Central Intelligence Agency

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Central Intelligence Agency
Seal of the Central Intelligence Agency
Agency overview
Formed	26 July 1947
Preceding Agency	Central Intelligence Group
Headquarters	Langley, Virginia, United States
Employees	Classified[1][2] 20,000 estimated[3][citation needed]
Annual Budget	Classified[4][5]
Minister Responsible	John Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence
Agency Executives	General Michael Hayden USAF, Director   Stephen Kappes, Deputy Director   Michael Morell, Associate Deputy Director
Website
www.cia.gov

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a civilian intelligence agency of the United States government. Its primary function is collecting and analyzing information about foreign governments, corporations, and persons in order to advise public policymakers.

Prior to December 2004, the CIA was literally the central intelligence organization for the US government. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 created the office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), who took over some of the government and intelligence community (IC)-wide function that had previously been under the CIA. The DNI manages the United States Intelligence Community and in so doing it manages the intelligence cycle. Among the functions that moved to the DNI were the preparation of estimates reflecting the consolidated opinion of the 16 IC agencies, and preparation of briefings for the President.

When discussing the CIA, it is critical to understand when one is speaking of the older IC-wide responsibilities, or its present set of responsibilities. The IC still has internal politics,^[6], although an increasing number of interagency "centers", as well as the Intellipedia information sharing mechanism, are hoped to be improvements.

The current CIA still has a number of functions in common with other countries' intelligence agencies; see relationships with foreign intelligence agencies. The agency both collects and analyzes intelligence. The CIA's headquarters is in the community of Langley in the McLean CDP of Fairfax County, Virginia, a few miles west of Washington, D.C. along the Potomac River.

Sometimes, the CIA is referred to euphemistically in government and military parlance as Other Government Agencies (or OGA), particularly when its operations in a particular area are an open secret.^[7][8] Other terms include The Company and The Agency.

Contents 1 Organization 1.1 Executive offices 1.1.1 Support to Military Operations 1.1.2 Proposed support to Homeland Security 1.2 National estimates 1.3 Directorate of Intelligence 1.3.1 Regional groups 1.3.2 Transnational groups 1.3.3 Support and general units 1.4 National Clandestine Service 1.5 Directorate of Science and Technology 1.6 Directorate of Support 1.6.1 Logistics and proprietaries 1.6.2 Training 1.7 Other offices 1.7.1 General Publications 1.7.2 General Counsel and Inspector General 1.7.3 Public Affairs 2 Relationship with other sources of intelligence 2.1 Other U.S. intelligence agencies 2.2 Open Source Intelligence 2.3 Outsourcing 2.4 Foreign intelligence services 3 Organizational history 3.1 Immediate predecessors, 1946-1947 3.2 Early CIA, 1947-1952 3.3 The structure stabilizes, 1952 3.4 Early Cold War, 1953-1966 3.5 Complications from Indochina and the Vietnam War (1954-1975) 3.6 Abuses of CIA authority, 1970s-1990s 3.7 2004, DNI takes over CIA top-level functions 4 Mission-related issues and controversies 4.1 Security and counterintelligence failures 4.1.1 Security failures 4.1.2 Counterintelligence failures 4.2 Failures in intelligence analysis 4.3 Internal/presidential studies, external investigations and document releases 4.3.1 1949 Eberstadt Report (First Hoover Commission) 4.3.2 1949 Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report 4.3.3 1954 Doolittle Report on Covert Activities 4.3.4 1956 Bruce-Lovett Report 4.3.5 1975 investigations 4.3.6 1996 reports 4.3.7 2007 documents 4.4 Influencing public opinion and law enforcement 4.5 Linkages with former Nazi and Japanese War Criminals 4.6 Al-Qaeda and the "war on terror" 4.7 The 2003 War in Iraq 4.8 Drug trafficking 5 See also 5.1 Further reading 5.2 Official websites and documents 5.3 Other links 6 References

[edit] Organization

The heraldic symbol of the CIA consists of three representative parts: the "right"-facing bald eagle head atop,( "right" facing, since the eagle looks over its "right" shoulder, not the left shoulder ) the compass star (or compass rose), and the shield. The eagle is the national bird, standing for strength and alertness. The 16-point compass star represents the CIA's world-wide search for intelligence outside the United States, which is then reported to the headquarters for analysis, reporting, and re-distribution to policymakers. The compass rests upon a shield, symbolic of defense.^[9][10]

The CIA has an executive office, four major directorates, and a variety of specialized offices. Prior to the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligences, it had some additional responsibilities for the IC as a whole.

[edit] Executive offices

Previously, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) oversaw the Intelligence Community (IC), serving as the president's principal intelligence advisor, additionally serving as head of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 amended the National Security Act to provide for a Director of National Intelligence who would assume some of the roles formerly fulfilled by the DCI, with a separate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The DCI's title now is "Director of the Central Intelligence Agency" (DCIA), serving as head of the CIA.

Currently, the Central Intelligence Agency answers directly to the Director of National Intelligence, although the CIA Director may brief the President directly. The CIA has its budget approved by the Congress, a subset of which do see the line items. The intelligence community, however, does not take direct orders from the Congress. The National Security Advisor is a permanent member of the National Security Council, responsible for briefing the President with pertinent information collected by all 16 U.S. Intelligence Community agencies are under the policy, but not necessarily budgetary, authority of the Director of National Intelligence.

The effect of the personalities of the DCIs on the structure and behavior of the Agency and indeed the IC is analyzed in Painter's dissertation on "Early Leader Effects" of Donovan, Dulles and Hoover^[11]

Until the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the Director of the CIA met regularly with the President to issue daily reports on ongoing operations. After the creation of the post of DNI, currently Mike McConnell, the report is now given by the DNI—who oversees all US Intelligence activities, including intelligence community operations outside of CIA jurisdiction. Former CIA Director Porter Goss, who had been a CIA officer, denied this has had a diminishing effect on morale, but promoted his mission to reform the CIA into the lean and agile counter-terrorism focused force he believes it should be.^[12]

A Deputy Director of the CIA (DDCIA) Assists the Director in his duties as head of the CIA and exercises the powers of the Director when the Director’s position is vacant or in the Director’s absence or disability. Either the Director or Deputy Director may be a military officer, but both positions may not be filled, at the same time, by military officers.

On July 5, 2006, the position of Executive Director, who managed day-to-day operations and budget, was replaced with an Associate Deputy Director of the CIA (ADD)^[13]

[edit] Support to Military Operations

As the DCIA's principal adviser and representative on military issues, the Associate Director for Military Support (AD/MS), a senior general officer, coordinates CIA efforts to provide Joint Force commanders, who are principally consumers of national-level intelligence but producers of operational intelligence. The AD/MS also supports Department of Defense officials who oversee military intelligence training and the acquisition of intelligence systems and technology. John A. Gordon was the first AD/MS, before the creation of ODNI. There is also an Associate Deputy Director for Operations for Military Affairs (ADDO/MA) ^[14]

The Office of Military Affairs provides intelligence and operational support to the US armed forces.^[15]

President George W. Bush, in creating the National Clandestine Service (NCS), made it clear policy that the CIA to be in charge of all human intelligence (HUMINT) operations. NCS, (formerly the Directorate of Operations, and earlier the "Directorate of Plans"), collects clandestine human intelligence collection, and conducts deniable psychological and paramilitary operations.^[16] Creation of the NCS was the culmination of a years old turf war regarding influence, philosophy and budget between the United States Department of Defense and the CIA. The Pentagon, through the DIA, wanted to take control of the CIA's paramilitary operations and many of its human assets.^{[citation needed]} DoD had organized the Defense HUMINT Service,^[17] which, with the Presidential decision, became part of the NCS.

The CIA, which has for years held that human intelligence is the core of the agency, successfully argued that the CIA's decades long experience with human resources and civilian oversight made it the ideal choice. Thus, the CIA was given charge of all US human intelligence, but as a compromise, the Pentagon was authorized to include increased paramilitary capabilities in future budget requests.^{[citation needed]} The military is also authorized to run Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations, which are directly related to the protection of military forces and facility. Another HUMINT area that remains with DoD is direct support to special operations, by an organization, originally called the Intelligence Support Activity (ISA), which is a special access program (i.e., separate from sensitive compartmented intelligence activities that must be reported to the Congressional intelligence committees). ISA and its successors transferred to the United States Special Operations Command, where their classified names and special access program designations are changed frequently.^[18]

The Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) program is a system of making national intelligence available to warfighters. ^[19] TENCAP information most commonly comes from space-based and national-level aircraft programs, where CIA's responsibilities have moved, in many cases, to NRO, NSA, NGA, and DIA. Nevertheless, CIA still can serve such information, with the emphasis on HUMINT, and on technical sensors that need to be emplaced clandestinely in denied areas.

