Brotherly Peoples' Conflicts & Wars in the Horn of Africa

Six weeks ago Ethiopia invaded Somalia. In a matter of days, Ethiopian and allied Somali forces routed the Islamic Courts Union, a coalition of Islamists whose Jihadist rhetoric and expanding rule Ethiopia deemed a regional security threat. In their place in Mogadishu, the Somali capital, Ethiopia helped install an allied UN-backed transitional government.

The invasion has put the spotlight on the Horn of Africa's most populous and powerful country. Meles Zenawi has led Ethiopia since the rebel movement he belonged to overthrew dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991 following years of guerrilla warfare. William Wallis, the FT's Africa editor interviewed him in Addis Ababa.

Q: The Americans appear to be concerned that some of the leadership of Somalia's Islamic Courts may be regrouping in Saudi Arabia, Eritrea and possibly Yemen? Is this something you are aware of?

A: Well there is a bit of a regrouping going on of the leaders but it all depends on how things turn out in Mogadishu. If the reconciliation conference that the president of the TFG (Somali Transitional Federal Government) was talking about takes off well there won't be the political basis for these groups to destabilise Somalia wherever they might congregate.

Q: Is there not a danger that international Jihadist networks may see this as an opportunity to open a new front in Somalia?

A: They had everything going for them before the back of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was broken. So by any measure we are much better off than where we were a month or two ago. Of course there is a risk of the re-emergence of a significant threat in the future but that will depend more on what the TFG does. If the TFG manages to pull off the plans it has for national reconciliation - and I have no reason to doubt that - then the remnants of the ICU and international Jihadists will be politically marginalised and therefore the security threat they can pose will be containable.

Q: What about the Eritreans (who supported Ethiopia's adversaries in Somalia). Have they been significantly weakened?

A: Well their strategy has been completely shattered.

They were trying to fish in troubled waters. And to the extent that the troubled waters are calmed all their attempts to fish around will not be fruitful.

Q: Has this operation significantly damaged the Ethiopian rebel movements that you allege were training in Somalia, supported by the Eritreans?

A: Absolutely. Some of these rebels were killed. Quite a number of their senior leaders were captured. They have lost the rear base they had in Somalia therefore their capacity to destabilise us has been dramatically reduced.

Q: How closely did you co-ordinate the whole operation with the Americans?

A: Well initially the Americans had serious misgivings about any military operation on our part in Somalia and they indicated that to us quite clearly. In the end we told them we have no option and that we are going in. They subsequently said in the event of our going into Somalia they would not renege on our previous agreement to share intelligence on terrorism. And so they supported us quite well on providing intelligence sharing.

They also provided diplomatic support in the United Nations and elsewhere and that has been very, very helpful.

Q: Were you fully aware of their own military operations in Somalia when they took place, the air strikes?

A: Yes we were.

Q: On both occasions?

A: I only know of one air raid.

Q: There was a second US air raid reported.

A: I am not aware of it.

Q: Have you been able to get an idea of which of the Islamist leadership survived these and other strikes?

A: We do not have definite information on a number of key al Qaeda targets. There are reports that one or two of them might have died but we have no confirmation. We have been trying to confirm that together with the Americans, to try and carry out DNA tests on a number of individuals who have died. But these DNA tests have not shown that the dead people that we came across were the top al Qaeda individuals. But we still have reports that they might have died in the battles. And we do not have any information on at least one individual.

Q: What about the more extremist elements among the Somali Islamists?

A: We had come across some documents that belonged to (Aden Hashi) Ayro and on that basis we suspected that he might have died in some of those battles. But later there have been reports of sightings of Ayro. We know that (Somali Islamist leaders) Hassan Turki and (Hassan Dahir) Aweys are alive and moving in and out of Kenya on the border.

Q: Are your troops operational there, are they still fighting?

A: They are not operational on a day-to-day basis but when they get targets of opportunity they do carry out raids.

Q: Will the timing of Ethiopia's withdrawal from Somalia depend on those operations?

A: No. We think that essentially the military operations are complete. The focus now should be more on the diplomatic, political front. We have our own withdrawal plans, which are independent of the deployment of African Union (peacekeeping) troops but it appears more and more that there will be a large measure of overlap. I wouldn't be surprised if we have the first contingent of the African Union some time in the second half of February.

Q: Where has this intervention in Somalia left your relationship with neighbouring Eritrea?

