Central Intelligence Agency

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Central Intelligence Agency
Seal of the Central Intelligence Agency
Agency overview
Formed	26 July 1947
Preceding Agency	Central Intelligence Group
Headquarters	Langley, Virginia, United States
Employees	Classified[1][2]
Annual Budget	Classified[3][4]
Minister Responsible	John Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence
Agency Executives	General Michael Hayden USAF, Director   Stephen Kappes, Deputy Director   Michael Morell, Associate Deputy Director
Website
www.cia.gov

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a civilian intelligence agency of the United States government. Its primary function is collecting and analyzing information about foreign governments, corporations, and persons in order to advise public policymakers.

Prior to December 2004, the CIA was literally the central intelligence organization for the US government. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 created the office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), who took over some of the government and intelligence community (IC)-wide function that had previously been under the CIA. Among those functions were the preparation of estimates reflecting the consolidated opinion of the 16 IC agencies, and preparation of briefings for the President. When discussing the CIA, it is critical to understand when one is speaking of the older IC-wide responsibilities, or its present set of responsibilities.

The CIA both collects and analyzes intelligence and is part of the U.S. Intelligence Community, led by the DNI, who manages the Community. The CIA's headquarters is in the community of Langley in the McLean CDP of Fairfax County, Virginia, a few miles west of Washington, D.C. along the Potomac River.

The role and functions of the CIA are roughly equivalent to those of the United Kingdom's Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki) (SVR) and Israel's Mossad. While the preceding agencies both collect and analyze information, some like the US State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research are purely analytical agencies. See List of intelligence agencies.

The CIA is sometimes referred to euphemistically in government and military parlance as Other Government Agencies (or OGA), particularly when its operations in a particular area are an open secret.^[5][6] Other terms include The Company and The Agency.

Contents 1 Organization 1.1 Executive offices 1.2 National estimates 1.3 Directorate of Intelligence 1.3.1 Regional groups 1.3.2 Transnational groups 1.3.3 Support and general units 1.4 National Clandestine Service 1.4.1 Mission definitions 1.4.1.1 Covert action 1.4.1.2 Clandestine operation 1.4.1.3 Types of HUMINT 1.4.1.4 Clandestine technical collection 1.4.1.5 Overt HUMINT 1.4.1.6 Psychological operations 1.4.2 Organization 1.4.3 Approval of clandestine and covert operations 1.4.3.1 Early autonomy of OPC 1.4.3.2 Increasing control by CIA management 1.5 Directorate of Science and Technology 1.6 Directorate of Support 1.6.1 Logistics and proprietaries 1.6.2 Training 1.7 Other offices 2 Relationship with other US intelligence agencies and commercial information sources 2.1 Open Source Intelligence 2.2 Clandestine technical collection 2.3 Outsourcing 2.4 Wikipedia 3 Relationship with foreign intelligence services 4 Organizational history 4.1 Immediate predecessors, 1946-1947 4.2 Early CIA, 1947-1952 4.3 The structure stabilizes, 1952 4.4 The coldest of Cold War, 1953-1966 4.5 Complications from Indochina and the Vietnam War (1954-1975) 4.6 Abuses of CIA authority, 1970s-1990s 4.7 2004, DNI takes over CIA top-level functions 5 Mission-related issues and controversies 5.1 Security and counterintelligence 5.1.1 Security issues 5.1.2 Counterintelligence failures 5.2 Criticism for ineffectiveness in intelligence analysis 5.2.1 Korean War 5.2.2 Vietnam War 5.2.3 Soviet Bloc 5.2.4 Indian nuclear test 5.2.5 9/11 attacks 5.3 Internal/presidential studies, external investigations and document releases 5.3.1 1949 Eberstadt Report (First Hoover Commission) 5.3.2 1949 Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report 5.3.3 1954 Doolittle Report on Covert Activities 5.3.4 1956 Bruce-Lovett Report 5.3.5 1975 investigations 5.3.6 1996 reports 5.3.7 2007 documents 5.4 Mind control experiments 5.4.1 Rockefeller Commission 5.4.2 Specific experiments 5.4.3 Outcome 5.5 Al-Qaeda 5.5.1 The Bin Laden Issue Station 5.5.2 The Plan 5.5.3 The Predator drone 5.5.4 The strategic assessments branch 5.6 War on terror 5.6.1 World-Wide Attack Matrix 5.6.2 Targeted killings 5.6.3 Detention, interrogation and rendition practices 5.7 The 2003 War in Iraq 5.8 Linkages with former Nazis 5.9 Influencing public opinion and law enforcement 5.9.1 Support of associations and journals 5.9.2 Support of labor organizations 5.9.3 Warren Commission 5.9.4 Robertson Panel 5.10 Drug trafficking 5.10.1 Contras 5.10.2 Drugs in Asia 5.11 Assassination plots 5.12 Human rights: declassified CIA interrogation manuals 6 Publications 7 CIA in fiction and the movies 8 See also 9 Further reading 10 References 11 External links 11.1 Official websites and documents 11.2 Other links

[edit] Organization

The heraldic symbol of the CIA consists of three representative parts: the left-facing bald eagle head atop, the compass star (or compass rose), and the shield. The eagle is the national bird, standing for strength and alertness. The 16-point compass star represents the CIA's world-wide search for intelligence outside the United States, which is then reported to the headquarters for analysis, reporting, and re-distribution to policymakers. The compass rests upon a shield, symbolic of defense.^[7][8]

The CIA has an executive office, four major directorates, and a variety of specialized offices. Prior to the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligences, it had some additional responsibilities for the IC as a whole.

[edit] Executive offices

This article may require cleanup to meet Wikipedia's quality standards. Please improve this article if you can. (January 2008)

Previously, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) oversaw the Intelligence Community (IC), serving as the president's principal intelligence advisor, additionally serving as head of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 amended the National Security Act to provide for a Director of National Intelligence who would assume some of the roles formerly fulfilled by the DCI, with a separate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The DCI's title now is "Director of the Central Intelligence Agency" (DCIA), serving as head of the CIA.

Currently, the Central Intelligence Agency answers directly to the Director of National Intelligence, although the CIA Director may brief the President directly. The CIA has its budget approved by the Congress, a subset of which do see the line items. The intelligence community, however, does not take direct orders from the Congress. The National Security Advisor is a permanent member of the National Security Council, responsible for briefing the President with pertinent information collected by all 16 U.S. Intelligence Community agencies are under the policy, but not necessarily budgetary, authority of the Director of National Intelligence.

President George W. Bush, in creating the National Clandestine Service (NCS), made it clear policy that the CIA to be in charge of all human intelligence (HUMINT) operations. This was the culmination of a years old turf war regarding influence, philosophy and budget between the United States Department of Defense and the CIA. The Pentagon, through the DIA, wanted to take control of the CIA's paramilitary operations and many of its human assets.^{[citation needed]} DoD had organized the Defense HUMINT Service,^[9] which, with the Presidential decision, became part of the NCS.

The CIA, which has for years held that human intelligence is the core of the agency, successfully argued that the CIA's decades long experience with human resources and civilian oversight made it the ideal choice. Thus, the CIA was given charge of all US human intelligence, but as a compromise, the Pentagon was authorized to include increased paramilitary capabilities in future budget requests.^{[citation needed]} The military is also authorized to run Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations, which are directly related to the protection of military forces and facility. Another HUMINT area that remains with DoD is direct support to special operations, by an organization, originally called the Intelligence Support Agency, which is a special access program (i.e., separate from sensitive compartmented intelligence activities that must be reported to the Congressional intelligence committees). According to several reports, responsibility for ISA was transferred to the U.S. Special Operations Command, given a new name (which is changed every two years) and new special access program designation (which is changed every six months).^[10]

The head of the CIA is now, rather than Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) given the title of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA). The National Security Act of 1947 that created the CIA also created a DCI to serve as head of the United States intelligence community, act as the principal adviser to the President for intelligence matters related to the national security, and serve as head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Further information: Director of Central Intelligence

The effect of the personalities of the DCIs on the structure and behavior of the Agency and indeed the IC is analyzed in Painter's dissertation on "Early Leader Effects" of Donovan, Dulles and Hoover^[11]

Despite reforms that have led back to what the CIA considers its traditional principal capacities, the CIA Director position has lost influence in the White House. For years, the Director of the CIA met regularly with the President to issue daily reports on ongoing operations. After the creation of the post of Director of National Intelligence, currently occupied by Mike McConnell, the report is now given by the DNI—who oversees all US Intelligence activities, including intelligence community operations outside of CIA jurisdiction. Former CIA Director Porter Goss, himself also a former CIA officer, denies this has had a diminishing effect on morale, in favor of promoting his singular mission to reform the CIA into the lean and agile counter-terrorism focused force he believes it should be.^[12]

A Deputy Director of the CIA (DDCIA) Assists the Director in his duties as head of the CIA and exercises the powers of the Director when the Director’s position is vacant or in the Director’s absence or disability. Either the Director or Deputy Director may be a military officer, but both positions may not be filled, at the same time, by military officers.

Previously, the Agency had a post of Executive Director, who managed day-to-day operations. On July 5, 2006, the position of Executive Director was replaced with an Associate Deputy Director of the CIA (ADD)^[13]

As the DCIA's principal adviser and representative on military issues, the Associate Director for Military Support (AD/MS)coordinates Intelligence Community efforts to provide Joint Force commanders with timely, accurate intelligence. The AD/MS also supports Department of Defense officials who oversee military intelligence training and the acquisition of intelligence systems and technology. A senior general officer, the AD/MS ensures coordination of Intelligence Community policies, plans and requirements relating to support to military forces in the intelligence budget.

[edit] National estimates

Prior to 2004, CIA had two analytic roles: the main effort based in the Directorate of Intelligence, which used internal experts to analyze data collected by the CIA, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the military collection organizations, and other parts of the intelligence community. Many of these reports were on current subjects, such as the status of a revolutionary group, or the technical details of a new Chinese factory.

Another function, however, was preparing "estimates", which try to predict the future. Estimates are a product of the intelligence community as a whole. National Intelligence Estimates were the most extensively coordinated documents, often that could be scheduled on a regular basis, such as a regular report on Soviet intentions. Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIE) were quick-response publications, often providing guidance in a crisis, but were still interagency consensus rather than CIA alone.

CIA had a separate and prestigious office, going by different names and organizations, such as the Office of National Estimates, Board of National Estimates, or a set of National Intelligence Officers, which would seek out the consensus of all the intelligence agencies, and then have some of the most senior analysts write a draft. This function is now in the National Intelligence Council of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.^[14]

The estimative function was formally defined in 1950. The responsibility originally defined stated

CIA is now in the business of producing what are called National Intelligence Estimates along the lines laid down in NSC 50. These papers are interdepartmental in character, designed to focus all available intelligence on a problem of importance to the national security. In the preparation of these Estimates, CIA is now relying on the State Department, rather than its own staff, for political and economic intelligence, the Department of the Army for military, etc., etc. A reorganization within CIA is in process with the emphasis on quality rather than quantity of personnel. CIA’s Office of Reports and Evaluation (ORE) is being eliminated. So far as political intelligence is concerned, and a small top level Office of National Estimates has been created to integrate the departmental drafts for the approval of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC). (The IAC advises the Director of Central Intelligence and is made up of the chiefs of intelligence of State, Army, Navy, Air, AEC, FBI, and a representative from the Joint Staff in the Department of Defense.) Upon approval by the IAC, the paper becomes a National Intelligence Estimate and is sent by the Director of Central Intelligence to the President, appropriate officers of Cabinet level, and the NSC.^[15]

The draft would be circulated around the IC, and, as much as possible, the CIA officer responsible for the document would work out differences. There is also a process by which an agency can disagree with a comment called a "reclama", which is a footnote expressing an alternate position. For an example of such dissents, see Special National Intelligence Estimate 10-9-65 in CIA activities in Asia and the Pacific#Vietnam 1965: Viet Cong and DRV Reactions, where there are dissents to various parts from all or part of the military, and from the Department of State.

IC-wide estimates are no longer coordinated by the CIA, but by the National Intelligence Council in the Office of the DNI. Sherman Kent is sometimes called the father of US intelligence analysis, with special emphasis on the production of estimates.^[16]

[edit] Directorate of Intelligence

The "DI" is the analytical branch of the CIA, responsible for the production and dissemination of all-source analysis intelligence analysis on key foreign issues.^[17]. While it has, like most government agencies, reorganized over the years, its current structure has four regional analytic groups, six groups for transnational issues, and two support units.^[18] Prior to the formation of the office of the Director of National Intelligence, the President's Daily Brief was prepared by the CIA Office of Current Intelligence.

