In the spring of 1999 during the Kosovo crisis, Americans were shocked to learn that Army pilots were not prepared to deploy and fight in Kosovo. A top-heavy "Army only" command and control headquarters could not conduct Joint operations. Troops from different Army divisions, thrown together at the last minute were untrained to fight together. Worst of all, it was hard to believe that it took more than thirty days to deploy twenty-eight attack helicopters from the US Army's divisions in Germany to Albania. This was Task Force Hawk, the Army's contribution to the Kosovo crisis. For many observers, this was reminiscent of the US Army's condition in the early days of the Korean War when its units were over-run by the North Koreans. Looking back, it seems certain that TF Hawk would have sustained considerable losses in action against the Yugoslav Forces without much to show for the effort.

To paraphrase Nathan Bedford Forrest, the key to victory in 21st Century warfare means getting there first with the most--and the right force. Strategic responsiveness in the 21st Century means organizing ground forces with air and naval forces that can come into action before the peace is lost. This is something today's Army cannot do. But the temptation for elected leaders to throw more tax money at the current Army structure to address what the Generals would say are minor training, readiness and modernization problems is a mistake. Spending money on old structures and organizations is not the answer. Task Force Hawk's problems are systematic, not financial! What ails the Army runs deep and will not be cured by inserting a few new pieces of equipment into the old World War II ten division structure.

The Army's ten division, Cold War mobilization structure is too complex, too large, centralizes too many capabilities at a high level, deploys too slowly, and is too vulnerable to weapons of mass destruction. The centralization of too many critical warfighting assets at the division and corps levels means that the deployment of one brigade immobilizes two more brigades, halts effective training and renders the WW II division structure non-deployable. In addition, the brigade task force that emerges from this structure whether it runs on wheels or tracks lacks cohesion, Joint command, control, communications and intelligence and is very slow to deploy.

The point is simple. America needs ground forces. Precision strike is a capability, not a strategy. Only armies change governments and fundamentally alter the geopolitical landscape. The continued survival of regimes in Baghdad and Belgrade testify to that fact. But new technologies cannot and should not be grafted on to old organizations that are not optimally designed to exploit them. Truly revolutionary change occurs when technology, organization, leadership and tactics all change. This, then, describes the challenge for the next administration -- transforming America's defense establishment to cope with new dynamics in a changed strategic environment to acquire revolutionary military capabilities early in the 21st Century. For the next Commander in Chief, it means "building new forces", not rebuilding the old ones and "spending smart", not just throwing money at old problems.

Reorganizing the Army as outlined in Breaking the Phalanx is the first critical step in a broader program of defense reform and reorganization. It will not only result in Army ground forces that are more deployable and effective in Joint operations, reorganization will also create more deployable combat power than exists in the current ten division force that is also significantly less expensive to operate, maintain and modernize.

At the center of the change in Breaking the Phalanx is the all arms Combat Group of roughly 5,000 troops. With embedded Joint command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C41) the division and brigade echelons are compressed into one echelon that enables: (1) Integration with other services at a lower level than division and corps; and, (2) Greater operational independence in smaller formations. These reorganized ground troops provide an agile force mix that will integrate seamlessly into the emerging strike capabilities of the Joint Task Force! In 28 days, an Army organized into Combat Groups can project nearly 40,000 ready, trained and equipped troops to a crisis or a conflict.

In the summer of 1997, the Center for Army Analysis examined the force structure outlined in Breaking the Phalanx alongside Force XXI in simulation. The results favored the force in Breaking the Phalanx. Simulations in Israel conducted for the Israeli Defense Doctrine and Training Division by General (retired) Dr. Shimon Naveh produced dramatic results. When the IDF was reorganized on the model outlined in Breaking the Phalanx it decisively defeated the (12) division Egyptian Army in record time and confirmed for the Israelis the validity of the operational architecture and the enormous warfighting potential of the force in Breaking the Phalanx. It is no surprise that America's NATO Allies are eager to adopt this model for cooperation with US Forces because it saves money, makes strategic sense and rationalizes modernization.

Sadly, the Army's senior leaders have opted to re-capitalize the Army's old Cold War force structure with wheeled armored vehicles at a cost of 70 billion dollars to the American taxpayer. This approach ignores the critical problems that contributed to the US Army's failure during the Kosovo crisis. In fact, the Army's current approach is reminiscent of the British and French decisions in the years between WWI and WWII to incorporate limited numbers of new equipment- such as tanks and radios-into the old WWI division structures.

As the world discovered in 1940 when Germany's Armored Battlegroups overran France, the full impact of new technology in war was not achieved until the German Army changed the way armored armed forces were organized, trained, led and employed in action with other air and ground elements. This is why change now is critical. Without a fundamental redesign of the Army force on the model outlined in Breaking the Phalanx , not only will Americans experience more Task Force Hawks, eventual failure on the scale of the Anglo-French defeat in 1940 is inevitable. Americans forget that while air power saved Britain from invasion, air power could not rescue the British and French Armies from defeat in France during the spring of 1940.

The questions for elected leaders are can the United States afford to risk another TF Hawk and sustain a defeat in the international arena? And, must Americans wait for defeat to justify sweeping change, reform and reorganization in the US Army?

It is time for change! The United States must opt for reform and reorganization of the nation's ground forces and avoid repeating Britain's historic mistake of always fielding an effective army just in time to avoid defeat, but too late to deter an aggressor. The alternative approach-keeping headquarters that are no longer strategically relevant in their current form and relying exclusively on the infusion of a few pieces of new technology to enable Cold War organizations to fight the last war better-will not transform the force. Moreover, this risks wasting very real opportunities to steal a dramatic march on potential adversaries in the next century.

Breaking the Phalanx and Seven Strategic Goals for the US Army!

What Breaking the Phalanx does for US National Defense! Creates a New Information Age Army for the 21st Century by integrating Army Ground Forces with America's growing arsenal of Strike Assets! More Teeth, Less Tail! Reorganization eliminates "no value added" headquarters, streamlines logistics tail and returns the personnel savings back to the units that deploy and fight! Readiness to Fight: The Combat Group Organization is based on the way we fight, not on how we garrison. With rotational readiness, this creates more deployable combat power for CINCs! Jointness: The combat group approach to organizing, training, educating, modernizing and fighting the Army is Joint! This integrates Army Forces with other Services in JTFs. Modernization: Retain equipment that works, dump what does not. Lease new sets to avoid large capital investment up front and keep pace with changing technology. $Savings: Estimates of potential savings range from 3 to 4 billion Dollars! Savings are critical to fund future modernization.

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For a slide presentation of the concepts in Breaking the Phalanx see
The Macgregor Briefings: An Information Age Vision for the U.S. Army

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