A: It has been for some time in the doldrums and unfortunately I don't see any signs of improvements.

Q: Some people think it is a very personal matter between you and President Isaias (Afewerki) and that only if one if you is gone will the problems between Ethiopia and Eritrea be resolved.

A: I wish it was as trivial as a personal feud but I think it is much deeper than that.

Q: Is there a clear way of resolving the crisis?

A: We see a clear way of resolving it and the five-point plan we have put on the table is such a clear way of resolving. The problem is that the Eritrean government doesn't want to talk. If you don't talk you do not resolve problems. Even if you go to war in the end you talk. So there is no way of getting round talking to each other. But that elementary truth does not seem to have dawned on our cousins in the north.

Q: So long as the border problem (between Eritrea and Ethiopia) remains presumably there are going to be continuing episodes of conflict in the Horn.

A: I don't think the capacity of the Eritreans to destabilise the Horn is as big as people imagined and I think the Somalia episode has conclusively shown that.

Q: Can I ask a few questions about the domestic political situation? I've been in Addis now for a couple of weeks and its clear there is still considerable trauma hanging over from the election and its violent aftermath in 2005. How much of a set back to democratisation has this been?

A: Very serious. We started well. We had an election campaign that was described by everyone as perhaps one of the best in the continent and subsequently after the elections we had this difficult period when many people died including policemen. That has been a serious set back.

Q: During the elections the (ruling) EPRDF did fine in rural areas it seems but you lost comprehensively in the capital. Have you looked at why?

A: I think we were perceived to be concerned solely with the rural areas and given the background of our movement, which was a rural movement, people in the urban areas needed to be reassured that we were not exclusively concerned with the rural areas. Apparently we did not succeed in persuading them.

Perhaps understandably we have focused our efforts on agricultural development. That's where 85 per cent of the population lives. That's more than 50 per cent of our GDP and much of the economic growth we have had has been in the rural areas. The urban poor have not benefited as much from the economic growth we have generated. So that also fed into the disenchantment in urban areas particularly in Addis.

There were also political issues that some people in Addis were not comfortable with including the fact that we recognised the independence of Eritrea, and…offered to engage the Eritrean government in dialogue.

Q: In other words your electoral defeat in the capital was also a product of the outcome of the (1998 to 2000 border) war.

A: It is not the outcome of the war per se, so much as the outcome of the independence of Eritrea. As you know our movement had fully accepted the independence of Eritrea and welcomed it as a peaceful way of resolving this 30 years war we had. We had tried to establish good relations with Eritrea and after the border war some in the urban areas wanted us to reverse the independence of Eritrea. We didn't want to go that far and when we came out with the five-point plan, which would have legalised the boundaries of Ethiopia and Eritrea and would have normalised relations between these two independent states. Some of these people felt betrayed twice and they vented their anger.

I don't think their anger was legitimate. I don't think their views as far as Eritrea is concerned are reasonable. Nevertheless we have not convinced them that our position is the more reasonable and pragmatic.

Q: You say this is nothing so trivial as a personal feud between you and President Isaias, but why, given how close you were to him in the past, have you not been able to pick up the telephone and speak to him and resolve it between you?

A: I used to do that in the early days of the conflict but it soon became very clear that this thing was deeper than some people thought. Some people thought it was just some misunderstanding around the border but I knew there were other fundamental problems. I had hoped and assumed that these tensions would not lead to war because nobody benefits from this war. But it became very clear that the Eritrean leadership had other views about it. The border was not the central problem. The central problem was the economic relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia and the perspective that the Eritrean government has with regards to its economic future vis a vis the rest of the Horn of Africa.

Q: Back in 1996 you and a group of other allied leaders in the region including President Isaias, managed to persuade policy-makers in the west, particularly the US that together you could help transform the continent.

A: We never set out to transform the whole continent. We set out to transform our own country and by doing so contribute towards the transformation of the continent. I think we have made a lot of headway as far as our own country is concerned. We have done very well as far as economic development, social development. In spite of the set backs we had after the elections I believe we are doing quite well politically too. Our recent efforts in Somalia have also contributed to the stabilisation of the Horn of Africa.

Q: I have had a chance to read some excerpts from your latest book. You appear to be very disenchanted with the World Bank-led liberal market model for development in Africa. What alternative are you proposing?