Some open source intelligence OSINT, such as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, were, at different times, part of the Directorate of Intelligence or the Directorate of Science & Technology. Along with other OSINT functions, the National Open Source Enterprise is now in the ODNI.

[edit] Regional groups

There is an Office dedicated to Iraq. In addition, there are regional analytical Offices covering:

• Near East, North Africa and South Asia: The Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis (NESA)
• Russia and Europe: The Office of Russian and European Analysis (OREA)
• Asian-Pacific, Latin America, and Africa: The Office of East Asian, Pacific, Latin American and African Analysis (APLAA)

[edit] Transnational groups

The Office of Terrorism Analysis,^[19] which supports the National Counterterrorism Center, in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

The Office of Transnational Issues^[20] applies unique functional expertise to assess existing and emerging threats to US national security and provides the most senior US policymakers, military planners, and law enforcement with analysis, warning, and crisis support.

The CIA Crime and Narcotics Center^[21] researches information on international narcotics trafficking and organized crime for policymakers and the law enforcement community. Since the CIA has no domestic police authority, it sends its analytic information to the FBI and other law enforcement organizations, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

The Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center^[22] provides intelligence support deals with national and non-national threats, as well as supporting threat reduction/arms control. This works with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

Again cooperating with the FBI for domestic activity, the Counterintelligence Center Analysis Group^[23] identifies, monitors, and analyzes the efforts of foreign intelligence entities, both national and non-national, against US interests.

The Information Operations Center Analysis Group^[24] evaluates foreign threats to US computer systems, particularly those that support critical infrastructures. It works with critical infrastructure protection organizations in the United States Department of Defense (e.g., CERT Coordination Center) and the Department of Homeland Security (e.g., United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team)

[edit] Support and general units

The Office of Collection Strategies and Analysis provides comprehensive intelligence collection expertise to the DI, a wide range of senior Agency and Intelligence Community officials, and key national policymakers.

The Office of Policy Support customizes DI analysis and presents it to a wide variety of policy, law enforcement, military, and foreign liaison recipients.

[edit] National Clandestine Service

The National Clandestine Service, a semi-independent service which was formerly the Directorate of Operations, is responsible for collection of foreign intelligence, principally from clandestine HUMINT sources, and covert action. The new name reflects its having absorbed the Defense HUMINT Service, which did strategic human intelligence HUMINT collection for the Department of Defense (DoD). HUMINT directly related to military missions remains under the DoD. Note that there is an open source function in the office of the Director of National Intelligence, which may be taking over certain legal interviews in the US that previously were the Domestic Contact Division (or Domestic Contact Service).

While the NCS organization chart has not been published, although there have been prior descriptions of the Directorate of Plans or the Directorate of Operations, a fairly recent organization chart of the Defense HUMINT Service will indicate functions transferred into the NCS, and may well be fairly close to the overall NCS organizational structure.^[25]

There are references to earlier structures in various historical documents. For example, in a CIA paper on the internal probe into the Bay of Pigs,^[26] there are several comments on the Directorate of Plans organizational structure in 1962. Even though any large organization will constantly reorganize, the basic functions will stay and can be a clue to future organization.

At the top level, Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell had two Assistant Deputy Directors, C. Tracy Barnes and Richard Helms. Warner explains "operational details fell to Branch 4 (Cuba) of the DDP's Western Hemisphere Division (WH)", with some exceptions. Jacob Esterline, chief of the Cuba Branch, reported directly to Bissell and Barnes rather than to his division chief, J.C. King "although King was regularly informed and often consulted. To confuse matters still further, Branch 4 had no direct control over the Brigade's aircraft, which were managed by a separate DDP division that also took some orders directly from Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) Charles P. Cabell, a US Air Force general who liked to keep his hand in the planning of airdrops and other missions," Air operations, therefore, were in a separate division either for covert support, paramilitary operations, or both.

Cuba Branch had a "Foreign Intelligence Section," foreign intelligence being a term of art for HUMINT. The branch, hpwever, established "a separate "G-2" unit subordinate to its Paramilitary Section, which planned the actual invasion. This gives us the model of a geographic branch with subordinate sections, at least, for intelligence collection and paramilitary actions.

Warner's paper also mentions that certain DDP groups were outside the scope of the post-mortem by Executive Director Lyman Kirkpatrick, but their mention tells us that these were representative components of the DDP: "... the Havana station or the Santiago base, the development of foreign intelligence assets and liaison contacts, Division D's technical collection programs, or counter-intelligence work against the Cuban services." CIA "stations" are the parts of the embassy with officers under diplomatic cover, in a typical diplomatic office building. "Bases", however, are large facilities for supporting operations, typically with an airfield, secure warehouses, barracks and training areas. Division D was the joint CIA-NSA collection effort, where CIA would use clandestine operations personnel to emplace NSA SIGINT sensors. The reference to counter-intelligence work appears to refer to a main counterintelligence division, presumably the Counterintelligence Staff under James Jesus Angleton.

[edit] Mission definitions

[edit] Covert action

Covert action is defined as an operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. A covert operation differs from a clandestine operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation.^[27]

[edit] Clandestine operation

Clandestine operations are sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of the identity of the sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities.^[27]

[edit] Types of HUMINT

Human-source intelligence HUMINT is mentioned in this section, since the classic HUMINT technique is espionage. The CIA is the principal US agency for collecting clandestine human-source intelligence, by espionage. They develop and train their staff in clandestine tradecraft.

The Agency also may be responsible for developing communications systems appropriate for clandestine operations. In 1962, the Central Intelligence Agency, Deputy Directorate for Research (now the Deputy Directorate for Science and Technology), formally took on ELINT and COMINT responsibilities.^[28] "The consolidation of the ELINT program was one of the major goals of the reorganization... it is responsible for:

• ELINT support peculiar to the penetration problems associated with the Agent's reconnaissance program under NRO.
• Maintain a quick reaction capability for ELINT and COMINT equipment."

"CIA's Office of Research and Development was formed to stimulate research and innovation testing leading to the exploitation of non-agent intelligence collection methods....All non-agent technical collection systems will be considered by this office and those appropriate for field deployment will be so deployed. The Agency's missile detection system, Project [deleted] based on backscatter radar is an example. This office will also provide integrated systems analysis of all possible collection methods against the Soviet antiballistic missile program is an example."

[edit] Clandestine technical collection

Sometimes in cooperation with technical personnel at other agencies such as NSA when the collection discipline is SIGINT, or DIA when the techniques come MASINT, or other appropriate agencies such as the United States Department of Energy for nuclear information, CIA may work to place technical collection equipment in denied territory. They have also cooperated in placing such equipment into US embassies. Emplacing and servicing such equipment is another form of clandestine operaion, of which the adversary should not be aware.These include:^[28] The National Security Archive commented, "In 1987, Deputy Director for Science and Technology Evan Hineman established... a new Office for Special Projects. concerned not with satellites, but with emplaced sensors – sensors that could be placed in a fixed location to collect signals intelligence or measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) about a specific target. Such sensors had been used to monitor Chinese missile tests, Soviet laser activity, military movements, and foreign nuclear programs. The office was established to bring together scientists from the DS&T’s Office of SIGINT Operations, who designed such systems, with operators from the Directorate of Operations, who were responsible for transporting the devices to their clandestine locations and installing them.

[edit] Overt HUMINT

In addition they may produce HUMINT from overt sources, such as voluntary interviews with travelers, businesspeople, etc. Some of the latter may be considered open source intelligence OSINT and be performed by other agencies, just as reports from diplomats are another form of HUMINT that flows into the Department of State.

At times, this function may be assigned to CIA, because its counter-intelligence staff has biographical indexes that let them check the background of foreign citizens offering information. For example, there may be a name check on a business or scientific contact who meets either with CIA representatives or staff of the National Open Source Enterprise

[edit] Psychological operations

Since psychological operations can involve many variants of truth, it is useful to know the formal definitions used in the Intelligence Community. These defintions come from the Operations Coordinating Board, which, in 1954, was the White House/cabinet level organization that approved or disapproved covert and clandestine activities.^[29]

See Psychological Operations (United States) for a more general discussion of US psychological operations, including those operations for which the CIA is responsible and those that belong to other agencies. Some of the policy for guiding the overall strategy is detailed there, as well as in the citation starting this section. Even for the IC, the Department of State generally guides the message.

[edit] Organization

The current structure of the National Clandestine Service, under the Director of the NCS, is as follows, according to the Official CIA Organizational Chart:^[30]

• Deputy Director of the NCS
  • Counterproliferation Division
  • Counterterrorism Center
  • Counterintelligence Center
  • Regional & Transnational Issues Divisions
  • Technology Support Divisions
• Deputy Director of the NCS for Communiity HUMINT
  • Community HUMINT Coordination Center

A major headquarters element was the Counterintelligence Staff, most powerful when headed by James Jesus Angleton. It was the principal US organization responsible for vetting potential new clandestine HUMINT assets, and for US offensive counterespionage and deception.

Under an assortment of names, such as Special Activities Division, there is a paramilitary function that may enter and prepare an area of operations before United States Army Special Forces enter in a more overt military role. This may or may not include psychological operations, especially black propaganda; paramilitary and psychological functions have split and joined under various historical reorganizations.

Various groups provide support services, such as cover documentation and disguise.^[31]. A technical services unit, sometimes in the clandestine division and occasionally in the Directorate of Science and Technology, contained both espionage equipment development and sometimes questionable research, such as the MKULTRA mind control program.

[edit] Approval of clandestine and covert operations

The Directorate of Plans (DDP) was created in 1952, taking control of the Office of Policy Coordination, a covert action group that received services from the CIA but did not go through the CIA management. The other main unit that went into the Directorate of Plans was the Office of Special Operations, which did clandestine intelligence collection (e.g., espionage) as opposed to covert action.

Approval of clandestine and covert operations came from a variety of committees, although in the early days of quasi-autonomous offices and the early DDP, there was more internal authority to approve operations.^[32] After its creation in the Truman Administration, the CIA was, at first, the financial manager for OPC and OSO, authorized to handle "unvouchered funds" by National Security Council document 4-A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4-A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch function.

[edit] Early autonomy of OPC

At first, the supervision by committee allowed the OPC to exercise

"early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4-A.

"NSC 10/2 directed CIA to conduct "covert" rather than merely "psychological" operations, defining them as all activities "which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.

NSC 10/2 defined the scope of these operations as: "propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations [sic] groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations."^[33]

Note that guerilla warfare was outside this statement of scope, but such operations came under partial CIA control with NSC 10/5 of October 1951. See "Psychological Strategy Board" below. To implement covert actions under NSC 10/2, OPC was created on September 1, 1948. Its initial structure had it taking "guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the State Department and to the military without having to proceed through CIA's administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions. In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to OPC through the DCI. During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of CIA's activities.

"Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper "scope and magnitude" of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy."

It should be noted that the concept of putting special operations under a "psychological" organization paralleled the military's development of United States Army Special Forces, which was created by a Pentagon unit called the Psychological Warfare Division. "NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded CIA's authority over guerrilla warfare"^[34] The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of CIA's covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.^[32]

"As the Truman administration ended, CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific projects ...no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

[edit] Increasing control by CIA management

After Smith, who was Eisenhower's World War Two Chief of Staff, consolidated of OSO, OPC, and CIA in 1952, the Eisenhower administration began narrowing CIA's latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of National Security Council directives, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the Central Intelligence Agency's responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad" A series of committees, containing reprresentatives from State, Defense, CIA, and sometimes the White House or NSC, reviewed operations. Over time and reorganizations, these committees were called the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), NSC 5412/2 Special Group or simply Special Group, Special Group (Augmented), 303 Committee, and Special Group (Counterinsurgency).^[32]

[edit] Directorate of Science and Technology

Main article: Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Science & Technology

The Directorate of Science & Technology creates and applies innovative technology in support of the intelligence collection mission.^[35] The CIA has always shown a strong interest in how to use advances in technology to enhance its effectiveness. This interest in modern technology came from two main aims: firstly, to harness these techniques its own use, and second to counter any new technologies the Soviets might develop. This effort gained impetus in fifties with the launch of the Sputnik satellite by the USSR. The agency was also extremely interested in computer and information technology. In 1999, CIA created the venture capital firm In-Q-Tel to help fund and develop technologies of interest to the agency.^[36][37]

Its website mentions its priorities being in:

• Application Software and Analytics
• Bio, Nano, and Chemical Technologies
• Communications and Infrastructure
• Digital Identity and Security
• Embedded Systems and Power^[38]

In January 2008, its featured collaboration was with Streambase Systems,^[39] makers of a "high-performance Complex Event Processing (CEP) software platform for real-time and historical analysis of high-volume intelligence data," using a new processing paradigm for Structured Query Language (SQL), allowing queries against multiple real-time data streams still updating the data base.

