrival of Superintendent Shelly,
negotiations were conducted by Superintendent Shelly and Sergeant Dooley, using
a loudhailer from a position proximate to the E.S.B. pole. According to Superintendent Shelly’s
statement, he repeatedly asked John Carthy to throw the gun out the window of
the house and to talk to the gardai. He
told John Carthy that he had nothing to fear and that he would be available to
sort out his difficulties. Apparently,
no verbal response was made to these requests. Further shots were discharged.
Neither Sergeant Dooley nor Superintendent Shelly had any previous
dealings with John Carthy and neither knew him. Whilst in transit, the trained negotiator, D/Sergeant Michael
Jackson was briefed on the telephone by both Sergeant Dooley and Superintendent
Shelly. He suggested to Superintendent
Shelly that efforts should continue to maintain contact with John Carthy. He spoke to Sergeant Dooley. The strategy which was advised to Sergeant
Dooley was that he should personalise himself as “Tom”, attempt to ascertain
the reason for the incident and inform John that he was there to help him. He also advised Sergeant Dooley that he
should assess his negotiation position with regard to his own personal safety. It appears that Sergeant Dooley was given a loudhailer. He attempted to negotiate from a point near the hedge that divides Carthys and Burkes houses. John Carthy did not respond verbally to Sergeant Dooley but further shots were discharged, not, however, it appears, in the direction of Sergeant Dooley. It is unclear, as yet, whether Superintendent Shelly or Sergeant Dooley had any particular training in negotiation techniques for this type of situation. Attempted negotiations by non-gardai The Tribunal has been informed that Tom Walsh arrived from Cork sometime before 9.30 p.m.. He spoke to Superintendent Shelly and was brought up to the negotiation post at the E.S.B. pole. The loudhailer was handed to Tom Walsh who commenced speaking. He got no response. He attempted to contact John Carthy on his mobile phone. He re-dialled his mobile phone number on a number of occasions. On one such occasion the phone was answered. Verbal contact was made and a brief conversation ensued. This effectively came to nought. ooo000ooo ARRIVAL OF THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT (E.R.U.) Preliminary investigations indicate that the E.R.U. arrived at the scene at 9.50 p.m.. The unit was under the command of D/Sergeant Gerry Russell. Accompanying D/Sergeant Gerry Russell were D/Gardai Oliver Flaherty, Ronan Carey and Tony Ryan. D/Sergeant (now Inspector) Michael Jackson and D/Garda Michael Sullivan arrived shortly thereafter. On arrival D/Sergeant Gerry Russell met with Superintendent Shelly and Chief Superintendent Tansey who briefed him on the situation as it existed at that time. The information conveyed to D/Sergeant Russell included information that John Carthy was a manic depressive who had received psychiatric treatment; that he was in possesion of a legally held double barrell shotgun; that he had discharged a number of shots at members of the Gardai and at a patrol car; that there was no hostage in the house; that the area had been evacuated and cordons had been established, with uniformed Gardai manning an outer cordon and armed Gardai at an inner cordon around the Carthy house. Having
surveyed the scene, D/Sergeant Russell was of the view that there were a number
of possible exits from the building which would require tightening of the inner
cordon during the hours of darkness.
The positioning of the cordon was agreed. D/Sergeant Russell considered that the best policy and strategy
to employ was one of continued containment and negotiation. Indeed, the Tribunal has been informed by
D/Inspector Hogan that these matters were discussed by him with D/Sergeant
Gerry Russell and that “negotiation was a priority in this case as hostages
were not an issue and confrontation was to be avoided.” The Tribunal has been informed that D/Sergeant Gerry Russell discussed with Superintendent Shelly the possible conclusion including a controlled exit and an uncontrolled exit. In his statement to the Tribunal, Sergeant Russell has stated that if it appeared that John Carthy was breaching the inner cordon, provision was made that the cordon could be maintained in a flexible manner to move with him. Other options such as covert entry, were not to be pursued at that time, as such would involve what has been described to the Tribunal as an unacceptable level of risk to John Carthy and to gardai. Sergeant Russell briefed his fellow members of the E.R.U. and he has informed the Tribunal that he reminded them of their obligations under “The Firearms Regulations and the Rules of Engagement”. Radio communications and nominated call signs for each cordon location were also established. One member of the E.R.U., who was armed with a Heckler & Koch rifle was deployed at a position situated to the left of the perimeter wall of Carthys house. He was directed to pay particular attention to the porch area of the house and to have consideration for possible cross fire with a second position which was established at the rear of the house. A member was requested to take up this position behind a mound of clay. This was to afford him cover in the event of cross fire. He was armed with an Uzi submachine gun. Another point was established at the rear of the residence and at the corner of the new residence. Another member of the E.R.U. was instructed to take up duty at that point. He was in possession of a Benelli shotgun. He was requested to pay particular attention to the windows at the back of the house. All members of the E.R.U. in the vicinity of the house were wearing protective body armour and clothing. The Tribunal has been informed that they were equipped with pyrotechnic equipment including flares, “two bang distraction devices” and smoke canisters. A command post (a garda jeep) was established at the E.S.B. pole on the roadway between Carthys and Burkes houses. The Unit went into position at approximately 10.15 p.m.. D/Sergeant Russell took up position alongside D/Garda Carey at the pillar nearest Farrell’s house. D/Sergeant Russell was armed with an Uzi submachine gun with tac light. From there he could observe John Carthy moving around a room which is understood to have been the kitchen (that is, the room closest to the gable end which faced on to the roadway). The light was on in the kitchen. D/Sergeant Russell saw John Carthy walking over and back in this room, he was carrying a shotgun and according to D/Sergeant Russell, he appeared to be in an agitated state and would occasionally approach the window at the gable end of the house, look out and point his shotgun. He observed John Carthy occasionally drinking some beverage and eating bread. He could hear the television turned on and the changing of channels. This appears to indicate that John Carthy throughout the course of that evening had access to television. It is also believed he had access to radio. Local armed gardai under the command of Superintendent Shelly were deployed to certain locations as back up to the inner cordon which was now manned by the E.R.U.. ooo000ooo ATTEMPTED NEGOTIATIONS BY THE E.R.U. Negotiator Documentary evidence received by the Tribunal indicates that D/Sergeant Michael Jackson was the E.R.U.’s chief negotiator at the scene. He was assigned to the E.R.U. as a D/Sergeant in September, 1998, having previously served with that unit between 1986 and 1993 as a D/Garda. He attended a number of different training courses and in particular in March, 2000, he underwent the National Hostage Negotiators Course with the London Metropolitan Police. This has been described as an internationally recognised course. This course is designed to train personnel in hostage negotiation techniques. The Tribunal has been informed that it was of fourteen days duration and included negotiator skill training and hostage training scenarios. D/Garda Michael Sullivan, E.R.U., was his assistant. D/Garda Sullivan’s function, as instructed by D/Sergeant Jackson, was to maintain a log of the events and to liaise with the Scene Commander in respect of the flow of vital information to and from the negotiator. His role included briefing any intermediaries or other non garda personnel who might become involved in the negotiations. It appears from documents and statements received that the E.R.U. had considered the inclusion of non garda personnel as intermediaries. D/Sergeant Jackson was briefed in relation to the background and received information which appears similar to that obtained by Superintendent Shelly. He was informed, in what he has described as a “full briefing”, regarding the strategy of containment and negotiation and the cordons which had been put in place. In addition, D/Sergeant Jackson was made aware of other personal information including, John Carthy’s mobile telephone number, that John had been arrested previously on suspicion of burning a mascot in the form of a wooden goat in August, 1998 and that John Carthy had been very angry about this and felt that he had been wronged by local gardai. It should be said that there is no evidence to suggest that John Carthy had anything to do with the burning of the mascot. It would appear from information received by the Tribunal that his arrest and detention and what he alleged at that time as his mistreatment in custody, led John Carthy to have feelings of mistrust towards members of An Garda Siochana and other persons around the village who allegedly had been “slagging him” in connection with the incident. D/Sergeant Jackson was also informed of Tom Walsh’s attempts at negotiation and that John’s sister, Marie Carthy, was on her way from Galway to Abbeylara. He was made aware that attempts at negotiation had come to nothing. The land line, which had previously been disconnected, was reconnected. At approximately 10.20 p.m., D/Sergeant Jackson commenced negotiations. A log has been kept of the attempts at negotiations, and this will be examined in evidence in due course. At 10.25 p.m., a single gunshot was discharged. Change in Negotiation Point Position On taking up position as negotiator at the command post D/Sergeant Jackson rang John Carthy’s mobile telephone number but received no response. The Tribunal has been informed that because the phone was not being answered and given what D/Sergeant Jackson described as the negotiation position being “too far away from the room to make contact”, D/Sergeant Jackson requested Superintendent Shelly and D/Sergeant Russell to be permitted to establish a closer negotiation point. After consultation, a position was established opposite the roadside gable window on the far side of the garden wall at a position which I have previously identified. D/Sergeant Jackson approached this negotiation point by means of a detour around the village of Abbeylara due to the “volatile situation” that was perceived to exist. It was now approximately 11 p.m.. The negotiator, D/Sergeant Jackson, and his assistant negotiator Garda Sullivan were now in close proximity to John Carthy. Due to such proximity both members wore body armour and protective ballistic helmets. Both were armed D/Sergeant Jackson has stated that he did not wish to present what he describes as “a threatening image” during the course of negotiations. He was permitted by the Unit Commander, D/Sergeant Russell to proceed without wearing the helmet. He also wore a green gortex jacket in order to cover up his body armour. Further attempts were made to contact John by telephone but without response. D/Sergeant Jackson thereafter commenced talking on the loudhailer. He called out his mobile phone number to John and requested him to call back. Whilst there was a net curtain in the lower half of the window, given the fact that the light was on in the kitchen, D/Sergeant Jackson had, what appears to have been a reasonably clear view of John Carthy. D/Sergeant Jackson has stated that he continued to attempt to personalise contact by the use of first names. He dispensed with the loudhailer. Again, there was no reply, though D/Sergeant Jackson heard what he described as some “mumbling”. He requested John to answer the phone. He rang the phone but again there was no answer. It appears that at approximately 11.20 p.m. first verbal contact was made between D/Sergeant Jackson and John Carthy, who said “who are you?” D/Sergeant Jackson once again introduced himself by his first name, stated that he was “there to help” and that he was a member of the gardai. According to D/Sergeant Jackson, John Carthy replied “Are you a Guard” and then he told him to go away and expletives were used. According to D/Sergeant Jackson, John Carthy appeared angry and upset at this stage but he did not proffer any reason for the anger or upset to D/Sergeant Jackson. D/Sergeant Jackson, in his statement, indicates that he put his head over the wall and spoke without the use of a loudhailer. He attempted to make eye contact. There was no reply. He was aware of the television in the room, the volume of which was turned up high. According to D/Sergeant Jackson, during this time John Carthy lowered the gun, levelled it at him and forced him to duck down behind the wall. This appears to have happened a number of times. Throughout this time D/Sergeant Russell was positioned to the right of D/Sergeant Jackson to afford him protection and to be in a position to inform him when it was safe to raise his head above the wall. Contact with Marie Carthy At approximately 7.30 p.m. John Carthy’s sister Marie who had been working in Galway was telephoned by her cousin Ann