A: Well I am suggesting that what some people have called a developmental model based on experience in east Asia particularly that in Korea and Taiwan but also in some other countries has a higher chance of success than the so called neo-liberal model. I think the only place where it (neo-liberalism) has delivered growth, with some qualification, is England in particular and the UK in general and that was the first country to industrialise. Every other country that has industrialised has done so by means other than neo-liberal including the United States and Germany.

And so while the neo-liberal model was right in identifying the central problem in Africa as being pervasive rent seeking on the part of the state, its solution was to remove the state from the economic equation. The neo-liberal reforms did not transform the rent-seeking state into a non-rent seeking one. It has no capacity to do it. All it did was reduce the influence of the state without changing its nature and therefore was inherently incapable of generating the type of growth it sought.

Mind you the fact that there was focus on correcting huge macroeconomic imbalances was right. It would be right even under a developmental model but the underlying philosophy I think is flawed.

Q: Clearly believe in a strong state, and strong state intervention?

A: Not in an unqualified sense. I believe in a strong developmental state and developmental states do not intervene in the market in a wanton fashion. They intervene in the market to address pervasive market failures and let the markets work where they work well. So it is a combination of market instruments and non-market instruments to optimise the outcome. That's been the model lets say in Korea, and Taiwan.

Q: In your book you seem to suggest that the capacity of the state to play this role is also partly dependant on stability of government. This suggests that you need to be in the driving seat for a long time?

A: No. I actually try to show that first developmental states do not have to be authoritarian. On the contrary I try to show that democratic states will actually do better than authoritarian states so long as both are developmental.

Secondly stability of policy does not depend on a certain party or a certain leader in power. It depends on how strong the influence of a certain idea within society is.

I'll give you the example of your own country. When Mrs Thatcher was carrying out her reforms it was new, it was resented by significant sectors of the population in the UK. Once many of her reforms have been firmly established they became the starting point of every party in the UK including the Labour party. The Labour party of course changed certain things but some of the fundamental tenets were there.

Developmental policy did not change with the introduction of democracy in neither Korea nor Taiwan because it had broad acceptance in society. Stability in policy can only be achieved in a sustainable manner so long as it is accepted by broad sectors of society so that parties will not have the incentive to change them when governments change.

Q: How long do you plan to remain in charge?

A: In person? Not long. But I hope my party stays longer than I do.

Q: So you plan to hand over soon, say in the next 3 or 4 years?

A: That's my expectation.

Q: Before elections?

A: What I'm saying is while I would hope that my party would be there and would even win the next election and the election after, like all parties wish, I don't wish to be here for much longer than my current term.

Q: This is your last term in other words?

A: That's my hope and expectation.

Q: Can I turn to your relations with China? These are increasingly strong. Is this partly because of your disillusionment with the neo-liberal policies touted by the west?

A: No. It's nothing to do with it. The reason why we have strong economic ties with China now is because China is emerging as a major actor. It is in a position to provide credit. It is in a position to provide assistance and we get credit and assistance wherever it is available. While our economic relationship is increasing we also have excellent relations with the UK for example and with the United States.

Q: I understand the Chinese have opened a $1.5bn credit facility with Ethiopia recently?

A: They have opened a $1.5bn credit facility for the Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation.

Q: I thought there was a separate $1.5bn loan as well?

A: That's a $500m credit that is separate. That is a concessional loan.

Q: Has this made up for the decline in financing from the west since the dispute associated with the elections?

A: It has but we need much more than what is available. Our economy is growing well and our investment in infrastructure is dramatically growing, so we still need additional resources.

Q: Will China be the principle source for this in coming years?

A: It is a very important source now and will probably continue to be but I don't think it is the only source.

Q: How do you think China's involvement is changing the continent?

A: For one thing it has increased commodity prices and Africa is a producer of commodities and that has improved the performance of African economies. But of course that in the long run is not what Africa is looking for. Africa wants to process these commodities and export value added products so we will have to go beyond exporting commodities. China is providing lots of credit for infrastructure and Africa needs investment in infrastructure.

Q: Is the $500m loan you talked about destined for infrastructure?

A: Yes. Roads, power, dams.

Q: In the west there is a growing concern that China's willingness to lend without conditions is strengthening regimes that have no regard for human rights, such as Khartoum, and some might say Ethiopia also.

