Ethiopia has continued to progress during the eight years since this book originally appeared, in spite of occasional setbacks. Weather always plays tricks on Ethiopia. There have been both droughts and floods, but the country has become more efficient in dealing with natural disasters and international assistance has always been forthcoming. The most surprising and difficult of the challenges the EPRDF-led government had to face occurred just as Layers of Time was in the final stages of writing, in time to be given brief mention (p. 338)—Eritrea's sudden attack on Ethiopia in May 1998. Strains between the governments in Addis Ababa and Asmara had seemed minor and amenable to settlement—hardly serious enough to lead to war. An Eritrean delegation had come to Addis Ababa in the spring of 1998 to talk about problems that had arisen as a result of Eritrea's introduction of its own currency, the nacfa, in November 1997. While discussions were underway in early May, Isaias Afewerki suddenly and without warning sent his army across the border into Tigray at several points.[1]

With little difficulty, the Eritrean army occupied areas that had always been under Ethiopian administration because the EPRDF had judged the northern border safe and maintained almost no military forces in the region. Eritrea had made no prior claims to areas it occupied. I trekked in the northeastern border region in February 1998 to the monastery of Gunda Gunde and found no evidence of worry or tension among the local population, no unusual security precautions and no military units. The Eritrean invasion came as a total surprise to both authorities in the region and to the government in Addis Ababa. The fact that Eritrea prepared the invasion while its officials were negotiating in Addis Ababa is evidence of calculated deception on the part of Isaias Afewerki.

Meles Zenawi's government reacted with shock and anger. The public pressed the government to take retaliatory measures against the large number of Eritreans residing in Ethiopia, many of whom were expelled. Asmara expelled most Ethiopian citizens who had remained in Eritrea. Eritrean treatment of the inhabitants of the occupied border regions was harsh. Eritrean forces destroyed churches, schools, health stations and infrastructure. During the months that followed, the EPRDF-led government declared itself the victim of aggression, appealed to the UN and the international community to condemn Eritrean incursions and demanded Eritrean withdrawal. When Eritrea refused to justify or even discuss its actions, Ethiopia mobilized and Meles Zenawi decided on military action to regain occupied areas. In all, close to half a million Ethiopian citizens in the border region had become refugees, confronting Ethiopia with a major humanitarian relief problem.

Curiously, the international community proved reluctant to recognize that unprovoked aggression had occurred. The UN, the United States and most European powers—as well as much of the international press—were indulgent toward Eritrea and treated the crisis as simply a quarrel between equally innocent parties. At that time, Eritrea still commanded widespread sympathy as a new nation striving to consolidate its independence. It continued to profit from the massive propaganda effort it had mounted during the final years of struggle against the Derg. Eritrea exploited international media to misrepresent its actions, and Isaias fostered the impression that Eritrea was still struggling against Ethiopian aggression, as it had during Derg times.

Only gradually did it become clear to the international community that equal treatment of the perpetrator and the victim of aggression was unjust and ineffective in moderating Eritrean behavior. The fundamental question remains: Why did the Eritrean leader embark on such a risky adventure? What is clear is that the border was not really the problem but an excuse for Eritrean actions. Isaias mistook manifestations of democracy in Ethiopia for weakness and hoped to cause the collapse of the EPRDF government in Addis Ababa. He saw this as a means of diverting attention from growing strains among the ethnic and religious groups in Eritrea and from the economic and political failures of his increasingly authoritarian rule. Progress toward democracy in Eritrea had stalled, and the constitution, approved with great fanfare in a referendum in 1996, had never (and to date has still not) been put into effect. Isaias miscalculated. Eritrea found no sympathizers among Ethiopia's population, who rallied in support of the EPRDF-led government. Ethiopian soldiers fought with skill and determination and regained control of most of the territory Isaias Afewerki's soldiers had occupied by the end of 1999. As the Eritreans were pushed back into their own territory, they systematically destroyed the areas they had occupied. In the once prosperous border town of Zalambessa, for example, they blew up residential and commercial buildings, carried movable property back into Eritrea and destroyed water pipes and electric lines. In the spring of 2000, Ethiopian forces penetrated deep into Eritrea on several sections of the front.