[edit] Directorate of Support

The Directorate of Support provides necessary "housekeeping" functions, but in a manner consistent with the need to keep their details protected. These functions include personnel, security, communications, and financial operations. Most of this Directorate is sub-structured into smaller offices based on role and purpose, such as the CIA Office of Security, which is concerned both with personnel and physical security. Other major offices include the Office of Communications and the Office of Information Technology.

[edit] Logistics and proprietaries

Under the original NSC 10/2 authorization, CIA was made responsible not just for covert action during the cold war, but for such action during major wars, in collaboration with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When DCI Smith created the Directorate of Plans and ended the autonomy of the OPC and OSO, he recognized it was necessary to establish logistical support for these operations before the start of a hot war. Smith did not want to create supply systems that paralleled those of the military, he proposed, in 1952, that support installations be created by cooperation between the CIA and military, and that the CIA should be able to draw, on a reimbursable basis, on military supply stocks. In many respects, this was the beginning of the idea that what was to become the Directorate of Support had a far wider scope than the OSS and initial CIA term, Directorate of Administration.

Smith presented the concept that the CIA would need a worldwide system of support bases, which usually could be tenant organizations on military bases. According to Smith's memo,

A major logistical support base will consist of a CIA base headquarters, training, communications, medical accommodation for evacuees and storage for six months’ hot war requirements as well as provide logistical support for CIA operational groups or headquarters... Informal planning along the lines indicated has been carried out by elements of CIA with the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the general planning is consistent with and complementary to approved plans for wartime military operations.

Where the service incurs additional, extraordinary expenses in providing transportation or establishing and maintaining at overseas points, dumps for covert operations, the CIA must make reimbursement therefor^[40]

While military transportation might be appropriate for some purposes, there would be cases where the arrival of a military aircraft at a location other than a military base might draw undue attention. This was the origin of the idea of the CIA operating proprietary airlines, whose relationship to the US government would not be public.^[41] Among these organizations were airlines that provided covert logistical support, such as Civil Air Transport, Southern Air Transport, and consolidated them into Air America. The latter was heavily involved in support with the war in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in the 1960s. Air America disbanded in 1975.

[edit] Training

This directorate includes the Office of Training, which starts with a Junior Officer Training program for new employees. So that the initial course might be taken by employees who had not received final security clearance and thus was not permitted unescorted access to the Headquarters building, a good deal of basic training has been given at office buildings in the urban areas of Arlington, Virginia.

It is known, although not acknowledged by the U.S. Government, that the CIA runs at least two operations training facilities.^[42] One is known as the The Farm, at Camp Peary, Virginia. The other is known the The Point at Harvey Point, North Carolina. While the course outline has never been revealed, it includes such things as surveillance, countersurveillance, cryptography, paramilitary training as well as other tradecraft. The course seems to be about less than a year and runs at irregular intervals depending on circumstances. Operations training is delivered by experienced operations officers.

Student progress is monitored by a "Murder Board," composed of experienced evaluators that meets to discuss a recruit's progress and has the power to dismiss a recruit even before his or her training is complete. Evaluation techniques for the CIA's World War II predecessor, the OSS, were published as the book Assessment of Men, Selection of Personnel for the office of Strategic Services. ^[43] See Roger Hall's You're Stepping on my Cloak and Dagger for an accurate but amusing account of Hall's OSS duty, which included finding unexpected solutions to things in the assessment process as well as his experience in real operations. ^[44] He described a specific assessment period at a rural facility called "Station S". Hall said he tried to find out why it was called Station S, and finally decided the reason was that "assess" has more "S" letters than any other.

Psychological stress is part of operations training, but of a different type than military special operations force evaluation, such as Navy SEAL "hell week" (officially Basic Underwater Demolition SEAL school (BUD/S)) or Army Special Forces Assessment and Selection. For instance, an operations training officer will often lie to a recruit saying they have evidence that will result in the recruit to be arrested and tried for felony crimes. This is a test of the recruit's ability to maintain a cover under stress.

[edit] Other offices

The Center for the Study of Intelligence maintains the Agency's historical materials and promotes the study of intelligence as a legitimate and serious discipline.^[45]

The Office of the General Counsel advises the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency on all legal matters relating to his role as CIA director and is the principal source of legal counsel for the CIA.^[46]

The Office of Inspector General promotes efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability in the administration of Agency activities. OIG also seeks to prevent and detect fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. The Inspector General is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Inspector General, whose activities are independent of those of any other component in the Agency, reports directly to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. OIG conducts inspections, investigations, and audits at Headquarters and in the field, and oversees the Agency-wide grievance-handling system. The OIG provides a semiannual report to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency which the Director is required by law to submit to the Intelligence Committees of Congress within 30 days.

The Office of Public Affairs advises the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency on all media, public policy, and employee communications issues relating to his role as CIA director and is the CIA’s principal communications focal point for the media, the general public and Agency employees.^[47]

The Office of Military Affairs provides intelligence and operational support to the US armed forces.^[48]

[edit] Relationship with other US intelligence agencies and commercial information sources

The CIA acts as the primary American HUMINT and general analytic agency, under the Director of National Intelligence, who directs or coordinates the 16 member organizations of the United States Intelligence Community. A number of those organizations are fully or partially under the budgetary control of the United States Secretary of Defense or other cabinet officers such as the Attorney General of the United States. Its National Clandestine Service (formerly the Directorate of Operations), which collects clandestine human intelligence collection, and conducts deniable psychological and paramilitary operations.^[49]

As do other analytic members of the U.S. intelligence community such as the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the analytic division of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), its raw input includes imagery intelligence IMINT collected by air and space systems of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) processed by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), signal intelligence SIGINT of the National Security Agency (NSA), and measurement and signature intelligence MASINT from the DIA MASINT center.

[edit] Open Source Intelligence

Until the 2004 reorganization of the intelligence community, one of the "services of common concern" that CIA provided was OSINT from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). FBIS, which had absorbed the Joint Publication Research Service, a military organization that translated documents,^[50] which moved into the National Open Source Enterprise under the Director of National Intelligence.

CIA still provides a variety of unclassified maps and reference documents both to the intelligence community and the public.^[51]

As part of its mandate to gather intelligence, CIA is looking increasingly online for information, and has become a major consumer of social media. "We're looking at YouTube, which carries some unique and honest-to-goodness intelligence," said Doug Naquin, director of the DNI Open Source Center (OSC) at CIA. "We're looking at chat rooms and things that didn't exist five years ago, and trying to stay ahead."^[52]

[edit] Clandestine technical collection

Various news reports and declassified documents indicate that the clandestine side has also worked with other agencies to install clandestine technical collection devices for SIGINT^[53][54] and MASINT^[55] in areas to which there is no conventional access, or in embassies in foreign locations.

[edit] Outsourcing

In a trend some find disturbing, many of duties and functions of Intelligence Community activities, not the CIA alone, are being "outsourced" and "privatized." Mike McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, was about to publicize an investigation report of outsourcing by U.S. intelligence agencies, as required by Congress.^[56] However, this report was then classified.^[57][58] Hillhouse speculates that this report includes requirements for the CIA to report:^[57][59]

• different standards for government employees and contractors;
• contractors providing similar services to government workers;
• analysis of costs of contractors vs. employees;
• an assessment of the appropriateness of outsourced activities;
• an estimate of the number of contracts and contractors;
• comparison of compensation for contractors and government employees,
• attrition analysis of government employees;
• descriptions of positions to be converted back to the employee model;
• an evaluation of accountability mechanisms;
• an evaluation of procedures for "conducting oversight of contractors to ensure identification and prosecution of criminal violations, financial waste, fraud, or other abuses committed by contractors or contract personnel; and
• an "identification of best practices of accountability mechanisms within service contracts."

Congress has required an outsourcing report by March 30, 2008.^[59]

The Director of National Intelligence has been granted the authority to increase the number of positions (FTEs) on elements in the Intelligence Community by up to 10% should there be a determination that activities performed by a contractor should be done by a US government employee.

Part of the contracting problem comes from Congressional restrictions on the number of employees in the IC. According to Hillhouse, this resulted in0% of the de facto workforce of the CIA's National Clandestine Service being made up of contractors. "After years of contributing to the increasing reliance upon contractors, Congress is now providing a framework for the conversion of contractors into federal government employees--more or less."^[59]

As with most government agencies, building equipment often is contracted. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), responsible for the development and operation of airborne and spaceborne sensors, long was a joint operation of the CIA and the United States Department of Defense. NRO had been significantly involved in the design of such sensors, but the NRO, then under DCI authority, contracted more of the design that had been their tradition, and to a contractor without extensive reconnaissance experience, Boeing.

The next-generation satellite Future Imagery Architecture project, which missed objectives after $4 billion in cost overruns, was the result of this contract.^[60];^[61]

Some of the cost problems associated with intelligence come from one agency, or even group within an agency, not accepting the compartmented security practices for individual projects, requiring expensive duplication.^[62]

[edit] Wikipedia

It has been reported in the media that the WikiScanner tool had detected people using CIA computers to edit Wikipedia.^[63] Allegedly, employees of the intelligence agency altered biographical information contained in Wikipedia entries on former presidents including Ronald Reagan and Richard Nixon. Changes were also made to the pages on Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, former CIA chief Porter Goss, and the Iraq war.^[64]

When asked by the BBC whether it could confirm whether the changes had been made by a person using a CIA computer, an agency spokesperson responded, "I cannot confirm that the traffic you cite came from agency computers. I'd like in any case to underscore a far larger and more significant point that no one should doubt or forget: The CIA has a vital mission in protecting the United States, and the focus of this agency is there, on that decisive work."^[65] Content appearing on Wikipedia has also been cited as a source and referenced in some U.S. intelligence agency products.^[66]

[edit] Relationship with foreign intelligence services

The closest links of the US IC to other foreign intelligence agencies are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. There is a special communications marking that signals that an intelligence-related messages can be shared with these four countries.^[67] An indication of the United States' close operational cooperation is the creation of a new message distribution label within the main US military communications network. Previously, the marking of NOFORN (i.e., NO FOREIGN NATIONALS) required the originator to specify which, if any, non-US countries could receive the information. A new handling caveat, USA/AUS/CAN/GBR/NZL EYES ONLY, used primarily on intelligence messages, gives an easier way to indicate that the material can be shared with Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and New Zealand.

Many intelligence services cooperate. There may even be a deniable communications channel with ostensibly hostile nations.

Strong and regular links exist between the CIA also has strong links with other foreign intelligence agencies such as the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, the UK's Secret Intelligence Service, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, and the New Zealand service.

Spain's Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI) and Israel's Mossad are routine partners on matters of common concern, but not all information is shared. Further, it is currently believed to be financing several Counterterrorist Intelligence Centers^{[citation needed]}. One of these, known under the codename of Alliance Base, was allegedly set up in Paris and jointly run in cooperation with France's DGSE^{[citation needed]}.

The CIA may also be actively cooperating with India's Research and Analysis Wing^{[citation needed]} and possibly Russia's SVR^{[citation needed]}. The CIA worked extensively with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) throughout the Afghan-Soviet War, and works with this agency closely for the War on Terror.

[edit] Organizational history

The Central Intelligence Agency was created by Congress with National Security Act of 1947, signed into law by President Harry S. Truman. It is the descendant of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) of World War II, which was dissolved in October 1945 and its functions transferred to the State and War Departments. Eleven months earlier, in 1944, William J. Donovan, the OSS's creator, proposed to President Franklin D. Roosevelt creating a new organization directly supervised by the President: "which will procure intelligence both by overt and covert methods and will at the same time provide intelligence guidance, determine national intelligence objectives, and correlate the intelligence material collected by all government agencies."^[68] Under his plan, a powerful, centralized civilian agency would have coordinated all the intelligence services. He also proposed that this agency have authority to conduct "subversive operations abroad," but "no police or law enforcement functions, either at home or abroad."^[69] Both the OSS and its British counterparts, as do other agencies worldwide, struggle with finding the right organizational balance among clandestine intelligence collection, counterintelligence, and covert action. See Clandestine HUMINT and Covert Action for a historical perspective on this problem. These issues also bear on the reasons that, in the history below, some "eras" overlap. Also see the Wikipedia article Director of Central Intelligence contains an expanded history of CIA by director; the priorities and personalities of individual directors have had a strong influence on Agency operations.

