1973 Chilean coup d'état

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La Moneda Presidential Palace being bombed during the coup (1973)

The Chilean coup d'état of 1973 was a watershed event in the history of Chile and the Cold War. Historians and partisans alike have wrangled over its implications ever since.

On September 11, 1973, less than two months after the first failed coup attempt (Tanquetazo), and less than a month after the Chamber of Deputies, where the Opposition held a majority, condemned Allende's alleged breaches of the constitution and requested his forcible removal, the Chilean military overthrew president Salvador Allende, who died during the coup. US intervention in Chilean politics and support to opponents of Allende, including support for an assassination, has been documented by the declassification in 1998 of documents concerning the Project FUBELT operations, although its exact nature is still controversial. General Augusto Pinochet took over and established an anti-communist military dictatorship which lasted until 1990.

[edit] Situation before the coup

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When Salvador Allende came to power as a result of the 1970 Chilean presidential election, Chilean society was already wracked by huge economic difficulties. Problems such as slow growth, inflation, unequal income distribution and the concentration of economic power remained stubborn and intractable. The majority of the Chilean population were at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum and had grown weary of perennial problems that were affecting the country.^{[citation needed]} However, the first year of Allende's presidency saw economic improvement. The GDP increased by 8.6%, inflation decreased from 34.9% in 1970 to 22.1%, while industrial production increased by 12% ^[1]. However, President Allende's Socialist political agenda brought opposition from wealthy sectors of Chilean society as well as the United States, which placed diplomatic, economic, and covert^[2] pressure on the government.

Towards the end of 1971, Cuban leader Fidel Castro toured Chile extensively during a four-week visit. ^[3] This gave credence to the belief of those on the right that the Chilean Way to Socialism was an effort to put Chile on the same path as Cuba.

In 1972, the monetary policies increasing the amount of currency, which had been adopted by the Minister of Economics, Pedro Vuskovic, led to a devaluation of the escudo and to renewed inflation, which reached 140% in 1972 ^[1]. The Allende administration tried to respond to the developing black market, by organizing the distribution of basic products.

In October 1972, Chile saw the first of what was to be a wave of confrontational strikes led by some of the historically well-off sectors of Chilean society; these received the open support of United States President Richard Nixon. A strike by truck-owners, which the CIA supported by funding them with US$2 million within the framework of the "September Plan," began on October 9, 1972 ^[4]. The strike was declared by the Confederación Nacional del Transporte, then presided by León Vilarín, one of the leader of the far-right paramilitary group Patria y Libertad ^[4]. The Confederation, which included 165 truck-owners' trade unions, with 40 000 members and 56 000 vehicles, declared an indefinite strike, paralyzing the country.

It was soon joined by small businessmen, some (mostly professional) unions, and some student groups. Its leaders (Vilarín, Jaime Guzmán, Rafael Cumsille, Guillermo Elton and Eduardo Arriagada) expected to topple the government through the strike. Other than the inevitable damage to the economy, the chief effect of the 24-day strike was to bring the head of the army, general Carlos Prats, into the government as Interior Minister, as a sign of appeasement.^[1] Carlos Prats had succeeded General René Schneider after his assassination on October 24, 1970 by two groups, General Roberto Viaux and General Camilo Valenzuela, who had benefited from logistical and financial support from the CIA. Prats was a supporter of the legalist Schneider doctrine and refused to involve the military in a coup against Allende.

Despite declining economic indicators, Allende's Popular Unity coalition actually slightly increased its vote to 43.2 percent in the parliamentary elections of March 1973. However, by this point what had started as an informal alliance between Allende's coalition and the Christian Democrats was long gone. ^[5] The Christian Democrats now linked with the right-wing National Party to oppose Allende's government, the two parties forming the Confederación Democrática coalition (CODE). The conflict between the executive and legislature paralyzed initiatives from either side. ^[6]

The CIA tried to destabilize the Allende government, by providing up to US$8 million in funding to opposition groups in order to "create pressures, exploit weaknesses, magnify obstacles" and hasten Allende's downfall ^[4]. The CIA report released in 2000 spoke of US $6.8 million spent during Allende's presidency to destabilize him ^[7]

[edit] Crisis

Main article: Tanquetazo

On June 29, 1973, a tank regiment under the command of Colonel Roberto Souper surrounded the La Moneda presidential palace in a violent but unsuccessful coup attempt.^[8] This failed coup, known as the Tanquetazo, and which had been organized by the far-right group Patria y Libertad, was followed by a general strike at the end of July, joined this time by the copper miners of El Teniente as well.