At this point, parallels to the experience of the American-led coalition in the Gulf War against Iraq became striking. If the first President Bush had sent his forces on to Baghdad to depose Saddam Hussein in early 1991, the problems the United States had to cope with in Iraq in the early 21^st century might never have arisen. Eritrean forces were so soundly defeated in early 2000 that Ethiopia could have pushed on to Asmara and expelled Isaias. The end of his authoritarian rule would not only have benefited Ethiopia; it would also have been an enormous gain for the people of Eritrea. Why did Ethiopia not move on? Meles Zenawi was dissuaded by the international community, especially by the United States, to avoid toppling the EPLF government in Asmara. American emissaries who came to help negotiate a cease-fire argued that Eritrea would serve as a barrier to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism from Sudan. They considered it important to preserve Isaias Afewerki's leadership to stabilize Eritrea. Ethiopia stopped its advance and entered into "proximity talks" in Algiers. These led to negotiations for a cease-fire.

Ethiopia insisted on assurance that Eritrea would not be able to mount another attack against it. Eritrea, soundly beaten, was in no position to refuse to ackowledge Ethiopia’s insistence. Ethiopia's aim was achieved with agreement on a UN-sponsored peacekeeping mission to monitor a 25-km.-wide strip of demilitarized territory on the Eritrean side of the border. For this purpose, the border was defined as it existed prior to the Eritrean invasion. This feature of the cease-fire agreement was ipso facto recognition of Eritrea's guilt.

Deterioration in Eritrea

As hostilities ceased, Ethiopia withdrew all its troops from Eritrean territory and preparations for the UN-operated peacekeeping mission, UNMEE[2], began immediately. Final demarcation of the border later became a rancorous problem. Both countries agreed on an independent border commission that would demarcate a border acceptable to both.[3] This commission met in the Hague and spent almost two years studying maps and documents from the Italian colonial period but failed to visit the border region. It was hardly surprising that its rulings, when finally announced in April 2002, contained awkward and arbitrary features, some of which would have been geographically impossible to implement. Many of its decisions favored Ethiopia, but the country objected strongly to the assignment of two important areas to Eritrea: (1) the town of Badme and its surroundings in the central border region and (2) a segment in the northeast inhabited by the Irob ethnic group, who had suffered heavy destruction during Eritrean occupation.[4] Ethiopia proposed bilateral negotiations to settle these issues. Isaias Afewerki was adamant—he was not interested in the border as such, only in exploiting the issue to continue harassing Ethiopia.

The border remained undemarcated as Eritrea degenerated into extreme authoritarianism.[5] Journalists and many of Isaias's own colleagues have been jailed. Many Eritreans who returned in the early 1990s to help build the new state have left. The population has continued to decline. Large numbers of young men have fled to avoid military service. Asmara University has been closed. The attack on Ethiopia cost Eritrea heavily in lives and resources. Nevertheless, Isaias has continued to buy arms and has maintained an outsized standing army based on conscription of both young men and women. The Eritrean economy has contracted, forcing austerity measures. Few of Eritrea’s erstwhile ardent supporters and apologists remain loyal to Isaias. Some have become strong critics.

It is a sad and depressing outcome from what appeared at the start of the 1990s to be a promising beginning for independent Eritrea. No change is in sight as long as Isaias retains power. Eritrean opposition groups abroad are numerous but have consistently failed to unite to take effective action.