[edit] Immediate predecessors, 1946-1947

The Office of Strategic Services, which was the first independent US intelligence agency, created for the Second World War, was broken up shortly after the end of the war, by President Truman, on September 20, 1945. The rapid reorganizations that followed reflected the routine sort of bureaucratic competition for resources, but also trying to deal with the proper relationships of clandestine intelligence collection and covert action (i.e., paramilitary and psychological operations). See Clandestine HUMINT and Covert Action for a more detailed history of this problem, which was not unique to the US during and after World War II. In October 1945, the functions of the OSS were split between the Departments of State and War:

New Unit	Oversight	OSS Functions Absorbed
Strategic Services Unit (SSU)	War Department	Secret Intelligence (SI) (i.e., clandestine intelligence collection) and Counter-espionage (X-2)
Interim Research and Intelligence Service (IRIS)	State Department	Research and Analysis Branch (i.e., intelligence analysis)
Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) (not uniquely for former OSS)	War Department, Army General Staff	Staff officers from Operational Groups, Operation Jedburgh, Morale Operations (black propaganda)

This division lasted only a few months. In January of 1946, President Truman created the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) which was the direct precursor to the CIA. Despite opposition from the military establishment, the United States Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),^[68] President Truman established the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) in January 1946.^[70] The CIG was an interim authority established under Presidential authority.

The assets of the SSU, which now constituted a streamlined "nucleus" of clandestine intelligence was transferred to the CIG in mid-1946 and reconstituted as the Office of Special Operations (OSO).

[edit] Early CIA, 1947-1952

In September 1947, the National Security Act of 1947 created the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency were established.^[71] Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter was appointed as the first Director of Central Intelligence.

The National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects, June 18, 1948 (NSC 10/2) further gave the CIA the authority to carry out covert operations "against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and conducted that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons."^[33]

In 1949, the Central Intelligence Agency Act (Public Law 81-110) was passed, permitting the agency to use confidential fiscal and administrative procedures, and exempting it from most of the usual limitations on the use of Federal funds. The act also exempted the CIA from having to disclose its "organization, functions, officials, titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed." It also created the program "PL-110", to handle defectors and other "essential aliens" who fall outside normal immigration procedures, as well as giving those persons cover stories and economic support.^[72]

[edit] The structure stabilizes, 1952

Then-DCI Walter Bedell Smith, who enjoyed a special degree of Presidential trust, having been Dwight D. Eisenhower's primary Chief of Staff during World War II, insisted that the CIA -- or at least only one department -- had to direct the OPC and OSO. Those organization, as well as some minor functions, formed the euphemistically named Directorate of Plans in 1952.

Also in 1952, United States Army Special Forces were created, with some missions overlapping those of the Department of Plans. In general, the pattern emerged that the CIA could borrow resources from Special Forces, although it had its own special operators.

[edit] The coldest of Cold War, 1953-1966

Allen Dulles, who had been a key World War II OSS operations officer in Switzerland during the Second World War, took over from Smith, at a time where US policy was dominated by intense anticommunism. Various sources were involved, the most visible being the investigations and abuses of Senator Joseph McCarthy, and the more quiet but systematic containment doctrine developed by George Kennan, the Berlin Blockade and the Korean War. Dulles enjoyed a high degree of flexibility, as his brother, John Foster Dulles, was simultaneously Secretary of State.

[edit] Complications from Indochina and the Vietnam War (1954-1975)

As the US military and electorate were affected by Vietnam, so was the CIA. The OSS Patti mission had arrived near the end of the Second World War, and had significant interaction with the leaders of many Vietnamese factions, including Ho Chi Minh.^[73] While the Patti mission forwarded Ho's proposals for phased independence, with the French or even the United States as the transition partner, the US policy of containment opposed forming any government that might be Communist.

The first CIA mission to Indochina, under the code name Saigon Military Mission arrived in 1954, under Edward Lansdale. US-based analysts were simultaneously trying to project the evolution of political power, both if the scheduled referendum chose merger of the North and South, or if the South, the US client, stayed independent. The SMM did prepare clandestine networks in the North, led by Lucein Conein.

Initially, the US focus in Southeast Asia was on Laos, not Vietnam.

During the period of American combat involvement in the Vietnam War, there was considerable arguments about progress among the Department of Defense under Robert S. McNamara, the CIA, and, to some extent, the intelligence staff of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam.^[74] In general, the military was consistently more optimistic than the CIA. Sam Adams, a junior CIA analyst with responsibilities for estimating the actual damage to the enemy, eventually resigned from the CIA, after expressing concern, to Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms with estimates that were changed for interagency and White House political reasons, writing the book War of Numbers.

[edit] Abuses of CIA authority, 1970s-1990s

Things came to a head in the early 1970s, around the time of the Watergate political burglary affair. A dominant feature of political life during that period were the attempts of Congress to assert oversight of U.S. Presidency, the executive branch of the U.S. Government. Revelations about past CIA activities, such as assassinations and attempted assassinations of foreign leaders, illegal domestic spying on U.S. citizens, provided the opportunities to execute Congressional oversight of U.S. intelligence operations. Hastening the Central Intelligence Agency's fall from grace were the burglary of the Watergate headquarters of the Democratic Party by ex-CIA agents, and President Richard Nixon's subsequent use of the CIA to impede the FBI's investigation of the burglary. In the famous "smoking gun" audio tape provoking President Nixon's resignation, Nixon ordered his chief of staff, H.R. Haldeman, to tell the CIA that further investigation of Watergate would "open the whole can of worms" about the Bay of Pigs of Cuba, and, therefore, that the CIA should tell the FBI to cease investigating the Watergate burglary, due to reasons of "national security".^[75]

In 1973, then-DCI James R. Schlesinger commissioned reports — known as the "Family Jewels" — on illegal activities by the Agency. In December 1974, Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh broke the news of the "Family Jewels" in a front-page article in The New York Times, revealing that the CIA had assassinated foreign leaders, and had conducted surveillance on some seven thousand American citizens involved in the antiwar movement (Operation CHAOS).

Congress responded to the disturbing charges in 1975, investigating the CIA in the Senate via the Church Committee, chaired by Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho), and in the House of Representatives via the Pike Committee, chaired by Congressman Otis Pike (D-NY). In addition, President Gerald Ford created the Rockefeller Commission, and issued an Executive Order prohibiting the assassination of foreign leaders.

Repercussions from the Iran-Contra Affair arms smuggling scandal included the creation of the Intelligence Authorization Act in 1991. It defined covert operations as secret missions in geopolitical areas where the U.S. is neither openly nor apparently engaged. This also required an authorizing chain of command, including an official, presidential finding report and the informing of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, which, in emergencies, requires only "timely notification".

[edit] 2004, DNI takes over CIA top-level functions

Previously, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) oversaw the Intelligence Community, serving as the president's principal intelligence advisor, additionally serving as head of the Central Intelligence Agency. The DCI's title now is "Director of the Central Intelligence Agency" (DCIA), serving as head of the CIA.

Currently, the Central Intelligence Agency reports to the Director of National Intelligence. Prior to the establishment of the DNI, the CIA reported to the President, with informational briefings to U.S. Congressional committees The National Security Advisor is a permanent member of the National Security Council, responsible for briefing the President with pertinent information collected by all U.S. intelligence agencies, including the National Security Agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration, et cetera; all sixteen Intelligence Community agencies are under the authority of the Director of National Intelligence.

Many of the post-Watergate restrictions upon the Central Intelligence Agency were lifted after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and The Pentagon^{[citation needed]}. Fifty-two years earlier, in 1949, Congress and President Harry S. Truman had approved arrangements that CIA and national intelligence funding could be hidden in the U.S federal budget. Some critics charge this violates the requirement in the U.S. Constitution that the federal budget be openly published^{[citation needed]}.

[edit] Mission-related issues and controversies

The history of CIA deals with several things, certainly including covert action, but also clandestine and overt intelligence collection, intelligence analysis and reporting, and logistical and technical support of its activities. Prior to the December 2004 reorganization of the intelligence community (IC), it also was responsible for coordinations of IC-wide intelligence estimates.

These articles are organized in two different ways: By geographical region (for state actors or non=state actors limited to a country or region) and by transnational topic (for non-state actors).

CIA operations by region, country and date are discussed in detail in the following Wikipedia articles:

• CIA activities in the Americas
• CIA activities in Africa
• CIA activities in Asia and the Pacific
• CIA activities in the Near East, North Africa, South and Southwest Asia
• CIA activities in Russia and Europe

CIA analyses of issues such as the effect of emerging diseases, and the detection of WMDs, are inherently transnational, and are discussed in the following articles. CIA operations and, where appropriate, authorizations for covert operations (for example, NSDD 138 authorizing direct action against terrorists) by transnational topic are discussed in the following Wikipedia articles:

• CIA transnational anti-terrorism activities
• CIA transnational activities in counterproliferation
• CIA transnational anti-crime and anti-drug activities
• CIA transnational health and economic activities
• CIA transnational human rights actions

In addition, a view of CIA activity specifically oriented towards regime change actions is given in the following Wikipedia article:

• CIA sponsored regime change

Major sources for this section include the Foreign Relations of the United States series, the National Security Archive and George Washington University, the Freedom of Information Act Reading Room at the CIA, U.S. Congressional hearings, and a wide range of books, including Blum's book^[76] and Weiner's book^[77] Note that the CIA has posted a rebuttal to Weiner's book.^[78]

[edit] Security and counterintelligence

While the names change periodically, there are two basic security functions to protect the CIA and its operations. There is an Office of Security in the Directorate for Support, which is responsible for physical security of the CIA buildings, secure storage of information, and personnel security clearances. These are directed inwardly to the agency itself.

In what is now the National Clandestine Service, there is a counter-intelligence function, called the Counterintelligence Staff under its most controversial chief, James Jesus Angleton. This function has roles including looking for staff members that are providing information to foreign intelligence services (FIS) as moles. Another role is to check proposals for recruiting foreign HUMINT assets, to see if these people have any known ties to FIS and thus may be attempts to penetrate CIA to learn its personnel and practices, or as a provocateur, or other form of double agent.

This agency component may also launch offensive counterespionage, where it attempts to interfere with FIS operations. CIA officers in the field often have assignments in offensive counterespionage as well as clandestine intelligence collection.

[edit] Security issues

In 1993, the headquarters of the CIA was attacked by Mir Aimal Kansi, a Pakistani national. Two CIA employees were killed, Frank Darling and Lansing Bennett, M.D.

The "Family Jewels" and other documents reveal that the Office of Security may have violated the prohibition of CIA involvement in domestic law enforcement.

[edit] Counterintelligence failures

Perhaps the most disruptive period involving counterintelligence was James Jesus Angleton's search for a mole,^[79]based on the statements of a Soviet defector, Anatoliy Golitsyn. A second defector, Yuri Nosenko, challenged Golitsyn's claims, with the two calling one another Soviet double agents. Many CIA officers fell under career-ending suspicion; the details of the relative truths and untruths from Nosenko and Golitsyn may never be released, or, in fact, may not be fully understood. The accusations also crossed the Atlantic to the British intelligence services, who also were damaged by molehunts.^[80]

On February 24, 1994, the agency was rocked by the arrest of 31-year veteran case officer Aldrich Ames on charges of spying for the Soviet Union since 1985.^[81]

Other defectors have included Edward Lee Howard, a field operations officer, and William Kampiles, a low-level worker in the CIA 24-hour Operations Center. Kampiles sold the Soviets the detailed operational manual for the KH-11 reconnaissance satellite.^[82]

[edit] Criticism for ineffectiveness in intelligence analysis

The agency has also been criticized for ineffectiveness as an intelligence gathering agency. Former DCI Richard Helms commented, after the end of the Cold War, "The only remaining superpower doesn't have enough interest in what's going on in the world to organise and run an espionage service."^[83]

See the information technology section of the intelligence analysis management for discussion of possible failures to provide adequate automation support to analysts, and US intelligence community A-Space for a IC-wide program to collect some of them. Cognitive traps for intelligence analysis also goes into areas where CIA has examined why analysis can fail.

