US Army Lessons Learned - battle of Mosul Iraq 2004

This Initial Impression Report (IIR) provides a summary of key emerging insights, observations and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) from the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, Stryker Brigade Combat Team’s (SBCT) operational deployment, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). Between 22 September - 19 October 2004, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) formed, trained, and deployed a nine (9) person Collection and Analysis Team (CAAT) to Mosul, Iraq.

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Observation: The brigade has developed some excellent examples of detainee holding facilities, however some are inadequate. Discussion: Each subordinate battalion task force, of the brigade, was responsible for establishing a detainee holding facility within their respective forward operating base (FOB). The 2nd Battalion, 3rd Brigade FOB had a large holding facility with separate holding areas, a separate interrogation room, and space for interrogators to confer and develop interrogations, an entrance way to the facility equipped with flood lights, and a location that offered cover and concealment. The battalion designed, contracted for, and supervised the completion of its own holding facility. Conversely, 1st Battalion, 14th Cavalry Squadron's FOB holding facility was established on an existing structure, approximately twenty feet from the perimeter. This structure had no cover or concealment from the Baghdad highway. In addition there was a large abandoned school just two hundred meters away, and overlooking, the selected structure. This facility consisted of a single room approximately twenty by forty feet in diameter with no room to conduct detainee screening or keep detainees separated. This configuration limited interrogation techniques, and jeopardized the discovery of the detainees' identities.

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Discussion: The Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF), previously, retained approval authority for PSYOP products. This process unnecessarily delayed the responsiveness and timeliness of products and prevented regional focus and legitimacy. With approval authority at the task force level products could be produced locally and shipped to the subordinate battalions within a week to two weeks. PSYOP was centralized at the brigade level, while Civil Affairs (CA) was decentralized and pushed down to the battalion level. The brigade ensured that CA process was equitable across the brigade battle space. CA projects however, did not appear to be used effectively as tools to leverage the information operations (IO) objectives and utilized an approval process not linked with the formal targeting process. Non-lethal effects were integrated into cordon and search operations. Specifically, tactical commanders found it very useful for loud speaker teams to accompany the inter cordon as a method for informing the local population of what was going on and how to comply. Once the operation was completed the media was alerted and moved to the location to provide coverage of the event. Soldiers also used combat camera to document damages occurring during the raid to provide a method for reimbursement, if no detentions were made. The documentation and media access were executed as defensive counter-propaganda operations.

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Observation: Infantry battalions were not trained nor particularly suited to conduct contracting functions during support operations and stability operations. Discussion: Battalions had limited or no contracting training prior to deploying. In one battalion, on any given day, there was in excess of $100,000 in cash for local contracts. A lieutenant or sergeant first class drew, secured, and disbursed the money to support approved contracted projects. The battalion had no training, or any dedicated office support, pertaining to the specific ways and means for letting contracts.

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Discussion: Several units expressed concern about the contracting they were required to initiate, at the battalion level, without any prior training. They were also concerned about the amount and legality of the contracting preformed. The battalions, spent on average, about four and one half million dollars, during the year they were in country, on civil affairs projects, construction projects for the Iraqi National Guard (ING) and force protection improvements. A majority of that funding was handled through the contracting office either at brigade or at the task force level. In one case the battalion commander initiated a contract for up armoring his canvas High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). After looking at several vendors he selected the vendor with the most experience, the material (that had been tested to do the job), and the workforce to accomplish the job. The commander submitted a sole source contract request to protect his Soldiers as quickly as possible. The contracting office rejected the sole source requested, and has competed the contracts resulting in an additional thirty days to process the request ultimately selecting the same vendor the commander had requested earlier. This process unnecessarily exposed Soldiers, to direct harm, for an additional thirty days. In other cases staff members complained about the constant changing of standards required for contracts, turn-over of contracting officers, and the fact that the process did not support the commander's timeline. Commanders felt that they need more flexibility to fund projects quickly to support their objectives and to show immediate good will toward target Iraqi audiences. Another serious deficiency is in writing contracts to ensure that applicable assessment is applied to contractor selection as well as quality control once the job has started. Many individuals claimed to be contractors to get American money.

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Topic M: Media Support to the Fight (ART 7.10.2 Facilitate Media Operations)

Observation: No issues, with embedded media, were identified.

Discussion: The brigade did not specify any major issues with embedded media but did emphasize the importance of developing a good media plan as detailed by the following actual event. An embedded media representative was staying with elements of the brigade and had been granted access to an event where school supplies were to be handed out to needy students. The unit took the reporter to a school which they had recently built. When they arrived they were surprised to find that no children were present and that an Iraqi family was homesteading in the building. The Iraqi police were unwilling to remove the family and no school supplies to be issued. Fortunately the reporter elected not to cover the event, which could have made us look bad, since we didn'tt know what was going on with the school after we funded its construction. The Iraqi police were unwilling or unable to support us and the supplies that we purchased were never distributed to the children. The reporter understood what had happened and had other good coverage to use and rather than airing any of this event.

Insights/Lessons Learned:

• Make sure you have a good media plan for embedded media so they can cover the types of articles they are interested in and have appropriate access to Soldier and events.
• It is wise to have a plan in advance and events for the media to choose from. Assisting the media in getting the type of coverage they want will ultimately enhance the opportunity for more favorable coverage.