|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A Balkan Revolution? A Changing of the Guard The Role of the Military The Course of the Revolution Internal Control: Plus ça change.... Prospects for Political Stability Post-Revolution International Relations A Balkan Revolution? Following the tumultuous events of October 2000 in Belgrade, the situation in the Balkans remains as unpredictable as ever. With the euphoria over the toppling of Milosevic fading from public scrutiny, Jane's Sentinel examines the nature of Serbia's revolution and highlights possible questions regarding the future for the region. In these excerpts from the foreword to Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments: The Balkans questions the spontaneity of Yugoslavia's October Revolution, looks at the future for Yugoslavia - both domestically and internationally, and charts the course of Milosevic's downfall. top A Changing of the Guard The Balkans region was almost constantly in the limelight as tensions inside and around Serbia kept mounting throughout 2000 to culminate in the somewhat unbelievably quick and easy change of power in Belgrade in early October. After 13 years of accumulating power as holder of various offices, Slobodan Milosevic, who has rightly been called the generator of regional instability, was replaced in a bloodless revolution of sorts. Although this is a most welcome change, it should by no means be taken for granted that the demise of Slobodan Milosevic is ultimate, total and irreversible, nor should one fall in the somewhat euphoric mood that came to dominate post-Milosevic Serbia and, to just slightly lesser degree, the international community, which over-optimistically claims that the days of Balkan problems are over. Milosevic's departure did defuse some tensions and eliminate others, particularly the possibility that the armed forces and the security apparatus of Serbia and/or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) would be used to threaten the neighbouring territories. However, although Slobodan Milosevic personally led and spearheaded some of the Balkans' nastiest bloodshed in the past decade, it was not a case of a ruthless dictator imposing his whims on his otherwise innocent subjects who would be unwilling to start new wars, warm up the old ones, take part in any atrocities or behave in any other unacceptable way. Rather, it is the case of the defeat of the personification of the policy of violent nationalism and ethnic exclusivity. However, even though its main promoter has been removed, the idea remains very much alive and substantially undefeated, threatening to find new forms of expression and reappear, possibly under a somewhat changed guise, at any of several potential hotspots in the region. The international community should very soberly refrain from any gloating over its role in the removal of Milosevic and start working seriously on the next step - the discrediting of the very idea of Balkans' ethnic nationalism - before it has a chance to mutate and re-appear somewhere else in the region where its destructive potential could once again develop quickly and uncontrollably. The change of power in Belgrade left Serbia/FRY in a fragile position, an interim state between an autocracy cemented by the willing participation of thousands of the regime's officials and occasionally confirmed in the elections of doubtful legality, and the nascent democracy. Both the Serbian state and the (practically non-existent) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia it claims to be so determined to maintain, remain in a dangerous institutional and power vacuum and there are no assurances that it will be filled to the satisfaction of all the parties concerned and of the international community. Milosevic's removal was a combination of spontaneity and orchestration, another exercise in manipulation which was willingly entered into by both sides. There are very serious indications that the removal of Slobodan Milosevic from the post of President of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 5 October was not just a result of spontaneous popular discontent. Rather, the deep dissatisfaction of the people was carefully channelled by a secret committee that closely co-operated with a task force composed of members from foreign secret services. The operation was carefully prepared and co-ordinated for a full year before Milosevic himself, by calling the presidential elections created the conditions for the plan to be put into action. Many links yet have to fall in their right place, but the pattern in which Milosevic was removed and replaced with an unsuspecting opposition candidate, Vojislav Kostunica, reveals a fascinating grand scheme masterminded by the West and executed with the participation of a surprisingly large number of Serbian politicians and officers. Yet, some ten days after the change it was becoming obvious that it left a somewhat bitter taste. The events of Belgrade have yet to be given an appropriate name, but it is certain that they do not qualify for the terms `velvet revolution' or any similar ones which were used to describe the fall of various Communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989. On 7 October Vojislav Kostunica was officially sworn in as the new president of FRY, so far the only level of power in FRY that is properly filled and uncontested. At all other levels the situation is much less clear: the FRY federal government had been practically deposed and replaced by a revolutionary Crisis Committee. The new regime then retreated somewhat to accept the authority of the old federal cabinet, which in purely legal terms should remain in office until a new government is appointed and approved by the federal parliament. Yet, although it accepts the legal basis of the old cabinet, which should be acting as caretaker, the new powers, led by the president of Serbia's Democratic Party (DS) Zoran Djindjic (whose only current official title is member of the Crisis Committee) rather than Kostunica, question or impede outright their power to make any decisions. Thus at the federal level there remains a dangerous duality, with one set of politicians - the ancien regime having the legality and legitimacy to exercise power until the new government is established but lack political willingness to do so; another group, the Crisis Committee, derives its claim to power from the overwhelming revolutionary fervour which swept Belgrade in the early days of October, but as yet remains technically illegal and not constrained by any constitutional intricacies, ruling somewhat clumsily and even arrogantly by revolutionary methods. In the first days following the fateful 5 October the power rolled in the streets of Belgrade but the new victors, still calling themselves the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) did not stoop to pick it up, allowing the representatives of the old regime a degree of consolidation. Several questions remain open, not least the one of how deep does the power and control of the new forces go? First indications unmistakably pointed to an amazing degree of amateurishness, with the DOS grabbing the symbols of power rather than its real levers and apparently contenting itself with controlling those sectors where they could establish themselves in authority effortlessly. Wherever there was some resistance to the revolutionary takeover, the Crisis Committee simply left issues unresolved, moving on to other easy targets. top The Role of the Military The dilettante approach taken by the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) has contributed to the sense of dangerous power vacuum, particularly in the security apparatus. At the time of writing, the Federal Army (VJ), which played a curious role in Milosevic's downfall, remained outside any real DOS influence although, admittedly, it vowed not to allow the old pro-Milosevic forces to influence it either. The VJ derives its claim to exclusion from the revolutionary movement from the fact that many of its highest officers participated in the grand scheme which toppled Slobodan Milosevic, most by non-obstructing the carefully orchestrated removal and refusing to obey direct orders to deploy troops into the streets to save his skin. But even if it did not openly side with Milosevic, the VJ openly avoided proclaiming its allegiance to the DOS as long as it was practically viable, and when some sort of declaration could no longer be avoided it came from a carefully worded statement by the Chief of Staff, General Nebojsa Pavkovic, who let it be known that the Army will respect the Constitution. Such a statement was welcomed as a sign of relief, but in reality it means very little, as there is hardly any constitutional order, being replaced by the revolutionary self-proclaimed legitimacy of the crisis committees at federal and lower levels. For all practical purposes the VJ, at the time of writing, remained outside the control of either the new or the old forces - a third element in the complex Belgrade power puzzle. Nominally it should be under control of the federal Defence Minister, but throughout the eight years of FRY's existence that post was just thin legalistic façade with no real power whatsoever, and all the generals occupying the post of Chief of Staff got used to - and willingly accepted - being under the personal command of Slobodan Milosevic, even at times in which his constitutional position was at the Serbian rather than the federal level, which would have given him no legal ground whatsoever to interfere in the running of military affairs. It can be safely assumed that after 10 difficult years marked with military, political, financial and personal ups and downs the military is now quite willing to occupy the space projected by the country's laws. But that change can not be too rapid as the VJ officer corps has never been trained in democracy, and on an individual level most share the fear for personal security and safety. From this climate of mistrust General Pavkovic has so far benefited most, not just for himself but for the Army as a whole, by claiming the right to be left out of the reach of the sweep of the revolutionary broom. Yet, while the VJ's position is welcome in the prolonged interregnum in which, at the time of writing, Serbia/FRY is still finding itself, it is untenable in the long run and