More recently, agency veterans have lamented CIA's inability to produce the kind of long-range strategic intelligence that it once did in order to guide policymakers. John McLaughlin, who served as the deputy director and acting director of central intelligence from October 2000 to September 2004, said that drowned by demands from the White House and Pentagon for instant information, "intelligence analysts end up being the Wikipedia of Washington."^[84]In the intelligence analysis article, orienting oneself to the consumers deals with some of ways in which intelligence can become more responsive to the needs of policymakers.

To balance these assertions, which certainly identify real failures, the failures are most newsworthy. A number of declassified National Intelligence Estimates do predict the behavior of various countries, but not in a manner attractive to news, or, most significantly, not public at the time of the event.

In operational role, some successes for the CIA include the U-2 and SR-71 programs, and anti-Soviet operations in Afghanistan in the mid-1980s, although critics charge that these helped foster the genesis of today's terrorist groups.

[edit] Korean War

On October 13, 1950, the CIA had assured President Truman that the Chinese would not send troops to Korea. Six days later, over one million Chinese troops arrived.^[85] See an analysis of the failure; also see surrounding text for the two Koreas and China, and the time period before the Korean War.

[edit] Vietnam War

The history of US intelligence, with respect to French Indochina and then the two Vietnams, is long and complex. The Pentagon Papers often contain pessimistic CIA analyses that conflicted with White House positions. It does appear that some estimates were changed to reflect Pentagon and White House views.^[74]. See CIA activities in Asia and the Pacific for detailed discussions of intelligence and covert operations from 1945 (i.e., before the CIA) onwards.

[edit] Soviet Bloc

In addition, the CIA has come under particular criticism for failing to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union

[edit] Indian nuclear test

Another criticism is the failure to predict India's nuclear tests in 1974. There was, indeed, a failure to predict the actual test. A review of the various analyses of India's nuclear program did predict some aspects of the test, such as a 1965 report saying, correctly, that if India did develop a bomb, it would be explained as "for peaceful purposes".

[edit] 9/11 attacks

A major criticism is failure to forestall the September 11, 2001 attacks. The 9/11 Commission Report identifies failures in the IC as a whole. One problem, for example, was the FBI failing to "connect the dots" by sharing information among its decentralized field offices. The report, however, criticizes both CIA analysis, and impeding their investigation.

The executive summary of a report which was released by the office of CIA Inspector General John Helgerson on August 21, 2007 concluded that former DCI George Tenet failed to adequately prepare the agency to deal with the danger posed by Al Qaeda prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The report had been completed in June, 2005 and was partially released to the public in an agreement with Congress, over the objections of current DCI General Michael V. Hayden, who said its publication would "consume time and attention revisiting ground that is already well plowed.”^[86] Tenet disagreed with the report's conclusions, citing his planning efforts vis-a-vis al-Qaeda, particularly from 1999 (for which see below).^[87]

[edit] Internal/presidential studies, external investigations and document releases

Several investigations (e.g., Church Committee, Rockefeller Commission, Pike Committee), as well as released declassified documents, reveal that the CIA, at times, operated outside its charter. In some cases, such as during Watergate, this may have been due to inappropriate requests by White House staff. In other cases, there was a violation of Congressional intent, such as the Iran-Contra affair.

[edit] 1949 Eberstadt Report (First Hoover Commission)

The first major analysis, following the National Security Act of 1947, was chaired by former President Herbert Hoover, with a Task Force on National Security Organization under Ferdinand Eberstadt, one of the drafters of the National Security Act and a believer in centralized intelligence.^[88]

It was immediately obvious to the task force that the system of the day led to an adversarial relationship, with little effective coordination, among the CIA, the military, and the State Department. "In the opinion of the task force, this produced duplication on one hand, and, on the other, departmental intelligence estimates that "have often been subjective and biased." In large measure, the military and State Department were blamed for their failure to consult and share pertinent information with the CIA. The task force recommended "that positive efforts be made to foster relations of mutual confidence between the [CIA] and the several departments and agencies that it serves."

This report stressed that the CIA "must be the central organization of the national intelligence system." It recommended a "...top echelon [of] an evaluation board or section composed of competent and experienced personnel who would have no administrative responsibilities and whose duties would be confined solely to intelligence evaluation." To foster professionalism and continuity of service, the report also favored a civilian DCI with a long term in office.

"In the arena of covert operations and clandestine intelligence, the Eberstadt Report supported the integration of all clandestine operations into one office within CIA, under NSC supervision. To alleviate concerns expressed by the military who viewed this proposal as encroaching upon their prerogatives, the report stated that clandestine operations should be the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in time of war."

The report declared that the failure to appraise scientific advances (e.g., biological and chemical warfare, electronics, aerodynamics, guided missiles, atomic weapons, and nuclear energy) in hostile countries might have more immediate and catastrophic consequences than failure in any other field of intelligence. Accordingly, the report stressed that the U.S. should establish a central authority "to collect, collate, and evaluate scientific and medical intelligence."

[edit] 1949 Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report

The Eberstadt report was soon eclipsed by what may have been the most influential policy paper. "On January 8, 1948, the National Security Council established the Intelligence Survey Group (ISG) to "evaluate the CIA's effort and its relationship with other agencies."^[88]The Jackson-Dulles-Correa report held an opposite view on clandestine collection to the Eberstadt Report, interesting in that Dulles was a clandestine collection specialist.

Like the Hoover Commission, this group was chartered at the request of President Truman, and was made up of Allen W. Dulles, who had served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during the Second World War and would become DCI in 1953, William Jackson, a future Deputy DCI, and Matthias Correa, a former assistant to Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal when the latter had served as Secretary of the Navy during the war. Under the chairmanship of Dulles, the ISG presented its findings, known as the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, to the National Security Council on January 1, 1949. Partially declassified in 1976, it "contained fifty-six recommendations, many highly critical of the CIA and DCI. In particular, the report revealed problems in the agency's execution of both its intelligence and operational missions. It also criticized the quality of national intelligence estimates by highlighting the CIA's--and, by implication, the DCI's--"failure to take charge of the production of coordinated national estimates." The report went on to argue that the CIA's current trend in secret intelligence activities should be reversed in favor of its mandated role as coordinator of intelligence." It was "particularly concerned about the personnel situation at CIA, including internal security, the high turnover of employees, and the excessive number of military personnel assigned to the agency." See the continuing concern about personnel in the 1954 Doolittle Report To add "continuity of service" and the "greatest assurance of independence of action," the report argued that the DCI should be a civilian and that military appointees be required to resign their commissions.

As with the Eberstadt Report, the Dulles Report also expressed concern about the inadequacies in scientific intelligence and the professionalism of the service intelligence organizations, and urged that the CIA provide greater coordination. This led to a recommendation for increased coordination between the DCI and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the arena of counterespionage. In turn, the report recommended that the Director of FBI be elevated to membership in the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), whose function was to help the DCI coordinate intelligence and set intelligence requirements.

The report proposed a large-scale reorganization of CIA. Even though it emphasized intelligence analysis and coordination over operations, it

"suggested incorporating covert operations and clandestine intelligence into one office within CIA. In particular, the report recommended that the Office of Special Operations (OSO), responsible for the clandestine collection of intelligence, and the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), responsible for covert actions, be integrated into a single division within CIA. [It] recommended replacing existing offices with four new divisions for coordination, estimates, research and reports, and operations."

The heads of the new offices would be included in the immediate staff of the DCI so that he would have "intimate contact with the day-to-day operations of his agency and be able to give policy guidance to them." These recommendations would become the start of the model for the future organization and operation of the present-day CIA. Until the DNI creation, estimates were in a separate office reporting to the DCI, coordination was a job of the DDCI (later assisted by the Intelligence Community Staff), research and reports became the Directorate of Intelligence, and operations was first, euphemistically, called the Directorate of Plans. Directorates for Support (originally called Administration), and Science & Technology, were also created.

[edit] 1954 Doolittle Report on Covert Activities

Gen. James Doolittle did an extensive report on covert actions, specifically for President Dwight D. Eisenhower.^[89]

The report's first recommendation dealt with personnel. It recommended releasing a large number of current staff that could never be more than mediocre, aggressively recruit new staff with an overall goal of increasing the workforce, and intensify training, with 10% of the covert staff time spent in training. The Director should be nonpolitical.

Security was the next concern, starting with a drive to reduce interim and provisional security clearances. The report strongly endorsed use of the polygraph both for initial recruits and existing staff. Counterespionage needed to be strengthened, and field stations needed both to report on their staff and periodically be inspected. Consolidating the Washington workforce, which was scattered among buildings, into one or a few main buildings was seen as a way of improving the security of classified information.

Coordination in the intelligence community was seen as a problem, with one of the highest priorities being establishing clear understandings between CIA and military intelligence organizations. The overall IC program for eliciting information from defectors needed improvement, with contributions from multiple agencies. In general, information sharing in the IC needed to improve.

As far as organization and management, the report described the structure of the Directorate of Plans (i.e., the clandestine service) as too complex and in need of simplification. The Inspector General needed an agency-wide mandate. The role of the Operations Coordinating Board, the covert and clandestine oversight staff of the National Security Council needed to be strengthened, with operations clearly approved and guided from the highest levels of government.

The report addressed the classic problem of increasing performance while reducing costs. This meant better review of the budgets of covert and clandestine activities by a Review Board, except for the most sensitive operations. It meant providing the Comptroller with enough information, even if sanitized, to do a thorough job.

[edit] 1956 Bruce-Lovett Report

Soon after President Dwight D. Eisenhower created the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Actitivites, that Board requested that Robert A. Lovett and David K.E. Bruce examine CIA's covert operations.^[90]. This information comes from Arthur Schlesinger's book about Robert F. Kennedy, cited by cryptome.org. ""Bruce was very much disturbed," Lovett told the Cuba board of inquiry in 1961. "He approached it from the standpoint of 'what right have we to go barging into other countries buying newspapers and handing money to opposition parties or supporting a candidate for this, that or the other office?' He felt this was an outrageous interference with friendly countries. . . . He got me alarmed, so instead of completing the report in thirty days we took two months or more.""

"The 1956 report, written in Bruce's spirited style, condemned

the increased mingling in the internal affairs of other nations of bright, highly graded young men who must be doing something all the time to justify their reason for being.... Busy, moneyed, and privileged [the CIA] likes its "King Making" responsibili9ty (the intrigue is fascinating -- considerable self-satisfaction, sometimes with applause, derives from "successes" -- no charge is made for "failures" -- and the whole business is very much simpler than collecting covert intellignece on the USSR through the usual CIA methods!).

According to cryptome's account of the Schlesinger book, "Bruce and Lovett could discover no reliable system of control. "there are always, of course, on record the twin, well-born purpose of 'frustrating the Soviets' and keeping others 'pro-western' oriented. Under these almost any [covert] action can be and is being justified.... Once having been conceived, the final approval given to any project (at informal lunch meetins of the OCB [Operations Coordinating Board] inner group) can, at best, be described as pro forma." One consequence was that "no one, other than those in the CIA immediately concerned with their day to day operation, has any detailed knowledge of what is going on." With "a horde of CIA representatives" swarming around the planet, CIA covert action was exerting "signficant, almost unilateral influences... on the actual formulation of our foreign policies... sometimes completely unknown" to the local American ambassador. "We are sure," the report added, "that the supporters of the 1948 decision to launch this government on a positive [covert] program could not possibly have foreseen the ramifications of the operations which have resulted from it." Bruce and Lovett concluded with an exasperated plea:

Should not someone, somewhere in an authoritative position in our government, on a continuing basis, be... calculating... the long-range wisdom of activities which have entailed a virtual abandonment of the international "golden rule," and which, if successful to the degree claimed for them, are responsible in a great measure for stirring up the turmoitl and raising the doubts about us that exist in many countries of the world today?... Where will we be tomorrow? | "Bruce was very much disturbed," Lovett told the Cuba board of inquiry in 1961. "He approached it from the standpoint of 'what right have we to go barging into other countries buying newspapers and handing money to opposition parties or supporting a candidate for this, that or the other office?' He felt this was an outrageous interference with friendly countries....