In August of 1973, a constitutional crisis was clearly in the offing: the Supreme Court publicly complained about the government's inability to enforce the law of the land and on August 22 the Chamber of Deputies (with the Christian Democrats now firmly united with the National Party) accused Allende's government of unconstitutional acts and called on the military ministers to enforce constitutional order. ^[6]

For some months, the government had been afraid to call upon the national police named Carabineros, for fear of their lack of loyalty. On August 9, Allende made General Carlos Prats Minister of Defense. Nonetheless, General Prats was forced to resign not only this position but his role as Army Commander-in-chief on August 24, 1973, embarrassed by the Alejandrina Cox incident and a public protest of the wives of his Generals in front of his home. He was replaced as Commander-in-chief by General Augusto Pinochet that same day. ^[6]

[edit] Supreme Court Resolution

On May 26, 1973, Chile’s Supreme Court issued a unanimous resolution denouncing the Allende regime’s "disruption of the legality of the nation" by its failure to uphold judicial decisions, due to the government's constant refusal to allow the police to carry out the judicial resolutions that were opposed to its own measures.

[edit] Chamber of Deputies' Resolution

On August 22, 1973 the Christian Democrats and the National Party members of the Chamber of Deputies passed, by 81 to 47 votes, a resolution entitled "Declaration of the Breakdown of Chile’s Democracy", which called upon the military to "put an immediate end" to what they described as "breach[es of] the Constitution… with the goal of redirecting government activity toward the path of Law and ensuring the constitutional order of our Nation and the essential underpinnings of democratic coexistence among Chileans."

The resolution declared that the Allende government was seeking "...to conquer absolute power with the obvious purpose of subjecting all citizens to the strictest political and economic control by the state... [with] the goal of establishing a totalitarian system," and claimed that it had made "violations of the Constitution" into "a permanent system of conduct." Many of the charges came down to disregarding the separation of powers and arrogating the prerogatives of both the legislature and judiciary within the executive.

Among other particulars, the regime was accused of:

• ruling by decree, thus thwarting the normal system of adopting legislation
• refusing to enforce judicial decisions against its own partisans and "not carrying out sentences and judicial resolutions that contravene its objectives"
• ignoring the decrees of the independent General Comptroller's Office
• various offenses related to the media, including usurping control of the National Television Network and "applying ... economic pressure against those media organizations that are not unconditional supporters of the government..."
• allowing its supporters to assemble even when armed, while preventing legal assembly by its opponents
• "...supporting more than 1,500 illegal 'takings' of farms..."
• illegal repression of the El Teniente strike
• illegally limiting emigration

The resolution finally condemned the "creation and development of government-protected armed groups which... are headed towards a confrontation with the Armed Forces." Allende's efforts to re-organize the military and police, which he could not trust in their current forms, were characterized as "notorious attempts to use the Armed and Police Forces for partisan ends, destroy their institutional hierarchy, and politically infiltrate their ranks."

[edit] Allende's response

Two days later (August 24, 1973), Allende responded ^[9] characterizing Congress's declaration as "destined to damage the country's prestige abroad and create internal confusion," and predicting that "It will facilitate the seditious intention of certain sectors." He pointed out that the declaration (passed 81-47 in the Chamber of Deputies) had not obtained the two-thirds Senate majority constitutionally required to convict the president of abuse of power: essentially, they were "invoking the intervention of the Armed Forces and of Order against a democratically elected government" and "subordinat[ing] political representation of national sovereignty to the armed institutions, which neither can nor ought to assume either political functions or the representation of the popular will." Allende argued that he had followed constitutional means in bringing members of the military into the cabinet "at the service of civic peace and national security, defending republican institutions against insurrection and terrorism." In contrast, he said that Congress was promoting a coup or a civil war, using a declaration "full of affirmations that had already been refuted beforehand" and which, in substance and process (handing it directly to the various ministers rather than delivering it to the president) violated a dozen articles of the then-current constitution. Further, he argued that the legislature was trying to usurp the executive role.