Walsh and informed of developments. A friend of John, Martin Shelly (also known by the nickname “Pepper”) and Marie Carthy were collected in Galway by Gardai at approximately 9.00 p.m. and brought to Abbeylara where they arrived at approximately 11.00 p.m.. They were brought to Walshs’ house. D/Sergeant Jackson delegated D/Garda Sullivan to speak to both of them for the purposes of attempting to obtain more information. According to D/Sergeant Jackson, the question of bringing Mr. Shelly or Marie to the negotiation point was not considered nor did it arise at that stage, as he was still attempting to establish a rapport as the negotiator. According to Marie Carthy, the guards on the roadway informed Martin Shelly and her that they were going to try to arrange for them to talk to John Carthy. They were brought via Granard to the Springtown side of the house (that is, the side opposite to the Abbeylara side) and they spoke to a Garda who appears to have been D/Garda Sullivan. They were then taken back to a house in Abbeylara where they remained for a number of hours. Negotiations Continue At 11.38 p.m. D/Sergeant Jackson again rang John Carthy’s mobile phone. He records that John shouted excitedly “Where’s my solicitor?”, told D/Sergeant Jackson to get out of there and hung up. According to D/Sergeant Jackson, this was the first time that John had answered the phone and the first that he had heard any mention of a solicitor. It appears, however, that John Carthy did not identify the solicitor. D/Sergeant Jackson phoned back and the phone was answered. However, John Carthy said nothing and hung up. With the use of the loudhailer, D/Sergeant Jackson asked John who his solicitor was to, which John Carthy replied that he “wanted the best”. According to D/Sergeant Jackson, John Carthy did not identify who the solicitor was but nevertheless John was observed banging the gun off the table and saying that he wanted his solicitor to come “In here. In here”. D/Sergeant Jackson requested John to come out without the gun and told him that a solicitor would be brought to meet him. The Tribunal has been informed that this offer was declined. Further negotiations took place in which D/Sergeant Jackson informed John Carthy that they would obtain a solicitor, a friend or a priest or anyone that John Carthy wanted to meet him outside, to which John Carthy replied that he was not coming out. D/Garda Sullivan spoke with Superintendent Shelly and attempted to ascertain the identity of John’s solicitor. Information was received by D/Sergeant Jackson from the command post “that John had no known local Solicitor”. D/Sergeant Jackson has informed the Tribunal that he continued to attempt to negotiate and to reassure John Carthy but it appears that he turned up the volume of the television. At approximately 11.45 p.m. a shot was discharged towards his position. D/Sergeant Jackson has stated that he could hear pellets hitting the wall in front of him. It seems that negotiations continued to be difficult and without positive response. Sometime before midnight D/Sergeant Jackson informed John that his friend “Pepper” (that is, Martin Shelly) was at the scene and was willing to speak to him. John Carthy agreed to talk to Martin Shelly and asked for him. Negotiations continued by means of a loudhailer and by attempts by D/Sergeant Jackson to telephone John Carthy. At approximately 12.51 a.m. a further shot was discharged from inside the room. The television was on and at high volume. According to Martin Shelly’s statement, at approximately 2 a.m. a Garda called to the house where he was staying. He was brought to the scene. D/Sergeant Jackson apprised him of the most appropriate way in which to approach the conversation with John Carthy. D/Sergeant Jackson gave him the loudhailer and advised him what to say. John never spoke to him. According to Martin Shelly he was present for approximately an hour to an hour and a half. According to D/Sergeant Jackson, Martin Shelly was there for approximately twenty five minutes before being returned to the command post. According to D/Garda Sullivan, Martin Shelly was there for approximately fifteen minutes before being returned to the command post. However Martin Shelly has informed the Tribunal that he took a break for approximately ten minutes during which time two further shots were discharged afterwhich he was brought back down to the negotiation post and started to talk again, though without response. When Martin Shelly was brought down to the scene, he was accompanied by Tom Walsh, Marie Carthy and Patricia Leavy. Marie Carthy requested to go down to the negotiation point with Martin Shelly. According to D/Sergeant Jackson, Marie was distressed. She was not permitted to contact her brother at that time. At some time between approximately 2.00 and 3.00 a.m., D/Sergeant Jackson requested that Dr. Cullen be contacted for further medical advice concerning the effects of medication that John may have been taking. Copies of medical reports in the possession of Dr. Cullen were also sought. Members of the gardai drove to Dr. Cullen’s surgery. Dr. Cullen photocopied three medical reports and some hospital notes. These were subsequently handed to D/Sergeant Jackson at approximately 4.15 a.m., who states that he also received medical advice from Dr. Cullen to the effect that the drugs John was taking might cause him to be drowsy or sleepy. At some time around 3.00 a.m., D/Sergeant Jackson asked John Carthy whether there was anything he required, to which he received the reply “Fags - 20 Major”. He informed John Carthy that this should not be a problem and that they needed to talk about getting the cigarettes inside. According to D/Sergeant Jackson, John replied with an expletive and said “don’t bother”. Shortly after this, at approximately 3.25 a.m., D/Sergeant Jackson has informed the Tribunal that John Carthy came to the window with the gun in his hand pointing upwards, levelled the gun at the negotiation position, causing D/Sergeant Jackson to duck down behind the wall and immediately a shot was discharged at his location. According to D/Sergeant Jackson, some of the pellets hit the pillar of the wall in front of him. D/Sergeant Jackson stayed down behind the wall and called to John on the loudhailer to stop shooting and to put the gun down. D/Sergeant Jackson continued to talk about the safe delivery of cigarettes and approximately five minutes later another shot was discharged in the direction of D/Sergeant Russell who was at the negotiating point and who felt the impact of shots hitting the wall. D/Sergeant Jackson called upon John to “stop firing the gun at us” and that this “would not solve anything”. D/Sergeant Jackson observed John Carthy lowering the gun and appearing to be getting ready to rest. At this stage the television was off. John Carthy went out of sight. D/Sergeant Jackson informed Superintendent Byrne (who was the Scene Commander from 12 a.m. to 9 a.m.) about John Carthy’s request for cigarettes and was of the opinion that this was an area which could be developed when John had finished resting. D/Sergeant Jackson has indicated to the Tribunal that as negotiator he was keen to build trust in this manner and perhaps entice John into giving something in return, such as ammunition or even the gun. He also requested that the television cable be cut because during the period when he attempted to make contact with John, according to D/Sergeant Jackson, John turned up the volume of the television. D/Sergeant Jackson has also indicated in his statement that he was concerned that some of the media coverage relating to the incident in news programmes might inadvertently “aggravate John”. The cutting of the television cable was agreed between Superintendent Byrne and D/Sergeant Russell. At or about this time (3.30 a.m.) D/Sergeant Russell, who was the tactical commander, states that he became concerned for the safety of the unit members. He was concerned that John’s conduct had become what he describes as “erratic” and for this reason informed Superintendent Byrne that no further visits by non gardai should be considered at that time. At around 4 a.m. Superintendent Byrne requested that D/Sergeant Russell should attempt to remove the keys from the unmarked patrol car which had been abandoned in Carthy’s driveway. Superintendent Byrne and D/Sergeant Russell discussed further options, which he states had been previously considered, namely covert entry. It was decided that close reconnaissance of the building should be carried out at first light, provided John Carthy remained quiet. There was no sign of activity from the house for approximately an hour and at 4.30 a.m. D/Sergeant Russell carried out such reconnaissance of the house. He removed the keys from the patrol car. He looked in the window of the kitchen. He could see John on the settee behind the far wall. He could see him “settling or moving as he lay”. It would seem that at at all times the light was switched on in the kitchen. According to D/Sergeant Russell, “John Carthy appeared to be resting but not asleep”. He could not see the gun, and assumed that the gun was beside John Carthy concealed by a blanket which was covering him. He checked the layout of the room. He returned to Superintendent Byrne and briefed him on what he had seen. Because of his observations, D/Sergeant Russell expressed concern that a covert entry could not be achieved without subjecting the gardai and John Carthy to a greater element of danger and possibly injury. D/Sergeant Russell has informed the Tribunal in his statement that because this was not a hostage situation, one could not justify the approach of a covert entry at that time. Superintendent Byrne agreed with this assessment and instructed D/Sergeant Russell to continue the policy of containment and negotiation. At approximately 6.00 a.m. D/Sergeant Russell located television cables which were hanging on the gable end of the wall and he cut them. At some stage after 7.00 a.m., D/Sergeant Russell reinforced the negotiation point by placing two concrete blocks on either side of the centre pillar. A cement mixer which was in the driveway was moved to the front door of the new house in order to offer cover at that point. At about this time three additional members of the E.R.U. were directed to go to the scene. These were D/Gardai Aidan McCabe, Joseph Finnegan and William Sisk. Between 5.30 a.m. and 8.00 a.m. D/Sergeant Jackson rested and D/Garda Sullivan took over negotiations. He tried to make contact but John Carthy did not reply. Shortly after 8.00 a.m. D/Sergeant Jackson made contact with Mr. Colm O’Regan, Clinical Psychologist attached to the Department of Justice. D/Sergeant Jackson has described the purpose of the consultation as being to obtain professional advice in relation to dealing with depressive people such as John. He discussed the situation with Mr. O’Regan who advised in a general way about John Carthy and how to approach him. Mr. O’Regan, has informed the Tribunal that he explained to D/Sergeant Jackson that being at such a remove from the scene, it would be inappropriate and unwise to offer any specific advice. He advised that contact be made with the relevant psychiatric services. At approximately 8.20 a.m. Superintendent Shelly and Inspector Maguire returned to the scene. Formal scene command was handed back to Superintendent Shelly at 9.00 a.m.. At some time shortly after 9.00 a.m. Assistant Commissioner Tony Hickey arrived at the scene and he was briefed by both Superintendent Shelly and Superintendent Byrne. Superintendent Shelly continued as Scene Commander at this time. D/Sergeant Jackson continued attempts at negotiating with John Carthy. He attempted to reassure John but according to D/Sergeant Jackson, John reacted by shouting “come on shoot me”. D/Sergeant Jackson attempted to entice John out of the house and offered to meet him in the garden if John put the gun down. John replied in the negative. Sometime before 9.00 a.m. D/Sergeant Jackson expressed his concern to Superintendent Shelly and Superintendent Byrne that no meaningful dialogue had taken place. At approximately 9.06 a.m. as he was talking through a loudhailer, over the wall, John Carthy’s gun was levelled at him forcing him to duck down behind the pillar. A shot was immediately discharged and D/Sergeant Jackson heard some of the pellets hitting the wall. D/Sergeant Jackson has informed the Tribunal that at this point he was in fear for his safety and stayed under cover behind the wall. D/Sergeant Jackson has stated that he continued to attempt to ring John Carthy’s mobile phone. On occasions, the phone was answered. Generally speaking D/Sergeant Jackson received no reply and indeed on one occasion John Carthy is stated to have put the phone against the radio. Attempts to speak to John Carthy by way of loudhailer were unsuccessful. D/Sergeant Jackson has informed the Tribunal that John was continually levelling the gun at him forcing him to duck down behind the wall. At 9.42 a.m. another shot was discharged by John Carthy. Tom Walsh offered to attempt further contact with John Carthy and was invited back to the negotiation point just before 10.00 a.m., the understanding of D/Sergeant Jackson being that John had agreed to speak with him. He spoke by means of a loudhailer. Again, this was without success. At one stage, Thomas Walsh either ducked or was pulled down behind the wall. At approximately 10.00 a.m. there was a further request for cigarettes. However, while the cigarettes were obtained from a local shop, there was concern regarding the safe means by which to convey the cigarettes to the house. Sometime before 11 a.m.