The CIA itself would like more detail on this report, a copy of which could not be found, in 1995, by the Agency's History Staff.^[91] Referring to reports such as the Dulles-Jackson-Correa, Doolittle, Pike, Church, and Rockefeller reports, the Staff "recently ran across a reference to another item, the so-called "Bruce-Lovett" report, that it would very much like to read--if we could find it! The report is mentioned in Peter Grose's recent biography Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles. According to Grose, [Bruce and Lovett] prepared a report for President Dwight Eisenhower in the fall of 1956 that criticized CIA's alleged fascination with "kingmaking" in the Third World and complained that a "horde of CIA representatives" was mounting foreign political intrigues at the expense of gathering hard intelligence on the Soviet Union.

"The History Staff decided to get a copy of the report and see what the two former diplomats had really said. The first place to look was the CIA files on the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA)... There was no reference to such a report. We then checked with the Eisenhower Library and National Archives, which holds the PBCFIA records, but came up empty handed. The Virginia Historical Society, the custodian of David Bruce's papers, did not have a copy either.

"Having reached a dead end, we consulted the author of the Dulles biography, Peter Grose. Grose told us that he had not seen the report itself but had used notes made from it by historian Arthur M. Schlesinger for Robert F. Kennedy and His Times (1978). Professor Schlesinger informed us that that he had seen the report in Robert Kennedy's papers before they were deposited at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston. He had loaned Grose his notes and does not have a copy of these notes or of the report itself.

"This raises an interesting question: how did a report on the CIA written for President Eisenhower in 1956 end up in the RFK papers? We think we have the answer. Robert Lovett was asked to testify before Gen. Maxwell Taylor's board of inquiry on the 1961 Bay of Pigs operation. Robert Kennedy was on that board and may have asked Lovett for a copy of the report. But we do not have the answer to another question: where is the "Bruce-Lovett" report? The JFK Presidential Library has searched the RFK papers without success. Surely the report will turn up some day, even if one government agency and four separate archives so far haven't been able to find it. But this episode helps to prove one of the few Iron Laws of History: the official who keeps the best records gets to tell the story."

[edit] 1975 investigations

The 1975 United States President's Commission on CIA activities within the United States, better known as the Rockefeller Commission was an investigation into questionable practices including assassination attempts and inappropriate domestic operations. Larger Congressional investigations followed in 1975, first the Church Committee of the United States Senate, followed by the Pike Committee of the United States House of Rrepresentatives. Eventually, these interim committees were replaced by the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

[edit] 1996 reports

In 1996, the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued a congressional report estimating that: "Hundreds of employees on a daily basis are directed to break extremely serious laws in countries around the world in the face of frequently sophisticated efforts by foreign governments to catch them. A safe estimate is that several hundred times every day (easily 100,000 times a year) DO officers engage in highly illegal activities (according to foreign law) that not only risk political embarrassment to the US but also endanger the freedom if not lives of the participating foreign nationals and, more than occasionally, of the clandestine officer himself."^[92][88]

In the same document, the committee wrote, "Considering these facts and recent history, which has shown that the [Director of the Central Intelligence Agency], whether he wants to or not, is held accountable for overseeing the [Clandestine Service], the DCI must work closely with the Director of the CS and hold him fully and directly responsible to him."^[88]

[edit] 2007 documents

On 27 June 2007 the CIA released two collections of previously classified documents which outlined various activities of doubtful legality.

The first collection, the "Family Jewels," consists of almost 700 pages of responses from CIA employees to a 1973 directive from Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger requesting information about activities inconsistent with the Agency's charter.

The second collection, the CAESAR-POLO-ESAU papers, consists of 147 documents and 11,000 pages of research from 1953 to 1973 relating to Soviet and Chinese leadership hierarchies, and Sino-Soviet relations.^[93]

[edit] Mind control experiments

Further information: CIA transnational human rights actions#human experimentation

Project MKULTRA, or MK-ULTRA, was the code name for a CIA mind-control research program that began in 1950, involved primarily with the experimentation of drugs and other "chemical, biological and radiological" stimuli on both willing and uninformed subjects.

[edit] Rockefeller Commission

In December 1974, The New York Times reported that the CIA had conducted illegal domestic activities, including experiments on U.S. citizens, during the 1960s. The report prompted investigations by both the U.S. Congress (in the form of the Church Committee) and a presidential commission (known as the Rockefeller Commission). The congressional investigations and the Rockefeller Commission report revealed that the CIA and the Department of Defense had in fact conducted experiments to influence and control human behavior through the use of psychoactive drugs such as LSD and mescaline and other chemical, biological, and psychological means. Experiments were often conducted without the subjects' knowledge or consent.

MK-ULTRA was started on the order of CIA director Allen Dulles, largely in response to alleged Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean use of mind-control techniques on U.S. prisoners of war in Korea. The goal of the experiments was to study mind-control in order to develop methods of interrogation and behavior modification and manipulation, as well as to develop a possible truth drug.

[edit] Specific experiments

Documents have revealed that experiments were conducted on CIA employees, military personnel, doctors, other government agents, prostitutes, prisoners, mentally ill patients, and members of the general public in order to study their reactions. The drugs were administered alone and in combination with other drugs and at varying doses and frequencies. The drugs included LSD, heroin, morphine, temazepam (used under code name MKSEARCH), mescaline, psilocybin, scopolamine, marijuana, alcohol, and sodium pentothal.

Some of the most infamous research involved LSD. During one set of experiments, named Operation Midnight Climax, the CIA set up several brothels in New York City and California in order to lure men in, who were then secretly administered LSD. The brothels were equipped with one-way mirrors and video surveillance equipment for observation, recording, and study. In another case, volunteers were given LSD for 77 days straight.

Another technique investigated was connecting a barbiturate IV into one arm and an amphetamine IV into the other. The barbiturates were released into the subject first, and as soon as the subject began to fall asleep, the amphetamines were released. The subject would begin babbling incoherently at this point, and it was sometimes possible to ask questions and get useful answers.

[edit] Outcome

MK-ULTRA research ultimately proved useless to the CIA and they have abandoned the program. Because most MK-ULTRA records were deliberately destroyed in 1973 by order of then CIA Director Richard Helms, it is difficult if not impossible to have a complete understanding of the more than 150 individually funded research sub-projects sponsored by MK-ULTRA and related CIA programs.

Following the recommendations of the Church Committee, President Gerald Ford in 1976 issued the first Executive Order on Intelligence Activities which, among other things, prohibited "experimentation with drugs on human subjects, except with the informed consent, in writing and witnessed by a disinterested party, of each such human subject" and in accordance with the guidelines issued by the National Commission. Subsequent orders by Presidents Carter and Reagan expanded the directive to apply to any human experimentation.

[edit] Al-Qaeda

By the mid-1980s many Arabs were volunteering to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. The Office of Services was founded in Peshawar in 1984 by Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden to finance and support this effort. "Cold warriors" in the CIA and US State Department looked favorably on these efforts, and considered that they should be formally endorsed and expanded, perhaps along the lines of the international brigades of the Spanish Civil War. The CIA denied, however, actually doing anything or having direct contact with Bin Laden.^[94]

[edit] The Bin Laden Issue Station

Main article: Bin Laden Issue Station

In 1996 an experimental "virtual station" was launched, modeled on the agency's geographically-based stations, but based in Washington and dedicated to a particular (transnational) issue. It was placed under the Counterterrorist Center (CTC), and (like the Center itself) cut across disciplines and drew its personnel from widely across the CIA and other intelligence agencies. Michael Scheuer, who up to then headed the Center's Islamic extremist branch, was asked to run it. Scheuer, who had noticed a stream of intelligence reports about Osama bin Laden, suggested the station be dedicated to this particular individual. The station began to produce evidence that Bin Laden was not only a significant terrorist financier, but a terrorist organizer too. Originally dubbed "Terrorist Financial Links" (TFL),^[95] the unit soon became rechristened the Bin Laden Issue Station.

The US government did not yet share the Bin Laden unit's consciousness of a structured worldwide organization called al-Qaeda, referring rather to bin Laden and his "associates" or "network". And a 1997 CIA National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism only briefly mentioned bin Laden. The intelligence community did not in fact describe al-Qaeda until 1999.

Al Qaeda operated as an organization in more than sixty countries, the CIA's Counterterrorist Center calculated by late 1999 [a figure that was to help underpin the "War On Terror" two years later]. Its formal, sworn, hard-core membership might number in the hundreds. Thousands more joined allied militias such as the [Afghan] Taliban or the Chechen rebel groups or Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines or the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan. ...

[edit] The Plan

In 1999 DCI George Tenet launched a grand "Plan" to deal with al-Qaeda. In preparation, he selected new leadership for the Counterterrorist Center. He placed Cofer Black in charge of the CTC, and "Rich B" (a "top-flight executive" from Tenet's own leadership group) in charge of the CTC's Bin Laden unit. Tenet assigned the CTC to develop the Plan. The proposals, brought out in September, sought to penetrate Qaeda's "Afghan sanctuary" with US and Afghan agents, in order to obtain information on and mount operations against Bin Laden's network. In October, officers from the Bin Laden unit visited northern Afghanistan. Once the Plan was finalized, the Agency created a "Qaeda cell" (whose functions overlapped those of the CTC's Bin Laden unit) to give operational leadership to the effort.

The CIA concentrated its inadequate financial resources on the Plan, so that at least some of its more modest aspirations were realized. Intelligence collection efforts on bin Laden and al-Qaeda increased significantly from 1999. "By 9/11", said Tenet, "a map would show that these collection programs and human [reporting] networks were in place in such numbers as to nearly cover Afghanistan". (But this excluded Bin Laden's inner circle itself.)^[96]

[edit] The Predator drone

The CIA also experimented with a small remote-controlled reconnaissance aircraft, the Predator, to try to spot Bin Laden in Afghanistan. A series of flights in autumn 2000, overseen by CTC officials and flown by USAF drone pilots from a control room at the CIA's Langley headquarters, produced probable sightings of the Qaeda leader.^[97]

Black and others became advocates of arming the Predator with adapted Hellfire anti-tank missiles to try to assassinate Bin Laden and other Qaeda leaders. But there were both legal and technical issues. Tenet in particular was concerned about the CIA moving back into the business of assassination. And a series of live-fire tests in the Nevada Desert in summer 2001 produced mixed results.

Tenet advised cautiously on the matter at a meeting of the Cabinet-level Principals Committee on September 4, 2001. If the Cabinet wanted to empower the CIA to field a lethal drone, Tenet said, "they should do so with their eyes wide open, fully aware of the potential fallout if there were a controversial or mistaken strike". National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice concluded that the armed Predator was required, but evidently not ready. It was agreed to recommend to the CIA to resume reconnaissance flights. The "previously reluctant" Tenet then ordered the Agency to do so. The CIA was authorized to "deploy the system with weapons-capable aircraft".^[98]

[edit] The strategic assessments branch

In late 2000 Tenet, recognizing the deficiency of "big-picture" analysis of al-Qaeda, appointed a senior manager in the Counterterrorist Center to investigate "creating a strategic assessment capability". In spring 2001 the CTC got back to him, requesting the hiring of "a small group of contractors not involved in day-to-day crises to digest vast quantities of information and develop targeting strategies".

