The Deductive/Logical Problem of Evil

The existence of evil has been used to create a myriad of philosophical problems for traditional theists. One such problem is the alleged "logical problem of evil." The logical problem of evil attempts to show that God and evil cannot coexist. Since evil most certainly exists, then God must not. Is this argument cogent? Below, I will clarify how this argument works, and I will show how theists have dealt with it.

The Argument Stated

Some people fail to understand the initial plausibility and powerful refutation that the deductive form of the problem of evil poses. The premises seem uncontestable, and the conclusion evidently follows from them. Here is one way to put the logical problem of evil:

1. If God exists, then God is perfectly good, omnipotent, and omniscient
2. God is perfectly good - God desires no evil to exist
3. God is omnipotent - God is powerful enough to accomplish what he desires
4. God is omniscient - God knows all things and how to bring about his plans
5. Evil exists
6. If both evil and God exist, then God cannot be perfectly good, omnipotent, and/or omniscient
7. Therefore, God does not exist

All theists would accept premise 1 and premises 2-4 follow from premise 1. The fifth premise is undeniably true. Premise 6 results from the conjunction of premises 1-4. And the final devastating conclusion reached in 7 follows from 5 and 6. Thus, it seems that if evil exists, then God cannot.

Before moving on, let me emphasize how this argument works. The logical problem of evil does not depend on a specific quantity or quality of evil to exist in order to succeed. All that is needed for the logical problem of evil to succeed is the existence of any evil. If the argument is cogent, then it ought to be impossible for God and any evil to coexist. Moreover, the logical problem of evil is not given on weighted probabilities, so the conclusion of the argument holds absolutely. In other words, should the logical problem of evil succeed, then theists have only two options: (a) abandon theism or (b) maintain theism irrationally. Neither option looks particularly satisfying.

The Argument Challenged

The untoward effects of the logical problem of evil ensue only if the argument is unassailable. While it appears as if the argument as it currently stands uses non-controversial premises, I will argue that mainstream theists do not embrace all of the premises in the argument as they currently are stated. While premise 1 is acceptable to theists, premises 2 and 3 are not sufficiently qualified to match what Christians mean by the divine attributes of perfect goodness and omnipotence. Since the deductive problem of evil argues for such a strong conclusion (that it is logically impossible for God and evil to coexist), in order to refute it, the theist only needs to show one counterexample where God and evil can possibly coexist. So, I will show the logical problem of evil is flawed by showing that theists are not committed to the premises of the argument (as they are currently stated), and showing that it is logically possible for God and evil to coexist.

Premise 2 hinges on the understanding that a perfectly good being would desire no evil to exist. Some reflection on this premise, however, will show that this understanding of a perfectly good being does not hold. The existence of certain types of evils is logically consistent with a perfectly good being. Let's take two examples. First, a perfectly good being might allow evil to exist for punitive reasons. When an authority punishes a wrongdoer, the evil manifested in that act (when done justly) is considered acceptable. Thus, if God permits evil to exist for punitive reasons, then a perfectly good being could logically coexist with evil. A second possible way a perfectly good being could coexist with evil would be if the existence of evil serves a higher purpose. A perfectly good being could permit evil to exist if the existence of evil was necessary to produce a greater good. For example, in order for a person to possess the virtue of patience it is necessary for that person to suffer through evils to produce the good, i.e., patience. Hence, a perfectly good being may be justified in permitting certain evils to exist if they were instrumental in bringing about a greater good. Therefore, premise 2 should be restated as:

2'. God is perfectly good - God would not desire evil to exist without good reason for permitting evil to exist.

So, premise 2 in the logical problem of evil is not stated in such a way that theists would accept. As a correction 2' has been offered, which theists do accept, and it shows how a perfectly good being could coexist with evil. Although this correction of premise 2 is sufficient to escape the logical problem of evil, theists can also question the understanding of omnipotence given in premise 3.

Premise 3 as it currently stands is too general to be helpful. A more precise understanding of omnipotence would state that God has the power to do anything that is possible. This view makes the best sense of omnipotence, and it goes back at least as far back as Thomas Aquinas (see his Summa Theologiae, 1a, 25, 3). What this definition rules out is that an omnipotent being can do what is logically impossible. Examples of logically impossible states of affairs include creating a five-sided triangle, a rock that is too heavy for God to lift, and other nonsense. Denying God the power to bring about what is not even meaningful is no detraction from his omnipotence. While this definition of omnipotence may seem too trivially qualified to help in any way, there is a way this qualification is pertinent to the current discussion. For it may be logically impossible for God to create free moral agents and deny the existence of evil. It may be the case that in any world where God creates beings who make significantly free choices, they will bring about evil. Moreover, if God used his omnipotent power to stop these free beings from committing evil, they would no longer be free (since being both free and not-free concerning some act is logically impossible). Therefore, premise 3 should be rephrased:

3'. God is omnipotent - God is powerful enough to do whatever is possible.

Given the amended premises 2' and 3', it now seems as if the existence of evil can logically coexist with God. For God may have good reasons for permitting evil to exist, and it may be logically impossible to create a world with significantly free agents who never sin. Thus, God and evil are logically compatible.

Just as the logical problem of evil does not need depend on the quality or quantity of evil in order to succeed, likewise the counter-argument does not need to show how specific evils or types of evil can be reconciled with God's existence. In order for theists to provide an escape to the logical problem of evil, all they need to do is show how evil can possibly coexist with God. Both premises 2' and 3' give sufficient and acceptable ways that God could allow evil to exist without diminishing God's goodness, power, and/or knowledge.

As an historical aside, I would like to point out that there is virtually universal agreement among philosophers that the logical problem of evil is no longer a cogent argument. For example, Michael Peterson, a recognized authority on the problem of evil, comments, "The outcome of these and other debates has been so favorable to theists that it is reasonable to say that the logical problem has been laid to rest" ["The Problem of Evil," in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999), 395]. Traditional theists can rest assured that the logical problem of evil has been solved, but the inductive or evidential problem of evil is still a serious threat that theists need to address.

For Further Reading

Online

"The Problem of Evil," by Peter Kreeft.

"The Problem with 'The Problem of Evil'," by David Basinger.

Books