D/Sergeant Jackson asked John Carthy what he was worried about. John replied “I’ll have to go back to hospital”. D/Sergeant Jackson reassured John that Dr Shanley (who will be
referred to in more detail later) was willing to come and speak with him and
that he could go to St Patrick’s Hospital, if he had to go to any hospital. D/Sergeant Jackson tried to
continue dialogue, however he reports that John Carthy suddenly became
aggressive and felt that the Gardai were trying to “break him”. He levelled the
gun at the negotiation point forcing D/Sergeant Jackson to duck behind the
wall. Further dialogue was
attempted with John Carthy repeatedly asking “Why” in what D/Sergeant Jackson
has described to the Tribunal, as a “challenging and agitated manner”. D/Sergeant Jackson asked John Carthy if
there was anyone else he wished to talk to, to which, according to D/Sergeant
Jackson’s statement, John replied “No,
nobody, I’m not coming out, no way, you come in and get me.” At one stage D/Sergeant
Jackson observed that John appeared to be talking on his mobile phone. Sometime after 1 p.m.
D/Sergeant Jackson was informed that John Carthy had spoken to his friend Kevin
Ireland over the phone and that he had mentioned the name of a solicitor. John Carthy’s request for a solicitor will
be addressed later. D/Sergeant Jackson
has informed that Tribunal that he attempted to establish the name of the
solicitor and contact details from John Carthy. He also expressed concern about letting a solicitor in to the
Carthy home while John had a gun. At approximately 1.08 p.m.
D/Sergeant Jackson placed the loudhailer on the wall to the left of the
pillar. The Tribunal has been informed
that John Carthy discharged a shot which knocked the loudhailer off the wall. Because John Carthy was
continually pointing the gun at the negotiation point and because the
loudhailer was now inoperative, D/Sergeant Jackson has informed the Tribunal
that he retreated to an official Garda E.R.U. jeep, parked on the roadway
outside Farrell’s house, which was equipped with a public address system. D/Sergeant Jackson called out to John to
answer the telephone. Negotiations continued by telephone. John Carthy mentioned to D/Sergeant Jackson
that the Guards would not get the gun off him again. It appears that on one occasion John Carthy phoned D/Sergeant
Jackson’s phone but did not say anything. A replacement loudhailer was
obtained and D/Sergeant Jackson returned to the negotiation point. At approximately 2.05 p.m.
D/Sergeant Jackson was made aware that Mr. Sean Farrell from Finea was
available to talk to John Carthy. John
had previously worked for Mr. Farrell and the Tribunal has been informed that
John regarded Mr. Farrell as a role model.
Mr. Farrell attempted to engage John in dialogue for approximately 45
minutes to one hour but received no response.
Mr. Farrell had been requested
to come to the scene by Tom Walsh. The Tribunal has been
informed that others who knew John Carthy also offered to speak with John. D/Sergeant Jackson continued
to attempt to negotiate. He has
informed the Tribunal that John Carthy became increasingly agitated and that he
began to break more glass and the vertical wooden bars of the kitchen
window. He noted that John appeared to
be constantly looking at his watch. It appears that sometime
after 3p.m. John threw the house phone into the garden. At approximately 3.20 p.m.
D/Sergeant Jackson took a rest period and was replaced by D/Garda Sullivan as
negotiator. According to D/Garda
Sullivan, John levelled the gun at him on a number of occasions forcing him to
duck down behind the wall. Sometime
after 3.20 p.m. John Carthy mentioned the name of a solicitor “Finucane” and asked why the Gardai did
not get him. D/Sergeant Jackson returned
to the negotiating point at 4.30 p.m..
He was informed that Marie Carthy and Dr Shanley had arrived at the
scene and that Marie Carthy wished to speak with John. Martin Shelly was also with them. D/Sergeant Jackson told John Carthy that
both Marie and Dr Shanley were present and wished to speak with him. At 5.06 p.m. John Carthy
discharged another shot in the direction of the negotiating point knocking the
concrete block off the top of wall. At this stage D/Sergeant
Jackson has informed the Tribunal that John Carthy appeared to become more
agitated and to move around the house.
Due to what has been described as “heightened agitation” and the
fact that he had just discharged a shot, it was decided, in consultation with
Superintendent Shelly, that it would be imprudent to bring Marie Carthy to the
negotiating point at this time. It was
decided that she instead try to contact John on his mobile phone. John Carthy was informed of this but he did
not answer his phone. Marie Carthy has
informed the Tribunal that she believed that the gardai were making
arrangements for both Dr Shanley and her to talk to John. Marie Carthy never got to speak to her
brother John. D/Sergeant Jackson has
stated that John Carthy’s agitation continued and that he began to bang
furniture with the butt of his gun, move from room to room and ask “Why?” to D/Sergeant Jackson’s repeated
requests to put the gun down and come out.
D/Sergeant Jackson informed John Carthy that Dr Shanley was there to
speak to him. Dr Shanley never got to
speak to John Carthy. John exited the
house before Dr. Shanley was brought to the negotiating point. During the events of the 19th
and 20th April 2000, as described above, the various members of An
Garda Siochana availed of rest periods.
This is a matter that will be dealt with in some detail in the evidence. ooo000ooo CONTACT WITH DR. SHANLEY Sometime between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. on Thursday 20th April 2000 Inspector Maguire made telephone contact with Dr. David Shanley, a consultant psychiatrist based in Dublin who had seen and treated John in the past. Dr. Shanley was at his Out Patient’s Clinic at St. James’ Hospital, Dublin. Dr. Shanley’s Secretary took particulars of Inspector Maguire’s mobile number and at approximately 10.00 a.m. Dr. Shanley returned the call. Inspector Maguire outlined his concerns about John Carthy’s mental state. According to Inspector Maguire, Dr. Shanley said that he could not give an opinion on John Carthy’s present behaviour or mental state as he had not seen him for some time, that he would require to know particulars of medication prescribed, whether John was adhering to that prescription and further as to whether alcohol was a factor. Dr. Shanley informed the Gardai that he was travelling through Longford in the afternoon and that he would travel to Abbeylara. It appears that it was arranged that Dr. Shanley would be contacted on his mobile phone at approximately 3.30 p.m.. Dr. Shanley was so contacted. He was informed that John was still refusing to leave the house and that he had discharged a number of shots from his weapon. He was met in Edgeworthstown at approximately 4.15 and was taken to Abbeylara. When he arrived, he was met by Superintendent Shelly and Inspector Maguire. He was apprised of the up to date situation. He then interviewed Mrs. Rose Carthy who was in a house nearby, with some relatives. In a statement to the Tribunal, Dr. Shanley has stated that his discussions with the family and the police indicated that John was very disturbed and probably suffering from depression. It was confirmed to him that John had been drinking prior to the incident. In his opinion, it was likely that besides suffering from depression, John also had the added burden of alcohol and nicotine withdrawal. These would have contributed to his agitation and aggressive outbursts. The lack of sleep was also a matter that would have contributed to his overall agitation. Authorisation was given by Superintendent Shelly to allow Dr. Shanley to speak to John Carthy. At approximately 5.20 p.m. Dr. Shanley who was sitting in a car outside Walsh’s house with Marie Carthy, Martin Shelly and Tom Walsh was joined by D/Garda Sullivan. Efforts were made by Marie Carthy to contact John by phone, as outlined earlier. D/Sergeant Jackson informed John that Dr. Shanley was there and willing to speak. He did not reply. According to D/Sergeant Jackson, John was asked whether he was willing to talk to Dr. Shanley to which he nodded and smiled and moved around the room. D/Sergeant Jackson states that at this time John was constantly raising and levelling the gun at the negotiation point. ooo000ooo REQUEST FOR A SOLICITOR It would appear that John Carthy first requested a solicitor at 11.38 p.m. on Wednesday the 19th of April, 2000. However, from information available it does not appear that he named the solicitor to members of An Garda Siochana until the afternoon of Thursday 20th April 2000. Mr. Kevin Ireland was a friend and work-mate of John Carthy’s in Galway. In his statement, he has informed the Tribunal that at 12.15 p.m. approximately on Thursday the 20th of April, 2000, he received a telephone call on his mobile telephone from John Carthy. Kevin Ireland has informed the Tribunal that in that conversation John Carthy stated that he “hadn’t a notion of doing anything stupid like shooting someone or shooting himself”. He informed Kevin Ireland that he was just shooting in the air and shooting at walls to keep the gardai away from the house. Kevin Ireland stated to John Carthy that he should give himself up. He was informed by John Carthy that he was not giving himself up unless he could get a solicitor. He identified “Mick Finucane” as the solicitor. Kevin Ireland has informed the Tribunal that at approximately 1.30 p.m. he drove to Millstreet Garda Station in Galway. The information concerning the solicitor was subsequently conveyed to the gardai at the scene. However, it seems that they were unable to establish the whereabouts of a solicitor named Mick Finucane. At the time, a
Mr. Michael Finucane was an apprentice solicitor working in the office of
Garrett Sheehan and Company Solicitors in Dublin. This Mr. Finucane has confirmed to the Tribunal that he neither
acted for nor ever met John Carthy. ooo000ooo THE EXIT OF JOHN CARTHY FROM THE HOUSE At approximately 5.45 p.m. on Thursday the 20th of April, 2000, John Carthy emerged from his house in what has been described as an “unexpected manner”. At the time of his exit, three members of the E.R.U. were present at the negotiation point. These were D/Garda Aidan McCabe, D/Sergeant Michael Jackson and D/Garda William Sisk. D/Garda McCabe was in possession of an Uzi sub-machine gun, D/Garda Sisk was in possession of a Heckler & Koch 33 assault rifle and D/Sergeant Michael Jackson was in possession of a Sig Sauer pistol. D/Sergeant Jackson was crouched down behind the wall.