The CTC's Strategic Assessments Branch was formally set up in July. But it struggled to find personnel. The head of the branch finally took up his post on September 10, 2001.^[99]

[edit] War on terror

Further information: War on Terrorism

Further information: CIA transnational human rights actions

Further information: CIA transnational anti-terrorism activities

[edit] World-Wide Attack Matrix

In a briefing held September 15, 2001, George Tenet presented the Worldwide Attack Matrix: A "top-secret" document describing covert CIA anti-terror operations in eighty countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The actions, underway or being recommended, would range from "routine propaganda to lethal covert action in preparation for military attacks." The plans, if carried out, "would give the CIA the broadest and most lethal authority in its history."^[100]

[edit] Targeted killings

On November 5, 2002, newspapers reported that Al-Qaeda operatives in a car travelling through Yemen had been killed by a missile launched from a CIA-controlled Predator drone (a medium-altitude, remote-controlled aircraft). On May 15, 2005, it was reported that another of these drones had been used to assassinate Al-Qaeda figure Haitham al-Yemeni inside Pakistan.^[101]

On January 13, 2006, the CIA launched an airstrike on Damadola, a Pakistani village near the Afghan border, where they believed Ayman al-Zawahiri was located. The airstrike killed a number of civilians but al-Zawahiri apparently was not among them.^[102] The Pakistani government issued a strong protest against the US attack, considered a violation of Pakistan's sovereignty. However, several legal experts argue that this cannot be considered an assassination attempt as al-Zawahiri is named as terrorist and an enemy combatant by the United States, and therefore this targeted killing is not covered under Executive Order 12333, which banned assassinations.^{[103][104][105][106][107]}

[edit] Detention, interrogation and rendition practices

Main article: Black site

Further information: CIA transnational human rights actions

A claim that the black sites existed was made by The Washington Post in November 2005 and before by human rights NGOs.^[108] US President George W. Bush acknowledged the existence of secret prisons operated by the CIA during a speech on September 6, 2006.^[109][110]

[edit] The 2003 War in Iraq

Further information: Iraq War

In 2002 an anonymous source, quoted in The Washington Post, says the CIA was authorized to execute a covert operation, if necessary with help of the Special Forces, that could serve as a preparation for a full military attack against Iraq.^[111]

U.S. intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction had been the focus of intense scrutiny in the U.S. In 2004, the continuing armed resistance against the U.S. military occupation of Iraq, and the widely-perceived need for a systematic review of the respective roles of the CIA, the FBI, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

On July 9, 2004, the Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq of the Senate Intelligence Committee reported that the CIA exaggerated the danger presented by weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, largely unsupported by the available intelligence.^[112]

Tyler Drumheller, a 26-year CIA veteran and former head of covert operations in Europe, told CBS News "60 Minutes" correspondent Ed Bradley in an April 23, 2006 interview that there was widespread disbelief within the agency about the Bush administration's public claims regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. According to Drumheller, the CIA had penetrated Saddam Hussein's inner circle in the fall of 2002, and this high-level source told CIA "they had no active weapons of mass destruction program." Asked by Bradley about the apparent contradiction with Bush administration statements regarding Iraqi WMDs at that time, Drumheller said, "The policy was set. The war in Iraq was coming. And they were looking for intelligence to fit into the policy, to justify the policy."^[113] Kenneth Pollack, a former National Security Council expert on Iraq, whose book “The Threatening Storm” generally supported the use of force to remove Saddam Hussein, told Seymour Hersh that what the Bush administration did was "dismantle the existing filtering process that for fifty years had been preventing the policymakers from getting bad information. They created stovepipes to get the information they wanted directly to the top leadership.... They always had information to back up their public claims, but it was often very bad information," Pollack said.^[114]

A July 14, 2003 syndicated newspaper column in The Washington Post by Robert Novak identified CIA officer Valerie Plame publicly as "an agency operative on weapons of mass destruction." Plame's husband, Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson IV had been sent by CIA to the African nation of Niger to investigate claims that Iraq intended to purchase uranium yellowcake from that country, which was incorporated in President George W. Bush's 2003 State of the Union address to support waging a preemptive war against Iraq. The disclosure of Mrs. Wilson's then-still-classified covert CIA identity as "Valerie Plame" led to a grand jury investigation and the subsequent indictment and conviction of Vice President Dick Cheney's former chief of staff, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Jr. on charges of perjury, obstruction of justice, and making false statements to federal investigators.^[115]

At the Abu Ghraib prison, while CIA interrogator Mark Swanner was supervising a prisoner named Manadel al-Jamadi, the prisoner died. Apparently, al-Jamadi was suspended from his wrists until he choked to death. Swanner was not charged with any crime.

[edit] Linkages with former Nazis

The CIA had been aware of the location of some high-profile Nazi war criminals, including the whereabouts of Adolf Eichmann two years before he was captured by Israeli agents, but the agency did not publicize this information, as it did not have a policy of pursuing Nazi war criminals at the time.^[116]

Several former Nazi operational agents were recruited as U.S. secret agents, yet formed just a minor portion of the agents at that time; they were induced financially and promised exemption from criminal prosecution and trial for war crimes committed during World War II.^[117] In particular, the recruitment of Heinz Felfe, an SS officer who rose through the ranks of West Germany’s Gehlen organization to become its counterintelligence chief in 1955 did not only raise questions of ethics, but produced a major security failure, since, in 1961, Felfe was identified as a Soviet spy. According to Norman Goda of Ohio University, Felfe was "the West German official most knowledgeable about CIA operations in Eastern Europe", which let him sabotage one of the CIA’s most important spy operations, against the KGB base in East Germany. The CIA subsequently estimated that Felfe had compromised 15,000 items.

The article cited an unidentified CIA officer as saying, in 1953, "Clear evidence of a war crimes record might also serve as a possible control."

Christopher Simpson claims that these agents had a long-term corrosive effect on American intelligence agencies.^[118]

[edit] Influencing public opinion and law enforcement

See also: CIA and the media

This is an area with many shades of gray. There is little argument, for example, that the CIA acted inappropriately in providing technical support to White House operatives conducting both political and security investigations, with no legal authority to do so. Things become much more ambiguous when law enforcement may expose a clandestine operation, a problem not unique to intelligence but also seen among different law enforcement organizations, where one wants to prosecute and another to continue investigations, perhaps reaching higher levels in a conspiracy.

[edit] Support of associations and journals

Yet more complex is the clandestine support of perfectly legal organizations and individuals, especially with no interference with their expression, when it is believed that their beliefs, perhaps expressed in other places in the world, advance American policies.^[119] In 1967, a number of clandestine subsidies to associations and journals became public. Given the CIA's prohibition from domestic activities, support of US groups with worldwide presence, such as the National Student Association, were especially problematic.^[120] The exposure, by Ramparts magazine, of CIA subsidies to the National Association, according to Time, led to the term "orphans", referring to nearly 100 private agencies that had been getting CIA money, and were affected by a Presidential order that support must end by the end of 1967.

Whatever the merits or demerits of the CIA's methods, most of these groups served the U.S. well in its contest for the faith and understanding of the world's workers and thinkers, students and teachers, refugees from yesterday and leaders of tomorrow. This led to the appointment of a presidential commission, headed by Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, to figure out how the gap left by the CIA should be filled. Ever since, new information about the CIA's past activities has continued to surface... Thomas Wardell Braden... a politically ambitious former California newspaper publisher who served with the CIA between 1950 and 1954, added further details. In an article in the Saturday Evening Post, Braden indignantly defended the CIA against charges that it had been "immoral" by recording some of the extremely useful things it accomplished early in the cold war.^[120]

Time succinctly summarized the issue with "the question is whether, in a free society, it is right, wise—or necessary—for supposedly independent organizations to receive secret subsidies."^[120]

In 1967 it was revealed that the Congress of Cultural Freedom, founded in 1950, had been sponsored by the CIA. It published literary and political journals such as Encounter (as well as Der Monat in Germany and Preuves in France), and hosted dozens of conferences bringing together some of the most eminent Western thinkers; it also gave some assistance to intellectuals behind the Iron Curtain. The CIA states that, "Somehow this organization of scholars and artists — egotistical, free-thinking, and even anti-American in their politics — managed to reach out from its Paris headquarters to demonstrate that Communism, despite its blandishments, was a deadly foe of art and thought".^[121]

[edit] Support of labor organizations

Braden revealed that not only intellectual organizations had been subsidized.

He said he had given money to Irving Brown, of the American Federation of Labor, "to pay off his strong-arm squads in Mediterranean ports, so that American supplies could be unloaded against the opposition of Communist dock workers." Braden said that CIA funds also went to Victor Reuther, brother and assistant of President Walter Reuther of the United Automobile Workers, and to Jay Lovestone, of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, for the purpose of helping various anti-Communist unions abroad. His article is highly self-flattering and oversimplified, but most of his statements appear to be correct. A.F.L.-C.I.O. President George Meany called Braden's account "a damn lie"—but added cautiously, "to the best of my knowledge."

Relationships with organized labor are not surprising, given the World War II activity of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Labor Branch under Arthur Goldberg. European labor groups often provided OSS with volunteers to penetrate occupied Europe, and, with greatest danger, into Nazi Germany.^[122] " [Arthur] Goldberg, head of the Labor Division of the OSS clandestine intelligence unit, later appointed to the US Supreme Court by President John F. Kennedy—was known at the time for his defense of the Chicago Newspaper Guild during its 1938 strike against the Hearst Corporation. Joining OSS/London in 1943, Goldberg convinced colleagues and OSS director, Gen. William J. Donovan, of the need to establish contact with underground labor groups in occupied and Axis countries. He believed that trade union resistance groups could be useful to the war effort because they shared with the Allies a common hatred of the Nazi regime, which had violently dissolved labor organizations in Germany. Because such groups were already major forces of internal resistance behind enemy lines, they constituted a readymade source of valuable military and political intelligence."

[edit] Warren Commission

Notre Dame law professor G. Robert Blakey, counsel for the House Select Committee on Assassinations, states that the CIA withheld information from the Warren Commission and frustrated the efforts of the Congressional Committee he represented.^[123]

According to a 1997 New York Times article, the CIA conducted a covert propaganda campaign to squelch criticism of the Warren Report. The CIA urged its field stations to use their "propaganda assets" to attack those who didn't agree with the Warren Report. In a dispatch from CIA headquarters, the Agency instructed its stations around the world to:

1. counteract the "new wave of books and articles criticizing the [Warren] Commission's findings...[and] conspiracy theories ...[that] have frequently thrown suspicion on our organization";
2. "discuss the publicity problem with liaison and friendly elite contacts, especially politicians and editors;" and
3. "employ propaganda assets to answer and refute the attacks of the critics. ... Book reviews and feature articles are particularly appropriate for this purpose. ... The aim of this dispatch is to provide material for countering and discrediting the claims of the conspiracy theorists..."^[124]

[edit] Robertson Panel

Main article: Robertson Panel

The Robertson Panel was a committee commissioned by CIA in 1952 in response to widespread Unidentified Flying Object reports, especially in the Washington, D.C. area. The panel was briefed on U.S. military activities and intelligence; hence the report was originally classified Secret.

Later declassified, the Robertson Panel's report concluded that UFOs were not a direct threat to national security, but could pose an indirect threat by overwhelming standard military communications due to public interest in the subject. Most UFO reports, they concluded, could be explained as misidentification of mundane aerial objects, and the remaining minority could, in all likelihood, be similarly explained with further study.

The Robertson Panel concluded that a public relations campaign should be undertaken in order to "debunk" UFOs, and reduce public interest in the subject, and that civilian UFO groups should be monitored. After the Freedom of Information Act was made law in 1974, Ufologists involved in making FOIA requests reported that more than nine hundred pages of information released by the CIA indicated that the organization was collecting and analyzing sighting reports from as early as 1949. In 1997 the CIA came forward to admit its historical interest in UFOs.^[125][126]

[edit] Drug trafficking

Main article: CIA drug trafficking

Main article: CIA transnational anti-crime and anti-drug activities

There have been accusations that the CIA participated in drug trafficking, for a variety of reasons including funding illegal operations in Nicaragua during their civil war, and as an acceptable bribe currency Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion (see CIA activities in the Near East, North Africa, South and Southwest Asia#Afghanistan) and in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War (see CIA activities in Asia and the Pacific, in multiple places in the Southeast Asia section, especially Laos).

[edit] Contras

Main article: CIA and Contras cocaine trafficking in the US

The Kerry Committee report in 1989 found that the U.S. State Department had paid drug traffickers. Some of these payments were after the traffickers had been indicted by federal law enforcement agencies on drug charges or while traffickers were under active investigation by these same agencies.^[127] The report declared, "It is clear that individuals who provided support for the Contras were involved in drug trafficking... and elements of the Contras themselves knowingly received financial and material assistance from drug traffickers."^[128]

According to a personal account by Everett Ellis Briggs, former U.S. Ambassador to Panama and Honduras, CIA undermined efforts to put a stop to the drug smuggling activities of Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega prior to the December 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama.^[129] The motivation for the activities was to obtain Noriega's support for the Contras.