"Chilean democracy," Allende wrote, "is a conquest by all of the people. It is neither the work nor the gift of the exploiting classes, and it will be defended by those who, with sacrifices accumulated over generations, have imposed it... With a tranquil conscience... I sustain that never before has Chile had a more democratic government than that over which I have the honor to preside... I solemnly reiterate my decision to develop democracy and a state of law to their ultimate consequences... Parliament has made itself a bastion against the transformations... and has done everything it can to perturb the functioning of the finances and of the institutions, sterilizing all creative initiatives." Economic and political means, he said, would be needed to get the country out of its current crisis, and Congress was obstructing these means; having already "paralyzed" the state, they were now seeking to "destroy" it. He concluded by calling upon "the workers, all democrats and patriots" to join him in defense of the constitution and of the "revolutionary process."

[edit] Military coup d'état

The overthrow of President Allende in some ways resembles the fictional events depicted in Jack London's dystopian novel "The Iron Heel" of 1908 - which is expressed in this cover for one of the book's later editions

On September 11, 1973, by 7:00 AM, the Navy took over Valparaíso, stationing ships and marines in strategic places throughout the central coast and closing down all radio and TV networks. The prefect of the province called Allende to inform him of the mysterious actions by the Navy. Allende immediately left for the presidential palace together with his personal bodyguards (Grupo de Amigos Personales, GAP). By 8:00 AM, the Army had silenced many TV and radio stations in Santiago, while others were bombed by the Air Force. The information that reached Allende was still very sketchy, and he was convinced the coup was by a "sector" of the Navy.

Allende and his Minister of Defense, Orlando Letelier, fruitlessly attempted to contact the leaders of the Armed Forces. Admiral Montero, the commander of the Navy and a loyalist, had had his telephone lines cut and his cars sabotaged before the coup began to ensure he did not interfere in the coup. The leadership of the Navy was transferred to second-in-command and coup-planner José Toribio Merino. Augusto Pinochet, General of the Army, and Gustavo Leigh, General of the Air Force, did not respond to Allende's phone calls. The General Director of Carabineros (uniformed police), José María Sepúlveda, and the head of the Investigations Police (plainclothed detectives), Alfredo Joignant, were the only ones who responded to Allende and went immediately to La Moneda. When Letelier arrived at the Ministry of Defense, controlled by Admiral Patricio Carvajal, he was immediately arrested: the first prisoner during the coup.

Despite growing evidence that the rebellion encompassed all the Armed Forces, Allende still hoped that some remained loyal to the government. He was convinced of Pinochet's loyalty, even stating to a journalist that the coup leaders must have imprisoned him (Pinochet). Only at 8:30 AM, when the Armed Forces declared they were in control of the country and that Allende was deposed, did the President realize the magnitude of the rebellion. Still, he refused to resign.

By 9:00 AM, the Armed Forces were in control of all of Chile except for the center of Santiago. Allende refused to surrender, even when the Armed Forces declared La Moneda would be bombed if Allende still resisted. The Socialist Party proposed that Allende escape to the industrial zone of San Joaquín in southern Santiago to later regroup and lead a counter coup, but Allende rejected the idea. The Armed Forces attempted a number of negotiations with Allende but he stubbornly stated that it was his constitutional duty to remain in the palace. Allende finally delivered a potent farewell speech informing the nation of the coup and his refusal to back down.

Increasingly annoyed by the long negotiations, General Leigh gave the order to bomb La Moneda. However, he was informed that the Hawker Hunter fighter jets were running late and that 40 minutes would pass before they arrived at Santiago's downtown. Pinochet meanwhile ordered that tanks and infantrymen besiege the palace and destroy all the opposition. They encountered none during their path to La Moneda and only when they got to the palace did they meet a few easily-defeated socialist gunmen. At noon, the jets finally arrived and proceeded to bomb the palace. Allende died soon after.