D/Garda Joseph Finnegan has informed the Tribunal that he was stationed at the back of the house but in view of the door. D/Garda Finnegan was in possession of an Uzi sub-machine gun and his function was to notify any movement of John Carthy if he left the house. He saw John Carthy walking out the door. According to D/Garda Finnegan, John Carthy was in a mid march and had a “very determined set” about him. He had the shotgun in his left hand holding it at the point where it breaks open. It was broken but D/Garda Finnegan, from his angle, could not say whether it was loaded or not. As he walked towards the corner of the house (away from D/Garda Finnegan) John changed his gun from his left hand to his right hand. He placed it in a position across his chest with both hands on it. D/Garda Finnegan informed all units by radio “He is out”. At that point, all members of the E.R.U. and detective gardai who were present were alerted to his exit. The gardai who were stationed at the negotiation point stood up and saw John Carthy walking past the window at the gable end towards the driveway. He was carrying the shotgun on his right side. The butt of the shotgun was under his right arm and his right hand was holding it in the area of the trigger guard. The shot gun was broken open. According to D/Sergeant Jackson, John Carthy was not saying anything and was walking towards the driveway in a “determined fashion”. D/Sergeant Jackson stated that he drew his Sig Sauer pistol as he thought John was “going to shoot somebody”. D/Sergeant Jackson has also informed the Tribunal that he was afraid for his safety. At that stage it was felt that John Carthy was a threat but not what has been described as “an immediate threat”. D/Garda Carey who had just been finishing a rest break and who was positioned in the new house drew his pistol and moved out the front doorway onto the driveway. When he got into a position to the right of the driveway between the unmarked garda patrol car (which had remained in position from the previous evening) and the shed at the side of the house he saw John Carthy standing on the earth in front of the old house close to the driveway. D/Garda Carey confirms that the shotgun was broken. He remembers seeing the brass of two cartridges sitting in the chambers of the shotgun. D/Garda Carey has informed the Tribunal that he was standing “no more than 20 feet away” away from John Carthy. John Carthy looked at D/Garda Carey. D/Garda Carey pointed the pistol in his direction and shouted at John Carthy “Armed Gardai. Armed Gardai. Put down the gun.”. He repeated this on a number of occasions. At the same time D/Garda Carey attempted to take cover to the side of the shed. D/Garda Carey considered that whilst John Carthy was a threat to him he was not an immediate threat because the shotgun was broken. His “instinct” was to continue to control the exit by moving the cordon with John Carthy. As he reached the side of the shed he put his left hand on the wall of the shed and noticed that the ground was falling away from him. He could not get his balance. At that point, John Carthy turned away from D/Garda Carey and began to walk down the driveway of the house. D/Garda Carey moved towards the bonnet of the garda car and according to his statement provided to the Tribunal, continually called “Armed Gardai. Armed Gardai. Put down the gun.”. Between the time John Carthy left the middle of the driveway and the time he passed the gateway onto the road he closed the shotgun. Several other members of the E.R.U. identified themselves as being armed gardai and requested John to put the gun down. The negotiator, D/Sergeant Jackson was still hopeful at that stage that he could persuade John Carthy to put the gun down and to bring the situation to a peaceful end. As John Carthy walked on to the driveway he paused momentarily and looked in the direction of D/Sergeant Jackson. John Carthy continued to walk down the driveway towards the pillar and out onto the roadway. D/Sergeant Aidan Foley who was near the jeep at the E.S.B. pole which was being used as a command post observed John Carthy walking out the open gate between the pillars onto the road, at which point he observed him closing the shotgun. His right hand was at the trigger and his left hand was underneath mid way on the gun. John Carthy proceeded to walk across the road with his gun which was carried slightly above waist height. As he walked across the road, John Carthy was observed breaking the gun once more, taking a cartridge from the right barrel and throwing it into a nearby ditch. D/Sergeant Foley observed John Carthy walking at what he described a normal pace. Before heading in the direction of Abbeylara, John Carthy stopped in the middle of the road. He looked to his right towards D/Sergeant Jackson again. He then turned left facing the direction of Abbeylara and according to the gardai who were present at the command post, John Carthy had his gun pointed in their direction. D/Sergeant Foley described John Carthy’s initial expression as being “fixatious” and that he had “a yellow colour“on his face. At the command post, D/Sergeant Foley and four of his colleagues, D/Garda James Campbell, D/Garda John Quinn, Garda Eugene Boland and Garda John Gibbons all took cover. It would seem that all of these gardai with the exception of Garda Gibbons were armed. According to garda statements, members of the E.R.U. continued to instruct John Carthy to leave the gun down and warned him that they were armed gardai. As John Carthy approached the jeep at the command post the three members of the E.R.U. who had been at the negotiation post had now fanned out behind him, D/Sergeant Jackson to his left, D/Garda Sisk behind him and D/Garda McCabe to his right. D/Sergeant Jackson could see people at the command post and on the road including unarmed uniformed gardai. He was concerned for their safety. According to D/Sergeant Jackson, John Carthy marched in “a deliberate and menacing fashion” towards the people at the command post. At that point he feared for the lives of the people on the roadway who were beside Burke’s hedge (that is, at the command post). D/Garda McCabe saw John Carthy walking towards armed and unarmed Gardai. He has also stated that at that point he saw gardai running and scattering in fear for cover. According to D/Sergeant Jackson, John Carthy advanced towards the people on the roadway and “appeared determined to use his shotgun”. He was called upon to put the gun down. At this point he was getting close to the command post. D/Sergeant Jackson has stated that he felt that the only option available to him was to discharge a shot from his pistol. He aimed his pistol at the higher left leg area. He discharged his pistol. A bullet struck John Carthy in the upper left leg area. According to D/Sergeant Jackson John Carthy continued on and he was shot again by D/Sergeant Jackson, once again in the leg. D/Garda McCabe has informed the Tribunal that he believed that John Carthy would pull the trigger and that gardai in front of him would be killed or seriously injured. He discharged a shot from his Uzi sub machine gun. He discharged the gun at the lower torso area. The preliminary evidence available suggests that his Uzi sub machine gun was on single shot action. According to D/Garda McCabe, John Carthy continued to move towards uniformed and plain clothes gardai. D/Garda McCabe states that he continued to fear for the lives of the gardai who were present and discharged a second shot aimed at the torso area from the Uzi sub machine gun. This bullet entered John Carthy’s body approximately nine inches above the third shot. John Carthy fell to the ground. At the scene, members of the E.R.U. who were trained in C.P.R. techniques, attempted to resuscitate John Carthy. An ambulance, which had been stationed at Granard Garda Station, was summoned to the scene. Unfortunately, the attempts to resuscitate him were unsuccessful. John Carthy was pronounced dead at approximately 6.11 p.m. by Dr. Niall Donohue, a General Medical Practitioner who had been called to the scene following the shooting. ooo000ooo Arising from the above, among the important issues which will require to be considered by the Tribunal are the following: (a) What consideration was given to the command structures at the scene including all logistical requirements that may have been necessary? (b) What effect did the positioning of the command post and the negotiation post have on the course and the conduct of the operation? Were there any suitable alternative locations for these posts? (c) Were all members conversant with the cordon strategy that had been put in place and its purpose? (d) De-escalation. What consideration, if any, was given to a withdrawal or partial withdrawal from the scene at any stage? Would this have been beneficial, safe or practical? (e) Were the warnings given to John Carthy when he exited the house adequate, bearing in mind his mental state. Was he capable of comprehending such, or any warnings? ooo000ooo MEDIA AND THE EFFECT OF MEDIA COVERAGE The preliminary investigations of the Tribunal indicate that from an early stage there was significant media interst in the events which occurred at Abbeylara. Sergeant (then Garda) Ronan Farrelly of the Garda Press Office, has informed the Tribunal that at approximately 6.55 p.m. on the 19th of April, 2000, he received a call from Chief Superintendent Tansey, informing him of the incident in Abbeylara. Sergeant Farrelly subsequently contacted the National Press Officer of An Garda Siochana, Superintendent John Farrelly at his home. Superintendent Farrelly was requested by Chief Superintendent Tansey to go to the scene. He arrived there at approximately 10.00 p.m.. Prior to Superintendent Farrelly’s arrival at the scene, Sergeant Farrelly has informed the Tribunal that a number of journalists contacted the Press Office seeking details of the incident. Sergeant Farrelly has stated that he confirmed the “basic facts” only and informed them that Superintendent Farrelly was on route to the scene. On Superintendent Farrelly’s arrival at Abbeylara he saw television satellite vans and a number of journalists, and a garda checkpoint preventing their access to the scene. He has described that he took full control of “media handling” for the duration of the incident. It appears that a number of media interviews and briefings took place over the course of the two days. On the 20th of April, 2000, at approximately 11.30 a.m., members of the press, including camera crews from national television were brought closer to the scene and permitted to film and take pictures. Superintendent Farrelly has explained that the reason that the media were brought there was to ensure that there was “controlled access”. It is understood that he was concerned that some members of the media, because they did not have access to the scene, might encroach in some other way and thereby affect or intefere with the garda operation. From a number of hours into the siege and at least by 9.00 p.m. on 19th April, 2000, it appears that concern had been expressed by locals regarding the effect of the media presence. Ann Walsh, cousin of John Carthy, has informed the Tribunal that she stated to the gardai that the media were not helping the situation and inquired whether the gardai had authority to move them away. On Thursday shots were discharged by John Carthy at 9.06 a.m., 9.42 a.m., 1.08 p.m. and 5.06 p.m.. John Carthy exited the house at approximately 5.45 p.m.. From information received by the Tribunal it seems that it was not until the “Five Seven Live” programme on R.T.E. radio on the 20th of April, 2000, that John Carthy’s name was disclosed nationally. He was also named in a television report on national television (T.V. 3) shortly after 5.30 p.m.. Brief details of his medical history were also disclosed in the latter report. Concern has been expressed by members of the public as to the connection between media coverage and the events which were unfolding. From information available at present, however, it