[edit] Proposed support to Homeland Security

A great sensitivity remains about CIA having domestic responsibilities, but it clearly will, on occasions, collect information outside the US that relates directly to domestic security. CIA, for example, is more likely to obtain HUMINT on terrorists than the very limited foreign resources of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

While DHS, like the military, is seen principally as a consumer of national intelligence, but its border and transportation security functions will produce intelligence. At present, however, there is no well-defined way for DHS to task intelligence collection agencies with its requirements. One proposal suggests using the AD/MS as a prototype, to create an AD/Homeland Security in the CIA, and possibly an equivalent position in the Justice Department, which, through the FBI and other agencies, legally collects domestic intelligence.^[20] This proposal is one of many to improve coordination and avoid intelligence failures caused by not "connecting the dots", when the dots are held by different agencies.

[edit] National estimates

Prior to 2004, CIA had two analytic roles: the main effort based in the Directorate of Intelligence, which used internal experts to analyze data collected by the CIA, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the military collection organizations, and other parts of the intelligence community. Many of these reports were on current subjects, such as the status of a revolutionary group, or the technical details of a new Chinese factory.

Another function, however, was preparing "estimates", which try to predict the future. Estimates are a product of the intelligence community as a whole. National Intelligence Estimates were the most extensively coordinated documents, often that could be scheduled on a regular basis, such as a regular report on Soviet intentions. Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIE) were quick-response publications, often providing guidance in a crisis, but were still interagency consensus rather than CIA alone.

CIA had a separate and prestigious office, going by different names and organizations, such as the Office of National Estimates, Board of National Estimates, or a set of National Intelligence Officers, which would seek out the consensus of all the intelligence agencies, and then have some of the most senior analysts write a draft. The idea of such estimates is often credited to Sherman Kent,sometimes called the father of US intelligence analysis, with special emphasis on the production of estimates.^[21]This function is now in the National Intelligence Council of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.^[22] Originally defined in 1950, this responsibility stated "CIA is now in the business of producing what are called National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) along the lines laid down in NSC 50. These papers are interdepartmental in character, designed to focus all available intelligence on a problem of importance to the national security." In the early days of the process, CIA used the State Department's intelligence staff for drafting the NIEs, but a "small top level Office of National Estimates" was set up to integrate the departmental drafts. A senior CIA analyst responsible for the document would work out differences. There is also a process by which an agency can disagree with a comment called a "reclama", which is a footnote expressing an alternate position. For an example of such dissents, see Special National Intelligence Estimate 10-9-65 in CIA activities in Asia and the Pacific#Vietnam 1965: Viet Cong and DRV Reactions, where there are dissents to various parts from all or part of the military, and from the Department of State.

Upon approval by an interagency review committee, the paper becomes a NIE and is sent by the Director of Central Intelligence to the President, appropriate officers of Cabinet level, and the NSC.^[23]

[edit] Directorate of Intelligence

The "DI" is the analytical branch of the CIA, responsible for the production and dissemination of all-source analysis intelligence analysis on key foreign issues.^[24]. While it has, like most government agencies, reorganized over the years, its current structure has four regional analytic groups, six groups for transnational issues, and two support units.^[25] Prior to the formation of the office of the Director of National Intelligence, the President's Daily Brief was prepared by the CIA Office of Current Intelligence.

Some open source intelligence OSINT, such as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, were, at different times, part of the Directorate of Intelligence or the Directorate of Science & Technology. Along with other OSINT functions, the National Open Source Enterprise is now in the ODNI.

[edit] Regional groups

There is an Office dedicated to Iraq. In addition, there are regional analytical Offices covering:

• Near East, North Africa and South Asia: The Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis (NESA)
• Russia and Europe: The Office of Russian and European Analysis (OREA)
• Asian-Pacific, Latin America, and Africa: The Office of East Asian, Pacific, Latin American and African Analysis (APLAA)

[edit] Transnational groups

The Office of Terrorism Analysis,^[26] which supports the National Counterterrorism Center, in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

The Office of Transnational Issues^[27] applies unique functional expertise to assess existing and emerging threats to US national security and provides the most senior US policymakers, military planners, and law enforcement with analysis, warning, and crisis support.

The CIA Crime and Narcotics Center^[28] researches information on international narcotics trafficking and organized crime for policymakers and the law enforcement community. Since the CIA has no domestic police authority, it sends its analytic information to the FBI and other law enforcement organizations, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

The Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center^[29] provides intelligence support deals with national and non-national threats, as well as supporting threat reduction/arms control. This works with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

Again cooperating with the FBI for domestic activity, the Counterintelligence Center Analysis Group^[30] identifies, monitors, and analyzes the efforts of foreign intelligence entities, both national and non-national, against US interests.

The Information Operations Center Analysis Group^[31] evaluates foreign threats to US computer systems, particularly those that support critical infrastructures. It works with critical infrastructure protection organizations in the United States Department of Defense (e.g., CERT Coordination Center) and the Department of Homeland Security (e.g., United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team)

[edit] Support and general units

The Office of Collection Strategies and Analysis provides comprehensive intelligence collection expertise to the DI, a wide range of senior Agency and Intelligence Community officials, and key national policymakers.

The Office of Policy Support customizes DI analysis and presents it to a wide variety of policy, law enforcement, military, and foreign liaison recipients.

[edit] National Clandestine Service

Main article: National Clandestine Service

The National Clandestine Service, a semi-independent service which was formerly the Directorate of Operations, is responsible for collection of foreign intelligence, principally from clandestine HUMINT sources, and covert action. The new name reflects its having absorbed the Defense HUMINT Service, which did strategic human intelligence HUMINT collection for the Department of Defense (DoD). HUMINT directly related to military missions remains under the DoD. Note that there is an open source function in the office of the Director of National Intelligence, which may be taking over certain legal interviews in the US that previously were the Domestic Contact Division (or Domestic Contact Service).

While the NCS organization chart has not been published, although there have been prior descriptions of the Directorate of Plans or the Directorate of Operations, a fairly recent organization chart of the Defense HUMINT Service will indicate functions transferred into the NCS, and may well be fairly close to the overall NCS organizational structure.^[32]

There are references to earlier structures in various historical documents. For example, in a CIA paper on the internal probe into the Bay of Pigs,^[33] there are several comments on the Directorate of Plans organizational structure in 1962. Even though any large organization will constantly reorganize, the basic functions will stay and can be a clue to future organization.

At the top level, Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell had two Assistant Deputy Directors, C. Tracy Barnes and Richard Helms. Warner explains "operational details fell to Branch 4 (Cuba) of the DDP's Western Hemisphere Division (WH)", with some exceptions. Jacob Esterline, chief of the Cuba Branch, reported directly to Bissell and Barnes rather than to his division chief, J.C. King "although King was regularly informed and often consulted. To confuse matters still further, Branch 4 had no direct control over the Brigade's aircraft, which were managed by a separate DDP division that also took some orders directly from Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) Charles P. Cabell, a US Air Force general who liked to keep his hand in the planning of airdrops and other missions," Air operations, therefore, were in a separate division either for covert support, paramilitary operations, or both.

Cuba Branch had a "Foreign Intelligence Section," foreign intelligence being a term of art for HUMINT. The branch, however, established "a separate "G-2" unit subordinate to its Paramilitary Section, which planned the actual invasion. This gives us the model of a geographic branch with subordinate sections, at least, for intelligence collection and paramilitary actions.

Warner's paper also mentions that certain DDP groups were outside the scope of the post-mortem by Executive Director Lyman Kirkpatrick, but their mention tells us that these were representative components of the DDP: "... the Havana station or the Santiago base, the development of foreign intelligence assets and liaison contacts, Division D's technical collection programs, or counter-intelligence work against the Cuban services." CIA "stations" are the parts of the embassy with officers under diplomatic cover, in a typical diplomatic office building. "Bases", however, are large facilities for supporting operations, typically with an airfield, secure warehouses, barracks and training areas. Division D was the joint CIA-NSA collection effort, where CIA would use clandestine operations personnel to emplace NSA SIGINT sensors. The reference to counter-intelligence work appears to refer to a main counterintelligence division, presumably the Counterintelligence Staff under James Jesus Angleton.

[edit] Directorate of Science and Technology

Main article: Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Science & Technology

The Directorate of Science & Technology creates and applies innovative technology in support of the intelligence collection mission.^[34] The CIA has always shown a strong interest in how to use advances in technology to enhance its effectiveness. This interest in modern technology came from two main aims: firstly, to harness these techniques its own use, and second to counter any new technologies the Soviets might develop. This effort gained impetus in fifties with the launch of the Sputnik satellite by the USSR. The agency was also extremely interested in computer and information technology. In 1999, CIA created the venture capital firm In-Q-Tel to help fund and develop technologies of interest to the agency.^[35][36][37]

Its website mentions its priorities being in:

• Application Software and Analytics
• Bio, Nuclear, and Chemical Technologies
• Communications and Infrastructure
• Digital Identity and Security
• Embedded Systems and Power^[38]

In January 2008, its featured collaboration was with Streambase Systems,^[39] makers of a "high-performance Complex Event Processing (CEP) software platform for real-time and historical analysis of high-volume intelligence data," using a new processing paradigm for Structured Query Language (SQL), allowing queries against multiple real-time data streams still updating the data base.

