Soviet-German relations before 1941

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Signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
Signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

Cooperation between Germany and Soviet Union dates to the aftermath of the First World War. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk[1], ending World War I hostilities between Russia and Germany, was signed on March 3, 1918. A few months later, the German ambassador to Moscow, Wilhelm von Mirbach, was shot dead by Russian Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in an attempt to incite a new war between Russia and Germany. The entire Soviet embassy under Adolph Joffe was deported from Germany on November 6, 1918, for their active support of the German Revolution. Karl Radek also illegally supported communist subversive activities in Weimar Germany in 1919.

From the outset, both states sought to overthrow the system that was established by the victors of World War I. Germany, laboring under onerous reparations and stung by the collective responsibility provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, was a defeated nation in turmoil. This and the Russian Civil War made both Germany and the Soviets into international outcasts, and their resulting rapprochement during the interbellum was a natural convergence.[2][3] At the same time, the dynamics of their relationship was shaped by both a lack of trust and the respective governments' fears of its partner's breaking out of diplomatic isolation and turning towards the French Third Republic (which at the time was thought to possess the greatest military strength in Europe) and the Second Polish Republic, its ally.

Cooperation ended in 1933, as Hitler came to power and created Nazi Germany, but some diplomatic initiatives continued through the 1930s, culminating with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 and various trade agreements. Few questions concerning the origins of the Second World War are more controversial and ideologically loaded than the issue of the policies of the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin towards Nazi Germany between the Nazi seizure of power and the German invasion of the USSR on June 22, 1941.[4]

A variety of competing and contradictory theses exist, including: that the Soviet leadership actively sought another great war in Europe to further weaken the capitalist nations[5]; that the USSR pursued a purely defensive policy[6]; or that the USSR tried to avoid becoming entangled in a war, both because Soviet leaders didn't feel that they had the military capabilities to conduct strategic operations at that time[7], and to avoid, in paraphrasing Stalin's words to the 18th Party Congress on March 10, 1939, "pulling other nation's (the UK and France's) chestnuts out of the fire."[8]

Contents

[edit] Soviet Russia and Weimar Germany

Europe in 1929-1939
Europe in 1929-1939
Georgy Chicherin
Georgy Chicherin
Adolph Joffe
Adolph Joffe
Nikolay Krestinsky
Nikolay Krestinsky
Karl Radek
Karl Radek
Walther Rathenau
Walther Rathenau
Gustav Stresemann
Gustav Stresemann
1932 KPD poster, "End This System"
1932 KPD poster, "End This System"

Initially, the Soviet leadership hoped for a successful socialist revolution in Germany as part of the "world revolution". However, this was put down by the right-wing freikorps. Subsequently, the Bolsheviks became embroiled in the Soviet war with Poland of 1919-20. As Poland was a traditional enemy of Germany (see e.g. Silesian Uprisings), and the Soviet state was also isolated internationally, the Soviet government started adopting a much less hostile attitude towards Germany, seeking closer relationships. This line was consistently pursued under People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgy Chicherin and Soviet Ambassador Nikolay Krestinsky. Other Soviet representatives instrumental in the negotiations were Karl Radek, Leonid Krasin, Christian Rakovsky, Victor Kopp and Adolph Joffe.[9]

In the 1920s, many in the leadership of Weimar Germany, humiliated by the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles imposed after their defeat in the First World War (especially General Hans von Seeckt, chief of the Reichswehr), were interested in cooperation with the Soviet Union, both in order to avert any threat from the Second Polish Republic, backed by the French Third Republic, and to prevent any possible Soviet-British alliance. The specific German aims were the full rearmament of the Reichswehr, which was explicitly prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles, and an alliance against Poland. It is unknown exactly when the first contacts between von Seeckt and the Soviets took place, but it could have been as early as 1919-1921, or possibly even before the signing of the Treaty of Versailles.[10][11]

On April 15, 1920, Victor Kopp, the RSFSR's special representative to Berlin, asked at the German Foreign Office whether "there was any possibility of combining the German and the Red Army for a joint war on Poland". This was yet another event at the start of military cooperation between the two countries, which ended before the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.

By early 1921, a special group in the Reichswehr Ministry devoted to Soviet affairs, Sondergruppe R, had been set up.[12]

Weimar Germany's army had been limited to 100,000 men by the Treaty of Versailles, which also forbade the Germans to have aircraft, tanks, submarines, heavy artillery, poison gas, anti-tank weapons or many anti-aircraft guns. A team of inspectors from the League of Nations patrolled many German factories and workshops to ensure that these weapons were not being manufactured.

The Treaty of Rapallo between Weimar Germany and the Soviet Union was signed by German Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau and his Soviet colleague Georgy Chicherin on April 16, 1922, during the Genoa Economic Conference, annulling all mutual claims, restoring full diplomatic relations, and establishing the beginnings of close trade relationships, which made Weimar Germany the main trade and diplomatic partner of the Soviet Union.[13] Rumors of a secret military supplement to the treaty soon spread. However, for a long time the consensus was that those rumors were wrong, and that Soviet-German military negotiations were independent of Rapallo and kept secret from the German Foreign Ministry for some time[14]. This point of view was later challenged.[15][16][17] On November 5, 1922, six other Soviet republics, which would soon become part of the Soviet Union, agreed to adhere to the Treaty of Rapallo as well.[18]

The Soviets offered Weimar Germany facilities deep inside the USSR for building and testing arms and for military training, well away from Treaty inspectors' eyes. In return, the Soviets asked for access to German technical developments, and for assistance in creating a Red Army General Staff.[19]

The first German officers went to the Soviet state for these purposes in March, 1922. One month later, Junkers began building aircraft at Fili, outside Moscow, in violation of Versailles. The great artillery manufacturer Krupp was soon active in the south of the USSR, near Rostov-on-Don. In 1925, a flying school was established at Vivupal, near Lipetsk, to train the first pilots for the future Luftwaffe.[2] Since 1926, the Reichswehr had been able to use a tank school at Kazan (codenamed Kama) and a chemical weapons facility in Samara Oblast (codenamed Tomka). In turn, the Red Army gained access to these training facilities, as well as military technology and theory from Weimar Germany.[20]

In the late 1920s, Germany helped Soviet industry begin to modernize, and to assist in the establishment of tank production facilities at the Leningrad Bolshevik Factory and the Kharkov Locomotive Factory.

The Soviets offered submarine-building facilities at a port on the Black Sea, but this was not taken up. The German Navy did take up a later offer of a base near Murmansk, where German vessels could hide from the British. One of the vessels that participated in the invasion of Norway came from this base. During the Cold War, this base at Polyarnyy (which had been built especially for the Germans) became the largest weapons store in the world.

Most of the documents pertaining to secret German-Soviet military cooperation were systematically destroyed in Germany.[21] The Polish and French intelligence communities of the 1920s were remarkably well-informed regarding the cooperation. This did not, however, have any immediate effect upon German relations with other European powers. After the World War II, the papers of General Hans von Seeckt and memoirs of other German officers became available,[22] and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a handful of Soviet documents regarding this were published.[23]

Alongside the Soviet Union's military and economic assistance, there was also political backing for Germany's aspirations. On July 19, 1920, Victor Kopp told the German Foreign Office that Soviet Russia wanted "a common frontier with Germany, south of Lithuania, approximately on a line with Bialystok".[citation needed] In other words, Poland was to be partitioned once again. These promptings were repeated over the years, with the Soviets always anxious to stress that ideological differences between the two governments were of no account; all that mattered was that the two countries were pursuing the same foreign policy objectives.

