For two years, the Bush administration diligently lobbied to weaken the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, a global treaty to curb smoking. Taking its cues from the US tobacco industry, the administration directed its negotiators to oppose anti-smoking initiatives at the heart of the pact, among them a ban on tobacco advertising, a call for beefed-up warning labels, and support for higher taxes on tobacco products.
Then, in early March, something remarkable happened. Delegates from developing countries and anti-smoking groups, claiming that the US had no intention of signing the treaty in any form, shrugged off Washington's pressure and pushed the convention to consider a draft treaty including virtually every measure the Bush administration had been fighting against. Isolated, US diplomats had no choice but to agree to the strongly-worded draft, which will be presented to the entire World Health Organization for adoption in May.
As soon as the draft treaty was approved, US officials suggested that the Bush administration may not sign the final agreement, even if it is adopted by the WHO. Which would hardly surprise many who attended the treaty talks in Geneva. Diplomats and anti-smoking advocates alike acknowledge that the WHO will be split when it gathers to vote on the treaty next month. And the US may not be alone in opposing the agreement. During negotiations over the draft, delegates from Germany, Japan, and China -- all countries where cigarette manufacturing or advertising is widespread -- joined US efforts to weaken the treaty.
"The Americans and Germans are determined to play a spoiler role," says Clive Bates, the director of Action on Smoking and Health, a London-based public health charity. "But it was very clear that developing countries have been pushed to the absolute limit of their flexibility and will not stand for any further weakening."
Before the final round of talks began on February 17, the Bush administration's bellicose approach appeared to be working. The chairman of the negotiating group, Luis Felipe de Seixas Correa of Brazil, arguing that the strongest treaty would be one signed by every nation, sought to develop a framework acceptable to all 191 members of the WHO.
The US delegation had objected to the proposed ban on tobacco advertising, arguing that it would be a violation of free speech, and the initiative to require a warning label covering 30 percent of a cigarette package, claiming that it would violate Congressional authority. Hoping to get Washington on board, Correa accepted weakening the treaty's text. Some of the treaty's strongest measures were deleted, others were made voluntary and non-binding.
Delegates from developing countries claimed that such objections were little more than a diplomatic veil. The Bush administration's real objective, they asserted, was the protection of US cigarette makers. As the delegates gathered in Geneva, disappointed health advocates feared that the four years spent developing the treaty would amount to little. But soon after the talks began, there emerged signs that the US had pushed its agenda too far.
First, a group of nearly 200 non-governmental organizations urged Correa to abandon his attempts to develop a consensus treaty, and delegates from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East began demanding that the agreement be strengthened. Then, as negotiations heated up during the last week of February, three leading US medical groups weighed in. In a remarkable joint statement, the American Cancer Society, American Lung Association, American Heart Association and the Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids asserted that Washington's intransigence was standing in the way of a treaty that could save millions of lives. The Bush administration's delegates, the groups declared, should "pack their bags and go home."
"In a way, this was the first time actual negotiations took place," says Ross Hammond, who represented the Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids in the recent treaty talks. "Until now, there was a lot of posturing, but not a lot of give and take."
Finally, three members of Congress released copies of a fax from the US Embassy in Saudi Arabia to that country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs asking for Saudi help in weakening the tobacco agreement.
In the final hours of negotiations, a majority of delegates made it clear that no more concessions would be accepted, and Germany and Japan decided to accept such widely supported measures as the ad ban. The US was left with no choice but to accept sending the stronger treaty to the WHO.
Of course, the fate of the tobacco agreement is far from certain. At the close of the Geneva talks, US delegates immediately signaled that Washington still has serious problems with the current treaty, and will seek to reopen negotiations when the World Health Assembly convenes next month. In addition, the Bush administration may well use ongoing negotiations over the WHO budget to gain leverage over both the organization and other member countries before the entire assembly meets.
"The US could still do enormous damage," Hammond warns.
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Colleen O'Brien is a Mother Jones editorial intern.