[edit] Directorate of Support

The Directorate of Support provides necessary "housekeeping" administration functions, but in a manner consistent with the need to keep their details protected. These functions include personnel, security, communications, and financial operations. Most of this Directorate is sub-structured into smaller offices based on role and purpose, such as the CIA Office of Security, which is concerned both with personnel and physical security. Other major offices include the CIA Office of Communications and the Office of Information Technology.

[edit] Logistics and proprietaries

Under the original NSC 10/2 authorization, CIA was made responsible not just for covert action during the cold war, but for such action during major wars, in collaboration with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When DCI Smith created the Directorate of Plans and ended the autonomy of the OPC and OSO, he recognized it was necessary to establish logistical support for these operations before the start of a hot war. Smith did not want to duplicate existing military support systems, and proposed, in 1952, that the CIA should be able to draw, on a reimbursable basis, on military supply stocks. In many respects, this was the beginning of the idea that what was to become the Directorate of Support had a far wider scope than the OSS and initial CIA term, Directorate of Administration.

Smith presented the concept that the CIA would need a worldwide system of support bases, which usually could be tenant organizations on military bases. According to Smith's memo,

A major logistical support base will consist of a CIA base headquarters, training, communications, medical accommodation for evacuees and storage for six months’ hot war requirements as well as provide logistical support for CIA operational groups or headquarters... Informal planning along the lines indicated has been carried out by elements of CIA with ... the Joint Chiefs of Staff ...

The CIA was expected to reimburse "extraordinary expenses" incurred by the military services.^[40]

While military transportation might be appropriate for some purposes, there would be cases where the arrival of a military aircraft at a location other than a military base might draw undue attention. This was the origin of the idea of the CIA operating proprietary airlines, whose relationship to the US government would not be public.^[41] Among these organizations were airlines that provided covert logistical support, such as Civil Air Transport, Southern Air Transport, and consolidated them into Air America. The latter was heavily involved in support with the war in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in the 1960s.

[edit] Training

This directorate includes the Office of Training, which starts with a Junior Officer Training program for new employees. So that the initial course might be taken by employees who had not received final security clearance and thus was not permitted unescorted access to the Headquarters building, a good deal of basic training has been given at office buildings in the urban areas of Arlington, Virginia.

It is known, although not acknowledged by the U.S. Government, that the CIA runs at least two operations training facilities.^[42] One is known as The Farm, at Camp Peary, Virginia. The other is known as The Point at Harvey Point, North Carolina. While the course outline has never been revealed, it is believed to include such things as surveillance, countersurveillance, cryptography, paramilitary training as well as other tradecraft. The course seems to be about less than a year and runs at irregular intervals depending on circumstances. Operations training is delivered by experienced operations officers.

Student progress is monitored by experienced evaluators that meets to discuss a recruit's progress and has the power to dismiss a recruit even before his or her training is complete. Evaluation techniques for the CIA's World War II predecessor, the OSS, were published as the book Assessment of Men, Selection of Personnel for the office of Strategic Services. ^[43] See Roger Hall's You're Stepping on my Cloak and Dagger for an accurate but amusing account of Hall's OSS duty, which included finding unexpected solutions to things in the assessment process as well as his experience in real operations. ^[44] He described a specific assessment period at a rural facility called "Station S". Hall said he tried to find out why it was called Station S, and finally decided the reason was that "assess" has more "S" letters than any other.

Psychological stress is part of operations training, but of a different type than military special operations force evaluation, such as the Navy SEAL Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL course or Army Special Forces Assessment and Selection. For instance, an operations training officer will often lie to a recruit saying they have evidence that will result in the recruit to be arrested and tried for felony crimes. This is a test of the recruit's ability to maintain a cover under stress.

Contrary to popular belief or what is seen in film and television series, American-born, professional employees trained to work for the National Clandestine Service (CIA) are never referred to as "secret agents", "spies", "agents" or "special agents", they are known as 'Operations Officers' or 'Case Officers', or Officer for short. To highlight this point: within the intelligence community, the equivalent of an FBI Special Agent is a CIA Officer. Within the law enforcement community, the equivalent of a CIA 'agent' is an FBI informant. There does not exist any working title or job position known as 'CIA Agent', agents of the CIA are usually always foreigners who choose to betray their own country by passing along secret information to our government through our CIA Case Officers, who are posted at U.S. embassies worldwide.^[45]

These CIA Case Officers recruit foreign agents, known as 'assets', to give information to the CIA. There are a wide range of motivations for a person to become an asset; see CIA Case Officers are normally sent abroad under a cover identity, most commonly as a diplomat but sometimes under "nonofficial cover" using an assumed identity and having no immunity. ^[45]

[edit] Other offices

[edit] General Publications

One of the CIA's best-known publications, The World Factbook, is in the public domain and is made freely available without copyright restrictions because it is a work of the United States federal government.^[46]

CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence maintains the Agency's historical materials and promotes the study of intelligence as a legitimate and serious discipline.^[47] The CIA since 1955 has published an in-house professional journal known as Studies in Intelligence that addresses historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of the intelligence profession. The Center also publishes unclassified and declassified Studies articles, as well as other books and monographs.^[48] A further annotated collection of Studies articles was published through Yale University Press under the title Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992.^[49]

In 2002, CIA's Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis began publishing the unclassified Kent Center Occasional Papers, aiming to offer "an opportunity for intelligence professionals and interested colleagues—in an unofficial and unfettered vehicle—to debate and advance the theory and practice of intelligence analysis."^[50]

[edit] General Counsel and Inspector General

Two offices advise the Director on legality and proper operations. The Office of the General Counsel advises the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency on all legal matters relating to his role as CIA director and is the principal source of legal counsel for the CIA.^[51]

The Office of Inspector General promotes efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability in the administration of Agency activities. OIG also seeks to prevent and detect fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. The Inspector General is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Inspector General, whose activities are independent of those of any other component in the Agency, reports directly to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. OIG conducts inspections, investigations, and audits at Headquarters and in the field, and oversees the Agency-wide grievance-handling system. The OIG provides a semiannual report to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency which the Director is required by law to submit to the Intelligence Committees of Congress within 30 days.

In February 2008, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Michael V. Hayden, sent a message to employees that Inspector General John L. Helgerson will accept increased control over the investigations by that office, saying "John has chosen to take a number of steps to heighten the efficiency, assure the quality and increase the transparency of the investigation process".^[52] The Washington Post suggested this was a response to senior officials who believe the OIG has been too aggressive in looking into counterterrorism programs, including detention programs. The changes were the result of an investigation, begun in April 2007, by one of Hayden's assistants, Robert L. Deitz. ^[53] There was congressional concern that restrictions on the OIG might have a chilling effect on its effectiveness. Senator Ron Wyden , a Democratic member of the Intelligence Committee, did not disagree with any of Hayden's actions, said the inquiry “should never have happened and can’t be allowed to happen again.”...“I’m all for the inspector general taking steps that help C.I.A. employees understand his processes, but that can be done without an approach that can threaten the inspector general’s independence

[edit] Public Affairs

The Office of Public Affairs advises the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency on all media, public policy, and employee communications issues relating to his role as CIA director and is the CIA’s principal communications focal point for the media, the general public and Agency employees.^[54] See CIA influence on public opinion.

[edit] Relationship with other sources of intelligence

The CIA acts as the primary American HUMINT and general analytic agency, under the Director of National Intelligence, who directs or coordinates the 16 member organizations of the United States Intelligence Community. It obtains information from other U.S. government intelligence agencies, commercial information sources, and foreign intelligence services.

[edit] Other U.S. intelligence agencies

A number of those organizations are fully or partially under the budgetary control of the United States Secretary of Defense or other cabinet officers such as the Attorney General of the United States.

As do other analytic members of the U.S. intelligence community such as the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the analytic division of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), its raw input includes imagery intelligence IMINT collected by air and space systems of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) processed by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), signal intelligence SIGINT of the National Security Agency (NSA), and measurement and signature intelligence MASINT from the DIA MASINT center.

[edit] Open Source Intelligence

Until the 2004 reorganization of the intelligence community, one of the "services of common concern" that CIA provided was OSINT from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). FBIS, which had absorbed the Joint Publication Research Service, a military organization that translated documents,^[55] which moved into the National Open Source Enterprise under the Director of National Intelligence.