Progress in Ethiopia

Ethiopia expended both lives and resources defeating Eritrea’s invasion, but losses were spread over a far larger population than in Eritrea. Development momentum that had gained force since the mid-1990s was not greatly affected. The economy continued to expand and investment from both domestic and external sources increased. Many diaspora Ethiopians returned and invested in productive enterprises. The currency remained stable, inflation low. Ethiopia held l parliamentary elections in May 2000, as its operations against Eritrea reached a successful climax. During the following year, strains within the ruling group developed and threatened to undermine the cohesion of the TPLF under Meles Zenawi's leadership. They were eventually settled with the dismissal of a number of federal and regional officials, but with little serious political or economic effect. Basic EPRDF policies continued unchanged.[6] The first years of the 21^st century were marked by great progress in expansion of infrastructure: dams, highways, communications. Addis Ababa grew steadily, with new construction outpacing that of any previous period. A Ring Road, circling the eastern, southern and western edges of the city, was completed in 2004. Radial highways to the center of the city have continued to be constructed. Better transportation encouraged development of new suburban housing areas as well as commercial and industrial undertakings. Industrial and commercial development extends southward through Kalitti and Akaki to Debre Zeit and on toward Mojo.

The establishment of new regional universities gained momentum after 2000. Thirteen are now in operation, producing a steady stream of graduates in many fields, with particular emphasis on technology, management, agriculture and education. Elementary and secondary education has continued to receive a major share of governmental expenditure, along with expansion of elementary health services. The government has adhered to these priorities at the same time that the experience of the war with Eritrea compelled it to invest more in its military services. A notable aspect of the educational scene in Ethiopia has been the enormous growth of private educational undertakings. Not only in Addis Ababa, but in all parts of the country, enterprising individuals and groups have set up colleges and vocational schools that offer training in fields ranging from computer science and management to engineering and journalism, for which students pay moderate fees and earn certificates of accomplishment. The Ministry of Education has implemented a system for evaluating and accrediting private colleges. They provide an additional source of talent for both government agencies and private entrepreneurs.

Ethiopia's traditional agricultural commodities have continued to be the best export earners: coffee, hides and skins, oilseeds—but new products have gradually gained in importance. These include ready-made clothing, leather goods and handicraft items. One of the most unusual new fields of enterprise that has attracted significant foreign investment is flower growing for export by air to Europe and the Middle East. Huge greenhouse complexes near sources of water are now a striking feature of the landscape along all the main routes south of Addis Ababa. Efficient air transport ensures dependable markets abroad. Ethiopia has begun to rival Kenya as a source of cut flowers year round.

Tourism has increased gradually but steadily during the past eight years. Growth has not been affected by regional tensions. As of the winter of 2006–07, tourist facilities along the Historic Route and in the southwest were approaching saturation. Private hotel construction has outstripped government facilities, and private tour operators are now recognized as the principal agents for expansion of the country's capability to receive and accommodate growing numbers of tourists. Expansion of tourism has benefited the economy in many ways.

Both regionally and internationally, Ethiopia has returned to the status it enjoyed in the late Imperial period as a country always ready to play a responsible role in international affairs. Addis Ababa remains the capital of Africa, hosting the headquarters of the African Union, the successor of the Organization of African Unity, in which Ethiopia has always played a significant role. For more than a decade, Ethiopian leaders devoted long hours to the problem of finding a solution to the deterioration of Somalia and offered support for the consolidation of a responsible administration in Somaliland. A stable Somaliland has, in turn, offered Ethiopia an alternate route to the sea through Berbera. Ethiopia has cooperated with international efforts to combat terrorism—having already gained a reputation for effective efforts to work against drug trafficking.

Politics and Elections

The EPRDF leadership remains firmly committed to democracy, but smoothly functioning multi-party democracy has proved to be elusive. Through 2004, opposition political parties continued to depend on foreign support and advice and concentrated on generating foreign pressures on the governing EPRDF. They failed to devise realistic alternate economic policies. Ethiopia, unique among former communist-dominated countries, had no neo-communist or socialist party that attracted members and followers of the Derg or claimed to be a reformed successor of it. The Derg “Workers’ Party” (WPE) remains proscribed, while some former officials continue to be incarcerated awaiting trial. Mengistu Haile Mariam's trial in absentia came to an end only in December 2006.