is unclear at this stage whether there is any connection between media coverage on the one hand; and the timing of the discharge of the shots and the exit of John Carthy from the house on the other hand? ooo000ooo CAUSE OF DEATH The Tribunal’s preliminary investigations indicate that John Carthy was struck by four bullets. His body was removed to Longford/Westmeath General Hospital at Mullingar. Post-mortem examination took place during the course of the following night. Professor Harbison, the State Pathologist has reported and the verdict of the inquest jury has found that the cause of death was a left haemothorax due to lacerations of the heart and left lung due to a bullet wound to the chest and upper abdomen. Professor Harbison has reported that the bullet wound which he described as the fatal shot had a different trajectory to the other bullets. Its entry was nine inches above the entry to what is believed to have been the third bullet, and was just to the right of the midline, over his spine and the angle of the trajectory was upwards and to the left rather than down. The exit in the left nipple area was approximately nine and a half inches above the entry. Important issues concerning the number of shots, the trajectories of those bullets, the significance of such trajectories and the time lag between the shots will require to be addressed in detail during the course of the evidence. ooo000ooo As part of the fourth module it is intended also to consider the possibility of an effective alternative approach or approaches which might have been adopted by the gardai, before or after John Carthy emerged from his house, and prior to being fatally shot. Sir, there had been a tendency to refer to such alternatives in the narrow sense of less than lethal weapons. This is neither a satisfactory nor complete statement of the alternatives. Alternatives or options to which consideration ought to be given should include more than just weapons. Such options, include, of course, the option of containment and negotiation, which we have been advised was employed at the scene. However, other options must also be addressed including the feasibility of engaging the services of the Garda Dog Unit. Was this an available or a suitable option? Were these, or other options available to An Garda Siochana at the time? Were they suitable? Were they considered? For example, in relation to the potential use of dogs, the Tribunal has been informed that the Garda Dog Unit was established in 1960. It has available to it a number of highly trained dogs for specific purposes including explosive and drug detection. There are also a number of general purpose dogs. From information presently available, it would appear that general purpose dogs are essentially used for outdoor patrol and patrolling of special events. It is the intention of the Tribunal to inquire whether dogs were available, whether such dogs were suitably trained to deal with the confrontational/sieige type situation which occurred and whether the use of such a unit would have affected the outcome? The Tribunal has been informed by An Garda Siochana that some police forces have trained what is termed a “non compliant dog” which can confront and attempt to hold a suspect or attempt to knock them to the ground. We have also been informed by An Garda Siochana that experience in the United Kingdom has shown that where the deployment of non compliant trained dog teams involving firearms incidents has occurred, various problems have been encountered including unpredictable behaviour. The Tribunal legal team, has noted from the Association of Chief Police Officers Manual of Guidance on Police Use of Firearms that an option which has been considered elsewhere is the use of a firearm support dog, trained specifically to assist in operations involving the deployment of armed firearm officers. It would seem that they are trained in a greater range of diciplines. ooo000ooo BACKGROUND TO THE FATAL SHOOTING OF JOHN CARTHY The essential and tragic facts of what occurred on the 19th and 20th of April, 2000, will be inquired into by the Tribunal in its second module. However, these facts do not provide the full picture and cannot be viewed in isolation. It is therefore necessary to inquire into background circumstances which prevailed and which have relevance to the events which occurred at Abbeylara on those dates. The Tribunal proposes to make such inquiries in its first module of evidence. The Tribunal’s Legal Team intends to examine a number of background matters which are considered relevant. The examination of these matters, which I will outline below, should not be perceived as an attempt by the Tribunal to be critical of John Carthy’s background or his situation. John Carthy had no criminal convictions. He has been described in positive terms to the Tribunal by many who knew him or came into contact with him. The Tribunal is conscious of its obligations to respect the privacy of others unless the temporary invasion of that privacy is essential to the workings of the Tribunal. It is
submitted, Sir, that such background information is of importance in the
context of the extent to which such information was available or should have
been available to members of An Garda Siochana at the scene. Of particular importance is the knowledge
which members of the gardai had or should have had of John Carthy’s medical
history, his possession of firearms, the circumstances in which he held a
firearms certificate and recent or past incidents or events which may have had
a bearing on his state of mind; and the extent to which such information was
utilised in dealing with the situation as it unfolded. The Tribunal intends to inquire into certain matters, which, on the basis of information presently in the possession of the Tribunal, it is believed had a bearing on John Carthy’s state of mind and the events which occurred on the 19th and 20th of April, 2000. These matters include: 1. John Carthy’s medical history; 2. The history of the possession of a firearm certificate by John Carthy, the granting and renewal of the firearm certificate, the taking possession of the firearm by members of An Garda Siochana in August 1998, its return to him in November 1998, and the subsequent renewal of his firearm certificate in 1999; 3. His arrest by An Garda Siochana in 1998; 4. His arrest in Galway in February 2000; 5. Events in the week prior to the incident and comments made by John Carthy on the 17th and 18th of April, 2000; 1. John Carthy’s Medical History Preliminary investigations of the Tribunal reveal that John Carthy was a patient of Dr. Patrick Cullen, General Practitioner, Coole, County Westmeath, since approximately 1988. His father died on the 12th day of April, 1990, a Holy Thursday. He was first treated for depression when he was a first year student at Warrenstown Agricultural College, in 1992. He missed a number of weeks from college around Christmas time. When he returned to college he became “low and unhappy”. His mood was fluctuating. He displayed many of the symptoms of depression. He attended his General Practitioner. On the 25th of March, 1992, Dr. Cullen referred him for further treatment by way of voluntary admission to St. Lomans Psychiatric Hospital Mullingar, where he was hospitalised, and a diagnosis of endogenous depressive illness was made. He was prescribed medication and was discharged from hospital on the 6th of April, 1992. He attended his General Practitioner for follow up over the next three months. In March, 1993, he re-attended his General Practitioner in relation to an accident at work. He was depressed. He was referred to the Psychiatric Clinic in Granard in June 1993, and was subsequently readmitted again as a voluntary patient to St. Lomans Hospital on the 19th of July, 1993. He remained in St. Lomans until the 4th of August, 1993. On admission he presented as depressed, tearful and agitated. A diagnosis of relapse of the unipolar depressive illness was made. His Consultant Psychiatrist at that time, Dr McGeown, reported that John Carthy impressed as a rather sensitive, insecure, diffident young person probably relatively easily upset by any kind of physical or emotional trauma. The psychiatrist also noted in his report that it was perhaps of some significance that his accident at work happened on the precise anniversary of his father’s death. He was treated by way of medication and was discharged. It was recorded by Dr. McGeown that the immediate prognosis at that time was good but that “one gets the impression that John is a very vulnerable personality who may well respond to the vicissitudes of life in the future with depressive episodes”. On the 12th of August, 1993, within eight days of his discharge, John Carthy was readmitted to St. Lomans Hospital, where he remained until the 30th of August, 1993. On the 18th of January, 1995, on a referral by Dr. Niall Donohue (who saw John Carthy on one or two occassions when Dr Cullen was unavailable) he was readmitted to St. Lomans until the 14th of February, 1995. He continued on medication. He attended as a patient of Dr. Cullen throughout the months of February and March and into early April of 1995. On one such visit he requested Dr. Cullen to refer him to Dr. David Shanley. He was so referred by letter dated the 4th of April, 1995 and was seen by Dr. Shanley on the 11th of April, 1995. It was reported that there was no evidence of depression although his concentration and interests were poor. He was reassured that the treatment and diagnosis he had received in St. Lomans Mullingar was appropriate. John Carthy was seen at approximately two monthly intervals during 1995
by Dr. Shanley. In July, 1995, it was
decided to commence him on Lithium, a drug which is a mood stabiliser. Arrangements were made for his General Practitioner
to take the necessary blood tests. In February, 1997, he was involved in a road traffic accident and he suffered injury to his left arm. He returned to Dr. Shanley’s care in April, 1997 and was further reviewed on various occasions throughout 1997 and 1998. Medical evidence so far received would tend to suggest that he continued on his medication throughout this period and that his Lithium levels were within normal range. He was in Galway during Christmas 1998. Whilst there he was admitted to the Psychiatric Unit of University College Hospital Galway on the 26th of December, 1998. He presented at the Accident and Emergency Department accompanied by his sister with complaints of poor sleep for the previous two weeks and a feeling of irritability and exhaustion and he also described poor concentration. Medical records received to date suggest that on the 4th of January, 1999, he left the hospital without permission. The medical records indicate that the Gardai in Galway and “Longford” were informed. The gardai at Granard and Longford Garda Stations have no record of such a call. It is recorded in those medical records that he returned later that evening. He was kept in hospital until the 6th of January, 1999. He was discharged but prognosis was described as being guarded. He returned to University College Hospital on the 11th of January, 1999, complaining of feeling high, having difficulty in sleeping and being agitated and was admitted unitl the 13th January 1999 when he was discharged. A diagnosis of bipolar affective disorder was confirmed. The Tribunal’s preliminary investigations suggest that this was the last occasion upon which John Carthy was admitted to hospital as an in-patient. He was seen by Dr. Shanley on a number of occasions between January and June of 1999; the last occasion being the 11th of June, 1999. It appears that an appointment had been made for him, by his sister Marie, on some date early in the month of April, 2000, to be seen by Dr Shanley on the 20th of April, 2000 (the day on which he was fatally wounded). Preliminary documentary evidence also indicates that on the 17th of
February, 2000, John Carthy attended Dr. Meagher, a general practitioner, who
at that time was in practice with Dr. Cullen.