CIA still provides a variety of unclassified maps and reference documents both to the intelligence community and the public.^[56]

As part of its mandate to gather intelligence, CIA is looking increasingly online for information, and has become a major consumer of social media. "We're looking at YouTube, which carries some unique and honest-to-goodness intelligence," said Doug Naquin, director of the DNI Open Source Center (OSC) at CIA. "We're looking at chat rooms and things that didn't exist five years ago, and trying to stay ahead."^[57]

[edit] Outsourcing

In a trend some find disturbing, many of duties and functions of Intelligence Community activities, not the CIA alone, are being "outsourced" and "privatized." Mike McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, was about to publicize an investigation report of outsourcing by U.S. intelligence agencies, as required by Congress.^[58] However, this report was then classified.^[59][60] Hillhouse speculates that this report includes requirements for the CIA to report:^[59][61]

• different standards for government employees and contractors;
• contractors providing similar services to government workers;
• analysis of costs of contractors vs. employees;
• an assessment of the appropriateness of outsourced activities;
• an estimate of the number of contracts and contractors;
• comparison of compensation for contractors and government employees,
• attrition analysis of government employees;
• descriptions of positions to be converted back to the employee model;
• an evaluation of accountability mechanisms;
• an evaluation of procedures for "conducting oversight of contractors to ensure identification and prosecution of criminal violations, financial waste, fraud, or other abuses committed by contractors or contract personnel; and
• an "identification of best practices of accountability mechanisms within service contracts."

Congress has required an outsourcing report by March 30, 2008.^[61]

The Director of National Intelligence has been granted the authority to increase the number of positions (FTEs) on elements in the Intelligence Community by up to 10% should there be a determination that activities performed by a contractor should be done by a US government employee.

Part of the contracting problem comes from Congressional restrictions on the number of employees in the IC. According to Hillhouse, this resulted in0% of the de facto workforce of the CIA's National Clandestine Service being made up of contractors. "After years of contributing to the increasing reliance upon contractors, Congress is now providing a framework for the conversion of contractors into federal government employees--more or less."^[61]

As with most government agencies, building equipment often is contracted. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), responsible for the development and operation of airborne and spaceborne sensors, long was a joint operation of the CIA and the United States Department of Defense. NRO had been significantly involved in the design of such sensors, but the NRO, then under DCI authority, contracted more of the design that had been their tradition, and to a contractor without extensive reconnaissance experience, Boeing.

The next-generation satellite Future Imagery Architecture project, which missed objectives after $4 billion in cost overruns, was the result of this contract.^[62];^[63]

Some of the cost problems associated with intelligence come from one agency, or even a group within an agency, not accepting the compartmented security practices for individual projects, requiring expensive duplication.^[64]

[edit] Foreign intelligence services

Many intelligence services cooperate. There may even be a deniable communications channel with ostensibly hostile nations.

The role and functions of the CIA are roughly equivalent to those of the United Kingdom's Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki) (SVR) and Israel's Mossad. While the preceding agencies both collect and analyze information, some like the US State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research are purely analytical agencies. See List of intelligence agencies.

The closest links of the US IC to other foreign intelligence agencies are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. There is a special communications marking that signals that an intelligence-related messages can be shared with these four countries.^[65] An indication of the United States' close operational cooperation is the creation of a new message distribution label within the main US military communications network. Previously, the marking of NOFORN (i.e., NO FOREIGN NATIONALS) required the originator to specify which, if any, non-US countries could receive the information. A new handling caveat, USA/AUS/CAN/GBR/NZL EYES ONLY, used primarily on intelligence messages, gives an easier way to indicate that the material can be shared with Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and New Zealand.

[edit] Organizational history

The Central Intelligence Agency was created by Congress with National Security Act of 1947, signed into law by President Harry S. Truman. It is the descendant of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) of World War II, which was dissolved in October 1945 and its functions transferred to the State and War Departments. Eleven months earlier, in 1944, William J. Donovan, the OSS's creator, proposed to President Franklin D. Roosevelt creating a new organization directly supervised by the President: "which will procure intelligence both by overt and covert methods and will at the same time provide intelligence guidance, determine national intelligence objectives, and correlate the intelligence material collected by all government agencies."^[66] Under his plan, a powerful, centralized civilian agency would have coordinated all the intelligence services. He also proposed that this agency have authority to conduct "subversive operations abroad," but "no police or law enforcement functions, either at home or abroad."^[67]

CIA personnel have died on duty, some in accidents and some by deliberate hostile action. On the memorial wall at CIA headquarters, some of the stars have no name attached, because it would reveal the identity of a clandestine officer. ^[68]Both the OSS and its British counterparts, as do other agencies worldwide, struggle with finding the right organizational balance among clandestine intelligence collection, counterintelligence, and covert action. See Clandestine HUMINT and Covert Action for a historical perspective on this problem. These issues also bear on the reasons that, in the history below, some "eras" overlap. Also see the Wikipedia article Director of Central Intelligence, which contains an expanded history of CIA by director; the priorities and personalities of individual directors have had a strong influence on Agency operations.

[edit] Immediate predecessors, 1946-1947

The Office of Strategic Services, which was the first independent US intelligence agency, created for the Second World War, was broken up shortly after the end of the war, by President Truman, on September 20, 1945. The rapid reorganizations that followed reflected the routine sort of bureaucratic competition for resources, but also trying to deal with the proper relationships of clandestine intelligence collection and covert action (i.e., paramilitary and psychological operations). See Clandestine HUMINT and Covert Action for a more detailed history of this problem, which was not unique to the US during and after World War II. In October 1945, the functions of the OSS were split between the Departments of State and War:

New Unit	Oversight	OSS Functions Absorbed
Strategic Services Unit (SSU)	War Department	Secret Intelligence (SI) (i.e., clandestine intelligence collection) and Counter-espionage (X-2)
Interim Research and Intelligence Service (IRIS)	State Department	Research and Analysis Branch (i.e., intelligence analysis)
Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) (not uniquely for former OSS)	War Department, Army General Staff	Staff officers from Operational Groups, Operation Jedburgh, Morale Operations (black propaganda)

This division lasted only a few months.Despite opposition from the military establishment, the United States Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),^[66] President Truman established the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) in January 1946m which was the direct predecessor to the CIA.^[69] The CIG was an interim authority established under Presidential authority. The assets of the SSU, which now constituted a streamlined "nucleus" of clandestine intelligence was transferred to the CIG in mid-1946 and reconstituted as the Office of Special Operations (OSO).

[edit] Early CIA, 1947-1952

In September 1947, the National Security Act of 1947 established both the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency.^[70] Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter was appointed as the first Director of Central Intelligence.

The National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects, June 18, 1948 (NSC 10/2) further gave the CIA the authority to carry out covert operations "against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and conducted that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons."^[71]

In 1949, the Central Intelligence Agency Act (Public Law 81-110) authorized the agency to use confidential fiscal and administrative procedures, and exempting it from most of the usual limitations on the use of Federal funds. It also exempted the CIA from having to disclose its "organization, functions, officials, titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed." It also created the program "PL-110", to handle defectors and other "essential aliens" who fall outside normal immigration procedures, as well as giving those persons cover stories and economic support.^[72]

[edit] The structure stabilizes, 1952

Then-DCI Walter Bedell Smith, who enjoyed a special degree of Presidential trust, having been Dwight D. Eisenhower's primary Chief of Staff during World War II, insisted that the CIA -- or at least only one department -- had to direct the OPC and OSO. Those organization, as well as some minor functions, formed the euphemistically named Directorate of Plans in 1952.

Also in 1952, United States Army Special Forces were created, with some missions overlapping those of the Department of Plans. In general, the pattern emerged that the CIA could borrow resources from Special Forces, although it had its own special operators.

[edit] Early Cold War, 1953-1966

Allen Dulles, who had been a key OSS operations officer in Switzerland during the Second World War, took over from Smith, at a time where US policy was dominated by intense anticommunism. Various sources were involved, the most visible being the investigations and abuses of Senator Joseph McCarthy, and the more quiet but systematic containment doctrine developed by George Kennan, the Berlin Blockade and the Korean War. Dulles enjoyed a high degree of flexibility, as his brother, John Foster Dulles, was simultaneously Secretary of State. Concern regarding the Soviet Union and the difficulty of getting information from its closed society, which few agents could penetrate, led to solutions based on advanced technology. Among the first success was with the Lockheed U-2 aircraft, which could take pictures and collect electronic signals from an altitude above Soviet air defenses' reach.SR-71

During this period, there were numerous covert actions against perceived Communist expansion. Some of the largest operations were aimed at Cuba after the overthrow of the Batista government, including assassination attempts against Fidel Castro and the dubiously deniable Bay of Pigs Invasion. There have been suggestions that the Soviet attempt to put missiles into Cuba came, indirectly, when they realized how badly they had been compromised by a US-UK defector in place, Oleg Penkovsky.^[73]

The CIA, working with the military, formed the joint National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to operate reconnaissance aircraft such as the SR-71 and later satellites. "The fact of" the United States operating reconnaissance satellites, like "the fact of" the existence of NRO, was highly classified for many years.

[edit] Complications from Indochina and the Vietnam War (1954-1975)

As the US military and electorate were affected by Vietnam, so was the CIA. The OSS Patti mission had arrived near the end of the Second World War, and had significant interaction with the leaders of many Vietnamese factions, including Ho Chi Minh.^[74] While the Patti mission forwarded Ho's proposals for phased independence, with the French or even the United States as the transition partner, the US policy of containment opposed forming any government that might be Communist.