Parliamentary elections of May 2005 produced a new phenomenon in Ethiopian politics. Two coalitions formed to cmpaign against the ruling EPRDF. One, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), popularly known as Kinejit, was formed of Amhara-oriented centrist groups. The other, United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF), popularly known as Hibret, consisted primarily of southern-based groups. Both mounted vigorous campaigns, but the ruling EPRDF, overconfident of its standing with the electorate, neglected to engage in energetic campaigning. Both opposition coalitions mobilized support and funding from diaspora elements in the United States. In the case of Kinejit, these included a substantial number of former Derg officials[7]. Thus, Kinejit's efforts in the 2005 elections marked a deliberate effort on the part of some elements in it to restore the influence of long-dormant former Derg forces, operating primarily from abroad and motivated by desire for revenge against the EPRDF. Kinejit included former Derg officials among its leaders.

The EPRDF welcomed foreign observers during campaigns and the elections in May 2005. The European Union sent a large group headed by the Portuguese socialist Ana Gomes. The Carter Center in the United States sent a smaller group headed by ex-President Jimmy Carter. Both groups of observers judged the voting itself to be fair and honest. But when the counting of votes had barely begun, the two opposition coalitions claimed they had won an overwhelming victory. Kinejit's claims were supported by Ana Gomes. Kinejit also claimed extensive irregularities, and Hibret fewer. And both accused the National Election Board of prejudiced actions. It became clear soon after the voting that the EPRDF had lost practically all its seats in Addis Ababa, but results in the regions did not substantiate the opposition coalitions’ claims of a victory over the EPRDF in rural areas where 85% of the Ethiopian population lives. In many districts, vote recounts were eventually agreed upon and carried out, and the EPRDF emerged with a parliamentary majority.

Kinejit took a contradictory stance. It refused to plan to take over the administration of Addis Ababa and demonstrate its ability to govern the capital, which the EPRDF was ready to concede. It organized street protests in the capital against what it alleged were fraudulent vote counts throughout the country. These became continually more serious. Hibret did not join in these actions. Violence mounted during early June when Kinejit called a taxi strike and encouraged mob attacks on buses, banks and commercial establishments. The EPRDF authorized police to react with force, and a number of demonstrators as well as policemen were killed. Subseuently large numbers of Kinejit supporters were arrested and interned. The EPRDF claimed that Kinejit leaders had deliberately encouraged violence and provoked police reaction with the aim of creating a "Rose (or Orange) Revolution" of the kind that occurred in Georgia and Ukraine. Politicians and the public were shocked; civic and religious leaders appealed for calm. An uneasy period of tension and confusion continued for several weeks.

Ana Gomes issued a report in September I behalf of the EU observer group that was highly critical of the government, especially the National Election Board, and supportive of most Kinejit claims. The EPRDF contested her claims. The Carter Center report gave the elections a basically positive endorsement. Differences developed among Kinejit leaders when some Kinejit candidates who were elected took their seats in parliament. Hibret took a more conciliatory stance and agreed to participate in parliament. This cost it the backing of its diaspora support group in Washington who, like the majority of Kinejit supporters, advocated a continued rejectionist stance. Parties that won smaller numbers of seats agreed to join parliament, and a long period of jockeying over parliamentary participation ensued. International human rights groups and media reflected diaspora denunciation of the EPRDF for having permitted killings. Pressures on Western governments and the World Bank led to restrictions on development aid. Tension rose steadily during autumn. In November, Kinejit called for a country-wide general strike. Threatened by a resurgence of violence, the government took strong measures, incarcerating Kinejit party leaders in Addis Ababa. Hibret dissociated itself from agitation in November. The EPRDF appointed a non-party administration to govern the capital.

