Bolivarian Revolution

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The “Bolivarian Revolution” refers to a mass social movement and political process in Venezuela. Its most prominent leader is Hugo Chávez, the founder of the Fifth Republic Movement and the current President of Venezuela. The "Bolivarian Revolution" seeks the implementation of Bolivarianism in Venezuela. Proponents of Bolivarianism trace its roots to an avowedly socialist interpretation of some ideals of Simón Bolívar, an early 19th century Venezuelan and Latin American revolutionary leader, prominent in the South American Wars of Independence. Critics say Chávez has used the Bolivarian Revolution to consolidate his power, nationalize industries, and use the government to change vast aspects of everyday life for Venezuelans.^[1][2]

Contents 1 Ideology 2 Historical development 3 Policies and aspects 3.1 Social justice aspects 3.2 Market socialist aspects 4 Results 4.1 Domestic 4.2 Criticism of domestic effects 4.3 Foreign affairs 4.4 Criticism of foreign policy 5 See also 6 Notes 7 References 8 External links

[edit] Ideology

Chávez is the most prominent exponent of Bolivarianism, which functions as the root ideology of the "Bolivarian Revolution". Chávez has listed a number of ideological streams that he sees as having contributed significantly to Bolivarianism.

Chávez asserted in his September 2005 speech at the Bronx's Latino Pastoral Action Center that Jesus of Nazareth was a radical activist who purportedly emphasized and sought redistributive social justice and democratic socialism--Chávez has stated that such emphases also characterize Bolivarianism. Chávez has repeatedly claimed that Jesus was a social, as well as an individual, savior and liberator who was active in class struggle, social justice, and human rights both individual and collective.

Chávez's statements on Bolivarian ideology have attracted the ire of some evangelical and conservative groups, who traditionally place almost exclusive emphasis on Jesus as a personal, as opposed to a social, savior.

Chávez's administration has sought to strengthen the Venezuelan government's control over the nation's vital oil industry while seeking to better redistribute the revenues earned from petroleum exports. Bolivarianism has continually changed and evolved as an ideology since Hugo Chávez was elected president in late 1998.

[edit] Historical development

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The recent political history of Venezuela has been marked by clashes - often violent - between supporters of President Chávez and his opponents. The proclamation of 49 laws by Chávez in late 2001 under powers granted to him by the country's National Assembly, the supreme legislative power, led to opposition. At the same time, the price of oil, Venezuela's principal export and the main source of government funds, fell, forcing the government to sharply curtail spending, which led to a decline in support for the government amongst Venezuela's poor, who make up the majority of voters. The resulting political tension led to an increasingly tense political situation in the country, which culminated in the violent attempted coup of 11 April 2002.^{[citation needed]}

Chávez returned to the presidency on 13 April 2002 and promised national reconciliation, but the president ultimately refused to make concessions on his economic plans. The breakdown in dialogue between the government and the opposition eventually led to the calling of a "national strike" in December 2002, designed to force early presidential elections. As part of the strike, thousands of employees of PDVSA, the state-owned oil company, walked off the job, shutting down oil production in the world's fifth largest oil exporter. The strike was eventually broken by the government in January 2003. As a result of the strike, some 19,000 PDVSA employees were fired. Critics have consistently claimed that PDVSA has failed to return oil production to pre-strike levels.

Following his 2004 referendum victory, Chávez embraced a more concretely leftist social, economic and foreign policy. Chávez now advocates "socialism of the 21st century" although there is debate among both supporters and critics as to the meaning of such a term.

[edit] Policies and aspects

[edit] Social justice aspects

Missions of the Bolivarian Revolution
— food — housing — medicine —
Barrio Adentro  · Plan Bolivar 2000 Hábitat  · Mercal
— education —
Ribas  · Sucre Robinson I  · Robinson II
— indigenous rights — land — environment —
Guaicaipuro  · Identidad Miranda  · Piar Vuelta al Campo  · Vuelvan Caras Zamora
— (Hugo Chávez) — (Venezuela) —

Venezuela under the Chávez administration has deployed national social welfare programs (Misiónes or "Missions") called Bolivarian Missions.