The purposes of the attendance appears to have been for assessment of
his ability to work. The Tribunal has also ascertained that on the 18th of April, 2000, John Carthy was dispensed Lithium, Prothiaden and Stelazine at a pharmacy in Longford. It should also be recorded that Dr Kevin Cunnane, Consulant Pathologist with the Midland Health Board has informed the Tribunal that a blood sample taken from John Carthy, following his death and analysed on the 21st April, 2000 revealed the presence of Lithium within what he described as the “therapeutic range”. 2.
John Carthy’s Firearm John Carthy successfully applied for an unlimited firearm certificate in 1992. This firearm certificate was renewed annually from1992 to 1995 after which he applied for and was granted a limited firearm certificate which was renewed annually up to the year 1998. From records and information received by the Tribunal it appears that he was a member of the Abbeylara Gun Club between 1992 and 1994. However, it appears that he did not renew his membership in 1994 and he ceased to be a member of the gun club at that time. In early August, 1998, a member of An Garda Siochana at Granard Garda Station, Garda Oliver Cassidy, took possession of John Carthy’s firearm. From his statement to the Tribunal it appears that in early August, 1998, Garda Cassidy received information that John Carthy had become unstable. The Tribunal has been informed that concern had been expressed in the Abbeylara area regarding threats allegedly made by John Carthy. The wife of a local builder is reported to have expressed concern when she learned of threats which allegedly had been made in a local handball alley. The Tribunal is not possessed of any information to suggest that threats were made directly to either her or to her husband. Nevertheless, she became concerned by what she had heard. She spoke to Garda Peter Earley, who was based at Granard. According to Garda Earley, she is reported to have thought that John Carthy was not a fit person to have a shotgun - though he doesn’t specifically record her stating that John Carthy had threatened anyone in particular. No written complaint was made. On receipt of this information Garda Cassidy felt that the question as to whether John Carthy was fit to hold a firearm should be considered. The garda’s concerns were expressed in writing to the Sergeant in Charge at Granard by memorandum dated the 10th of August, 1998. In that memorandum, Garda Cassidy stated that perhaps John Carthy’s firearm should be taken as “I feel that he is becoming unfit to hold a firearm certificate.” Around that time, Garda Cassidy went to John Carthy’s house and took possession of the shotgun . It appears that the weapon was retained at Granard Garda Station. Preliminary investigations suggest that Sergeant Desmond Nally, the Sergeant in Charge at Granard Garda Station wrote to Garda Cassidy by memorandum dated the 11th of August, 1998, requiring details as to whether John Carthy had a history of mental illness and requiring that a full report be submitted on his background and home circumstances. A further memorandum in August, 1998 from Garda Cassidy to Sergeant Nally records as follows: “This man was born on 9th of October, 1972 and is living with his widowed mother at Toneymore, Abbeylara, County Longford. He was working as a labourer to Brendan McLoughlin a plasterer until recently. It is reported that he is taking a civil action against McLoughlin. John Carthy has threatened a number of people in the Abbeylara area and said that he would use his gun. He spent some time in St. Lomans Mental Hospital Mullingar and appears to be not well lately. “ During this period it would appear that John Carthy attended at Granard Garda Station on a regular basis requesting the renewal of his certificate. On the 7th of September, 1998, Sergeant Monahan requested that a comprehensive file be prepared. He also requested that persons who were threatened should be interviewed and statements taken from them and that if no statement was forthcoming, the contents of interviews should be noted. Sergeant Monahan asked that the matter be expedited as “there is a likelihood that this person will endeavour to licence his firearm”. On the 6th of October, 1998, John Carthy attended at the Superintendent’s Office at Granard. At that time, the Superintendent for the District was Superintendent Denis Cullinane. In a memorandum dated the 6th of October, 1998, addressed to Sergeant Monahan, Superintendent Cullinane noted as follows: “Carthy called to my office today -
said his gun was taken by Garda for examination. The Garda told him it would be returned to him in a week. He has not been offered any explanation why
it has not been returned. Please
forward full report of the circumstances under which the weapon was
seized. Please expedite. “ John Carthy was seen by his psychiatrist, Dr. David Shanley on the 8th of October, 1998. At the time of that examination, the Tribunal’s legal team has been informed that Dr. Shanley found no evidence of depression or elation. It appears from medical records which have been disclosed to the Tribunal by Dr. Shanley with the consent of the Carthy family, that John Carthy had explained to Dr. Shanley that a letter was required in relation to the firearm certificate and the holding thereof. The entry in Dr Shanley’s clinical notes for the 8th October 1998 reads as follows: “Superintendent indicates he
needs another letter to indicate he is able to handle a firearm – no evidence of depression/elation sleeping well due to have a Bone Scan of his hip in near future cost £200: joint is painful when expecting rain Unsure whether to have an M.R.I or a Bone Scan Appetite and weight [ticked] Conc and interest [ticked] Won a handball tournament recently Nightmares of accident less persistent Is travelling a lot in cars. Working in Longford area a lot – plastering May work in Galway as sister’s home is there Hopes to use gun to shoot pheasants and game pigeons. Has had gun for last seven years but police took in guns from all over country for a routine check.” Dr. Shanley wrote a letter on the 13th of October, 1998 addressed to the Superintendent at Granard Garda Station as follows: “Dear Superintendent, Mr. John Carthy has given me
permission to write to you. He is a
patient of mine for some years and in my opinion is fit to use a firearm. When last seen on the 8th of October, 1998,
he was very well. He has been treated
for depression and elation in the past and should the situation change his
general practitioner will be in touch with your office. Yours sincerely, “ Preliminary investigations by the Tribunal’s legal team do not reveal any written record to suggest that Dr. Shanley had been made aware of any other reason as to why John Carthy’s shotgun had been taken. Superintendent Cullinane’s memorandum of the 6th of October, 1998 suggests that John Carthy was seeking a reason as to why his shotgun had not been returned. Superintendent Cullinane in a statement has informed the Tribunal that prior to his meeting with John Carthy he had ascertained that the shotgun had been seized by Granard gardai because of alleged threats made by John Carthy against people in the area and also because it was alleged that he was mentally unstable. Superintendent Cullinane in his statements states that when he met John Carthy that he, John Carthy, had stated that he had not been given any explanation as to why the gardai were retaining his gun. Superintendent Cullinane states that he told John Carthy of the allegations against him but that John Carthy denied ever threatening anyone and that while he did have depression in the past that he had attended a psychiatrist in Dublin and was now fully recovered. Superintendent Cullinane has confirmed to the Tribunal that he informed John Carthy that before the firearm could be returned that he, Superintendent Cullinane, had to be satisfied that by having a firearm John Carthy would not pose a danger to anyone. By memorandum dated the 19th of October, 1998, Garda Cassidy confirmed to Sergeant Monahan that he had carried out further enquires in Abbeylara and that he had failed to get any concrete reason for not renewing the licence. He also confirms that he had made contact with Dr. Cullen’s surgery in Coole, and that he had spoken to a locum. Garda Cassidy, in his memorandum states “When Dr. Cullen returns from holidays I will endeavour to obtain a report on this man’s condition. For your information.” To date the Tribunal’s legal team has not received any information or evidence to suggest that such report was either sought or obtained by the gardai. By memorandum dated the 20th of October, 1998, Sergeant Nally wrote to
Superintendent Cullinane informing him that Garda Cassidy had been unable to
get anyone to make a complaint about John Carthy, that Dr. Cullen was away on
holidays and that he, Sergeant Nally, would like to have “his (that is, Dr.