The first CIA mission to Indochina, under the code name Saigon Military Mission arrived in 1954, under Edward Lansdale. US-based analysts were simultaneously trying to project the evolution of political power, both if the scheduled referendum chose merger of the North and South, or if the South, the US client, stayed independent. Initially, the US focus in Southeast Asia was on Laos, not Vietnam.

During the period of American combat involvement in the Vietnam War, there was considerable arguments about progress among the Department of Defense under Robert S. McNamara, the CIA, and, to some extent, the intelligence staff of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam.^[75] In general, the military was consistently more optimistic than the CIA. Sam Adams, a junior CIA analyst with responsibilities for estimating the actual damage to the enemy, eventually resigned from the CIA, after expressing concern, to Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms with estimates that were changed for interagency and White House political reasons, writing the book War of Numbers.

[edit] Abuses of CIA authority, 1970s-1990s

Things came to a head in the early 1970s, around the time of the Watergate political burglary affair. A dominant feature of political life during that period were the attempts of Congress to assert oversight of U.S. Presidency, the executive branch of the U.S. Government. Revelations about past CIA activities, such as assassinations and attempted assassinations of foreign leaders, illegal domestic spying on U.S. citizens, provided the opportunities to execute Congressional oversight of U.S. intelligence operations. Hastening the Central Intelligence Agency's fall from grace were the burglary of the Watergate headquarters of the Democratic Party by ex-CIA agents, and President Richard Nixon's subsequent use of the CIA to impede the FBI's investigation of the burglary. In the famous "smoking gun" recording that led to President Nixon's resignation, Nixon ordered his chief of staff, H.R. Haldeman, to tell the CIA that further investigation of Watergate would "open the whole can of worms" about the Bay of Pigs of Cuba, and, therefore, that the CIA should tell the FBI to cease investigating the Watergate burglary, due to reasons of "national security".^[76]

In 1973, then-DCI James R. Schlesinger commissioned reports — known as the "Family Jewels" — on illegal activities by the Agency. In December 1974, Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh broke the news of the "Family Jewels" in a front-page article in The New York Times, revealing that the CIA had assassinated foreign leaders, and had conducted surveillance on some seven thousand American citizens involved in the antiwar movement (Operation CHAOS).

Congress responded to the disturbing charges in 1975, investigating the CIA in the Senate via the Church Committee, chaired by Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho), and in the House of Representatives via the Pike Committee, chaired by Congressman Otis Pike (D-NY). In addition, President Gerald Ford created the Rockefeller Commission, and issued an Executive Order prohibiting the assassination of foreign leaders.

Repercussions from the Iran-Contra Affair arms smuggling scandal included the creation of the Intelligence Authorization Act in 1991. It defined covert operations as secret missions in geopolitical areas where the U.S. is neither openly nor apparently engaged. This also required an authorizing chain of command, including an official, presidential finding report and the informing of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, which, in emergencies, requires only "timely notification".

[edit] 2004, DNI takes over CIA top-level functions

Previously, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) oversaw the Intelligence Community, serving as the president's principal intelligence advisor, additionally serving as head of the Central Intelligence Agency. The DCI's title now is "Director of the Central Intelligence Agency" (DCIA), serving as head of the CIA.

Currently, the Central Intelligence Agency reports to the Director of National Intelligence. Prior to the establishment of the DNI, the CIA reported to the President, with informational briefings to U.S. Congressional committees The National Security Advisor is a permanent member of the National Security Council, responsible for briefing the President with pertinent information collected by all U.S. intelligence agencies, including the National Security Agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration, et cetera; all sixteen Intelligence Community agencies are under the authority of the Director of National Intelligence.

[edit] Mission-related issues and controversies

The history of CIA deals with several things, certainly including covert action, but also clandestine and overt intelligence collection, intelligence analysis and reporting, and logistical and technical support of its activities. Prior to the December 2004 reorganization of the intelligence community (IC), it also was responsible for coordinations of IC-wide intelligence estimates.

These articles are organized in two different ways: By geographical region (for state actors or non-state actors limited to a country or region) and by transnational topic (for non-state actors).

CIA operations by region, country and date are discussed in detail in the following Wikipedia articles:

• CIA activities in the Americas
• CIA activities in Africa
• CIA activities in Asia and the Pacific
• CIA activities in the Near East, North Africa, South and Southwest Asia
• CIA activities in Russia and Europe

CIA analyses of issues such as the effect of emerging diseases, and the detection of WMDs, are inherently transnational, and are discussed in the following articles. CIA operations and, where appropriate, authorizations for covert operations (for example, NSDD 138 authorizing direct action against terrorists) by transnational topic are discussed in the following Wikipedia articles:

• CIA transnational anti-terrorism activities
• CIA transnational activities in counterproliferation
• CIA transnational anti-crime and anti-drug activities
• CIA transnational health and economic activities
• CIA transnational human rights actions

In addition, a view of covert US activity specifically oriented towards regime change actions is given in the following Wikipedia article:

• Covert U.S. regime change actions

Major sources for this section include the Council on Foreign Relations of the United States series, the National Security Archive and George Washington University, the Freedom of Information Act Reading Room at the CIA, U.S. Congressional hearings, Blum's book^[77] and Weiner's book^[78] Note that the CIA has posted a rebuttal to Weiner's book.^[79]

Areas of controversy about inappropriate, often illegal actions include experiments, without consent, on human beings to explore chemical means of eliciting information or disabling people. Another area involved torture and clandestine imprisonment. There have been attempted assassinations under CIA orders and support for assassinations of foreign leaders by citizens of the leader's country, and, in a somewhat different legal category that may fall under the customary laws of war, targeted killing of terrorist leaders.

[edit] Security and counterintelligence failures

While the names change periodically, there are two basic security functions to protect the CIA and its operations. There is an Office of Security in the Directorate for Support, which is responsible for physical security of the CIA buildings, secure storage of information, and personnel security clearances. These are directed inwardly to the agency itself.

In what is now the National Clandestine Service, there is a counter-intelligence function, called the Counterintelligence Staff under its most controversial chief, James Jesus Angleton. This function has roles including looking for staff members that are providing information to foreign intelligence services (FIS) as moles. Another role is to check proposals for recruiting foreign HUMINT assets, to see if these people have any known ties to FIS and thus may be attempts to penetrate CIA to learn its personnel and practices, or as a provocateur, or other form of double agent.

This agency component may also launch offensive counterespionage, where it attempts to interfere with FIS operations. CIA officers in the field often have assignments in offensive counterespionage as well as clandestine intelligence collection.

[edit] Security failures

In 1993, the headquarters of the CIA was attacked by Mir Aimal Kansi, a Pakistani national. Two CIA employees were killed, Frank Darling and Lansing Bennett, M.D.

The "Family Jewels" and other documents reveal that the Office of Security violated the prohibition of CIA involvement in domestic law enforcement, sometimes with the intention of assisting police organizations local to CIA buildings.

[edit] Counterintelligence failures

Perhaps the most disruptive period involving counterintelligence was James Jesus Angleton's search for a mole,^[80]based on the statements of a Soviet defector, Anatoliy Golitsyn. A second defector, Yuri Nosenko, challenged Golitsyn's claims, with the two calling one another Soviet double agents.^[81] Many CIA officers fell under career-ending suspicion; the details of the relative truths and untruths from Nosenko and Golitsyn may never be released, or, in fact, may not be fully understood. The accusations also crossed the Atlantic to the British intelligence services, who also were damaged by molehunts.^[82]

On February 24, 1994, the agency was rocked by the arrest of 31-year veteran case officer Aldrich Ames on charges of spying for the Soviet Union since 1985.^[83]

Other defectors have included Edward Lee Howard, a field operations officer, and William Kampiles, a low-level worker in the CIA 24-hour Operations Center. Kampiles sold the Soviets the detailed operational manual for the KH-11 reconnaissance satellite.^[84]

[edit] Failures in intelligence analysis

The agency has also been criticized for ineffectiveness as an intelligence gathering agency. Former DCI Richard Helms commented, after the end of the Cold War, "The only remaining superpower doesn't have enough interest in what's going on in the world to organize and run an espionage service."^[85] The CIA has come under particular criticism for failing to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union.

See the information technology section of the intelligence analysis management for discussion of possible failures to provide adequate automation support to analysts, and US intelligence community A-Space for a IC-wide program to collect some of them. Cognitive traps for intelligence analysis also goes into areas where CIA has examined why analysis can fail.

Agency veterans have lamented CIA's inability to produce the kind of long-range strategic intelligence that it once did in order to guide policymakers. John McLaughlin, who was deputy director and acting director of central intelligence from October 2000 to September 2004, said that drowned by demands from the White House and Pentagon for instant information, "intelligence analysts end up being the Wikipedia of Washington."^[86]In the intelligence analysis article, orienting oneself to the consumers deals with some of ways in which intelligence can become more responsive to the needs of policymakers.