Oil profits -- about 25 billion dollars in 2004 -- allowed the Chávez administration to carry out what he calls a "new socialist revolution." The leftist platform involves a remarkable increase in spending on social programs. The Chávez administration has thus built free health care clinics, subsidized food and created small manufacturing cooperatives.^{[citation needed]} Political scientist Michael Shifter says these projects have galvanized his core supporters -- the poor -- who make up around 60 percent of the country's population.^{[citation needed][opinion needs balancing]}

Venezuela has been involved in the purchase of a large number, 300,000, Russian assault rifles as well as military helicopters. As well, "neighborhood defense units" has been established to protect the nation against a purported American invasion.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Market socialist aspects

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In 2004, a group of trade unionists occupied the Venepal paper mill, the largest supplier of paper products in Venezuela, and called for its nationalization under workers' control. The company that oversaw the factory had previously been forced to declare bankruptcy as a result of financial losses stemming from its participation in the general lockout in 2003. Workers occupied the factory and restarted production, placing the factory under democratic worker management. Following a failed deal with the prior corporate management and amidst the company's threats to sell off equipment, the Chávez administration expropriated and nationalized the Venepal mill and extended a government line of credit to the factory for use in making repairs and installing upgrades.

The example of Venepal has inspired many of Chávez's supporters to call for the transformation of the Venezuelan economy to a fully market socialist model. However, other Chávez supporters fear that such expropriations would incur retaliation from the United States. Nonetheless the "Bolivarian Revolution" is quickly developing into a socialist movement.

A free software law was implemented in January 2006. Directive 3.390 mandated all government agencies to migrate to free software over a two year period.^[3]

[edit] Results

[edit] Domestic

The changes brought about by the "Bolivarian Revolution" have altered the economic and cultural landscape of Venezuela. Most other oil-exporting countries have seen similar growth, regardless of their domestic policies.^{[citation needed][original research?]} According to sources within the Chávez administration, there have also been marked improvements in infant mortality between 1998^[4] and 2005.^[5] Domestically, the Chávez administration has launched anti-poverty initiatives,^[6][7] instituted educational campaigns that have allegedly taught more than one million adult Venezuelans to read,^[8] enacted deep food^[9] and promulgated the new progressive 1999 Bolivarian constitution. President Chávez has also overseen state-supported experimentation in participatory economics as well as the granting of thousands of free land titles to formerly landless poor and indigenous communities;^{[citation needed]} in contrast, several large landed estates and factories have been — or are in the process of being — nationalized.

According to The Boston Globe, the head of Mission Sucre, a program to provide free and ongoing education, says that “investments in education, health, and infrastructure will have a lasting effect on standard of living”. Data from a private Venezuelan research firm shows the incomes of the “poorest Venezuelans have risen because of subsidies and grants”. The Globe reports that the government has “subsidized markets in poor neighborhoods that sell staple foods up to 40 percent cheaper than elsewhere.” Low income residents are reportedly living better because of subsidies that boost household income, decrease food costs, and provide access to free schooling and basic medical care. Chavez’s “missions” offer education, aid to the needy, soup kitchens, and medical care.^[10]

[edit] Criticism of domestic effects

Main article: Criticism of Hugo Chávez

Chávez was first elected on an anti-corruption platform and on promises of redistributing wealth to the poor, but Michael Shifter of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service says that "despite record oil profits that are funding social spending, his initiatives have yielded only very modest gains",^[1] and The Economist reports that his policies are most vulnerable in the areas of corruption, jobs and crime.^[11]

During Chávez's presidency from 1999 to 2004, per-capita GDP dropped 1–2%,^[12] but with the help of rising oil prices, the end of the oil strike, and strong consumption growth, recent economic activity under Chávez has been robust. GDP growth rates were 18% in 2004,^[13] 9% in 2005,^[14] and 9.6% in the first half of 2006, with the private sector growing at a 10.3% clip.^[15] From 2004 to the first half of 2006, non-petroleum sectors of the economy showed growth rates greater than 10%.^[16] Some economists argue that this subsidized growth could stop if oil prices decline,^[17] and some social scientists and economists claim that the government's reported poverty figures have not fallen in proportion to the country's vast oil revenues in the last two years.^[13] The president of a private Venezuelan research firm which documented 55% real income growth among the poorest sectors of society said that, although his surveys showed rising incomes because of subsidies and grants, the number of people in the worst living conditions has grown. "The poor of Venezuela are living much better lately and have increased their purchasing power . . . [but] without being able to improve their housing, education level, and social mobility," he said. "Rather than help [the poor] become stakeholders in the economic system, what [the government has] done is distribute as much oil wealth as possible in missions and social programs."^[10]