Cullen’s) opinion before renewing the
licence” as Carthy had a history
of psychiatric problems. “This had not come to light when the licence was renewed in the
past.” A further memorandum indicated that Superintendent Cullinane requested the sergeant in charge to “report further when Dr. Cullen
returns from his holiday.” On the 30th of October, 1998, John Carthy completed his application for a firearm certificate. This was accompanied by a letter of consent from his mother to the holding of the firearm within her house. The application was processed and signed on the 3rd of November, 1998 and Superintendent Cullinane informed the sergeant in charge on the 4th of November, 1998 that the certificate may issue. It is understood that John Carthy’s firearm was returned to him on or about the 13th of November, 1998. The Tribunal has not been made aware of any evidence that after August, 1998, any member of the family, friend, public or professional person objected to or expressed concern to An Garda Siochana at John Carthy’s continued possession of a firearm. 3. The Arrrest of John Carthy in 1998 and his Disposition towards An Garda Siochana In September, 1998, Abbeylara Football Club reached the County Football Final. A mascot, a wooden goat, was bedecked in the Abbeylara colours and left outside a local public house. It was damaged by fire. On the 24th of September, 1998, John Carthy was arrested on suspicion of having committed criminal damage to the mascot and taken to Granard Garda Station. He was not charged with any offence and was released from custody. It appears that John Carthy had complained to others that he had been mistreated while in custody. Members of An Garda Siochana, who have provided statements in relation to this issue, contest that he was in fact mistreated. However, he did attend his family doctor on the following day complaining of injury and of mistreatment and was referred for x-ray. According to his sister, John was very annoyed at being arrested. According to his friend and cousin Thomas Walsh, John’s attitude to the gardai changed at that time and he began to dislike them. It seems to us, the Tribunal legal team, that the importance of this matter relates, not to whether the allegations were correct or incorrect, but to the facts of this allegation and the arrest; and the knowledge which the gardai at the scene had or ought to have had of these facts. Further, it would also appear from documentation received that the arrest on the 24th of September, 1998 was during the period when John Carthy’s firearm was in the possession of the gardai at Granard. 4. Arrest in Galway in February, 2000 On the 20th of February, 2000, John Carthy was in Galway. According to a statement from his sister Marie, he was drinking. Martin Shelly, a friend who John had met in Galway, was with them. According to Marie, John was high from drink and medication. They were in Eyre Square and Marie Carthy was afraid that something might happen to him or that he might become involved in a fight. It seems that some time earlier in the evening they had been asked to leave a public house as a row had been brewing. Martin Shelly who was present saw gardai passing by on the street. He told Marie to go and talk to them. These gardai have been identified as Garda Mary Ann O’Boyle of Galway Garda Station and Garda Oliver White. Marie Carthy spoke to these guards on the street. She requested them to take John down to the Garda Station for his own safety. In her statement to the Tribunal, Garda O’Boyle noted that at approximately 11.30 p.m. she was on Eglington Street when she was approached by two people, a male and a female. The female introduced herself as Marie Carthy. She said that she was worried about her brother and “was there anything that could be done”. She explained to Garda O’Boyle that her brother suffered with depression, was depressed and had “told her that he wouldn’t be around much longer”. She expressed a fear to Garda O’Boyle that John was suicidal. Garda O’Boyle has informed the Tribunal that she explained to Marie Carthy that under the Mental Treatment Acts, they had a power to arrest him and to have him examined by a doctor if they feared for his safety. If he wasn’t willing to get treatment voluntarily then she, as his sister, could speak with the doctor and have him certified. According to Garda O’Boyle, Marie Carthy was happy to hear that there was something that could be done and indicated that there was no way that John would go voluntarily, and that the only option to her was to have him certified because she felt that he required help and treatment. Garda O’Boyle ascertained his whereabouts and accompanied Marie Carthy and Martin Shelly to Eyre Square It appears that John Carthy was not happy with the situation. He was arrested under the Mental Treatment Acts at 11.50 p.m.. However the Tribunal has been informed that no force was required and that John Carthy went peacefully to Galway Garda Station in the patrol car. At the station, the evidence suggests that he settled down and told the gardai that he had depression and that he was attending Dr. Shanley for treatment. He also said that his General Practitioner was Dr. Cullen in Coole and while in Galway for the past few months he was attending Dr. Bluett at Castlelawn Heights. Garda O’Boyle contacted Dr. Bluett’s number at approximately 12.10 a.m.. Dr. Bluett was off duty and Dr. Dymphna Horgan was on call. Dr. Horgan went to the Garda Station. She spoke with Marie Carthy and thereafter examined John Carthy. Dr. Horgan advised John Carthy to go to University College Hospital Galway but he refused to do so. The Tribunal has been informed that Dr. Horgan explained to Marie Carthy that the only way that he could be committed to a psychiatric hospital was for Marie Carthy to commit him by signing a committal form but this she did not wish to do. Dr. Horgan increased his prescription and advised that Dr. Shanley be contacted on the following morning. John agreed to stay with Marie at her house in Oaklands in Salthill and indicated that he would contact Dr. Shanley the following morning. He was released from custody at approximately 1.12 a.m. It is unclear whether this information was conveyed to the gardai at Granard. 5. Events in the Week prior to the Incident and Comments made by John Carthy during that Period The Tribunal’s legal team has been provided with information relating to statements alleged to have been made by John Carthy in the days prior to the 19th and 20th April 2000. The evidence to be adduced in due course in relation to such statements may be of assistance in attempting to establish his state of mind at that time. Sir, it would seem at this stage, however, that the primary importance of this information may lie in the extent to which it was conveyed to the gardai at the scene; and whether possession of this information did or might have influenced their approach. In a statement made by Alice Farrell to the gardai, she relates that on Tuesday the 18th of April, 2000, she went to the Carthy household. John Carthy had been playing music in his room. She knocked on the window at the side of the house as she was passing to let people know that she was coming. As she approached John opened the door. It appears that a short conversation took place . She states that she said in a joking manner, “I was thinking it was you that was here when I heard the rock”. Somewhat cryptically, John Carthy is stated by Alice Farrell to have replied, “The party is over or there will be no more laughing Alice. The guards won’t be here anymore”. Alice Farrell stated that she was somewhat taken aback by this statement. She thought that John had meant that she had called the Guards to him at some stage. She states that she told him she had never called the Guards. Alice Farrell noted that John was annoyed and wasn’t himself. She felt that John would never talk to her like that in normal circumstances. John Carthy then left the house to go for cigarettes. Ann Walsh, who was walking up the road, in a statement to the Tribunal has stated that she asked John what was wrong to which he replied “the party’s over the Guards will never be here again”. It is unclear at this stage whether the above information was conveyed to the gardai during the course of the incident. There is some preliminary evidence to suggest that John Carthy had stated to an electrician, from whom he had thumbed a lift on the morning of Tuesday 18th of April 2000, that two other named persons “should be shot”. Statements received suggest that the electrician reported this to one of those named individuals on Thursday 20th April, 2000. The recipient of this information has stated that he “took it seriously” and reported it to an unnamed garda at Granard at some time between 9 and 10 a.m on Thursday 20th April, 2000. Again, Sir, it requires to be clarified whether this information was conveyed to the gardai at the scene at Abbeylara. There is preliminary information to suggest that John Carthy had worked earlier that week, but that his emploment had ceased. ooo000ooo TRAINING OF AN GARDA
SIOCHANA The training of An Garda Siochana, including
members of the ERU, will be addressed in detail at the formal opening of the
Third and Sixth Modules. Nevertheless
some brief comments are appropriate at this stage. It is important that the Tribunal is possessed of information concerning the training with which members of An Garda Siochana were provided; and the application of that training to the circumstances which prevailed at Abbeylara. It appears to the Tribunal legal team that the situation which confronted the members of the An Garda Siochana at the scene was difficult and difficult in the extreme. There is little doubt that they did not wish for the tragic outcome that occurred. However, they are trained professionals and it seems not only appropriate but of some considerable importance to inquire into whether they were adequately trained and equipped to deal with the situation and whether that training was implemented appropriately. It is therefore the intention of the Tribunal to inquire into the relevant training which members of An Garda Siochana who were involved received, including those who attended immediately after the reporting of the incident; those non E.R.U. members who negotiated and those members of the E.R.U. who negotiated and who reacted to the events which subsequently transpired. As stated these matters will be addressed in more detail in later modules. ooo000ooo COMPARABLE JURISDICTIONS The fifth module will involve an examination of how the police in some other jurisdictions deal with similar situations where a dangerous armed gunman is believed to be activated by mental illness, psychiatric disorder or other such disability. This module will be opened in greater detail at the appropriate time. Research is ongoing and reports have been commissioned. At this stage it may be recorded that the Tribunal has obtained and received a number of published reports from other jurisdictions. Reports and information received to date would seem to indicate that in most situations which confront a police force, including incidents such as occurred at Abbeylara, the first response may be critical. Such response is likely to be a product of the individual officer’s training and experience. Other reports suggest that the ability to communicate effectively is important and that police officers must be able to distinguish between two differents stages of aggression in the subject, namely emotional aggression and social aggression. According to McBride, “Street Survial Skills” [1996] “people displaying social aggression will be thinking rationally…..Those behaving emotionally will be thinking irrationally”. In September, 1994, in the state of Victoria, Australia, Project Beacon was created to address a range of use of force and operational safety issues following a number of fatal shootings by Victoria police. As part of that project, the police force adopted a safety first philosophy and made a public commitment to retrain all operational police within six months. In accordance with the aims of that study: “the success of an operation will be primarily judged by the extent to which the use of force is avoided or minimised”. In a joint statement issued by the Deputy Premier, Police and Emergency Services Minister, Mr. Patrick McNamara and the Acting Police Commissioner, Mr. Mal Hyde (Victoria) it was stated that to give effect to the above philosophy in responding to emergency situations, which may involve a person who is armed or is reasonably suspected to be armed, the following principles are to apply: 1. Safety
first - The safety of police, the public, offenders or suspects is
paramount. 2. Risk
assessment-Police are required to assess the level of risk to police
personnel, the public and an offender or suspect in all incidents and
operations. 3. Take
charge - A senior officer should take effective command and control
of operations where there is a potential for violence. 4. Planned
response - Every opportunity should be be taken to convert an
unplanned response to an incident into a planned operation. 5. Cordon
and containment - Unless it is impractical to do so a cordon and
containment approach should be adopted. 6. Avoid
confrontation - A violent confrontation is to be avoided. 7. Avoid
force - The use of force is to be avoided. 8. Minimum
force - Where force cannot be avoided, only the minimum amount
necessary is to be used. 9. Forced
entry searches - Force entry searches are to be used as a last
resort. 10. Resources - It is accepted that a safety first principle may require the deployment of more resources, more complex planning and more time to complete. In the United Kingdom, the Association of Chief Police Officers in its “Manual of Guidance on Police Use of Firearms” considered in some detail the incident or operational command structures that should be adhered to. Thus it is stated: 3.1.1. In normal circumstances an effective command structure has three
levels, strategic, tactical and operational.
These command functions are commonly referred to as gold, silver and
bronze respectively and the commanders performing these roles need to be
carefully selected, trained and updated on a regular basis. 3.1.2.