On December 4, 1924, Victor Kopp, worried that the expected admission of Germany to the League of Nations (Germany was finally admitted to the League in 1926) was an anti-Soviet move, offered German Ambassador Ulrich Graf von Brockdorff-Rantzau to cooperate against the Second Polish Republic, and secret negotiations were sanctioned.[2] However, the Weimar Republic rejected any venture into war.

Germany's fear of international isolation due to a possible Soviet rapprochement with France, the main German adversary, was a key factor in the acceleration of economic negotiations. On October 12, 1925, a commercial agreement between the two nations was concluded.[24]

Also in 1925, Germany broke their European diplomatic isolation and took part in the Locarno Treaties with France and Belgium, undertaking not to attack them. The Soviet Union saw western détente as potentially deepening its own political isolation in Europe, in particular by diminishing Soviet-German relationships. As Germany became less dependent on the Soviet Union, it became more unwilling to tolerate subversive Comintern interference.[25]

On April 24, 1926, Weimar Germany and the Soviet Union concluded another treaty (Treaty of Berlin (1926)), declaring the parties' adherence to the Treaty of Rapallo and neutrality for five years. The treaty was signed by German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann and Soviet ambassador Nikolay Krestinsky.[26] The treaty was perceived as an imminent threat by Poland (which contributed to the success of the May Coup in Warsaw), and with caution by other European states regarding its possible effect upon Germany's obligations as a party to the Locarno Agreements. France also voiced concerns in this regard in the context of Germany's expected membership in the League of Nations.[27]

In 1928, the 9th Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern (international communist organization) and its 6th Congress in Moscow favored Stalin's program over the line pursued by Comintern Secretary General Nikolay Bukharin. Unlike Bukharin, Stalin believed that a deep crisis in western capitalism was imminent, and he denounced the cooperation of international communist parties with social democratic movements, labelling them as social fascists, and insisted on a far stricter subordination of international communist parties to the Comintern, that is, to Soviet leadership. The policy of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) under Ernst Thälmann was altered accordingly. The relatively independent KPD of the early 1920s underwent an almost complete subordination to the Soviet Union.[28][29]

Relying on the foreign affairs doctrine pursued by the Soviet leadership in the 1920s, in his report of the Central Committee to the 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (b) on June 27, 1930, Joseph Stalin welcomed the international destabilization and rise of political extremism among the capitalist powers.[30]

The most intensive period of Soviet military collaboration with Weimar Germany was 1930-1932. On June 24, 1931, an extension of the 1926 Berlin Treaty was signed, though it was not until 1933 that it was ratified by the Reichstag due to internal political struggles. Some Soviet mistrust arose during the Lausanne Conference of 1932, when it was rumored that German Chancellor Franz von Papen had offered French Prime Minister Edouard Herriot a military alliance. The Soviets were also quick to develop their own relations with France and its main ally, Poland. This culminated in the conclusion of the Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact on July 25, 1932, and the Soviet-French non-aggression pact on November 29, 1932.[31][32]

The conflict between the Communist Party of Germany and the Social Democratic Party of Germany fundamentally contributed to the demise of the Weimar Republic. It is, however, disputed whether Hitler's seizure of power came as a surprise to the USSR. Some authors claim that Stalin deliberately aided Hitler's rise by directing the policy of the Communist Party of Germany on a suicidal course in order to foster an inter-imperialist war[33], a theory dismissed by many others.[34]

[edit] The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany

Few questions concerning the origins of the Second World War are as controversial as the issue of pre-war Soviet policy toward Nazi Germany, especially due to the absence of a complete opening of the Politburo, Joseph Stalin's and Vyacheslav Molotov's papers on foreign affairs.[35] German documents pertaining to their relations were captured by the American and British armies in 1945, and published by the U.S. Department of State shortly thereafter.[36] In the Soviet Union and Russia, including in official speeches and historiography, Nazi Germany has generally been referred to as Fascist Germany (Russian: фашистская Германия) from 1933 until today.

[edit] Collective security

Konstantin von Neurath
Konstantin von Neurath
Maxim Litvinov
Maxim Litvinov
Soviet propaganda poster of 1938 by Kukryniksy showing Western powers giving Hitler Czechoslovakia on a dish. Inscription in the flag: "On towards the East!"
Soviet propaganda poster of 1938 by Kukryniksy showing Western powers giving Hitler Czechoslovakia on a dish. Inscription in the flag: "On towards the East!"

After Adolf Hitler came to power on January 30, 1933, during the suppression of the Communist Party of Germany, the Nazis at times took police measures against Soviet trade missions, companies, press representatives, and individual citizens in Germany. They also launched an anti-Soviet propaganda campaign coupled with a lack of good will in diplomatic relations, although the German Foreign Ministry under Konstantin von Neurath (foreign minister from 1932-1938) was vigorously opposed to the impending breakup.[37] The second volume of Hitler's programmatic Mein Kampf (which first appeared in 1926) called for Lebensraum (living space for the German nation) in the east (mentioning Russia specifically), and out of his parochial prejudice [38], he presented the Communists as Jews destroying a great nation (see also Jewish Bolshevism). Such an imperialist quest, if implemented, would put a clear danger to the security of the Soviet Union.

Moscow's reaction to these steps of Berlin clearly aimed against the USSR was initially restrained with the exception of several tentative attacks on the National Socialist government in the Soviet press. However, as the heavy-handed anti-Soviet actions of the German government continued unabated, the Soviets unleashed their own propaganda campaign against the Nazis, but by May the possibility of conflict appeared to have receded. The 1931 extension to the Berlin Treaty was ratified in Germany on May 5.[39] In August 1933, Molotov assured German ambassador Herbert von Dirksen that Soviet-German relations would depend exclusively on the position of Germany towards the Soviet Union[40] However, access to the three Reichswehr military training and testing sites (Lipetsk, Kama, and Tomka) was abruptly terminated by the Soviet Union in August-September 1933.[41] Political understanding between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany was finally broken by the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of January 26, 1934 between Nazi Germany and the Second Polish Republic.[42]

Maxim Litvinov, who had been People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Foreign Minister of the USSR) since 1930, perceived Nazi Germany as the greatest threat. However, as the Red Army was perceived as not strong enough, and the USSR sought to avoid becoming embroiled in a general European war, he began pursuing a policy of collective security, trying to contain Nazi Germany via cooperation with the League of Nations and the Western Powers. The Soviet attitude to the League of Nations and international peace had changed. In 1933-34 the Soviet Union was diplomatically recognized for the first time by Spain, the United States, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, and ultimately joined the League of Nations in September 1934. It is often argued that the Soviet foreign policy change happened around 1933-34, and was triggered by Hitler's assumption of power.[43][44] However, the Soviet turn towards the French Third Republic in 1932, discussed above, could also have been a part of the policy change.[45] On May 2, 1935, the five-year Soviet-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance was signed.[46] The ratification of the treaty by France was one reason why Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland on March 7, 1936.