For the media, the failures are most newsworthy. A number of declassified National Intelligence Estimates do predict the behavior of various countries, but not in a manner attractive to news, or, most significantly, not public at the time of the event. In its operational role, some successes for the CIA include the U-2 and SR-71 programs, and anti-Soviet operations in Afghanistan in the mid-1980s.

Among the first analytic failures, before the CIA had its own collection capabilities, it assured President Harry S Truman on October 13, 1950 that the Chinese would not send troops to Korea. Six days later, over one million Chinese troops arrived.^[87] See an analysis of the failure; also see surrounding text for the two Koreas and China, and the time period before the Korean War. Earlier, the intelligence community failed to detect the North Korean invasion, in part because resources were not allocated to SIGINT coverage of the Korean peninsula.

The history of US intelligence, with respect to French Indochina and then the two Vietnams, is long and complex. The Pentagon Papers often contain pessimistic CIA analyses that conflicted with White House positions. It does appear that some estimates were changed to reflect Pentagon and White House views.^[75]. See CIA activities in Asia and the Pacific for detailed discussions of intelligence and covert operations from 1945 (i.e., before the CIA) onwards.

Another criticism is the failure to predict India's nuclear tests in 1974. A review of the various analyses of India's nuclear program did predict some aspects of the test, such as a 1965 report saying, correctly, that if India did develop a bomb, it would be explained as "for peaceful purposes".

A major criticism is failure to forestall the September 11, 2001 attacks. The 9/11 Commission Report identifies failures in the IC as a whole. One problem, for example, was the FBI failing to "connect the dots" by sharing information among its decentralized field offices. The report, however, criticizes both CIA analysis, and impeding their investigation.

The executive summary of a report which was released by the office of CIA Inspector General John Helgerson on August 21, 2007 concluded that former DCI George Tenet failed to adequately prepare the agency to deal with the danger posed by Al Qaeda prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The report had been completed in June, 2005 and was partially released to the public in an agreement with Congress, over the objections of current DCI General Michael V. Hayden. Hayden said its publication would "consume time and attention revisiting ground that is already well plowed.”^[88] Tenet disagreed with the report's conclusions, citing his planning efforts vis-a-vis al-Qaeda, particularly from 1999.^[89]

[edit] Internal/presidential studies, external investigations and document releases

Several investigations (e.g., Church Committee, Rockefeller Commission, Pike Committee), as well as released declassified documents, reveal that the CIA, at times, operated outside its charter. In some cases, such as during Watergate, this may have been due to inappropriate requests by White House staff. In other cases, there was a violation of Congressional intent, such as the Iran-Contra affair.

[edit] 1949 Eberstadt Report (First Hoover Commission)

The first major analysis, following the National Security Act of 1947, was chaired by former President Herbert Hoover, with a Task Force on National Security Organization under Ferdinand Eberstadt, one of the drafters of the National Security Act and a believer in centralized intelligence.

The task force concluded that the system of the day led to an adversarial relationship, with little effective coordination, among the CIA, the military, and the State Department. "In the opinion of the task force, this produced duplication on one hand, and, on the other, departmental intelligence estimates that "have often been subjective and biased." In large measure, the military and State Department were blamed for their failure to consult and share pertinent information with the CIA. The task force recommended "that positive efforts be made to foster relations of mutual confidence between the [CIA] and the several departments and agencies that it serves."

This report stressed that the CIA "must be the central organization of the national intelligence system." It recommended a "...top echelon [of] an evaluation board or section composed of competent and experienced personnel who would have no administrative responsibilities and whose duties would be confined solely to intelligence evaluation." It also favored a civilian DCI with a long term in office.

"In the arena of covert operations and clandestine intelligence, the Eberstadt Report supported the integration of all clandestine operations into one office within CIA, under NSC supervision. To alleviate concerns expressed by the military who viewed this proposal as encroaching upon their prerogatives, the report stated that clandestine operations should be the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in time of war."

The report declared that the failure to appraise scientific advances (e.g., biological and chemical warfare, electronics, aerodynamics, guided missiles, atomic weapons, and nuclear energy) in hostile countries might have more immediate and catastrophic consequences than failure in any other field of intelligence. It urged the US to develop a centralized capability for tracking these developments.

[edit] 1949 Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report

The Eberstadt report was soon eclipsed by what may have been the most influential policy paper. "On January 8, 1948, the National Security Council established the Intelligence Survey Group (ISG) to "evaluate the CIA's effort and its relationship with other agencies."^[90]The Jackson-Dulles-Correa report held an opposite view on clandestine collection to the Eberstadt Report, interesting in that Dulles was a clandestine collection specialist.

Like the Hoover Commission, this group was chartered at the request of President Truman, and was made up of Allen W. Dulles, who had served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during the Second World War and would become DCI in 1953, William Jackson, a future Deputy DCI, and Matthias Correa, a former assistant to Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal when the latter had served as Secretary of the Navy during the war. Chaired by Dulles, the ISG presented its findings, known as the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, to the National Security Council on January 1, 1949. Partially declassified in 1976, it "contained fifty-six recommendations, many highly critical of the CIA and DCI. In particular, the report revealed problems in the agency's execution of both its intelligence and operational missions. It also criticized the quality of national intelligence estimates by highlighting the CIA's--and, by implication, the DCI's--"failure to take charge of the production of coordinated national estimates." The report went on to argue that the CIA's current trend in clandestine intelligence activities should be reversed in favor of its mandated role as coordinator of intelligence." It was "particularly concerned about the personnel situation at CIA, including internal security, the high turnover of employees, and the excessive number of military personnel assigned to the agency." See the continuing concern about personnel in the 1954 Doolittle Report To add "continuity of service" and the "greatest assurance of independence of action," the report argued that the DCI should be a civilian and that military appointees be required to resign their commissions.

As with the Eberstadt Report, the Dulles Report also expressed concern about the inadequacies in scientific intelligence and the professionalism of the service intelligence organizations, and urged that the CIA provide greater coordination. This led to a recommendation for increased coordination between the DCI and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the arena of counterespionage. In turn, the report recommended that the Director of FBI be elevated to membership in the committee to help the DCI coordinate intelligence and set intelligence requirements.

The report proposed a large-scale reorganization of CIA. Even though it emphasized intelligence analysis and coordination over operations, it

"suggested incorporating covert operations and clandestine intelligence into one office within CIA. ... the Office of Special Operations (OSO), responsible for the clandestine collection of intelligence, and the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), responsible for covert actions, be integrated into a single division within CIA. [It] recommended replacing existing offices with four new divisions for coordination, estimates, research and reports, and operations."

The heads of the new offices would be included in the immediate staff of the DCI so that he would have "intimate contact with the day-to-day operations of his agency and be able to give policy guidance to them." These recommendations would become the start of the model for the future organization and operation of the present-day CIA. Until the DNI creation, estimates were in a separate office reporting to the DCI, coordination was a job of the DDCI (later assisted by the Intelligence Community Staff), research and reports became the Directorate of Intelligence, and operations was first, euphemistically, called the Directorate of Plans. Directorates for Support (originally called Administration), and Science & Technology, were also created.

[edit] 1954 Doolittle Report on Covert Activities

Gen. James Doolittle did an extensive report on covert actions, specifically for President Dwight D. Eisenhower.^[91]

The report's first recommendation dealt with personnel. It recommended releasing a large number of current staff that could never be more than mediocre, aggressively recruit new staff with an overall goal of increasing the workforce, and intensify training, with 10% of the covert staff time spent in training. The Director should be nonpolitical.

Security was the next concern, starting with a drive to reduce interim and provisional security clearances. The report strongly endorsed use of the polygraph both for initial recruits and existing staff. Counterespionage needed to be strengthened, and field stations needed both to report on their staff and periodically be inspected. Consolidating the Washington workforce, which was scattered among buildings, into one or a few main buildings was seen as a way of improving the security of classified information.

Coordination in the intelligence community was seen as a problem, especially agreeing on clear understandings between CIA and military intelligence organizations. The overall IC program for eliciting information from defectors needed improvement, with contributions from multiple agencies.

As far as organization and management, the report described the structure of the Directorate of Plans (i.e., the clandestine service) as too complex and in need of simplification. The Inspector General needed an agency-wide mandate. The role of the Operations Coordinating Board, the covert and clandestine oversight staff of the National Security Council needed to be strengthened, with operations clearly approved and guided from the highest levels of government.

The report addressed the classic problem of increasing performance while reducing costs. This meant better review of the budgets of covert and clandestine activities by a Review Board, except for the most sensitive operations. It meant providing the Comptroller with enough information, even if sanitized, to do a thorough job.

[edit] 1956 Bruce-Lovett Report

Soon after President Dwight D. Eisenhower created the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Actitivites, that Board requested that Robert A. Lovett and David K.E. Bruce examine CIA's covert operations.^[92]. This information comes from Arthur Schlesinger's book about Robert F. Kennedy, cited by cryptome.org. ""Bruce was very much disturbed," Lovett told the Cuba board of inquiry in 1961. "He approached it from the standpoint of 'what right have we to go barging into other countries buying newspapers and handing money to opposition parties or supporting a candidate for this, that or the other office?' He felt this was an outrageous interference with friendly countries. . . . He got me alarmed, so instead of completing the report in thirty days we took two months or more.""