both the civilian authorities-to-be and the military ones are facing some difficult tasks in establishing a long-term working partnership to their mutual satisfaction. So far it was the unquestionable personal authority of General Pavkovic, whom the VJ sees as their wartime leader who "led the Army undefeated through 77 days of war with NATO", which has shielded the army from revolutionary zealots and allowed it to remain on the outside. There is little doubt that Pavkovic commands full authority (except for possibly up to 3 brigades which allegedly warned that they would not carry out any orders that could harm Milosevic). To prove this, he summoned the VJ's top dozen generals and admirals barely a week after the changes in Belgrade and uttered the statement that the VJ will behave according to the Constitution and will respect the will of the people. However, the exact interpretation of whatever that means remains with General Pavkovic and while he is currently happy in his splendid isolation, there are no guarantees that such a position may not change in future due to some unpredictable turn of events. So far, the message sent out by the generals to the DOS was unmistakable: according to them the VJ is a complex and efficient system whose integrity - and honour - have been preserved and the military is unwilling to place such a crucial system in the hands of a regime which has not fully established its legitimacy and, even more importantly, which has shown a regrettable degree of clumsiness and amateurishness in running other systems which it had taken over. Even if the DOS gets its act together and appoints a functioning federal government, the question of authority over the VJ will not be resolved that simply. Officially, the federal armed forces are under command of the Supreme Defence Council (VSO) which has not convened for almost two years. While Milosevic is in power the reason was clear - the disagreement of Montenegro's president Milo Djukanovic with the role Milosevic projected for the VJ in repression against Kosovar Albanians. To minimise Djukanovic's influence, Milosevic simply stopped convening the VSO and acted as Supreme Commander, in which role he was endorsed and recognised by Pavkovic. New federal president Kostunica announced that he would convene the VSO "at the first opportunity" and Djukanovic, reiterating that Montenegro continues to deem the federal authorities illegitimate and illegal as they derive their claim to power from a flawed and non-democratic process and constitutional changes unrecognised by Montenegro, announced that he would participate in that session. Yet, there seems to be a lot of reluctance in Serbia to convene that session quickly as many believe that it would reinforce the position of Djukanovic who, through his staunch refusal to endorse the much-idealised DOS revolutionary federal government and Kostunica as president, has quickly become the focus of Serbian vilification. Whatever the uncertainties of the VJ's position in the new balance of political forces, it can be quite safely assumed that the danger of it once again being used for political purposes at the whim of one man is completely removed - including the possibility of that man being Pavkovic himself. However, as the danger of a backlash by forces of the ancien regime has not been completely eliminated, there is still some possibility that Pavkovic could lead the VJ to take an autonomous decision. In such a remote possibility he would continue to claim a de facto exclusion from political control. Unlike the Army, the other - numerically almost equal - armed force in Serbia, the Ministry of the Interior (MUP) practically disintegrated overnight. For a long time the willing executioners of Milosevic's personal rule, the MUP started to waver as resistance and discontent with Milosevic's rule became strong at local levels. It seems that the long-prepared and carefully-orchestrated conspiracy to remove Milosevic found willing participants in a number of key police officials who decided that time was ripe for a change. However, as far as the integrity of the MUP is concerned, the change may have come too late. The Serbian Interior Ministry forces remained without any orders immediately after 5 October and that caused many local commanders, particularly in the central-Serbian towns, to seek a new master. Although the Serbian government, which is nominally in charge of the MUP, should have been functioning and exercising control, that simply did not happen and the pro-Milosevic cabinet decided to stay clear of trouble by doing nothing whatsoever, ignoring repeated calls from MUP commanders to issue some regulations. Barely three days after the change in Belgrade, Serbian Interior Minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic, a man of extremely modest capacities, resigned rather than take personal responsibility for the first time ever. That left the MUP technically under control of Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic, a Milosevic loyalist, but he too had other things to worry about and as a consequence the MUP remained headless for over ten days. top The Course of the Revolution Details of what appears