Kinejit leaders have remained incarcerated as the party has fragmented into two major factions and some minor offshoots. Hibret leaders have cooperated with the government in parliament, and smaller parties, such as the Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement, have remained critical of the EPRDF while participating in parliament. Pro-Kinejit elements among the diaspora in the United States made efforts to persuade the U.S. Congress to pass legislation condemning the EPRDF. These efforts were not supported by the President and the State Department and have so far been unsuccessful. The commotion stemming from the 2005 elections has had little effect on the EPRDF's ability to deliver government services and maintain development momentum. Infrastructure projects have proceeded successfully, exports have increased and tourism has expanded. Increased economic cooperation with China, as it expands its activities in Africa, has become a major feature of development policy. Meles Zenawi has announced a continued commitment to maintain progress toward multi-party democracy, but the path to be followed is far from clear. Changes in political party functions and electoral procedure seem likely, along with, perhaps, measures to limit the influence of the diaspora on the political process.

Crisis over Somalia

Ethiopia was an enthusiastic participant in the effort that culminated, in 2004 in Nairobi, in the creation of a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for Somalia. The TFG was temporarily established in Baidoa in preparation for an eventual move to Mogadishu. In the summer of 2006, however, a group calling itself the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) took power in Mogadishu and inaugurated a reactionary Islamic program. Its leaders took a hostile stance toward Ethiopia and made claims on the Ethiopian Ogaden, apparently forgetting that his invasiom of the Ogaden had led to the defeat of Somali dictator Siad Barre in 1978 and contributed to his downfall in 1991 and the bloody collapse of central government in Somalia. Ethiopia's leaders became increasingly concerned about Somalia through the latter months of 2006, as did Kenya. The United States had evidence that al Qaeda–connected terrorists who had been responsible for bombing American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Selaam had found refuge in Somalia. The danger that Somalia would become a new haven for al Qaeda operations seemed likely, for the ICU gained endorsement from al Qaeda spokesmen. Ethiopian concerns intensified as Isaias Afewerki, ready to exploit a new opportunity to harass Ethiopia, began supplying advisors and weaponry to the Islamic Courts.[8]

In December 2006, Ethiopia decided that it must intervene to support the beleaguered TFG in Baidoa, and at the end of the year mounted a major military operation to unseat the ICU. The United States provided intelligence support to Ethiopia and placed a naval task force along the Somali coast. Ethiopian intervention proved rapidly successful. The ICU collapsed, and many of its members fled to Kenya. The U.S. Naval force launched bombing attacks on fleeing Islamists. Eritreans in Somalia fled, and some were captured. All the equipment Eritrea supplied to the ICU was lost. The Ethiopian army surprised international observers by the high quality of its performance.[9]

Ethiopia disavowed any designs on Somali territory and committed itself to complete withdrawal from Somalia to make way for an African Union peacekeeping force expected to take over in early 2007. Somalia is still far from settled and may prove difficult to stabilize, but the danger it could represent to Ethiopia has been decisively reduced. Eritrea has suffered an embarrassing defeat. What effect this may have on Isaias Afewerki's ability to maintain himself in power remains to be seen.

The Ethiopian Millennium

The historic Ethiopian calendar reaches the year 2000 in September 2007 of the Western calendar. EPRDF leaders decided to make this an occasion for reconciliation and celebration as well as for undertaking projects that will lay the basis for Ethiopia's progress during its Third Millennium. A meeting of the national Millennium Council, consisting of a broad group of distinguished Ethiopians and friends of Ethiopia from abroad, was held in December 2006. The African Union declared the Ethiopian Millennium a major milestone significant for all of Africa in its early 2007 summit in Addis Ababa. Events and projects of many kinds marking the Millennium will be inaugurated in EC 2000 and into EC 2001. It marks a major milestone, for, after steady progress for the better part of a century, Ethiopia fell under control of an oppressive, aggressive leader in 1974 who attempted to force it into a communist system that was already facing collapse. Since 1991, the country has entered into a new period of freedom and rapid development. It completes its Second Millennium as one of the most promising countries in Africa, respected throughout the world. It is a good beginning for the Third Millennium.