"The 1956 report, written in Bruce's spirited style, condemned

the increased mingling in the internal affairs of other nations of bright, highly graded young men who must be doing something all the time to justify their reason for being.... Busy, moneyed, and privileged [the CIA] likes its "King Making" responsibili9ty (the intrigue is fascinating -- considerable self-satisfaction, sometimes with applause, derives from "successes" -- no charge is made for "failures" -- and the whole business is very much simpler than collecting covert intellignece on the USSR through the usual CIA methods!).

According to cryptome's account of the Schlesinger book, "Bruce and Lovett could discover no reliable system of control. "there are always, of course, on record the twin, well-born purpose of 'frustrating the Soviets' and keeping others 'pro-western' oriented. Under these almost any [covert] action can be and is being justified.... Once having been conceived, the final approval given to any project (at informal lunch meetins of the OCB [Operations Coordinating Board] inner group) can, at best, be described as pro forma." One consequence was that "no one, other than those in the CIA immediately concerned with their day to day operation, has any detailed knowledge of what is going on." With "a horde of CIA representatives" swarming around the planet, CIA covert action was exerting "signficant, almost unilateral influences... on the actual formulation of our foreign policies... sometimes completely unknown" to the local American ambassador." Bruce and Lovett concluded with an plea about taking control of covert operations and their consequences:

Should not someone, somewhere in an authoritative position in our government, on a continuing basis, be... calculating... the long-range wisdom of activities which have entailed a virtual abandonment of the international "golden rule," and which, if successful to the degree claimed for them, are responsible in a great measure for stirring up the turmoitl and raising the doubts about us that exist in many countries of the world today?... Where will we be tomorrow? | "Bruce was very much disturbed," Lovett told the Cuba board of inquiry in 1961. "He approached it from the standpoint of 'what right have we to go barging into other countries buying newspapers and handing money to opposition parties or supporting a candidate for this, that or the other office?' He felt this was an outrageous interference with friendly countries....

The CIA itself would like more detail on this report, a copy of which could not be found, in 1995, by the Agency's History Staff.^[93] Referring to reports such as the Dulles-Jackson-Correa, Doolittle, Pike, Church, and Rockefeller reports, the Staff "recently ran across a reference to another item, the so-called "Bruce-Lovett" report, that it would very much like to read--if we could find it! The report is mentioned in Peter Grose's recent biography Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles. According to Grose, [Bruce and Lovett] prepared a report for President Dwight Eisenhower in the fall of 1956 that criticized CIA's alleged fascination with "kingmaking" in the Third World and complained that a "horde of CIA representatives" was mounting foreign political intrigues at the expense of gathering hard intelligence on the Soviet Union.

The History Staff checked the CIA files on the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA). They checked with the Eisenhower Library. They checked with the National Archives, which holds the PBCFIA records. They checked with the Virginia Historical Society, the custodian of David Bruce's papers. None had a copy.

"Having reached a dead end, we consulted the author of the Dulles biography, Peter Grose. Grose told us that he had not seen the report itself but had used notes made from it by historian Arthur M. Schlesinger for Robert F. Kennedy and His Times (1978). Professor Schlesinger informed us that that he had seen the report in Robert Kennedy's papers before they were deposited at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston. He had loaned Grose his notes and does not have a copy of these notes or of the report itself.

"This raises an interesting question: how did a report on the CIA written for President Eisenhower in 1956 end up in the RFK papers? We think we have the answer. Robert Lovett was asked to testify before Gen. Maxwell Taylor's board of inquiry on the 1961 Bay of Pigs operation. Robert Kennedy was on that board and may have asked Lovett for a copy of the report. But we do not have the answer to another question: where is the "Bruce-Lovett" report? The JFK Presidential Library has searched the RFK papers without success. Surely the report will turn up some day, even if one government agency and four separate archives so far haven't been able to find it. But this episode helps to prove one of the few Iron Laws of History: the official who keeps the best records gets to tell the story."

[edit] 1975 investigations

The 1975 United States President's Commission on CIA activities within the United States, better known as the Rockefeller Commission investigated questionable practices including assassination attempts and inappropriate domestic operations. Larger Congressional investigations followed in 1975, first the Church Committee of the United States Senate, followed by the Pike Committee of the United States House of Representatives. Eventually, these interim committees were replaced by the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

[edit] 1996 reports

In 1996, the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued a congressional report estimating that: "Hundreds of employees on a daily basis are directed to break extremely serious laws in countries around the world in the face of frequently sophisticated efforts by foreign governments to catch them. A safe estimate is that several hundred times every day (easily 100,000 times a year) DO officers engage in highly illegal activities (according to foreign law) that not only risk political embarrassment to the US but also endanger the freedom if not lives of the participating foreign nationals and, more than occasionally, of the clandestine officer himself."^[94]

In the same document, the committee wrote, "Considering these facts and recent history, which has shown that the [Director of the Central Intelligence Agency], whether he wants to or not, is held accountable for overseeing the [Clandestine Service], the DCI must work closely with the Director of the CS and hold him fully and directly responsible to him." ^[90]

[edit] 2007 documents

On 27 June 2007 the CIA released two collections of previously classified documents which outlined various activities of doubtful legality. The first collection, the "Family Jewels," consists of almost 700 pages of responses from CIA employees to a 1973 directive from Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger requesting information about activities inconsistent with the Agency's charter.^[95]

The second collection, the CAESAR-POLO-ESAU papers, consists of 147 documents and 11,000 pages of research from 1953 to 1973 relating to Soviet and Chinese leadership hierarchies, and Sino-Soviet relations.^[96]

[edit] Influencing public opinion and law enforcement

See also: CIA influence on public opinion.

See also: CIA and the media and CIA in fiction and the movies

This is an area with many shades of gray. There is little argument, for example, that the CIA acted inappropriately in providing technical support to White House operatives conducting both political and security investigations, with no legal authority to do so. Things become much more ambiguous when law enforcement may expose a clandestine operation, a problem not unique to intelligence but also seen among different law enforcement organizations, where one wants to prosecute and another to continue investigations, perhaps reaching higher levels in a conspiracy.^[97]

[edit] Linkages with former Nazi and Japanese War Criminals

See U.S. Intelligence involvement with German and Japanese War Criminals after World War II.

[edit] Al-Qaeda and the "war on terror"

The CIA had long been dealing with terrorism originating from abroad, and in 1986 had set up a Counterterrorist Center to deal specifically with the problem. At first confronted with secular terrorism, the Agency found Islamist terrorism looming increasingly large on its scope. (For a discussion of the full range of CIA involvement with terrorism of all types, see CIA transnational anti-terrorism activities.)

The network that became known as al-Qaeda ("The Base") grew out of Arab volunteers who fought the Soviets and their puppet regimes in Afghanistan in the 1980s. In 1984 Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden set up an organization known as the Office of Services in Peshawar, Pakistan, to coordinate and finance the "Afghan Arabs" (as the volunteers became known). The CIA also channeled US aid to Afghan resistance fighters via Pakistan in a covert operation known as Operation Cyclone. It denied dealing with non-Afghan fighters, or having direct contact with bin Laden.^[98] However, various authorities relate that the Agency brought both Afghans and Arabs to the United States for military training.^{[99][100][101]} Azzam and Bin Laden set up recruitment offices in the US, under the name "Al-Khifah", the hub of which was the Farouq Mosque in Brooklyn's Atlantic Avenue, "a place of pivotal importance for Operation Cyclone".^[102] Among notable figures at the Brooklyn center were Egyptian "double agent" Ali Mohamed, who FBI special agent Jack Cloonan called "bin Laden's first trainer"^[103]; and "Blind Sheikh" Omar Abdel-Rahman, a leading recruiter of mujahideen, who obtained US visas with the help of the CIA in 1987 and 1990.

