I thought these comments on Terrence Lyons CSISI paper might be of some interest. They were written a few weeks ago. Response welcome.

Antony Shaw
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Ethiopia in 2005: The Beginning of a Transition? *[1] Some Comments by Antony Shaw

It should concern all Ethiopian scholars, Ethiopianists, observers of Ethiopia that so much recent writing on Ethiopia, including most of the discourse on last year's controversial elections, has been politically inept, even malicious, propaganda, often of appalling quality. The arguments are tendentious at best, seldom making any effort to appear scholarly or impartial, let alone accurate. There is frequently a marked failure of intelligence and argument, together with deliberate manipulation of fact for political interest. None of this should have a place in intellectual debate. It amounts to a real betrayal of scholarly responsibility. That most of the writing has been by committed partisans of  the CUD or of the EPRDF is no excuse. 

There have, of course been a number of more reputable articles from well-known scholars. One of the most prominent writings last year was that by Professor Clapham, a notable name in Ethiopian scholarship.*[2] Professor Clapham must be acquitted of malice or partisanship, but his analysis was marred by significant omissions, and a failure to bring his undoubted analytical powers to bear on the political reality of the post-election process or on the claims of the opposition. * [3]

The latest such article is that of Professor Lyons, Professor of Conflict Resolution at the George Mason University: ‘Ethiopia in 2005: the Beginning of a Transition?’, a paper written for the influential Washington think-tank, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. This also appears to be suffering from the same syndrome of intellectual laziness, with a failure to look in detail at opposition aims and policies, at the influence of the Diaspora, at current EPRDF policies and its levels of support and at other aspects of the events of 2005. These omissions, and the apparent reliance on opposition propaganda, make it clear that Professor Lyons has done little of no recent research in Ethiopia.

Professor Lyons has however been closely connected with the Carter Centre, and that gives his analysis of the election greater authority, as he has been able to draw on the Carter Centre documentation of the election. Disappointingly, however, this association appears to have inhibited him from any criticism of other electoral observers, and in particular of the EU Electoral Monitoring Mission. Off-the-record, and in private, other observers were highly critical about the unprofessional behavior of the head of the EU Monitoring Mission, Mrs. Gomes, as well as of the EU Ambassador, Tim Clarke, and their inappropriate relations with opposition leaders. The Carter Centre was well aware of this, and privately shared such criticism, though it was not prepared to articulate it.

Professor Lyons is content to refer to opposition claims of "irrefutable evidence" of winning the election, and to suggest that: "international observers from the European Union and the Carter Centre also noted problems with the count and with intimidation of the opposition, although they stopped short of accepting the opposition's claim that it had won the election".  He makes no reference to Mrs. Gomes' role in providing support for such claims, or to the political importance of some of her comments to opposition leaders, and the role these played in fueling opposition claims that they had won the election (while privately admitting this to be nonsense). He might also have mentioned the leaked document from Mrs. Gomes’ office in late May which played a significant role in providing the CUD with the misplaced confidence which was a major factor in sparking off the post-election disturbances in June and the shootings on June 8^th. The leaked document was no more than an internal memo, but it asserted the CUD had won the election. The failure of the EU Monitoring Mission to apologize for the leak, or to explain that 80% of the figures used in this assertion were drawn only from Addis Ababa and from the Amhara region where the CUD did particularly well, provided the CUD with a considerable propaganda coup that it was quick to exploit.       

Professor Lyons does make reference to the highly organised anti-government Diaspora and the general role it played in pressing for "hard-line positions and polarizing rhetoric". He does not, however, make any reference to the specific role the Diaspora played in funding Hailu Shawel's AEUP, or in manipulating the CUD leadership into its final refusal to take up its parliamentary seats in October despite the fact that very nearly two-thirds of the CUD central council wanted the elected MPS to join parliament. The most significant omission in this context is the failure to identify the Amhara basis of the CUD, and more particularly of the All Ethiopia Unity Party (AEUP), though he does note that Hailu Shawel was previously in the AAPO. The CUD, of course, does have a significant number of non-Amharas (100,000 I believe); it doesn’t however usually mention that all seven of its regional organizers are Amhara as is most of its leadership. Similarly, support for the CUD in the Diaspora has come largely, though not exclusively, from Amhara, many of whom fled from Ethiopia under the Derg, reinforced by those who have been consistently unprepared to accept Tigrean leadership for Ethiopia, and even worse, a leadership that set up a federal state on ethnic lines with the apparent intention of ensuring the Amhara would never again be able to take a controlling role in the state.