to be a very carefully orchestrated plot to remove Milosevic and which included a significant degree of participation of foreign secret services are only beginning to appear and the picture is not yet fully clear. What can be established beyond doubt is that both sides cheated in the first round of the elections on 24 September. While that was nothing new for Milosevic, it was a novel approach by the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) who had worked out precise mathematical models with which to counter any actual results. While the real result of the presidential vote was certainly in favour of Kostunica, it almost certainly did not surpass the 50 per cent mark needed for the first round victory. However, that did not prevent DOS's teams from claiming a first round victory - they were certain that after so many frauds Milosevic had no international credibility. With the public protests claiming Kostunica's victory gathering momentum, it was only a question of successfully completing the plan by the physical removal of Milosevic. The main political co-ordinator was Djindjic, the main strategist Stanisic and field co-ordination was in the hands of some 200 members of Otpor and two dozen mayors and their assistants. Otpor had been provided with field radios and secure communications and it was decided that the task force which would lead the attacks was to come from the western Serbian town of Cacak - a stronghold of the opposition and the royalist movement embodied in its mayor Velja Ilic, who had secured the co-operation of several local VJ officers and arms from reserve warehouses. Those were duly distributed on 2 October as the DOS prepared to call the rally in Belgrade on 5 October to force Milosevic out. The Cacak group, some 4,000-strong, had 2,500 AK-47 rifles and over 600 anti-tank shoulder-launched weapons. In case some Federal Army (VJ) or Interior Ministry (MUP) units decided to remain loyal to Milosevic, trenches were dug out on the southern approaches to Belgrade and several hundred mortars and recoilless rifles deployed. In several towns armed teams, co-ordinated by Otpor, were on standby; members of the DOS, most notably Djindjic and Nebojsa Covic, who joined the opposition after he was expelled from the SPS in 1997, gathered their own `security forces' which numbered over 1,000. The final test was to be the performance of General Pavkovic at Kolubara, where the mining strike, carefully co-ordinated by the DOS, had been paralysing Serbia's largest power station for over a week. On 3 October Milosevic issued direct orders to Pavkovic to break-up the strike and re-establish coal supplies; instead he played his own game and left after several hours of fruitless negotiations. This was the final cue for Djindjic who gave the political go-ahead; meanwhile Stanisic kept issuing precise instructions to demonstrators as to which crossroads to block, spreading thin the MUP, which was still without orders from top for an all-out attack. Given the large numbers involved, it is quite amazing that Serbian secret services did not thwart the operation. However, it appears that the number of participants at their top level was significant, and those who stumbled upon elements of the plan were quietly sidelined. The teams moved on Belgrade on the night of 4 October. The Cacak team had bulldozers on trailers and other heavy machinery was on standby in Belgrade. It was crucial to execute the operation quickly and bloodlessly, as such guarantees had been given to Pavkovic and the MUP. The `demonstrators' centred on the Federal Parliament which had been protected by less than 300 MUP members with orders to "apply minimum force". They repealed the first attack with tear-gas, and the opposition forces retreated to a nearby plateau. Then came the second and third attacks which outflanked the MUP. Lukewarm resistance ended almost immediately - the crowd stormed the building without harming a single policeman. A similar scenario repeated itself at several key points: the TV station, the Politika newspaper and government buildings. Otpor teams had to intervene and save the hated TV Serbia Head of News Dragoljub Milanovic from being lynched. All over Belgrade police suddenly gave up any notion of resistance and fraternised with the crowds. It all happened at pre-arranged spots where TV cameras had been waiting. According to the plan, Belgrade was taken over in less than two hours. There were only two tense moments - first when a police unit tried to reach the besieged TV building with armoured vehicles, only to be called off at the last moment by a higher commander, and another when the VJ's 1st Guards Brigade, which remained personally loyal to Milosevic, sent two battalions out, only to have them give up when confronted with a wall of demonstrators. By 21:00 it was all over - Vojislav Kostunica was taken to the state TV wartime broadcasting facility on Kosutnjak Hill (which was taken over half an hour before the downtown central TV building was stormed) to address the nation. Symbolically, he took over from Milosevic the moment when he appeared on state TV - the formal inauguration was just a legal intricacy. Throughout the turmoil