Gold – strategy –
the overall intention to combine resources towards managing and resolving an
event or incident; 3.1.3.
Silver – tactics –
the way that resourcers are used to achieve the strategic intentions within the
range of approved tactical options; 3.1.4.
Bronze – action –
organises the groups of resources to carry out the tactical plan. 3.1.5.
The structure can be
used for both pre-planned events and spontaneous incidents and can offer the
degree of flexibility required to cope with a varied and developing range of
circumstances. It relies on the
paramount principle of flexibility and as such is role-specific, not necessarily rank related. 3.1.6.
In particular a
gold, silver and bronze structure
requires that each participant understands the parameters of their own role
whilst accepting the relationship with others in the command team. Officers of senior rank cannot assume
primacy solely on the basis of rank or territorial responsibility without
taking up the appropriate role within the command structure. This change should be discussed before it is
undertaken and it should be documented should it occur. 3.1.7.
Similarly, if an
officer senior in rank to the gold commander quality assures an
operational plan, offers advice or
makes decisions, they are likely to be held accountanble for all actions taken
under the plan. 3.1.8. There is a need on protracted operations for command resilience to be addressed – suitably qualified replacements should be identified and briefed in good time. In that manual, consideration has been given to what has been described as “Special Population Groups” (13.4). This is a term used to describe a group of people who do not behave in an expected, rational manner as a result of some form of mental impairment (either permanent or temporary). This impairment may be caused by a range of psychiatric disorders, by the consumption of drugs or alcohol; or where there may be communication difficulties such as when the subject is deaf or has a different first language. According to the manual, rational individuals are likely to respond to the arrival of armed officers in a more predictible fashion than members of a Special Population Group; and that it is important that the negotiators and Armed Firearms Officers have an understanding of how disturbed people or those who have their perception altered through alcohol or drugs may respond to communications from police officers.
However, it is also recorded that the fact that the subject is a member of a Special Population Group does not in any way reduce the harm he or she may inflict if the incident is not resolved and that: “it is the role of the police to deal with the threat irrespective of any motivation”. It is the intention of the Tribunal legal team to lead oral evidence from overseas experts in relation to the procedures adopted in other jurisdictions and to see what lessons, if any, might be learned. ooo000ooo FIREARMS LEGISLATION Consideration will be given in this module to the Statute Law in Ireland regarding gun licences and firearms certificates. Sir, you outlined in some considerable detail in your opening statement on the 7th of January, 2003, the issues which the Tribunal considers pertinent to consider. It is proposed here to broadly outline the legislative background. The right of citizens to possess and use firearms is regulated by statute, the principal of which are The Firearms Acts of 1925 and 1964 (hereafter referred to as the Act of 1925 and 1964 respectively). The firearms legislation in general is cited as the Firearms Acts, 1925 to 2000. The possession of firearms and other weapons and ammunition is subject to the restrictions contained in the Act of 1925 which provide that for such possession to be lawful it must be authorised by a firearm certificate. Section 2 of the Act of 1925 (as amended) provides that, subject to specified exceptions, it is not lawful for any person to possess, use or carry any firearm or ammunition except as authorised by a firearm certificate granted under the Act and in force. The possession, use or carriage of firearms, save in excepted cases, without a certificate is an offence punishable under the provisions of the Act. Section 3 of the Act of 1925 (as amended) provides that the Superintendent of An Garda Siochana of any district may, subject to the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Act, upon the application of any person residing in such district and upon the payment by such person of the fee (if any) for the time being required by law, grant to such person a firearm certificate. Therefore, the issuing of firearm certificates is a function conferred on the local Garda Superintendent as the appropriate designated person. Section 3 (4) of the Act of 1925 (as amended) provides that: “ Every firearm certificate shall be in the
prescribed form and shall operate and be expressed to authorise the person to
whom it is granted – a)
to have in his
possession, use and carry the particular firearm prescribed in the certificate;
and b) to use ammunition in the firearm and to have in his possession at any one time and carry so much ammunition for the firearm as shall be specified in the certificate. “ Section 12 of the Act of 1964 provides that when a firearm described in a firearm certificate is a shotgun the certificate may be expressed and in such case shall operate to authorise such firearm to be used only for killing animals or birds other than protected wild animals or protected wild birds within the meaning of the Wildlife Act, 1976, on land occupied by the person to whom such certificate is granted or on land occupied by another person. However such certificate shall not be granted unless the occupier of the land has given the applicant for the certificate a nomination in writing for holding the certificate. Where such a nomination is revoked the limited certificate to which it relates shall not, if it is then in force, be capable of being renewed. Section 4 of the Act of 1925 provides that before granting a firearm certificate to any person under the Act, a Superintendent of An Garda Siochana (or in appropriate cases the Minister) shall be satisfied that such person: a) has
a good reason for requiring the firearm in respect of which the certificate is
applied for; and b) can
be permitted to have in his possession, use and carry a firearm without danger
to the public safety or to the peace;
and c) is not a person declared by the Act to be disentitled to hold a firearm certificate. It is also provided (section 5) that the Superintendent may revoke a certificate at any time if he or she is satisfied that the holder: a) has
no good reason for requiring the firearm to which the certificate relates; or b) is
a person who cannot, without danger to the public safety or to the peace, be
permitted to have a firearm in his possession; or c) is
a person who is declared by the Act to be disentitled to hold a firearm
certificate; or d) where the firearm certificate limits the purposes for which the firearm to which it relates may be used, is using such firearm for purposes not authorised by the certificate. The Acts also describe persons declared to be disentitled to hold a firearm certificate. These include people of intemperate habits, any person of unsound mind and any person who is subject to the supervision of the police. Section 23 of the Act of 1925 also provides that a Court may order the forfeiture of the firearm or cancel a firearm certificate in circumstances where a person is convicted of an offence under the Act or is convicted of any crime for which he or she is sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment, is ordered to be subject to police supervision, or is ordered to enter into a recognisance to keep the peace or to be of good behaviour a condition of which is that the offender shall not possess, use or carry a firearm. Where a court causes a firearm certificate to be cancelled under this section, notice of the cancellation is required to be sent to An Garda Siochana. Further, under the Act of 1964 (section 4 as amended), the Minister may on grounds of public safety or public security make an Order requiring every person in a specified area to surrender a particular class of firearm or ammunition to An Garda Siochana. On foot of such an Order the Garda Siochana may seize any firearm to which the Order relates and retain it in their possession. There is no statutory right of appeal against a refusal to grant a firearm certificate. Further, there is no statutory right of appeal against revocation of a firearm certificate under Section 5 of the Act of 1925. Such refusals, however, may be judicially reviewed. It appears from decisions such as Hourigan v. Kelly, Ireland and the Attorney General (decision of Mr. Justice Egan 26th of April, 1991) that the principles of natural and constitutional justice apply. Judicial review is concerned primarily with procedures and the manner in which the decision is made, rather than the merits of the decision. The renewal of a firearms certificate is dealt with in Section 9 of the Act of 1964. Such certificate must be renewed annually. It may be renewed by an authorised member of An Garda Siochana not below the rank of sergeant, in the district in which the certificate holder resides, where such member has been so authorised by the Superintendent. However a decision to refuse to renew is ultimately a matter for the Superintendent. The authorised member does not have the power to refuse to renew the certificate unless the Superintendent of the district has authorised the member to so refuse. The above is not intended to be a complete statement of the law. For present purposes it is to be noted, however, that under current legislation there is no statutory requirement that applicants for firearm certificates, either on initial application or at annual renewal, are obliged to furnish to the Superintendent a medical certiciate certifying that in terms of physical and mental health he or she is fit to possess the firearm and to be granted such certificate. It may also be pertinent to consider Recommendation No. R (84) 23 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to Member States on the Harmonisation of National Legislation relating to Firearms adopted by the Committee of Ministers on the 7th of December, 1984. That Recommendation, states, among other things that: “ Having regard to the provisions of the
European Convention on the control of the acquisition and the possession of
firearms by individuals, recommends that
governments of Member States …… apply the following principles to the
issue of licenses to private persons subject to the procedural safeguards
provided in domestic law: (a) A licence to acquire, possess or carry a
firearm shall be granted to a person only;
i.if he or she has
attained 18 years of age, save in exceptional cases;
ii.if he or she is
not being and has not been subject to treatment for any disease of the mind or
other mental disorder which renders him or her unfit to acquire, possess or
carry such a firearm;
iii.if he or she has
not been found guilty of a crime which indicates that he or she is a danger to
public safety or security;
iv.if acquiring,
possessing or carrying the firearm is not contrary to public safety or
security;
v.if he or she is
able to demonstrate that he or she has a good reason to acquire, possess and
carry the firearm; (b) An effective system shall be instituted
to permit, inter alia, by periodical review of all licences, the withdrawal of
all licences granted to any person who either no longer satisfies the
qualifications for the grant of a licence or no longer had good reason to
possess a firearm, or fails to observe any condition attached thereto or
misuses the firearm. “ In the accompanying explanatory memorandum published by the Council of Europe it is stated that: “ The facts justifying the issuing of a licence … may change quickly, or the licensee may fail to observe the conditions attached thereto. When such new facts come to the knowledge of the authority concerned, they should have the power to withdraw the licence. However, a system should be instituted with a view to ensuring that new facts are brought to the attention of the authority. A most effective system is the periodical review of all licences. “ These are matters which the Tribunal’s legal team intends to inquire into. From correspondence received to date it is anticipated that full submissions will be made by interested parties in due course. ooo000ooo CONCLUSION Finally Sir, I think once again it is important to re-emphasise that this opening statement does not purport to be, and is not a statement of either assumed or accepted facts. It is important that it should not be so construed. As previously stated the finding of fact is a matter entirely for you Sir. It is proposed that oral hearings of the evidence will commence in Dublin at a date to be announced by you. Legal representatives, interested persons and members of the public are reminded that the Tribunal’s Memorandum on Procedures and your opening statement, Sir, delivered in Dublin on 7th January 2003 may be obtained on the Tribunal’s web site, the address of which is www.barrtribunal.ie. This opening statement of counsel will also be available on the web site shortly. ooo000ooo | ||||||
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