The ethnic factor is something Professor Lyons largely ignores. He does refer to Oromos being apprehensive about CUD policies, and he notes that "some, (particularly in the urban areas and the Amhara region) clearly supported the CUD's platform with regard to Ethiopian nationalist themes ("Ethiopian Unity" in contrast to the ruling party's commitment to ethnic federalism)." He suggests that "others saw leaders of the UEDF and OFDM as more authentic and legitimate representatives of their ethnic group or nationality than EPRDF ethnic parties...", but he fails to expatiate on this or make any attempt to draw out the detail of CUD policies that seriously alarmed almost all nationalities other than Amharas.

From the beginning of the electoral campaign, it was likely that CUD policies would preclude any possibility of an outright victory. The CUD made it plain that it wanted to revoke Article 39 of the Constitution, which provided a very theoretical basis for regional claims for secession. It also made clear it wished to remove the ethnic basis of the killil, and return to smaller provinces. It was widely believed that by this the CUD had in mind a return to the old imperial provinces, though it never specified this; one presumed effect would be to break up the current Oromia state into at least three or four regions in which Oromo majorities could not be taken for granted. The third, particularly controversial, element of policy was the demand for the privatization of land. This has been widely supported by the international community, and by the World Bank, but it is much less popular in southern Ethiopia where it is seen as a device to allow former Amhara landlords, driven out under the land reform of 1975/76, to recover their previous estates. This may well not have been the intention of the CUD but again it was widely believed. In sum, none of these were policies that offered the chance of any real support from Oromos, the Southern regional nationalities, Somalis, Afar, or from any non-Amharas. This is why CUD claims to have won the election are simply impossible, even though the CUD, like other more local parties, was able to capitalize on the very substantial protest vote against the EPRDF and its component parties, most obviously in Addis Ababa.

One of the main difficulties with Professor Lyons’ view of the opposition is that he lumps it all together, failing to note that the two main opposition coalitions not only had nothing in common but also actively disagreed on fundamental areas of policy. Their only real basis for any association was opposition to the EPRDF, and this only briefly survived the election itself. This was made apparent when the UEDF decided to enter parliament and the CUD did not. In other words, Professor Lyons makes the all-too-common mistake (Professor Clapham made an identical error, as indeed did the CUD itself) of assuming that criticisms of the EPRDF or of the government meant support for the CUD. The CUD frequently went a step further, identifying all opposition votes (whether for CUD, UEDF and OFDM) as indication of support for CUD policies. The CUD’s tendency to assume that the extensive protest vote against the EPRDF should be interpreted as positive support for the CUD, or for other opposition parties, is shared by Professor Lyons. There is no evidence for such an assertion. 

There is a widespread, and highly unscholarly, trend in almost all recent comment on Ethiopia that appears to accept that all the elements of the political problems of the last year should be laid at the feet of the government; that government statements should be automatically disbelieved; that opposition pronouncements should be accepted without question; that the government is always responsible for violence; that the opposition never is. Professor Lyons does mention at one point, in passing, that several policemen were killed in the November riots, but elsewhere he ignores the seven police deaths which certainly make clear that violence was not altogether one-sided - as any observer of the riots would have seen. Indeed, the CUD deliberately chose a policy of confrontation on the streets, calling for strikes, a boycott of EPRDF companies and individuals. Despite CUD claims that it was all intended to be peaceful, it was a policy that led inexorably to the violence of November. Indeed, from the perspective of Addis Ababa, CUD claims of non-violent protest look very hollow even though the government certainly used excessive force in response.

The final section of Professor Lyons' paper is headed "Implications for US policy", and it is clearly intended to inform US policy makers. Given the omissions and errors this must be of real concern, both for Ethiopia and for the US. Policy makers who read this paper should certainly take note of the paper's serious deficiencies, and with the very substantial errors in three possible future scenarios that Professor Lyons outlines. Professor Clapham also proposed three such scenarios, based on a similarly flawed analysis: these were that the EPRDF government might leave power peacefully (which Clapham regarded as in the broader interests of the international community and of Ethiopia); that the government might leave power violently which Clapham apparently regarded as most probable; and thirdly that the government might hang on, converting itself into "an overtly repressive regime on the lines of Mugabe's Zimbabwe or Issayas' Eritrea", though Clapham doubted its capacity to do this.

Professor Lyons' scenarios are slightly different though little more plausible as he also fails to take into account government activity or the reality of recent political developments. His first scenario involves a mechanism to strengthen the “more pragmatic elements” of both EPRDF and opposition and marginalizing their rejectionist wings. This, Professor Lyons claims, would need an end of the opposition boycott of parliament, programs to strengthen parliament, and reform the electoral system and a release of those arrested in November. Despite the fact that most of this is already being carried out at least partially, he claims this would require sustained international pressure and a transformation in how the international community regards the government, and rates the possibility as “low”. Second, the opposition “dream” of the government collapsing under massive demonstrations and international sanctions which Professor Lyons rightly describes as “never realistic”. The third scenario, which Professor Lyons described as most likely in the short to medium term, is that the EPRDF will retain power through increasing reliance on military and security forces as “electoral legitimacy declines and international pressures and criticism grows”.  