According to government figures, unemployment has dropped by 6.9% since the start of Chávez's presidency.^[18][19] Despite high oil revenues, Venezuela's rate of unemployment remains at 10% in February 2006 from the 2003 high of 20%, which occurred during a two-month strike and business lockout that shut down the country's oil industry. However, some economists argue that recent job creation may not be permanent, for it relies on an expanded public payroll that will become unaffordable if oil prices fall.^[13] With the help of an expanded public payroll, unemployment has been reduced from the 2003 high under Chávez of 20%, but some economists argue that the jobs may not be permanent, and critics question the government's reported poverty figures, based on contradictory statistics and definitions,^[1] which they say have not fallen enough considering the country's vast oil revenues in the last two years.^[13] The Economist reports that both poverty and unemployment figures under Chávez have not seen significant improvement and that official corruption under his government continues to be rampant,^[20] and point to the 1-2% drop in Venezuela's per-capita GDP early in Chávez's term, before the 2004 surge in oil prices.^[12] According to The Boston Globe, critics say the government defines "informal workers, such as street vendors, as employed, and exclud[es] adults who are studying in missions from unemployment numbers." When the president of the Venezuelan National Statistics Institute released numbers in 2005 which showed that poverty had actually risen by more than 10 points under Chávez (to 53% in 2004), Chávez called for a new measure of poverty, defining a "social well-being index". Under this new definition, poverty registers at 40 percent.^[10] The minimum wage in Venezuela in July 2006 covered only 65 percent of the cost of the basic food basket.^[21]

The government and independent observers refute the charges of economic decline by pointing out that the renewed economic growth of the last two years has brought rapid reductions in poverty, especially when one considers the vast expansion of non-cash income represented by subsidized food distribution and other social programs.^[22]

At the same time, The Economist opines that the administration's unwillingness to utilize private sector resources has resulted in a crumbling public infrastructure and a deficit in housing.^[13] Critics cite the many public hospitals that lack basic medicine and hygienic supplies. They also question the motives behind the Bolivarian Missions' regular cash and in-kind payments to the millions of poor Venezuelans enrolling in their social programs. With many enrollees participating in more than one Mission simultaneously, receiving a steady and unearned income, critics worry that work ethic will be corrupted and enrollees will be predisposed to support and vote for Chávez. Supporters would respond that the opposition was not similarly worried about economic policy influencing political allegiances in the years when the current Venezuelan opposition promoted policies that re-distributed income upward. There have been marked improvements in the infant mortality rate between 1998 and 2005.^[23][24]

According to Venezuela's El Universal, one of the Chávez administration's outstanding weaknesses is the failure to meet its goals of construction of housing. Chávez promised to build 150,000 houses in 2006, but in the first half of the year, completed only 24 percent of that target, with 35,000 houses.^[25]

Venezuela's non-traditional exports decreased by 20 percent in the first quarter of 2006. The drop was attributed to uncertain regulations on exports, markets lost because of politics, restrictions on purchasing US dollars, and bureaucratic delays affecting exporters, according to Francisco Mendoza, president of the Venezuelan Exporter's Association (AVEX). Mendoza said Venezuela is losing five large trade partners by withdrawing from the Group of Three (G-3) and the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), exchanging them for less valuable markets in the Common Market of the South (Mercosur). He says that only 10 percent of AVEX members have been granted certificates to purchase USD dollars needed for exports, and that overvaluation of the Venezuelan bolivar undermines the competitiveness of Venezuelan products abroad.^[26]

ISN Security Watch says that, as long Venezuela's military leaders remain loyal to Chávez, they will "receive no oversight from Caracas", resulting in impunity and corruption. Gustavo Coronel, a former member of PDVSA's board of directors, claimed that social programs are "run by military officers who have little to no oversight".^[27] Members of the Venezuelan Armed Forces are alleged to be involved in supplying arms to Colombia's FARC,^[27] and U.S. anti-drug officials allege that corruption within the Chávez administration is converting Venezuela into a trafficking route for Colombian drugs.^[28] Critics also allege widespread corruption in the police force.^[29]

The Economist reports that "Mr Chávez has grasped all the powers of state into his own hands, and eliminated all independent oversight of his government. The opposition argues that the inevitable result of this is graft on an increased scale." Berlin-based Transparency International, in its annual survey Corruption Perceptions Index, ranked Venezuela as one of only a dozen countries where perceived corruption had "greatly increased", resulting in a ranking of 130 out of the 150 countries surveyed,^[30][31] to become the nation perceived as the third most corrupt in Latin America, above Paraguay and Haiti. Critics claim that rampant corruption reaches the highest levels of Venezuelan airport and security officials, that billions of dollars have been siphoned away from social programs by corrupt officials, and that leaders of the military have limited oversight, creating an environment in which impunity and corruption develop.^{[30][27][29][28]}

Since he took office, The Economist reports that the murder rate has almost tripled, and that Venezuela's capital – Caracas – has become South America's most violent, with police implicated in some of the crimes.^[11][32] The United Nations reported in 2005 that Venezuela had the highest number of deaths by gunfire per capita in the world,^[33] garnering for Venezuela claim to the title of the world's most violent crime capital.^[29]