The 7th World Congress of the Comintern in 1935 officially endorsed the Popular Front strategy of forming broad alliances with parties willing to oppose the fascists, a policy pursued by the Communist parties since 1934.

Also in 1935, at the 7th Congress of Soviets (in a study in contradiction), Molotov stressed the need for good relations with Berlin[47]

On November 25, 1936, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact, joined by Fascist Italy in 1937.

In 1937, the last Soviet ambassador to Germany of Jewish origin, Yakov Surits, was replaced with an ethnic Russian.

Litvinov's strategy faced ideological and political obstacles. The Soviet Union continued to be perceived by the ruling class in Great Britain as no less a threat than Nazi Germany (some felt that the USSR was the greater threat), not least for its policy of supporting the elected government in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). At the same time, as the Soviet Union was blindly stumbling about in the midst of the Great Purge, it was not perceived to be a valuable ally by the West. [48][49]

Further complicating matters, the purge of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, forced the Soviet Union to close down quite a number of embassies abroad.[50][51]

Litvinov's policy of containing Germany via collective security failed utterly with the conclusion of the Munich Agreement on September 29, 1938, when the Western democracies favored self-determination of the Sudetenland Germans over Czechoslovakia's territorial integrity, in defiance of the Soviet position.[52] However, it is still disputed whether, even before Munich, the Soviet Union would actually have fulfilled its guarantees to Czechoslovakia, in the case of an actual German invasion resisted by France.[53][54]

In April, 1938, Litvinov launched the triple alliance negotiations with the new British and French ambassadors, (William Seeds, assisted by William Strang, and Paul-Emile Naggiar), in an attempt to contain Germany. However, for one reason or another, they were constantly dragged out and proceeded with major delays.[55]

The Western powers believed that war could still be avoided and the USSR, much weakened by the purges, could not act as a main military participant. The USSR more or less disagreed with them on both issues, approaching the negotiations with caution because of the traditional hostility of the capitalist powers.[56][57]

On May 3, 1939, Litvinov was dismissed and Chairman of the Council of People's Comissars (Prime Minister) Vyacheslav Molotov, who had very stranded relations with Litvinov, was not of Jewish origin, unlike Litvinov, and had always been sympathetic towards Germany, was put in charge of foreign affairs. The Foreign Affairs Commissariat was purged from Litvinov's supporters and the Jews.[58][59] All this could well have purely internal reasons, but it could also be a signal to Germany that the era of anti-German collective security was past[60], or a signal to the British and French that Moscow should be taken more seriously in the triple alliance negotiations[61][62][63] and that it is ready for arrangements without the old baggage of collective security, or even both.[64][65]

As evident from the German diplomatic correspondence, captured by the American and British armies in 1945 and later published, the reshuffle was warily perceived by Germany as a chance.[66][67]

It is sometimes argued that Molotov continued the talks with Britain and France to stimulate the Germans into making an offer of a non-aggression treaty and that the triple alliance failed because of the Soviet determination to conclude a pact with Germany.[68][69] Another existing point of view is that the strive for the triple alliance was sincere and that the Soviet government turned to Germany only when an alliance with the Western powers proved impossible.[70][71][72][73]

Additional factors which drove the Soviet Union towards an understanding with Germany might be the signing of a non-aggression pact between Germany, Latvia and Estonia on June 7, 1939[74] and the threat from Imperial Japan in the East with the Battle of Khalkin Gol (May 11 – September 16, 1939).[75][76] Molotov suggested that the Japanese attack might be inspired by Germany in order to hinder the conclusion of the Triple Alliance.[77]

[edit] Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

Vyacheslav Molotov
Vyacheslav Molotov
Signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Joseph Stalin is the second from the left, smiling
Signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Joseph Stalin is the second from the left, smiling
Signatures on the secret protocol
Signatures on the secret protocol
Molotov and Stalin
Molotov and Stalin
Planned and actual divisions of Europe, according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, with later adjustments.
Planned and actual divisions of Europe, according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, with later adjustments.
Further information: Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

In July open Soviet-German trade negotiations were under way. On August 19, the German-Soviet Trade Agreement was reached. On August 22 the secret political negotiations[78] unearthed as well, as it was publicly announced in German newspapers that the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany were about to conclude a non-aggression pact, and the dragged Soviet Triple Alliance negotiations with France and Britain were suspended. The Soviets blamed on the Western powers their reluctance to take the Soviet Union's military assistance seriously and acknowledge the Soviet right to cross Poland and Romania if necessary against their will[79], as well as their failure to send representatives with more importance and clearly defined powers and the disagreement over the notion of indirect aggression.[80] On August 23, 1939, a German delegation headed by Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop arrived to Moscow, and in the following night the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed by him and his Soviet colleague Vyacheslav Molotov, in the presence of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.[81] The ten-year pact of non-aggression declaring adherence to the Treaty of Berlin (1926) was supplemented by a secret additional protocol, which divided Eastern Europe between the German and Soviet zones of influence:[82]

1. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognized by each party.
2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San.
The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments.
In any event both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement.
3. With regard to Southeastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterestedness in these areas.
This protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret.

The protocol was rumoured to exist from the very beginning and was actually found after the capture of the German Foreign Office archives by the United States in 1945[83]. The Soviet Union, however, had officially denied its existence until 1989 and it wasn't mentioned in the Soviet historiography. In retrospect the Soviet leadership was clearly embarrassed by it. The Russian originals, together with almost all associated documents, were transferred out of the archives of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to one of Molotov's aides in 1946 and have never been found ever since.[84] A copy of the Russian protocol was finally published in the Soviet Union in 1990.[85]

Thus, the collective security doctrine was eventually abandoned. Some scholars argue that for a long time it was a sincere and unanimous position of the Soviet leadership, pursuing a purely defensive line[86][87], while others contend that from the very beginning the Soviet Union was aimed at the cooperation with Nazi Germany, collective security being merely tactical counter to some unfriendly German moves.[88][89][90][91] However, it might well be the case that Moscow sought to avoid a great war in Europe because it was no strong enough to fight an offensive, but there was much disagreement over the policy between Litvinov and Molotov as to how to attain the goal, and Stalin balanced between their positions, starting pursuing both contradictory lines simultaneously quite early and abandoned collective security only at some point in 1939.[92][93]

Nazi Germany started its quest for a pact with the Soviet Union at some point in the spring of 1939 in order to prevent an Anglo-Soviet-French alliance and secure Soviet neutrality in a future Polish-German war.[94]

There are, however, many conflicting points of view in historiography as to when the Soviet side began to seek rapprochement and when the secret political negotiations started.[95]

The rapprochement could start as early as in 1935-1936, when Soviet trade representative in Berlin David Kandelaki made attempts at political negotiations on behalf of Stalin and Molotov, behind Litvinov's back.[96][97] Molotov's speech to the Central Executive Committee of the Supreme Soviet in January 1936 is usually taken to mark this change of policy.[98] Thus, Litvinov's anti-German line didn't enjoy unanimous support by the Soviet leadership long before his dismissal.[99] Walter Krivitsky, an NKVD agent, who defected in the Netherlands in 1937, reported in his memories in 1938 that already then Stalin had sought better relations with Germany. [100][101] According to other historians, these were merely responses to German overtures for détente.[102]