A: I think it would be wrong for people in the west to assume that they can buy good governance in Africa. Good governance can only come from inside. It cannot be imposed from outside. People can have illusions of doing so but the reality is that it never works. What the Chinese have done is explode that illusion. That doesn't in any way weaken the need for democracy and good governance in Africa. It does not in any way endanger the reforms of good governance and democracy in Africa. Because only those that were home grown ever had a chance of success. And the Chinese support does not threaten this home grown effort at reform. They are not forcing anybody to be undemocratic.

Q: Your critics here say you have two faces, one which you address to donors and journalists like me which speaks out in support of democracy, and another face for your domestic audience, which is authoritarian, autocratic.

A: They ought to be the ones who should know better because many of them were members of the Mengistu regime and they know first hand how autocratic governments deal with dissent. One of the leaders of the opposition was a minister in the Mengistu regime. Now, had it been up to him and his ilk I would not have been allowed to speak nor would anyone else with different opinions.

Q: But there is an atmosphere of fear in Addis Ababa now. Almost no one I have spoken to in the past would speak on the record to me.

A: I don't notice that because I get an earful of criticism every day whether it is in parliament, which is broadcast. Outside of parliament whenever I have meetings I get an earful. Some of the criticism is deserved but a good part of it I believe is completely undeserved. Nobody has been imprisoned for criticising the government. No one.

Q: What about the opposition leaders who are in prison? What's their fate? I know the Americans have put pressure on you to release them?

A: I simply can't do that because it is in the hands of the courts. It is up to the courts to decide their fate.

Q: Clearly this is a source of continuing political tensions.

A: Well I think it is very important for democracy to make sure the institutions work. We have accused these people of being involved in an attempt to change the government of the day unconstitutionally and in spite of the criticism by some campaigner who masqueraded herself as an observer, all objective observers that I know of including all governments in Europe, do not contest the fact that we won the last elections.

They wanted to change that by unconstitutional means. When that happens the normal thing to do is to take these people to court. That's what we have tried to do. Any gesture that aborts this process will not help. If there are gestures they can only come after the institutions have had their say.

Q: Do you think the steam has been taken out of the opposition now?

A: I think the steam is out of the violent opposition but not out of opposition as a whole.

Q: I have also found here in Addis that aspects of enterprise are stifled. Is that because you do not believe in the capacity of the private sector to deliver development?

A: I didn't say I don't believe in the capacity of the private sector to deliver. On the contrary the developmental model whether it is in Korea or Taiwan, the engine has to be the private sector. The issue is what the state does to provide a conducive environment for productive activities on the part of the private sector as opposed to rent-seeking activities.

There is always rent. And I argue that it depends on the nature and the policy of the state whether it manages rent for developmental purposes or for completely unproductive rent-seeking purposes. But in the end the growth has to come from the private sector. It cannot come from the state. It didn't come from the state in Taiwan and Korea. The state was the facilitating agency.

I can tell you the investment environment in Ethiopia for the private sector has dramatically improved. So much so for example that we have horticultural companies relocating from a very well established horticulture producer such as Kenya to Ethiopia.

Q: But your telecoms for example trail much of the region and some people would say this is because they are still controlled by the state, that liberalising telecoms in other African countries has proved extremely effective in bringing down prices and rolling out infrastructure.

A: I would argue that the telecoms infrastructure in Europe was built by state companies and that it was only after the backbone was created that there was liberalisation. Not before. And I would argue that nobody in Africa of comparative GDP like ours is investing in broadband infrastructure that is going to be crucial for future economic growth like we are.

Q: Is this what the $1.5bn deal with ZTE of China is going towards?

A: It is. But we started it earlier. We have so far established about 3,000km of optical fibre network within the country. We have linked up with submarine cable with Sudan. We hope to link up to Djibouti too. And at some stage also link up with Kenya too with optic fibre. This is the future. And we are investing in the future in spite of the fact we are begging for food aid at the same time.

Q: Mobile telecoms can expand very rapidly under private control…

A: Yes and it is a license to print money in Africa. The issue is how do you use that money. Do you use it to build less profitable but in the long-term more important infrastructure.

Q: So you are using revenues from mobile telecoms to invest in other communications infrastructure?

A: Yes. Absolutely. We are not spending a single cent of the government budget on telecoms infrastructure. Telecommunications is self-sustaining. (Source: E-mail. Full credit to FT)

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