Milosevic remained in his residence on Dedinje Hill guarded by his own MUP security detail commanded by the uncompromisingly loyal General Senta Milenkovic. Several VJ units, all from the former Special Forces Corps (KSS) continue to claim loyalty to Milosevic, albeit refraining from any practical moves. top Internal Control: Plus ça change.... The power vacuum was cunningly used by the secret services within the Interior Ministry (MUP), most notably the State Security Directorate (RDB), to quietly fade out taking a good insurance policy: between 8,000 and 12,000 files, diligently collected for years, are claimed to have disappeared, including both the hard copies and electronic files. While some of the files will undoubtedly be destroyed, the majority are likely to be used to blackmail members of the new ruling regime or for simple extortion. That threatens to create another murky power player in Serbia - former security officials who could either decide to claim the right to return to their former posts once the service is restored, or continue to operate as a parallel underground structure. The new rulers demonstrated that they were neither strangers to the old ways nor that they would baulk at old practices. For the first few days after Milosevic's fall all phone tapping, control of email and other secret activities had ceased, but there were reports that several of the new leaders tried to establish control over the secret service apparatus - apparently on their own, rather than DOS's agenda. Initial reports indicate that they were only prevented from succeeding by the degree to which the secret services had disintegrated, but the struggle for that attractive segment of the security forces is likely to continue. The notion that the hated tyrant was brought down by popular revolt remains the official version. Time and events will confirm that the list of those who denounced their erstwhile protector and made his downfall possible, headed by Serbian President Milan Milutinovic and VJ Chief of Staff Pavkovic, is much longer than anybody could have believed possible. Meanwhile, Milosevic remains cornered and isolated, and it is only a matter of time before his personal security will be removed, opening a free-for-all hunt on the former Serbian strongman. That hunt is likely to evolve on several levels. Officially, he is wanted as a war crimes suspect by the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague (ICTY), but unlike NATO-led KFOR in Bosnia there are no foreign force in Serbia with an official mandate to apprehend war crimes suspects. Therefore, the ICTY has to rely on the willingness of the FRY authorities, and President Kostunica has reiterated time and again that those tasks are very low on his priority list, although a question of Kostunica's willingness to do anything for ICTY would be pertinent. The second level includes Serbs with a personal grudge against Milosevic, not least those whose family members or friends were victims of unexplained assassinations during his rule. Revenge is a strong feature of Serbian mentality and institutional control can do little to prevent determined individuals from carrying out the task they set before themselves. Yet on the third level there are many who pragmatically recognise that as long as he lives, Milosevic remains a psychologically destabilising factor, a liability and a source of potential embarrassment to many domestic and foreign politicians who were party to his shady political, criminal, military and financial deals. Some prominent and influential Serbs have already indicated that their country would be in a much better starting position for its new life without the shadow of Milosevic looming over it, constantly threatening to damage both the internal processes and its international standing by exposing the dirty laundry of the past 13 years. Therefore, it is quite safe to assume that a number of secret services must be seriously preparing to eliminate this potentially unpleasant witness. top Prospects for Political Stability Politically, Serbia/FRY remains inherently unstable. The deposition of Milosevic originally left both entities in a state of potential confrontation, with power at the federal level being exercised by DOS's Crisis Committee in abeyance of the officially still existing caretaker federal cabinet, while at the level of Serbia the power officially remained in the hands of the pro-Milosevic coalition, which includes his own party as well as his wife's extreme leftist one and the hardline nationalist and staunch advocate of violence, Vojislav Seselj. It was immediately obvious to both sides that such a situation was untenable and a source of potentially violent conflicts. For all practical purposes the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, not recognised by Montenegro and virtually evicted from Kosovo, territorially coincides with Serbia, and the recognition of that fact makes the impossibility of the duality of power obvious. While there is little hope that the federation will be able to extend control over either Montenegro or Kosovo in the foreseeable future, political considerations dictate that both notions be preserved. Yet, their