It is also possible that the change of foreign policy occurred in 1938, after the Munich Agreement, which became the final defeat of Litvinov's anti-German policy of collective security, which was marked by the reported remark about an inevitable fourth partition of Poland made by Litvinov's deputy Vladimir Potemkin in a conversation with French ambassador Robert Coulondre shortly thereafter.[103]

The turn towards Germany could also be made in early 1939, marked by Stalin's speech to the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1939, shortly after the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, when he warned that the Western democracies were trying to provoke a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union and declared the Soviet non-involvement in inter-capitalist quarrels, which is sometimes considered signal to Berlin.[104][105]

According to others, the first sign of a serious Soviet-German political détente was the conversation between Soviet ambassador Aleksey Merekalov and Ernst von Weizsäcker, State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry, on April 17, 1939, when the former hinted at possible improvement of the relations. This was followed by a series of perceived German signals of goodwill and replacement of Litvinov with Molotov. [106][107][108]

Yet another, "revisionist" point of view is that it was not until the end of July 1939 – August 1939 that the policy change occurred and that it was a consequence rather than a cause of the breakdown of the Anglo-Soviet-French triple alliance negotiations.[109]

The pact was ratified by the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union on August 31, 1939.

[edit] World War II

[edit] Polish campaign

Further information: Invasion of Poland (1939)
Invasion of Poland: Germany (blue), the Soviet Union (red) and the European allies of Poland (green)
Invasion of Poland: Germany (blue), the Soviet Union (red) and the European allies of Poland (green)
German and Soviet troops meeting in occupied Poland in 1939
German and Soviet troops meeting in occupied Poland in 1939
General Heinz Guderian (center) and Combrig Semyon Krivoshein (right) at a German-Soviet victory parade in Brest on September 23, 1939
General Heinz Guderian (center) and Combrig Semyon Krivoshein (right) at a German-Soviet victory parade in Brest on September 23, 1939
Soviet and German soldiers meeting after the Soviet invasion of Poland, late September 1939
Soviet and German soldiers meeting after the Soviet invasion of Poland, late September 1939
1940 Soviet map of the western portions of the Ukrainian SSR captured from Poland in 1939. The adjacent parts of Poland occupied by Nazi Germany are labeled area of state interests of Germany
1940 Soviet map of the western portions of the Ukrainian SSR captured from Poland in 1939. The adjacent parts of Poland occupied by Nazi Germany are labeled area of state interests of Germany

A week after having signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, on September 1, 1939, Nazi Germany invaded its zone of influence in Poland (see Invasion of Poland (1939)). On September 3, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and France, fulfilling their obligations to the Second Polish Republic, declared war on Germany. The Second World War broke out in Europe.

On September 4, as Britain blockaded Germany at sea, the German cargo sea shipping heading towards the German ports was diverted to the Soviet Arctic port of Murmansk. On September 8 the Soviet side agreed to pass it by railway to the Soviet Baltic port of Leningrad. At the same time the Soviet Union refused to allow a Polish transit through its territory citing the threat of being drawn into war on September 5.

Von der Schulenburg reported to Berlin that attacks on the conduct of Germany in the Soviet press had ceased completely and the portrayal of events in the field of foreign politics largely coincided with the German point of view, while anti-German literature had been removed from the trade.[110]

On September 7 Stalin once again outlined a new line for the Comintern now based on the idea that the war was an inter-imperialist conflict and hence there was no reason for the working class to side with Britain, France or Poland against Germany, thus departing from the Comintern's anti-fascist popular front policy of 1934-1939.[111] He labeled Poland fascist state oppressing Belarusians and Ukrainians.

On September 8 Molotov prematurely congratulated the German government with the entry of German troops into Warsaw.[112]

German diplomats had urged the Soviet Union to intervene against Poland from the east since the beginning of the war[113][114], but the Soviet Union was reluctant to intervene as Warsaw hadn't yet fallen. The Soviet decision to invade the eastern portions of Poland earlier agreed as the Soviet zone of influence was communicated to the German ambassador Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg on September 9, but the actual invasion was delayed for more than a week.[115][116] The Polish intelligence became aware of the Soviet plans around September 12.

On September 17 the Soviet Union finally entered the Polish territories from the east (see Soviet invasion of Poland (1939)), citing the collapse of the Second Polish Republic and alleged help to the Belorussian and Ukrainian people as the pretext. It is usually considered direct result of the pact, although the revisionist school contends that this was not the case and that the Soviet decision was taken few weeks later.[117] The Soviet move was denounced by Britain and France, but they didn't intervene. In an exchange of captured Polish territories in compliance with the terms of the protocol, already on September 17 the Red Army and Wehrmacht held a joint military parade in Brest, transferred by Germany to the Soviet troops. In the following battles with the rest of the Second Polish Republic's army the Soviet Union occupied the territories roughly corresponding to its sphere of interests, as defined in the secret additional protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

On September 25, when Hitler was still going to proceed to Lithuania, the Soviet Union proposed to renegotiate the spheres of interest. On September 28, 1939 in Moscow Molotov and Ribbentrop signed the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty, determining the boundary of their respective national interests in the territory of the former Polish state.[118] In a secret supplementary protocol to the treaty the spheres of interest outside Poland were renegotiated, and in exchange for some already captured portions of the Polish territory Germany acknowledged still independent Lithuania part of the Soviet zone.[119]

The territory of Poland had been completely occupied by the two powers by October 6, and the Polish state was liquidated. In early November the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union annexed the occupied territories and the Soviet Union shared a common border with Nazi Germany, the Nazi-occupied Polish territories and Lithuania for the first time.

After the invasion, the cooperation was visible for example in the four Gestapo-NKVD Conferences, where the occupants discussed plans for dealing with the Polish resistance movement and further destruction of Poland.[120]

[edit] Further development

Plaque in Tallinn commemorating the Orzeł incident
Plaque in Tallinn commemorating the Orzeł incident
Soviet troops trying to maintain their tanks in severe sub-zero temperatures during the Winter War
Soviet troops trying to maintain their tanks in severe sub-zero temperatures during the Winter War
"The Spirit of Great Lenin and His Victorious Banner inspires us for the Great Patriotic War" (Joseph Stalin)"
"The Spirit of Great Lenin and His Victorious Banner inspires us for the Great Patriotic War" (Joseph Stalin)"

On September 14, 1939, the Polish submarine ORP Orzeł reached Tallinn, Estonia. At the insistence of Germany, the Estonian authorities interned the crew, yet they managed to escape with their ship in the Orzeł incident on September 18, a day after the Soviets invaded Poland. In response on September 19 the Soviet Union questioned Estonia's neutrality, and Molotov declared that the submarine would be searched by the Soviets all over the Baltic Sea, including the Estonian waters.