The problems with these scenarios, and those of Professor Clapham, is that the reliance on opposition sources, and the failure of either author to visit Ethiopia or to try and take a balanced view of EPRDF policies, has led to seriously inaccurate presumptions about government aims and intentions. The result is a failure to take into account a number of critical facts or to acknowledge changes in government and EPRDF policies. Among these are:  

The collapse of the CUD (although Professor Lyons does refer to the shattered opposition coalition he fails to draw any inferences from this), and the appearance of the UEDP as a separate organisation.; any further alliance between UEDP and AEUP is highly improbable. The history of the post-1991 Amhara parties suggests fragmentation is a more likely future than unity for any Amhara opposition.

1.  The basic weakness of any almost exclusive Amhara coalitions in a state where the Amhara make up less than 30% of the population at most, and are not even the largest single ethnic group.
2. The growth of alternative Oromo parties, and current moves towards producing a coherent Oromo political alternative to the Amhara, including the government’s intent to include the Oromo Liberation Front in the political process.    
3. The restructuring of the EPRDF, started last year, particularly in the Amhara region (though whether this will go far enough to restore the position of the EPRDF’s ANDM has yet to be seen).
4. The almost total opposition to CUD policies from all other ethnic groups
5. The possibility that the EPRDF could, in these circumstances, build up support for a real multi-national coalition of all ethnic groups
6. The EPRDF continued complete control of security and military forces; there is no sign of any serious unrest in the armed forces. .
7. The EPRDF’s commitment to a democratic future, and to significant devolution of power to regional and woreda levels of administration, though this has yet to make much real progress.
8. The government’s acceptance of the need to alter parliamentary rules, rethink the draft press law, and re-organize the National Electoral Board; international consultants are already working in all three areas. 

Professor Lyons’ consistently negative view of the EPRDF government is hardly unexpected given his failure to consider the stresses within the opposition, the fundamental divisions between opposition parties and their dangerous dependence upon outdated Amhara Diaspora rhetoric. Nor has he attempted to look beyond the opposition criticisms of the EPRDF to consider its post-electoral policies and strategies. Surprisingly, however, he doesn’t attempt to consider the possibility that divisions within the EPRDF might threaten its cohesion, nor its awareness that its longer-term survival will depend upon its ability to restructure itself as a party, move away from its “revolutionary democracy”, and revitalize its own Amhara and Oromo support. 

In fact, neither Professor Lyons (nor Professor Clapham), in suggesting that the most likely scenario is for the EPRDF to retain power through increased reliance on security, have seriously analysed the make-up, policies or support levels for either opposition or EPRDF. Most obvious is the failure to analyse the support available to the EPRDF, or to see the variations in support for the CUD’s “Ethiopian Unity” even within the Amhara regions themselves. Both appear locked into acceptance of a CUD analysis of the EPRDF based on Diaspora propaganda. In the absence of any first hand knowledge of current developments they have failed to note significant changes within the policies of the EPRDF and the CUD, of both government and opposition. And it is here that Professor Lyons’ contention that a transition is taking place has some reality.

The electoral process of 2005 may well be characterized, as Professor Lyons has done, as a series of squandered opportunities and bad-faith strategies by the major contending parties, but this doesn’t necessarily imply instability. Indeed, by the end of 2005, despite CUD efforts to launch a series of strikes and demonstrations, the government was beginning to move away from the electoral disputes. The main opposition coalition (of the CUD) had split, (of its own volition rather than being shattered as Professor Lyons puts it), with a majority of the UEDP leaving the coalition over the issue of joining parliament coupled with concern over the authoritarian tendencies of the CUD leadership. After that leadership was detained in November, a majority of the CUD MPs elect, including most of those from Hailu Shawel’s AEUP and Rainbow, quietly joined parliament, underlining the point that CU’s decision in October to stay out of parliament was a demonstration of manipulation and pressure by a leadership with which a majority of the CUD’s central council actually disagreed. By February, these MPs were looking to organise their own new leadership within parliament. A majority of the Addis Ababa city councilors-elect, with strong government encouragement, were also moving towards setting up their own administration for the capital. This is likely to involve the creation of a new party as a political vehicle, in practice sidelining the detained CUD leadership.