Critics claim that Chávez's policies are responsible for some of these declines.^[34][29] and the U.S. State Department says there is unchecked concentration of power in the executive.^[2]

Critics accuse the Bolivarian Circles Chávez founded of furthering violence,^[35] and say Chávez's new civil reserve defense force is intended to intimidate domestic opponents and repress internal dissent. Chávez government officials respond that the reserve is similar to civilian reserves and forces in many nations, including the United States.^[36] According to a study by Brigham Young University scholars, the "Bolivarian circles" also help the government identify opponents, who are then denied services.^[37]

According to an article in Foreign Policy Magazine, "On average, Chávez shuffles more than half of his cabinet every year."^[34] During his presidency, Chávez has had six Ministers of Interior and Justice. In August 2006, following assaults on a squatter and a National Assembly member, El Universal says that Chávez called on the latest Minister, Jesse Chacón to quit if he could not do the job, demanding more rigor in the fight against corruption, and affirming the need to clean up and transform the local police forces. He questioned the impunity that exists in the country, and challenged authorities, like Chacón, to resign if they couldn't make progress against crime. He also called for greater protection of squatters settling on landed estates.^[38]

Farmers have protested about the lack of a consistent policy addressing prices, smuggling, insecurity and crime.^[39]

Left wing parties have also been very critical of Chavez as the main left wing parties do not support Chavez, and never did. MAS (Movement towards Socialism) MIR (Revolutionary Left Movement), CR (Radical Cause) have been very critical towards Chavez.

[edit] Foreign affairs

Further information: Foreign policy of Hugo Chávez

This section does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unverifiable material may be challenged and removed. (March 2008)

The "Bolivarian Revolution" under Chávez has also refocused Venezuelan foreign policy on Latin American economic and social integration by enacting bilateral trade and reciprocal aid agreements, including his so-called "oil diplomacy". Chávez regularly portrays his movement's objectives as being in intractable conflict with neocolonialism and neoliberalism. As a result of his anti-capitalist and redistributive domestic policies combined with his strong relations with Cuba's Fidel Castro and other controversial figures, Venezuela-U.S. relations have deteriorated in recent years.

Chávez has also made a policy of spreading his ideas around the world and funding groups such as the International Bolivarian Circles and reaching out to Iran, Syria and Zimbabwe in the form of visits, symbolic acts and numerous trade agreements. Perhaps he is best known on the diplomatic scene for systematically opposing the United States numerous times.

[edit] Criticism of foreign policy

Main article: Criticism of Hugo Chávez

The New York Times has represented Chàvez as "thriving on the atmosphere of confrontation" between Venezuela and the U.S.^[40] The Washington Post has described him as an "ideologue".^[41] A PBS discussion panel has said that Chávez's actions are "hurtful to Venezuela's democracy" and that he is "making all types of unfounded allegations about what the U.S. is up to in Venezuela."^[42]

Chávez's trips abroad have also caused some criticism within his own coalition. For example, in July 2006 the National Assembly refused to ratify a trip to North Korea.^[43] The BBC reports that Chávez has spent 365 days abroad since taking office.^[43]

U.S. News & World Report and U.S. government officials say that the Chávez administration allows alleged terrorist organizations to operate within Venezuela's borders, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamiyya al Gammat. U.S. officials also allege that the Venezuelan government is knowingly providing identity documents to these organizations. The Venezuelan government flatly denies all of these claims.^[44] The U.S. government criticizes Venezuela's cooperation in the "War on Terrorism" as negligible or purposely indifferent, particularly with regards to FARC and ELN in neighboring Colombia, which the U.S. government considers to be terrorist organizations,^[45] while Venezuela accuses the U.S. government of having a double standard for giving safe haven to Luis Posada Carriles.^[46] However, U.S. officials acknowledge that there is no evidence of Chavez engaging directly in terrorism.^[47]

Critics say that Chávez's large purchases of military hardware are for reasons other than the defence of his country in the event of the "imminent US invasion", which he has repeatedly claimed will take place and which has used as a reason to justify these large transactions. Colombian military analyst Alfredo Rangel says that Chávez's new civil reserve defense force, claimed to consist of approximately two million members, may be intended to intimidate domestic opponents and suppress internal dissent, dismissing the possibility of a U.S. invasion. Chávez government officials respond that the reserve is similar to civilian reserves and forces in many nations, including the United States.^[36]

On August 3, 2006 Chávez ordered the Venezuelan charge d'affaires to Israel, to return from Tel Aviv to Caracas, protesting the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict. The Israeli government responded by recalling the Israeli ambassador to Venezuela.^[48][49]

Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Mark Regev responded, "As an act of protest against the one-sided policy of the president of Venezuela and in light of his wild slurs against the state of Israel and in response to the recall of the Venezuelan charge d'affaires to his country, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni decided to bring our ambassador in Venezuala back temporarily for consultations."^{[citation needed]}

CNSNews says that critics of Israel, many of them in the Arab world, hailed Chávez in his dealings with Israel.^[50] Al-Ahram Weekly commented, "it was somehow ironic that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, following his attack on Israel and the recalling of his ambassador to Tel Aviv, emerged as the most popular leader within the Arab world."^[51] The Syrian communist party urged Arab governments to "follow the example of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez”.^[52]

President Chávez's has made a number of trips to Libya in his role as OPEC representative to discuss the international situation, declining oil prices, and OPEC production.^[53] The first occurred in 2001 after a personal invitation he received in 1999 by Muammar al-Gaddafi.^[54] Some members of the National Assembly of Venezuela accused Chávez of not reporting his trip to Libya and hiding it under a tour of Europe and Africa.^[55] Venezuela's former ambassador to Libya Julio César Pineda said in 2003 that Chávez was coordinating an anti-American strategy with terrorist states following his visit to Libya,^[56] but today, Libya is moving closer to alignment with the United States at a time that Chávez is setting himself up as South America's leading anti-American.^[57][58]

President Chávez has developed strong ties with the government of Iran, in particular in the area of energy production, economic, and industrial cooperation.^[59] He has visited Iran on several occasions, the first time in 2001,^[60] when he declared that he came to Iran to "prepare the road for peace, justice, stability and progress for the 21st century".^[59] Mohamed Khatami also has visited Venezuela on three occasions. During his 2005 visit, Chávez awarded him the Orden del Libertador and called him a "tireless fighter for all the right causes in the world".^[61] In May of 2006, Chávez expressed his favorable view of the production of nuclear energy in Iran announced by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and denied that they had plans to develop atomic weapons.^[62] His relationship with the government of Iran and his support for their nuclear program has elicited the concern of the U.S. government. Condoleezza Rice commented that, given the political strategy of President Chávez in relation to Iran, "Venezuela has become a negative force in the region".^[63]

[edit] See also

• Socialism of the 21st century

[edit] Notes

[edit] References

• Schuyler, George W. (The Policy Studies Organization) Health and Neoliberalism: Venezuela and Cuba. Retrieved 18 Oct 2005.

• (Spanish) Gobierno en Línea: Misiones — Official government website detailing the Bolivarian Missions.
• Richard Gott, The Guardian, May 30 2005, Chávez leads the way
• Christian Parenti, The Nation, 11 April 2005, "Hugo Chávez and Petro Populism"

[edit] External links

• (Spanish) Gobierno en Línea: Misiones — Official government website detailing the Bolivarian Missions.
• (Spanish) Misión Barrio Adentro — Official government Mission Barrio Adentro web portal.
• (Spanish) Instituto Nacional de Estadística — Venezuela's National Institute of Statistics; has web several portals for accessing demographic and economic data related to the impact of Bolivarian Missions.
• (Spanish) Barrio Adentro — Official government dossier on Barrio Adentro (in Spanish)
• (Spanish) Aló Presidente 225 — Video of a July 2005 episode of Hugo Chávez's talkshow Aló Presidente that features an eight hour tour of a new Barrio Adentro II CDI (Centros de Diagnóstico Integral) in Maturín, Monagas state, Venezuela.
• (Spanish) Programa Nro. 225 - Aló Presidente — Transcript of Aló Presidente 225.
• Venezuela's Cooperative Revolution from Dollars & Sense magazine

v • d • e Hugo Chávez Biography Early life · Military career · Presidency Political events Coup attempt of 1992 · Coup attempt of 2002 · Recall referendum of 2004 · Putative coup attempt of 2004 · Constitutional referendum of 2007 Elections Presidential election of 1998 · Presidential election of 2000 · Presidential election of 2006 Governance Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas · Bolivarian Circles · Bolivarian Revolution · Bolivarianism · Cabinet · Chavismo · Constitution · Foreign policy Bolivarian Missions Barrio Adentro · Guaicaipuro · Hábitat · Identidad · Mercal · Miranda · Piar · Plan Bolivar 2000 · Ribas · Robinson · Sucre · Vuelta al Campo · Vuelvan Caras · Zamora Reactions Criticism · Media representation · ¿¡Revolución!? · The Revolution Will Not Be Televised · Súmate

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