The Soviets continued taking over their sphere of interests. Having concentrated massive troops along the border and threatening the Baltic states with imminent military invasion, the Soviet Union on September 24, October 2 and October 3, respectively, issued ultimatums demanding that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania allow stationing of Soviet troops (25, 25 and 20 thousand) and installation of Soviet military bases and conclude mutual assistance pacts with the Soviet Union. Germany also advised them to accept the conditions. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania acceded to the Soviet demands and signed mutual assistance treaties on September 28, October 5 and October 10, respectively (for ten years for Estonia and Latvia and fifteen years for Lithuania). Lithuania in exchange got from the Soviet Union the area of Vilno annexed by Poland in 1920. On October 18, October 29 and November 3 first Soviet troops entered Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.[121][122][123]

The last negotiations with Finland had been initiated by the Soviet side as part of the collective security policy in April 1938 and aimed to reach an understanding and to secure a favorable Finnish position in case of a German attack against the Soviet Union through the Finnish territory, but had proven futile due to the Finnish reluctance to break neutrality and ended in April 1939, shortly before Litvinov's dismissal.

On October 13 new negotiations started in Moscow, and the Soviet Union (represented by Stalin, Molotov and Vladimir Potyomkin) offered Finland to conclude a mutual assistance pact, lease the military base of Hanko and cede 70 km deep area in the Karelian Isthmus, located immediately to the north of the Soviet city of Leningrad, to the Soviet Union in exchange for some land much further to the north. Finland, however, refused to accept the offer, withdrew from negotiations on November 7 and continued preparations against a Soviet invasion. On November 26, the Soviet Union staged the shelling of Mainila near the border, accused the Finnish troops of the provocation and requested their withdrawal. In turn on November 27 Finland requested a mirror withdrawal of the Soviet troops. On November 28 the Soviet Union denounced the 1932 Soviet-Finnish Non-Aggression Pact prolonged in 1934, on November 29 broke diplomatic relations and on November 30, 1939, attacked Finland in what became known as the Winter War, starting the invasion of Finnish Karelia and bombing civilian boroughs of Helsinki under the command of Kliment Voroshilov. On December 1 the puppet socialist government of the Finnish Democratic Republic was established by the Soviet Union in the border town of Terijoki. On December 14 for waging the war of aggression the Soviet Union was expelled from the League of Nations. After the disastrous start of the campaign, taking a disproportionally heavy death toll on the Red Army, on January 7, 1940, Voroshilov was replaced with Semyon Timoshenko as the commander of the front (and four months later as People's Commissar for Defence). In mid-February the Soviet troops finally managed to broke through the Mannerheim Line, and Finland started seeking a ceasefire.[124][125]

The Moscow Peace Treaty was signed on March 12, and at noon of the following day the fighting ended. Finland ceded Karelian Isthmus and Ladoga Karelia, part of Salla and Kalastajasaarento and leased the Hanko naval base, but remained a neutral state, albeit increasingly leaning toward Germany (see Interim Peace).

The consequences of the conflict were twofold. While the Soviet Union was prompted to reorganize its army and gained new territories, the invasion revealed its striking military weaknesses, left Finland independent, pushing the neutral country toward Germany, and dealt yet another devastating blow on the Soviet international prestige.

Suffering disproportionally high losses, as compared to the Finnish troops, despite the fourfold Soviet superiority in troops and nearly absolute superiority in heavy weapons and aircraft, the Red Army appeared an easy target, which contributed to Hitler's decision to plan an attack against the Soviet Union.

But in 1940 Germany was engaged in the West. On April 9 Germany invaded Denmark and Norway. On May 15 the Netherlands capitulated. By June 2 Germany had occupied Belgium. On June 14 Wehrmacht entered Paris. On June 22 France surrendered.

At the same time the Soviet Union was discontented with the Baltic alliance leaning toward Britain and France, the so-called Baltic Entente, dated back to 1934, which could potentially be reoriented toward Germany, and considered it violation of the mutual assistance treaties of the autumn of 1939. On May 25, as several Soviet soldiers had disappeared from Soviet garrisons in Lithuania, Molotov accused Kaunas of provocations. On June 14 People's Commissar of Defence Timoshenko ordered a complete blockade of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Soviet air force shot down Finnish passenger plane Kaleva heading from Tallinn towards Helsinki. Shortly before midnight Molotov presented Lithuania with a ten-hour ultimatum, demanding replacement of the Lithuanian government with a pro-Soviet one and free access for additional Soviet troops, and threatening the country with immediate occupation otherwise.

Lithuanian President Antanas Smetona insisted on armed resistance, but was not supported by the military leadership so Lithuania acceded to the ultimatum. The government was reshuffled and additional Soviet troops entered Lithuania. Vladimir Dekanozov was sent to Kaunas as Soviet special envoy. The following night Smetona fled to Germany (and later to Switzerland and the United States). On June 16 Molotov presented similar nine-hour ultimatums to Latvia and Estonia, citing Soviet concerns over the Baltic Entente, and they acceded as well. At the same time Wehrmacht started concentrating along the Lithuanian border. On June 17 additional Soviet troops occupied Estonia and Latvia. Soviet envoys Andrey Vyshinsky and Andrey Zhdanov arrived to Latvia and Estonia to supervise the process on June 18 and June 19. On June 20 and June 21 in Latvia and Estonia new pro-Soviet governments were formed under Augusts Kirhenšteins and Johannes Vares. By June 21 dislocation of the Soviet troops had been completed in all three countries.

The British historians Alan S. Milward and W. Medicott show that Nazi Germany--unlike Imperial Germany--was prepared for only a short-term war (Blitzkrieg).[126] According to Andreas Hillgruber,[127] without the necessary supplies from the USSR and the strategic security in the East, Germany could not have succeeded in the West. Had Soviets joined the Anglo-French blockade, German war economy would have been blocked soon. With its own raw materials in September 1939, Germany could have been supplied for mere 9 to 12 months.[128]

From the start of the war until Germany invaded the Soviet Union less than two years later, Stalin supplied Hitler with 1.5 million tons of oil, the same quantity of grain, and many thousands of tons of rubber, timber, phosphates, iron and many valuable metal ores, particularly chromium, manganese and platinum. At the time of the invasion, Germany was heavily in debt to the Soviet Union.

German advances during Operation Barbarossa, 1941-06-22 to 1941-09-09.
German advances during Operation Barbarossa, 1941-06-22 to 1941-09-09.

According to Mr. Rapoport, "one of Stalin's first gifts to the Nazis was to turn over some 600 German Communists, most of them Jews, to the Gestapo at Brest-Litovsk in German-occupied Poland.”.[129] Soviets also offered support to Nazis in the official statements, Stalin himself emphasised that it was the Anglo-French alliance that had attacked Germany, not the other way round[130] and Molotov affirmed that Germany had made peace efforts, which had been turned down by 'Anglo-French imperialists'.[131]

By annexing Poland and the Baltic States, Germany and the Soviet Union eliminated the buffer states and magnified the threat of war[132]

[edit] Volksdeutsche in the Soviet Union

Further information: History of Germans in Russia and the Soviet Union
Flag of the Volga German ASSR
Flag of the Volga German ASSR
Volga German ASSR (yellow) in 1940
Volga German ASSR (yellow) in 1940

Ethnic Germans in Soviet Russia of the 1920s enjoyed a certain degree of cultural autonomy, had their own national districts and Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Volga German ASSR), schools and newspapers, in compliance with the policy of national delimitation in the Soviet Union.

