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15/08/00
Russian Navy: AssessmentThe Russian Navy is deployed in four fleets, in the Black Sea, Baltic, Pacific, and North Atlantic. In recent years increasing focus has been placed on the Northern Fleet. Despite the reduced role of the Baltic Fleet, the division of the Black Sea Fleet and Caspian Flotilla, the Russian Navy retains a claim to be the world's most powerful, after the US Navy. All the same, the Russian Navy is experiencing similar crises of role, personnel and resources as the other arms of service. It is contracting but at the same time acquiring advanced new vessels and weapons and thus retains a potentially formidable technical capability. Broadly speaking, the navy's role is to provide sea-based nuclear deterrence and to support Russia's wider interests. Roughly one-third of naval personnel serve on the high seas, with other concerns being naval aviation, training, coastal defence, shore support, communications and maritime border duties. While the SSBN fleet is contracting - perhaps to a force of 25-30 vessels - there is considerable effort in developing the SSN fleet, with the `Akula II' and Severodvinsk classes replacing dated `Victor I' and `II' class submarines. The construction of surface vessels, by contrast, is slow and largely limited to smaller combatants, notably the Neustrashimy class frigate and Sovremenny II destroyer. There is a realisation among Russian policy makers of the need to maintain a credible naval capability. Speaking in November 1999 Prime Minister Putin announced that a decree on the modernisation of the fleet was to be drafted and that the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov was to be deployed to the Mediterranean in 2000. This marks a pattern of increasing Russian naval activity that has seen attack submarines operate in the Cold War stamping grounds of the Mediterranean and Eastern Pacific, carrying out simulated attacks on US naval forces. According to senior US intelligence analysts the Russian Navy is operating in a manner very similar to that of the Soviet fleet during the Cold War. Crucially however, Russian naval strength has seriously declined, with only 20 first class attack submarines in operating condition. The fleet has suffered from being relatively weak politically and has been unable to be of much use to Russia's most pressing security concerns such as the conflict in Chechnya. As a result, it has been hard-pressed to fight for resources. Overall, it has had to adopt a `survival and denial' strategy, concentrating on maintaining smaller surface combatants and a powerful submarine arm both to protect Russia's waters and deny other powers the seas it cannot itself control. However, decisions such preserving all the type 1144 Ushakov (ex-Kirov) class battle cruisers in service has a number of implications for how Russia envisages the use of sea power in the early 21st century. The extensive investment involved in keeping these warships in service shows that Russia continues to have a commitment to blue water operations involving large missile cruisers. This may indicated that new doctrine will continue to reflect the Soviet era concept of layered defence, keeping enemy naval forces as far away from home waters as possible. The August 2000 exercise in which Kursk was involved showed a traditional Russian modus operandi harnessing a variety of units to defeat a naval foe concentrated around large aircraft carriers. There has been growing concern as to whether the navy's present decline has become irreversible. Crews are increasingly losing their basic skills. Sea duty for submarines has been cut by a quarter since 1997, and that for ships by fully a third. Furthermore, conditions for the navy are even worse than those in the other arms of service. Officers and warrant officers only received in mid-1999 their ration allowances for 1997-98, for example, and even an admiral is paid only the equivalent of US$150 a month.
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S p o n s o r :
Kursk fate shows up gaps in Russia's rescue system Kursk: did collision trigger explosion? Tragedy may lead to purge, but no new funds Russian Submarine Disaster - Update Russian Submarine Emergency Rehearsing for DISSUB (Sept 96) Background Information:TYPE 65/DT/DST 92 Background Information:LR5 Background Information: Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicles Background Information: OSCAR II (ANTYEY) (TYPE 949A) (SSGN)
Intelligence Review Sentinel - Russia and the CIS Balkans Reconstruction Russia's Aerospace Industry World Armies World Air Forces Fighting Ships
DEFENCE 'Smart' payloads offered for Russian air-launched rockets France will modernise its Exocets UAE commits to missile boat AIR FORCES Boeing considers feasibility of plasma-based weapons Iran shows its helicopter expertise USA negotiates Desert Falcon missiles LAND FORCES Myanmar heat turned up with SAMs from China MoU signed for lightweight SPH Russia offers missile defence for oilfields NAVAL FORCES USN commissions Winston S Churchill Bofors gun on UAE short list Major equipment selections announced for Type 45 |
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