There have certainly been intermittent demonstrations in schools, both in Addis Ababa and other towns, and these will no doubt continue, but Professor Lyons’ references to the “use of massive levels of military force against civilians and [the] arrest of thousands upon thousands of youths in neighborhood sweeps to keep order in the capital’s streets” are exaggerated.  There was a brief period in early November during and after violent rioting in which seven policemen were killed and 42 civilians died when there were widespread arrests of civilians, but those detained amounted to around 15,000 – more than enough certainly, but a far cry from the 50,000 alleged by the opposition to be held in Didessa alone; the majority of the detainees were released within a couple of weeks.

Those who continue to be held do include a number of CUD leaders, including several elected MPs, a number of journalists and others, but it is slapdash to refer to this as criminalisation of dissent, the current opposition catch phrase. Those arrested have been charged, and it is clear from the evidence now coming into the public domain that they have a case to answer, even if its credibility has yet to be established. The detainees do themselves no favors by refusing to recognize the authority of the court. Amnesty International regards them as prisoners of conscience, but there can be no intrinsic reason why political party leaders, journalists and other professional cannot be involved in attempts to overthrow a state. Professor Lyons might have commented unfavorably, and rather more legitimately, on the conditions under which the detainees are held, on the speed of the trial processes (disgracefully slow) and on the quite unnecessary delays in providing defence lawyers with notice of the evidence against the accused etc.  

Professor Lyons also raises the Ethiopian-Eritrean border issue, but links it to the “contemporary issue” of politics, as part of a “further alarming dimension “ of the internal political crisis”, though he does accept the border has its own internal dynamics. Again, there are serious problems with his analysis. This time it broadly follows the standard tendentious Eritrean arguments that have been endlessly repeated over the Internet for the last few months. Professor Lyons even fails to mention the most important elements of the border crisis: that Eritrea attacked and invaded Ethiopia in May 1998, and that Eritrea has been in non-compliance with the Algiers Agreements since they were signed. Ethiopia, as Professor Lyons does point out, has of course failed to comply with the EEBC’s ruling of April 2002, delaying agreement to demarcate while calling for a dialogue to discuss the anomalies in the Decisions, over which it has also raised significant criticisms, and to deal with normalization of relations with Eritrea. 

In recent months, Eritrea has brought the issue of the border back into international concern by further deliberate flouting of the Algiers Agreements with the limitations it has imposed on UNMEE activity and by its refusal to respond to UN Security Council resolution 1640. Professor Lyons claims it is Ethiopia’s unwillingness to move to implement the border demarcation that has put the UN mission at risk, and threatened another round of fighting. This, again, is Eritrea’s argument, and it is simply not true. It is Eritrea’s own obduracy and political maneuvering that has caused current tensions. Eritrea may be frustrated by delays in demarcation, though these are certainly due significantly to its own refusal to hold any sort of dialogue with Ethiopia, but that is surely no excuse for threatening further war or putting UNMEE lives at risk - one UNMEE soldier has already died as a result of Eritrea’s actions. 

Professor Lyons calls President Issayas is “a volatile, unpredictable leader”, but he fails to understand that Issayas’ vision for Eritrea includes the collapse of both Sudan and Ethiopia; he denies federalism is an acceptable form of government for either state. Issayas has done his utmost to undermine Ethiopia’s current government since 2000, and these efforts have intensified in the last few months. A fundamental flaw in UN and US policy over the border issue and over Eritrea, is the failure to realise that President Issayas does not want a settlement unless he gets all that he wants. He would regard anything less as a victory for Ethiopia. Similarly, the US and UN fail to recognize that President Issayas remains determined to reverse the events of 2000 (though he still denies that Eritrea lost the war he launched in May 1998). 

Professor Lyons links the border issue with the current internal situation in Ethiopia but he fails to relate it to the internal situation in Eritrea, surely now one of the most unpleasant authoritarian and militarized regimes in Africa – with over 400,000 national service conscripts, many serving since 1997. However, he fails to address the implications for US policy in Eritrea’s manipulations of the border issue, other than to emphasize criticism of Ethiopia’s desire for dialogue before demarcation.     

The mobilization of a large, wealthy, vocal and well-organised, anti-EPRDF Ethiopian-American Diaspora, currently co-operating in certain respects with a similarly vocal Eritrean-American Diaspora, has inevitably influenced US policy in recent years. It has also clearly had a major impact on the thinking of Professor Lyons. Ethiopia is certainly entering a transition – this is most accurate point of Professor Lyons’ analysis - but his failure to consider or to understand either the EPRDF policies and actions or the aims of the CUD significantly weakens his arguments.  His analysis can do little to help policy-makers in Washington understand the realities of politics in Ethiopia or in Eritrea, nor, unfortunately, find the way forward for future US/Ethiopian relations.