In September 1929, discontented with the reintroduction of coercive grain requisitions and collectivization of agriculture, several thousand of Soviet peasants of German descent (mostly Mennonites) convened in Moscow, demanding exit visas to emigrate to Canada, provoking a significant political scandal in Germany, which soured Soviet-German relations. The charity "Brothers in Need" was established in Germany to raise money for the Soviet Germans, President Paul von Hindenburg himself donated 200 thousand Reichsmarks of his money for that purpose. The Soviet government first permitted 5,461 Germans to emigrate, but then deported the remaining 9,730 back to their original places of residence.[133][134][135] However, throughout 1930, efforts were still being put by the Soviet government into increasing the number and quality of German national institutions in the Soviet Union. [136]

The first mass arrests and show trials specifically targeting Soviet Germans (those who were considered counter-revolutionaries) occurred in the Soviet Union during the 1933 Ukrainian terror. However, with the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b)'s decree of November 5, 1934, the domestic anti-German campaign took on all-union dimensions. [137]

In 1933-1934, a campaign was launched in Germany to help Soviet Volksdeutsche during the famine by sending food packets and money[138]

Deeply concerned over cross-border ethnic ties of national minorities (such as Germans, Poles, Finns), in 1934 the Soviet Union decided to create new border security zone along its western border, and in 1935-1937 potentially disloyal nationalities (including German) were mostly (albeit not completely) deported from this strip of land to the inner parts of the Soviet Union by NKVD.[139] German national institutions were gradually abolished[140]

In 1937-1938 NKVD conducted mass operations "for the destruction of espionage and sabotage contingents" (known as National operations of NKVD) among diaspora nationalities against both Soviet and foreign citizens (resulting in arrest and usually execution), including German operation of the NKVD against Germans, in fact indiscriminately targeting national minorities in that important campaign of the Great Terror. Concurrently all German and other diaspora national districts and schools in the Soviet Union except the Volga German ASSR and German schools within that republic were abolished.[141][142]

The Soviet government had made a prior decision to evacuate the entire population of German origin in case of German invasion, which was immediately implemented after the actual invasion by forcibly transferring 1.2 million citizens of German origin from European Russia to Siberia and Soviet Central Asia[143][144]