competencies often clash, with the VJ being officially a federal institution while the MUP belongs to Serbia, customs being a federal responsibility while taxes a republican competence and so on. This unresolved status, reinforced by the strong determination of Montenegro not to be subdued by Serbia, will remain the biggest generator of long-term instability. However, in the short-term both the anti-Milosevic and the pro-Milosevic forces realise that a head-on confrontation could run out of control, and a little more than a week after the changes a compromise solution was found. Elections for the Serbian parliament have been called for 24 December, and in the meantime the Socialist Party agreed to create an interim Serbian government in which they will be joined by the DOS and the Serbian Renewal Movement as a party represented in the Serbian parliament. Each has been allocated their share of ministries, but the key ones - interior, justice, finance and information are to be under joint control of all parties, with the decisions being reached by consensus. While this has alleviated the immediate threat, it has not removed it completely. Firstly, as Seselj's Radical Party refused to participate and opted to remain outside the system. Seselj, always an unpleasant character, lost all ministerial posts and in the municipal elections of 24 September also had to relinquish control of the lucrative - and showcase - municipality of Zemun. The voting patterns indicate that almost all moderate Radical voters have deserted him and supported Kostunica and DOS, which consolidated the party around its most-hardline elements, with a record of violence. That leaves Seselj free of any traces of constraint and there were indications that he was plotting with the extreme wing of the Socialist party, allegedly led by Mirko Marjanovic, to gather sufficient forces for a counter-coup. Such a move would have little hope of succeeding outright, as it lacks the crucial backing of the Army, but it could definitely cause bloodshed. Somehow, the `revolution' seems to have proved too quick and too peaceful for the Serbs' accumulated frustrations to vent themselves, and there is an mood of slight disappointment in the air which could present just the right ingredients for more serious unrest. Apart from Seselj's "the worse - the better" policy, unrest could also be initiated by a number of other factors: economic hardships which are likely to remain a feature of Serbia despite Western financial pledges and the realisation that, unlike in the anti-Communist events across Eastern Europe in 1989 very little has in fact changed. Only the very thin layer of top leadership has been removed, but the economy is likely to be run by those very same people who ran it in Milosevic's era; the same is true of the security forces, media, public services and many other walks of life. In that respect Serbia can be compared to post-Ceausescu Romania, but without the psychological release of seeing the hated dictator dead. top Post-Revolution International Relations The international community has been amazingly quick in embracing Serbia/FRY and hailing its "successful change". Possibly even a little too quick, for the change so far remains only skin-deep. However, it is understandable that the West, frustrated by years of Milosevic's stubbornness, is eager to secure its position and assure the Serbs that they should co-operate. To achieve this, it lifted most of the sanctions at the first opportunity, welcomed Kostunica at Biarritz and pledged substantial financial aid. That financial aid might initially prove to be a strong impetus, but it is necessary to exercise a degree of caution. Popular belief in Serbia is that money will pour in overnight and that living conditions will improve accordingly and visibly. Yet, before the aid will have had a chance to be transferred, let alone distributed, the new authorities will have to distribute salaries and pensions and find money to keep the primary infrastructure running. During Milosevic's time that task was easier, as he had the power to order the heads of state and public companies who had some money in their accounts to have it transferred into the gaps that most urgently needed filling. But the new authorities enjoy no such power, and the economic situation might combine with the electoral campaign to create high tensions in Serbia. Many international actors, while euphoric over the removal of Milosevic, seem unprepared for such a possibility. top
|
 |
  
Balkans Reconstruction Intelligence Review High Command Intelligence Watch Report Terrorism Watch Report World Armies World Air Forces Fighting Ships Geopolitical Library CD-ROM
The insurgency threat in southern Iraq The Iraq blame game: Israel Blame Arafat: The struggle for Palestinian power Commercial intelligence leaders join forces to monitor maritime risk Trauma recovery: Washington DC student fatalities highlight need for sustained effort Jane's Citizen's Safety Guide provides essential information on how everyday people and families can protect themselves Jane's war movies crossword: the solution Chemical pellets could replace baton rounds in Northern Ireland, report shows |