Representative Maxine Waters testified to Congress:

“

Senator Kerry and his Senate investigation found drug traffickers had used the Contra war and tie to the Contra leadership to help this deadly trade. Among their devastating findings, the Kerry committee investigators found that major drug lords used the Contra supply networks and the traffickers provided support for Contras in return. The CIA of course, created, trained, supported, and directed the Contras and were involved in every level of their war.[130]

”

In 1996, investigative journalist Gary Webb wrote a series of exposés for the San Jose Mercury News entitled, "Dark Alliance", in which he reported evidence that CIA aircraft, which had ferried arms to the Nicaraguan Contras, had been used to ship cocaine to the United States on their return flights. Webb also alleged that Central American narcotics traffickers could distribute cocaine in U.S. cities in the 1980s without the interference of normal law enforcement agencies, and that the CIA intervened to prevent the prosecution of drug dealers who were helping to fund the Contras. He asserted that this led, in part, to the crack cocaine epidemic, especially in poor neighborhoods of Los Angeles. Faced with heavy Congressional and mainstream media criticism (especially from the Los Angeles Times), the Mercury News ultimately retracted Webb's conclusions, and Webb was prevented from conducting any further investigative reporting. (Webb was transferred to cover non-controversial suburban stories and subsequently gave up journalism and committed suicide.)

After the "Dark Alliance" reports in the Mercury News, CIA Inspector General Frederick Hitz was assigned to investigate these allegations. In 1998 the new DCI, George Tenet, declared that he was releasing the report.^[128] The report and Hitz's testimony showed that the "CIA did not 'expeditiously' cut off relations with alleged drug traffickers" and "the CIA was aware of allegations that 'dozens of people and a number of companies connected in some fashion to the contra program' were involved in drug trafficking"^[128][102] Hitz also said that under an agreement in 1982 between Ronald Reagan's Attorney General William French Smith and the CIA, agency officers were not required to report allegations of drug trafficking involving non-employees, which was defined as meaning paid and non-paid "assets [meaning agents], pilots who ferried supplies to the contras, as well as contra officials and others.^[102] This agreement, which had not previously been revealed, came at a time when there were allegations that the CIA was using drug dealers in its controversial covert operation to bring down the leftist Sandinista government in Nicaragua.^[102] Only after Congressional funds were restored in 1986 was the agreement modified to require the CIA to stop paying agents whom it believed were involved in the drug trade.^[128]

[edit] Drugs in Asia

It has also been alleged that the CIA was involved in the opium/heroin trade in Asia during the Vietnam War and later, which was the focus of Alfred W. McCoy's book, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, an earlier edition of which had already been subjected to attempted suppression by the CIA.

The CIA's air cargo operation, Air America, has also been accused of transporting drugs.^[131]

[edit] Assassination plots

Further information: Plausible denial, Cuba Project, G. Robert Blakey, Church Committee

The CIA has been linked to several assassination attempts on foreign leaders, including first democratically elected prime minister of the Republic of the Congo Patrice Lumumba, Jaime Roldos of Ecuador,^[132]former leader of Panama Omar Torrijos^[133] and the President of Cuba, Fidel Castro. Between August 1960, and April 1961, the CIA with the help of the Mafia assassins pursued a series of plots to poison or shoot Castro according to the assassination plots proposed by Colonel Sheffield Edwards, director of the CIA's Office of Security.^[134]

[edit] Human rights: declassified CIA interrogation manuals

Further information: U.S. Army and CIA interrogation manuals

{{Further|[[CIA transnational human rights actions#Questionable interrogation techniques|questionable interrogation techniques}} In 1984, a CIA manual for training the Nicaraguan contras in psychological operations was discovered, entitled "Psychological Operations in Guerrilla War".^[135] The manual recommended “selective use of violence for propagandistic effects” and to “neutralize” (i.e., kill) government officials. Nicaraguan Contras were taught to lead:

“

...demonstrators into clashes with the authorities, to provoke riots or shootings, which lead to the killing of one or more persons, who will be seen as the martyrs; this situation should be taken advantage of immediately against the Government to create even bigger conflicts.

”

The manual also recommended:

“

...selective use of armed force for PSYOP [psychological operations] effect.... Carefully selected, planned targets — judges, police officials, tax collectors, etc. — may be removed for PSYOP effect in a UWOA [unconventional warfare operations area], but extensive precautions must insure that the people “concur” in such an act by thorough explanatory canvassing among the affected populace before and after conduct of the mission.[136]

”

The CIA claimed that the purpose of the manual was to "moderate" activities already being done by the Contras.^[137]

On January 24, 1997, two new manuals were declassified in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request filed by the Baltimore Sun in 1994. The first manual, "KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation," dated July 1963, is the source of much of the material in the second manual. The second manual, "Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual - 1983," was used in at least seven U.S. training courses conducted in Latin American countries, including Honduras, between 1982 and 1987.

Both manuals deal exclusively with interrogation and have an entire chapter devoted to "coercive techniques."^[138][139] These manuals recommend arresting suspects early in the morning by surprise, blindfolding them, and stripping them naked. Interrogation rooms should be windowless, soundproof, dark and without toilets. Suspects should be held incommunicado and should be deprived of any kind of normal routine in eating and sleeping. The manuals describe coercive techniques to be used "to induce psychological regression in the subject by bringing a superior outside force to bear on his will to resist."^[140]

[edit] Publications

One of the CIA's best-known publications, The World Factbook, is in the public domain and is made freely available without copyright restrictions because it is a work of the United States federal government.

The CIA since 1955 has published an in-house professional journal known as Studies in Intelligence that addresses historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of the intelligence profession. Unclassified and declassified Studies articles, as well as other books and monographs, are made available by CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence on a limited basis through Internet and other publishing mechanisms.^[141] A further annotated collection of Studies articles was published through Yale University Press under the title Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992.^[142]

In 2002, CIA's Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis began publishing the unclassified Kent Center Occasional Papers, aiming to offer "an opportunity for intelligence professionals and interested colleagues—in an unofficial and unfettered vehicle—to debate and advance the theory and practice of intelligence analysis."^[143]

[edit] CIA in fiction and the movies

• The character Jack Ryan in Tom Clancy books is a CIA agent.^[144] Ryan is never an "agent" or case officer in the usual sense of the term, as opposed to characters such as John Clark and Domingo Chavez. Ryan starts as an contract consultant, becomes an analyst, and rises in responsibility. There are operations officers that play a major role in Clancy's novel, such as John Clark and Domingo Chavez, to say nothing of the creative and ruthless Mary Pat Foley.

• Jason Bourne is a former CIA Agent whom the CIA wishes to terminate for disobeying their orders to assassinate certain political figures.
• The CIA is a central player in the events of Tom Clancy's Splinter Cell. In the game, NSA Splinter Cell Agent Sam Fisher must determine the fates of two CIA Agents who disappeared while spying on the government of Georgia. Fisher must then infiltrate the CIA Headquarters in Langley in order to track down the source of a security link within the agency. Later games in the franchise features operatives from a fictional NSA initiative known as SHADOWNET.
• Sydney Bristow in Alias (TV series) first works for a fake CIA branch, then the real CIA.
• The film Charlie Wilson's War, released in December 2007, gives a popular account of the efforts of U.S. Congressman Charles Wilson to secure funding for CIA's Operation Cyclone giving covert assistance to Afghan rebels during the Soviet war in Afghanistan. This film gives the CIA a positive portrayal, while finishing with a muted scolding of Congress for funding the war but not funding subsequent peacetime reconstruction. This lack of funding for reconstruction, or what are called Operations Other Than War (OOTWA) in military parlance and counter-insurgency doctrine, are mooted as an antecedent to our present War on Terrorism. The film has its critics.^[145][146]
• The CIA has most recently been portrayed in the new comedy television show on NBC called "Chuck"
• The Good Shepherd, directed by Robert De Niro in 2006 narrate the tumultuous early history of the Central Intelligence Agency as viewed through the prism of one man's life.

[edit] See also

CIA's operations Category:Central Intelligence Agency operations Allegations of state terrorism by United States of America Pike Committee - 1976 House committee investigation Rockefeller Commission Family jewels (Central Intelligence Agency) Kerry Committee report - looked into charges of drug trafficking CIA and Contras cocaine trafficking in the US CIA drug trafficking CIA interrogation tapes destruction (2005) CIA-related terms Blowback CIA cryptonym Extraordinary rendition CIA analysts, directors, historians, officers and critics Category:Analysts of the Central Intelligence Agency Category:Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency Category:Historians of the Central Intelligence Agency Category:People of the Central Intelligence Agency Victor Marchetti John Marks L. Fletcher Prouty

Books and media Category:Books about the Central Intelligence Agency Vince Flynn - author of government fiction with major characters who work for the CIA R J Hillhouse - author of political fiction about the outsourcing of the CIA The Agency, a CBS television series about the CIA Alias, an ABC television series about the CIA American Dad!, an animated comedy series that spoofs the CIA. The Bourne Ultimatum, a film series in which jason bourne is persued by the CIA. Other national and international agencies List of intelligence agencies Defense Intelligence Agency Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency National Security Agency Private intelligence agencies Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) Mossad, Israel's Intelligence agency

[edit] Further reading

• Andrew, Christopher (1996). For the President's Eyes Only. HarperCollins. ISBN 0-00-638071-9. 
• Baer, Robert (2003). See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism. Three Rivers Press. ISBN 1-4000-4684-X. 
• Baer, Robert (2003). Sleeping With the Devil: How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude. Crown. ISBN 1-4000-5021-9. 
• Bearden, Milton; James Risen (2003). The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown With the KGB. Random House. ISBN 0-679-46309-7. 
• Chomsky, Noam (2003). Hegemony or Survival. Henry Holt & Co.. ISBN 0-8050-7688-3.  Also Deterring Democracy, also 9/11
• Cockburn, Alexander (October 1999). Whiteout: The CIA, Drugs and the Press. Verso. ISBN 1-8598-4258-5. 
• Grey, Stephen (2006). Ghost Plane: The True Story of the CIA Torture Program. St. Martin's Press. ISBN 978-0312360238. 
• Johnson, Loch K. (1991). America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society. Oxford University Press. 
• Kessler, Ronald (1992, reissue 1994). Inside the CIA. Pocket Books. ISBN 0-671-73458-X. 
• Mahle, Melissa Boyle (2004). Denial and Deception: An Insider's View of the CIA from Iran-Contra to 9/11. Nation Books. ISBN 1-56025-649-4. 
• Marchetti, Victor; John D. Marks (1975 reissue 1989). The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. Dell. ISBN 978-0440203360. 
• McCoy, Alfred W. (2003). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade. Lawrence Hill Books. 1556524838.  CIA involvement with the drug trade since World War 2 to present day.
• Moran, Lindsay (2005). Blowing My Cover: My Life as a CIA Spy and Other Misadventures. Berkley Books. ISBN 0-425-20562-2. 

• Scott, Peter Dale; Jonathan Marshall (April 1998). Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America. University of California Press. 0520214498.  CIA involvement in the drug trade during the US backed Contra war with Nicaragua.
• Saunders, Frances Stonor (1999). The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters. New Press. ISBN 1-56584-664-8.  (AKA, Who Paid the Piper?: CIA and the Cultural Cold War 1999 Granta [UK edition])
• Smith, Jr., W. Thomas (2003). Encyclopedia of the Central Intelligence Agency. Facts on File. ISBN 0-8160-4667-0. 
• Theoharis, Athan (2007). The Quest for Absolute Security; The Failed Relations Among U.S. Intelligence Agencies. Ivan R. Dee, Publisher. ISBN 1-56663-697-3. 
• Webb, Gary (May 1999). Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion. Seven Stories Press. 1888363932. 

[edit] References

[edit] External links

[edit] Official websites and documents

• CIA official site
• CIA official Freedom of Information Act (foia) site
• George Washington University National Security Archive:
  • Documents on CIA involvement with Pinochet
  • On CIA involvement in Guatemala
  • On CIA involvement with Nazi War Criminals (especially the Gehlen organization)
• U.S. National Archive's Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group.
  • Summary of newly acquired CIA name files (including Klaus Barbie)
• CIA manual on coercive questioning
• CIA World Factbook

[edit] Other links

• CIA information at Rotten.com.
• Cop vs. CIA. Online posting. From the Wilderness (mirror site) /
• Cocaine Import Agency. Online posting. San José Mercury News. (On alleged drug-smuggling by the CIA.)
• Inside the Company: CIA Diary. Online posting. Third World Traveler: Excerpt from a book by leading whistleblower Philip Agee.
• Killing Hope, by William Blum.
• CIA roll of honour, awards and images.
• Central Intelligence Agency Meeting Notices and Rule Changes from The Federal Register RSS Feed
• Video's and Info
• Proposal for a Privacy Protection Guideline on Secret Personal Data Gathering and Transborder Flows of Such Data in the Fight against Terrorism and Serious Crime by Marcel Stuessi
• CIA "Family Jewels" documents

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