[edit] Soviet ambassadors (chargés) to Berlin

[edit] German ambassadors to Moscow

[edit] References

  1. ^ Full text in English: The Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk; March 3, 1918
  2. ^ a b c Gasiorowski, Zygmunt J. (1958). The Russian Overture to Germany of December 1924. The Journal of Modern History 30 (2), 99-117.
  3. ^ Large, J. A. (1978). The Origins of Soviet Collective Security Policy, 1930-32. Soviet Studies 30 (2), 212-236.
  4. ^ Haslam, Jonathan (1997). Soviet-German Relations and the Origins of the Second World War: The Jury Is Still Out. The Journal of Modern History 69: 785-797.
  5. ^ Raack, R. C. Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945: The Origins of the Cold War. Stanford, CA, 1995, p. 12.
  6. ^ Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War: Russo-German Relations and the Road to War 1933-1941 (New York, 1995), p. 73.
  7. ^ Haslam, Jonathan. The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Securing in Europe, 1933-39. New York, 1985, pp. 140-41.
  8. ^ Lukacs, John, June 1941: Hitler and Stalin, Yale University Press, 2006.
  9. ^ Kochan, Lionel (1950). The Russian Road to Rapallo. Soviet Studies 2 (2), 109-122.
  10. ^ Smith, Arthur L. (1956). The German General Staff and Russia, 1919-1926. Soviet Studies 8 (2), 125-133.
  11. ^ Hallgarten, George W. F. (1949) General Hans von Seeckt and Russia, 1920-1922. The Journal of Modern History 21 (1), 28-34.
  12. ^ Gatzke, Hans W. (1958). Russo-German Military Collaboration during the Weimar Republic. The American Historical Review 63 (3), 565-597.
  13. ^ Full text in English: German-Russian Agreement; April 16, 1922 (Treaty of Rapallo).
  14. ^ Gatzke, Hans W. (1958). Russo-German Military Collaboration during the Weimar Republic. The American Historical Review 63 (3), 565-597.
  15. ^ Mueller, Gordon H. (1976) Rapallo Reexamined: A New Look at Germany's Secret Military Collaboration with Russia in 1922. Military Affairs 40 (3), 109-117.
  16. ^ Kretschmer, Ernst (1930). Germano-Russian trade relations and the Five-Year Plan. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 6 (1), 111–133.
  17. ^ Fraenkel, Ernst (1940). German-Russian Relations Since 1918: From Brest-Litovsk to Moscow. The Review of Politics 2 (1), 34-62
  18. ^ Full text in English: Supplementary Agreement to the German-Russian Agreement; November 5, 1922
  19. ^ Gatzke, Hans W. (1958). Russo-German Military Collaboration during the Weimar Republic. The American Historical Review 63 (3), 565-597.
  20. ^ Dyakov, Yu. L. & T. S. Bushueva. The Red Army and the Wehrmacht. How the Soviets Militarized Germany, 1922-1933, and Paved the Way for Fascism. New York: Prometheus Books, 1995.
  21. ^ Speidel, Helm (1953). Reichswehr und Rote Armee. Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte I (Jan., 1953), 9-45
  22. ^ Gatzke, Hans W. (1958). Russo-German Military Collaboration during the Weimar Republic. The American Historical Review 63 (3), 565-597.
  23. ^ Dyakov, Yu. L. & T. S. Bushueva, The Red Army and the Wehrmacht: How the Soviets Militarised Germany, 1922-1933, and Paved the Way for Fascism, New York: Prometheus Books, 1995.
  24. ^ Morgan, R. P. (1963). The Political Significance of German-Soviet Trade Negotiations, 1922-5. The Historical Journal 6 (2), 253-271.
  25. ^ Large, J. A. (1978). The Origins of Soviet Collective Security Policy, 1930-32. Soviet Studies 30 (2), 212-236.
  26. ^ Full text in English: Treaty of Berlin Between the Soviet Union and Germany; April 24, 1926.
  27. ^ Garner, J. W. (1926). The Russo-German Treaty. The American Journal of International Law 20 (3), 530-533.
  28. ^ Fischer, Ruth. Stalin and German Communism: a Study in the Origins of the State Party. Cambridge, MA – London: Harvard University Press & Oxford University Press, 1949.
  29. ^ Ossip K. Flechtheim. Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik (Offenbach a. M., 1948).
  30. ^ Full text of the report in Russian
  31. ^ Stein, George H. (1962) Russo-German Military Collaboration: The Last Phase, 1933. Political Science Quarterly 77 (1), 54-71.
  32. ^ Large, J. A. (1978). The Origins of Soviet Collective Security Policy, 1930-32. Soviet Studies 30 (2), 212-236.
  33. ^ Tucker
  34. ^ Uldricks, Teddy J. (1977) Stalin and Nazi Germany. Slavic Review 36 (4), 599-603.
  35. ^ Haslam, Jonathan (1997). Review: Soviet-German Relations and the Origins of the Second World War: The Jury Is Still Out. The Journal of Modern History 69.4, 785-797.
  36. ^ Published as Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945. Series D, Volume 1: From Neurath to Ribbentrop. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1949 and Sontag, Raymond James & James Stuart Beddie. Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives of The German Foreign Office. Washington, DC: Department of State, 1948.
  37. ^ Stein, George H. (1962) Russo-German Military Collaboration: The Last Phase, 1933. Political Science Quarterly 77 (1), 54-71.
  38. ^ Bracher, Karl D., The German Dictatorship, Praeger, NY, 1976, p.425; Parrish, Thomas (ed.), The Simon and Schuster Encyclopedia of World War II, Simon and Schuster, NY, 1978, p. 398; Taylor, James, and Warren Shaw, The Third Reich Almanac, World Almanac, NY, 1987, p.212. See also John Toland's, Joachim Fest's, Alan Bullock's, or Robert Waite's biographies of Hitler for further insight.
  39. ^ Stein, George H. (1962) Russo-German Military Collaboration: The Last Phase, 1933. Political Science Quarterly 77 (1), 54-71.
  40. ^ Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle, p. 22.
  41. ^ Stein, George H. (1962) Russo-German Military Collaboration: The Last Phase, 1933. Political Science Quarterly 77 (1), 54-71.
  42. ^ Carr, E. H. (1949) From Munich to Moscow. I. Soviet Studies 1 (1), 3-17.
  43. ^ A. B. Ulam, Expansion and Co-existence (New York, 1968), p. 195
  44. ^ M. Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929-1941, vol. I (London, 1947). p. 89.
  45. ^ Large, J. A. (1978). The Origins of Soviet Collective Security Policy, 1930-32. Soviet Studies 30 (2), 212-236.
  46. ^ France-U.S.S.R.: Treaty of Mutual Assistance. The American Journal of International Law 30 (4), Supplement: Official Documents. (Oct. 1936), pp. 177-180.
  47. ^ Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle, p. 46.
  48. ^ Haslam, Jonathan (1997). Soviet-German Relations and the Origins of the Second World War: The Jury Is Still Out. The Journal of Modern History 69: 785-797.
  49. ^ Carr, E. H. (1949) From Munich to Moscow. I. Soviet Studies 1 (1), 3-17.
  50. ^ Uldricks, Teddy J. (1977) Impact of the Great Purges on the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Slavic Review 36 (2), 187-204.
  51. ^ See The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Ministry of January 13, 1938 and The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Ministry of January 17, 1938 @ Avalon Project
  52. ^ Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle, chap. 10.
  53. ^ Jonathan Haslam (1979). The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovakian Crisis of 1938. Journal of Contemporary History 14 (3), 441-461.
  54. ^ Hochman, Jiri. The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934-1938. London -- Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984.
  55. ^ Michael Jabara Carley (1993). End of the 'Low, Dishonest Decade': Failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance in 1939. Europe-Asia Studies 45 (2), 303-341.
  56. ^ Watson, Derek (2000). Molotov's Apprenticeship in Foreign Policy: The Triple Alliance Negotiations in 1939. Europe-Asia Studies 52.4, 695-722.
  57. ^ Resis, Albert (2000). The Fall of Litvinov: Harbinger of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Europe-Asia Studies 52 (1), 33-56.
  58. ^ Haslam, Jonathan (1997). Review: Soviet-German Relations and the Origins of the Second World War: The Jury Is Still Out. The Journal of Modern History 69.4, 785-797.
  59. ^ Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle, p. 22.
  60. ^ Richard Overy and Andrew Wheatcroft, The Road to War
  61. ^ Roberts, Geoffrey (1992). The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany. Soviet Studies 44.1, 57-78.
  62. ^ Roberts, Geoffrey (1992). The Fall of Litvinov: A Revisionist View. Journal of Contemporary History 27. 4, 639-657.
  63. ^ Roberts, Geoffrey. 'The Alliance that Failed', p. 397.
  64. ^ Watson, Derek (2000). Molotov's Apprenticeship in Foreign Policy: The Triple Alliance Negotiations in 1939. Europe-Asia Studies 52.4, 695-722.
  65. ^ Resis, Albert (2000). The Fall of Litvinov: Harbinger of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Europe-Asia Studies 52 (1), 33-56.
  66. ^ See telegrams and memorandums of the German Foreign Office, April 17 - August 14, 1939 ( Gustav Braun von Stumm, Gustav Hilger, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Karl Schnurre, Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, Werner von Tippelskirch, Ernst von Weizsäcker, Ernst Woermann) @ Avalon Project
  67. ^ Cf. also the German diplomatic documents, Germany and The Soviet Union - November 1937 to July 1938 @ Avalon Project
  68. ^ W. Strang. Home and Abroad. London, 1956. P. 198
  69. ^ Aleksandr M. Nekrich, Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922-1941. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
  70. ^ Taylor (1962), The Origins of the Second World War, pp. 229, 232, 240-241.
  71. ^ Roberts, Geoffrey. Unholy Alliance (1989)
  72. ^ Roberts, Geoffrey. The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War: Russo-German Relations and the Road to War, 1933-1941. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. p. 73.
  73. ^ Geoffrey Roberts (1998) On Soviet-German Relations: The Debate Continues. A Review Article. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 8. pp. 1471-1475.