In about 1988 Bin Laden set up al-Qaeda from the more extreme elements of the Services Office.^[104][105] But it was not a large organization. When Jamal al-Fadl (who had been recruited through the Brooklyn center in the mid 1980s) joined in 1989, he was described as Qaeda's "third member".^[106]

In January 1996 the CIA created an experimental "virtual station", the Bin Laden Issue Station, under the Counterterrorist Center, to track Bin Laden's developing activities. Al-Fadl, who defected to the CIA in spring 1996, began to provide the Station with a new image of the Qaeda leader: he was not only a terrorist financier, but a terrorist organizer too, and sought weapons of mass destruction. FBI special agent Dan Coleman (who together with his partner Jack Cloonan had been "seconded" to the Bin Laden Station) called him Qaeda's "Rosetta Stone". ^[107]

In 1999 CIA chief George Tenet launched a grand "Plan" to deal with al-Qaeda. The Counterterrorist Center, its new chief Cofer Black and the center's Bin Laden unit were the Plan's developers and executors. Once it was prepared Tenet assigned CIA intelligence chief Charles E. Allen to set up a "Qaeda cell" to oversee its tactical execution.^[108] Developing from this strategy, in 2000 the CIA and USAF jointly ran a series of flights over Afghanistan with a small remote-controlled reconnaissance drone, the Predator; they obtained probable photos of Bin Laden. Cofer Black and others became advocates of arming the Predator with missiles to try to assassinate Bin Laden and other Qaeda leaders. At the Cabinet-level Principals Committee meeting on terrorism of September 4, 2001, Tenet warned of the dangers of a contoversial or mistaken strike with an under-tested armed drone. After the meeting, the CIA resumed reconnaissance flights, the drones now being weapons-capable but as yet unarmed.^{[109][110] [111] [112]}

The CIA set up a Strategic Assessments Branch in 2001 to remedy the deficit of "big-picture" analysis of al-Qaeda, and apparently to develop targeting strategies. The branch was formally set up in July 2001, but it struggled to find personnel. The branch's head took up his job on September 10, 2001.^{[113][114][115]}

Further information: CIA transnational human rights actions

[edit] The 2003 War in Iraq

Whether or not the intelligence available, or presented by the Bush Administration justified the action or allowed proper planning, especially for the occupation, is quite controversial. See details in CIA activities in the Near East, North Africa, South and Southwest Asia#Iraq both for these controversies as well as a rather long history of CIA involvement with Iraq. See Iraq 2003.

[edit] Drug trafficking

Main article: CIA transnational anti-crime and anti-drug activities

[edit] See also

Indices of CIA-related pages and some unindexed pages Category:Central Intelligence Agency Category:Analysts of the Central Intelligence Agency Category:Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency Category:Historians of the Central Intelligence Agency Category:People of the Central Intelligence Agency Victor Marchetti L. Fletcher Prouty

[edit] Further reading

• Andrew, Christopher (1996). For the President's Eyes Only. HarperCollins. ISBN 0-00-638071-9. 
• Baer, Robert (2003). Sleeping With the Devil: How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude. Crown. ISBN 1-4000-5021-9. 
• Bearden, Milton; James Risen (2003). The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown With the KGB. Random House. ISBN 0-679-46309-7. 
• Johnson, Loch K. (1991). America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society. Oxford University Press. 
• Mahle, Melissa Boyle (2004). Denial and Deception: An Insider's View of the CIA from Iran-Contra to 9/11. Nation Books. ISBN 1-56025-649-4. 
• Marchetti, Victor; John D. Marks (1975 reissue 1989). The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. Dell. ISBN 978-0440203360. 
• Smith, Jr., W. Thomas (2003). Encyclopedia of the Central Intelligence Agency. Facts on File. ISBN 0-8160-4667-0. 

[edit] Official websites and documents

• CIA official site
• CIA official Freedom of Information Act (foia) site
• George Washington University National Security Archive:

[edit] Other links

• Inside the Company: CIA Diary. Third World Traveler: Excerpt from a book by Philip Agee.
• William Blum website on CIA and US policy
• Central Intelligence Agency Meeting Notices and Rule Changes from The Federal Register RSS Feed

[edit] References

v • d • e Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
Geographic CIA activities: the Americas · Africa · Asia/Pacific · Near East, North Africa, South and Southwest Asia · Russia and Europe · Transnational CIA activities: Terrorism · Arms control, WMD, and proliferation · Crime and illicit drug trade · Health and economy · Human rights · Divisions: Directorate of Science & Technology

v • d • e Intelligence agencies and organizations of USA
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Portal

v • d • e External Intelligence Agencies of the World
ASIS  · CSIS  · FE  · CNI  · DGI  · DGSE  · EYP  · BND  · AIVD  · RAW   · SAVAMA  · Mossad  · SISMI  · PSIA  · EAB  · NIA  · ISI  · NICA  · AW  · SIE  · SVR   · SID  · SASS  · NIS  · MIT  · NSB  · SIS  · HIS  · CIA

v • d • e Cold War
Participants   NATO · Non-Aligned Movement · People's Republic of China · Warsaw Pact
1940s	Yalta Conference · Potsdam Conference · Gouzenko Affair · Iran crisis · Chinese Civil War · Greek Civil War · Restatement of Policy on Germany · Truman Doctrine · Marshall Plan · Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia · Tito-Stalin split · Berlin Blockade
1950s	Korean War · First Indochina War · 1953 Iranian coup d'état · 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état · Uprising of 1953 in East Germany · First Taiwan Strait Crisis · Poznań 1956 protests · Hungarian Revolution of 1956 · Suez Crisis · Sputnik crisis · Second Taiwan Strait Crisis · Cuban Revolution
1960s	Congo Crisis · Sino-Soviet split · U-2 Crisis of 1960 · Bay of Pigs Invasion · Cuban Missile Crisis · Berlin Wall · Vietnam War · 1964 Brazilian coup d'état · U.S. Invasion of Dominican Republic · South African Border War · Transition to the New Order · Bangkok Declaration · Laotian Civil War · Greek military junta of 1967-1974 · Cultural Revolution · Prague Spring · Goulash Communism · Sino-Soviet border conflict
1970s	Détente · Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty · Cambodian Civil War · Ping Pong Diplomacy · Four Power Agreement on Berlin · 1972 Nixon visit to China · 1973 Chilean coup d'état · Yom Kippur War · Strategic Arms Limitation Talks · Angolan Civil War · Mozambican Civil War · Ogaden War · Sino-Vietnamese War · Iranian Revolution
1980s	Soviet war in Afghanistan · Polish Solidarity Movement · Central American Crisis · Able Archer 83 · Strategic Defense Initiative · Invasion of Grenada · Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 · Singing Revolution · Fall of the Berlin Wall · Revolutions of 1989
1990s	Breakup of Yugoslavia · Dissolution of the USSR
See also	Bricker Amendment · Glasnost · Iron Curtain · McCarthyism · Operation Condor · Operation Gladio · Perestroika · Soviet espionage in US
Establishments	Central Intelligence Agency · Comecon · European Community · KGB · Stasi
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Timeline of events · Portal · Category

v • d • e War on Terrorism

Military conflicts Major terrorist attacks Participants in operations Targets of operations Operation Enduring Freedom (October 2001 – current) War in Afghanistan (Oct 2001 – current) OEF - Philippines (January 2002 – current) Georgia Train and Equip Program / Sustainment and Stability Operations (February 2002 – September 2007) OEF - Horn of Africa (October 2002 – current) OEF - Trans Sahara (February 2007 – current) Islamic insurgency in the Maghreb (2002 – current) Iraq insurgency and operations (2003 – current) Insurgency in Saudi Arabia (May 12, 2003 – current) War in Waziristan (March 2004 – current) South Thailand insurgency (November 7, 2004 – current) Lebanon War (July 12, 2006 – August 14) War in Somalia (December 20, 2006 – current) Lebanon-Fatah al-Islam conflict (May 20 – September 3, 2007) 2001: September 11, 2001 attacks Shoe bomb plot (December 22) 2002: Terrorism in Pakistan (February 2002 – current) 1st Bali bombing (October 12) 2003: Riyadh compound bombings (May 12) Casablanca bombings (May 16) Marriott Hotel bombing (August 5) Istanbul bombings (November 15 and November 20) 2004: SuperFerry 14 bombing (February 27) Madrid train bombings (March 11) Jakarta Australian embassy bombing (September 9) 2005: 1st London bombings (July 7) 2nd London bombings (July 21) Sharm el-Sheikh attacks (July 23) 2nd Bali bombings (October 1) Delhi bombings (October 29) Amman bombings (November 9) 2006: Mumbai train bombings (July 11) 2007: 1st Algiers bombings (April 11) London car bomb plot and Glasgow Airport attack (June 29 and June 30 respectively) Qahtaniya bombings (August 14) Karachi bombing (October 18) Baghlan bombing (November 6) Philippine Congress bombing (November 13) 2nd Algiers bombings (December 11) Afghanistan War: Invasion Allies  Afghanistan Northern Alliance ISAF Iraq insurgency: Multinational force  Iraq (Iraqi Army) Waziristan War:  Pakistan  United States Philippines:  Philippines  United States War in Somalia  Ethiopia  United States al-Qaeda Abu Sayyaf Iraqi insurgency Hamas Islamic Courts Union Jemaah Islamiyah Taliban Muslim Brotherhood Pattani Separatists Jaish-e-Mohammed Hizbul Mujahideen Kurdistan Workers Party Hezbollah Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Lashkar-e-Toiba and others Related Articles Timeline Casualties Theaters Criticism Abu Ghraib prison Axis of Evil Bush Doctrine CIA run Black sites Combatant Status Review Tribunal Enhanced interrogation techniques Extrajudicial prisoners of the US Extraordinary rendition Guantanamo Bay detention camp Military Commissions Act NSA electronic surveillance program Protect America Act of 2007 Unitary executive theory Unlawful combatant USA PATRIOT Act