  74. ^ Roberts, Geoffrey (1995). Soviet Policy and the Baltic States, 1939-1940: A Reappraisal. Diplomacy and Statecraft 6 (3).
  75. ^ Haslam, Jonathan. The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, 1933-41: Moscow, Tokyo and the Prelude to the Pacific War. Basingstoke, 1994, p. 129-134
  76. ^ Sella, A. (1983) Khalkin-Gol, the Forgotten War. Journal of Contemporary History 18.
  77. ^ Watson, Derek (2000). Molotov's Apprenticeship in Foreign Policy: The Triple Alliance Negotiations in 1939. Europe-Asia Studies 52 (4), 695-722.
  78. ^ See also the German diplomatic documents, Agreement Achieved, August 14 - August 23, 1939 @ Avalon Project)
  79. ^ Poland declined to accept any help from the Soviet Union. It should be noted, however, that the Soviets didn't try to approach Poland and Romania directly and entirely relied on the British and French mediation.
  80. ^ Watson, Derek (2000). Molotov's Apprenticeship in Foreign Policy: The Triple Alliance Negotiations in 1939. Europe-Asia Studies 52 (4), 695-722.
  81. ^ Treaty of Nonaggression Between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics @ Avalon Project
  82. ^ Secret Additional Protocol @ Avalon Project
  83. ^ Sontag, Raymond James & James Stuart Beddie. Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives of The German Foreign Office. Washington, DC: Department of State, 1948. P. 78.
  84. ^ Roberts, Geoffrey (1992). The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany. Soviet Studies 44 (1), 57-78.
  85. ^ Год кризиса, 1938-1939: Документы и материалы. Т. 2. Moscow, 1990. Document # 603.
  86. ^ Roberts, Geoffrey. Unholy Alliance (1989)
  87. ^ Roberts, Geoffrey. The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War: Russo-German Relations and the Road to War, 1933-1941. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995.
  88. ^ R. C. Raack, Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945: The Origins of the Cold War (Stanford, Calif., 1995), p. 12.
  89. ^ Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941 (New York, 1990).
  90. ^ Aleksandr M. Nekrich, Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922-1941. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
  91. ^ Hochman, Jiri. The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934-1938. London -- Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984.
  92. ^ Haslam, Jonathan (1997). Review: Soviet-German Relations and the Origins of the Second World War: The Jury Is Still Out. The Journal of Modern History 69.4, 785-797.
  93. ^ Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933-39 (New York, 1985), pp. 140-41.
  94. ^ Geoffrey Roberts (1992). The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany. Soviet Studies 44.1, 57-78.
  95. ^ Geoffrey Roberts (1992). The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany. Soviet Studies 44.1, 57-78.
  96. ^ Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle, p. 86, 127-128.
  97. ^ Haslam, Jonathan (1997). Soviet-German Relations and the Origins of the Second World War: The Jury Is Still Out. The Journal of Modern History 69: 785-797.
  98. ^ D. C. Watt, 'The Initiation of the Negotiations Leading to the Nazi-Soviet Pact: A Historical Problem', in C. Abramsky, ed., Essays in Honour of E.H. Carr (London, Macmillan, 1974)
  99. ^ Haslam, Jonathan (1997). Review: Soviet-German Relations and the Origins of the Second World War: The Jury Is Still Out. The Journal of Modern History 69.4, 785-797.
  100. ^ Кривицкий, Вальтер (1938). Из воспоминаний советского коммуниста. Социалистический вестник 7, April 15, 1938.
  101. ^ W. G. Krivitsky, I Was Stalin's Agent (London, 1940).
  102. ^ Roberts, Geoffrey. The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War (London, 1995), chap. 3.
  103. ^ D. C. Watt, 'The Initiation of the Negotiations Leading to the Nazi-Soviet Pact: A Historical Problem', in C. Abramsky, ed., Essays in Honour of E.H. Carr (London, Macmillan, 1974).)
  104. ^ R.C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941 (New York, W.W. Norton, 1991).
  105. ^ Haslam, Jonathan (1997). Review: Soviet-German Relations and the Origins of the Second World War: The Jury Is Still Out. The Journal of Modern History 69.4, 785-797.
  106. ^ Watt, p. 164. In How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War (London, Heinemann, 1989)
  107. ^ Carr, E. H. (1949) From Munich to Moscow. II. Soviet Studies 1 (2), 93-105.
  108. ^ See Ernst von Weizsäcker, Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign Office. April 17,1939 @ Avalon Project
  109. ^ Geoffrey Roberts (1992). The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany. Soviet Studies 44.1, 57-78.
  110. ^ The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Office @ Avalon Project
  111. ^ Roberts, Geoffrey (1992). The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany. Soviet Studies 44 (1), 57-78.
  112. ^ The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union. (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Office @ Avalon Project
  113. ^ Roberts, Geoffrey (1992). The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany. Soviet Studies 44 (1), 57-78.
  114. ^ The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) @ Avalon Project and some following documents
  115. ^ Roberts, Geoffrey (1992). The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany. Soviet Studies 44 (1), 57-78.
  116. ^ The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Office @ Avalon Project
  117. ^ Roberts, Geoffrey (1992). The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany. Soviet Studies 44 (1), 57-78.
  118. ^ German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty @ Avalon Project
  119. ^ Secret Supplementary Protocol @ Avalon Project
  120. ^ "Terminal horror suffered by so many millions of innocent Jewish, Slavic, and other European peoples as a result of this meeting of evil minds is an indelible stain on the history and integrity of Western civilization, with all of its humanitarian pretensions" (Note: "this meeting" refers to the most famous third (Zakopane) conference).
    Conquest, Robert (1991). "Stalin: Breaker of Nations". New York, N.Y.: Viking. ISBN 0670840890
  121. ^ Moscow's Week at Time Magazine on Monday, Oct. 09, 1939
  122. ^ The Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania by David J. Smith, Page 24, ISBN 0415285801
  123. ^ Tannberg. Tarvel. Documents on the Soviet Military Occupation of Estonia, Trames, 2006.
  124. ^ Vehviläinen, Olli. Finland in the Second World War: Between Germany and Russia.New York: Palgrave, 2002. ISBN 0333801490.
  125. ^ Van Dyke, Carl. The Soviet Invasion of Finland 1939-1940. London: Frank Cass, 1997. ISBN 0714643149.
  126. ^ Milward, German Economy at War. London 1965, pp. 2-18; Medicott, The Economic Blockade. Vol I, London 1952, pp. 47-48.
  127. ^ Hillgruber, Germany at two World Wars. Harvard University Press, 1981, p. 75
  128. ^ Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie. Politik und Kriegsführung 1940 – 1941. Frnakfurt am Main, 1965. S.667-671
  129. ^ Anatomies of a Murderer by DAVID K. SHIPLER http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE5DF1331F93BA25752C1A966958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all
  130. ^ Pravda, 30 November 1939, http://www.magister.msk.ru/library/stalin/14-25.htm
  131. ^ It is generally known, however, that the British and French governments turned down German peace efforts, made public by her already at the end of last year, which for its part, owed to preparations to escalate the war. Molotov's report on March 29, 1940 http://www.histdoc.net/history/molotov.html
  132. ^ Aleksandr M. Nekrich, Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922-1941. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. p. 144
  133. ^ Dyck, Harvey. Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 1926-1933 (New York, 1966), pp. 162-174
  134. ^ Buchsweiler, Meir. Volksdeutsche in der Ukraine am Vorabend und Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegs -- ein Fall doppelter Loyalität? (Gerlingen, 1984), pp. 58-64.
  135. ^ Martin, Terry (1998). The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing. The Journal of Modern History 70 ( 4), 813-861.
  136. ^ Martin, Terry (1998). The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing. The Journal of Modern History 70 ( 4), 813-861.
  137. ^ Martin, Terry (1998). The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing. The Journal of Modern History 70 ( 4), 813-861.
  138. ^ Buchsweiler, Meir. Volksdeutsche in der Ukraine am Vorabend und Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegs -- ein Fall doppelter Loyalität? (Gerlingen, 1984), pp. 64-71.
  139. ^ Martin, Terry (1998). The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing. The Journal of Modern History 70 ( 4), 813-861.
  140. ^ Martin, "An Affirmative Action Empire", pp. 757-759.
  141. ^ Martin, Terry (1998). The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing. The Journal of Modern History 70 ( 4), 813-861.
  142. ^ See also The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Ministry (February 7, 1938) @ Avalon Project
  143. ^ Бугай, Н.Ф. (ред.) Л. Берия - И. Сталину: Согласно вашему указанию. М, 1995. p. 27-55
  144. ^ Fleischhauer, Ingeborg. Operation Barbarossa. In: Rogovin Frunkel, Edith (ed.), The Soviet Germans: Past and Present. New York: St. Martin's, 1986.

[edit] External links

[edit] Further reading

  • Ericson, Edward E. Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933-1941. New York: Praeger, 1999. ISBN 0275963373
  • Kochan, Lionel. Russia and the Weimar Republic. Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes, 1954.
  • Carr, Edward Hallett. German-Soviet Relations between the Two World Wars. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951.
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