The worst violence occurred in the first few months after the coup, with the number of suspected leftists killed or "disappeared" soon reaching into the thousands. In the days immediately following the coup, the National Stadium was used for the internment of 40,000 opponents. Some of the most famous cases of "desaparecidos" are Charles Horman, a U.S. citizen who was tortured and killed during the coup itself; Chilean songwriter Víctor Jara, murdered while held prisoner at the Chile Stadium immediately after the coup, and the October 1973 Caravan of Death (Caravana de la Muerte) where at least 70 persons were killed. Approximately 130,000 individuals were arrested in a three-year period, with the number of dead and "disappeared" reaching into the thousands within the first few months. Those include the British physician Sheila Cassidy, who later brought awareness to the UK public of human rights violations in Chile. Among those detained is current Chilean President Michelle Bachelet's father Alberto, an official in the airforce. Bachelet was, according to a major Chilean newspaper^[10], allegedly tortured and died of heart failure on March 12, 1974 after playing a basketball match (he had a history of heart issues). Other sources make no mention of the alleged basketball match, and state that he died after torture.^{[11][12][13][14][15]} Bachelet herself and her mother were detained in the Villa Grimaldi detention and torture center on 10 January 1975, with all but one^[16] source stating she and her mother were tortured.^{[17][18][19][20][21][11][12][22][23][24][25][15]}

Following Pinochet's defeat in the 1988 plebiscite, the 1991 Rettig Commission, a multipartisan effort from the democratic government to discover the truth about the allegations, listed a number of torture and detention centers (such as Colonia Dignidad, Esmeralda ship or Víctor Jara Stadium), and found that at least 2,700 people were killed or disappeared by the regime between 1973 and 1990.

A later report, the Valech Report (published in November 2004), confirmed the figure of less than 3,000 deaths, but dramatically reduced the alleged cases of disappearances. It tells of some 28,000 arrests in which the majority of those detained were incarcerated and in a great many cases tortured. Many were exiled and received abroad, in particular in Argentina, as political refugees; however, they were followed in their exile by the secret police DINA (National Intelligence Directorate), in the frame of Operation Condor which linked South American dictatorships together against political opponents.

In the book in which he recounts the coup (El Día decisivo), General Pinochet affirms that he was the leading plotter of the coup and used his position as Commander of the Army to coordinate a far-reaching scheme with the other branches of the military. In recent years, however, high military officials from the time have said that Pinochet only reluctantly got involved in the coup a few days before it was scheduled to occur, and then only followed the lead of Admiral Merino of the Navy and General Leigh of the Air Force, as they triggered it.

[edit] Casualties

According to official reports prepared after the return of the democracy, at La Moneda only two people died: President Allende and the journalist Augusto Olivares. Two more were injured, GAP bodyguards Antonio Aguirre and Osvaldo Ramos, who would later be kidnapped from the hospital and disappeared. In November 2006, the Associated Press noted that more than fifteen bodyguards and aides were taken from the palace during the coup and are still unaccounted for; in 2006 Augusto Pinochet was indicted for two of their deaths ^[26].

On the military side, there were 5 deaths: two sergeants, a corporal, an army private, and a transit policeman. A press photographer also died in the crossfire while attempting to cover the event. In the rest of Santiago, the deaths in battle were also very few: 10 policemen, one MIR and two Socialist fighters, 5 workers and two housewives.^{[citation needed]}

While fatalities due to battle during the coup might have been relatively small, tens of thousands of people were arrested during the coup and held in the National Stadium^[27]. This was because the plans for the coup called for the arrest of every man, woman and child on the streets the morning of September 11. Of these approximately 40,000 to 50,000 prefunctory arrests, several hundred individuals would later be detained, questioned, tortured, and in some cases murdered. While these deaths did not occur before the surrender of Allende's forces, they occurred as a direct result of arrests and round-ups during the coup's military action. Furthermore, a death squad known as the "Caravan of Death" (including Pedro Espinoza Bravo, who later became operations chief of the DINA) roamed Chile from September 30, 1973 to October 22, 1973, and executed without judgment between 75 and 97 political opponents which were already detained by the military ^[28][29].

[edit] Allende's death

Main article: Allende's death

President Allende died in La Moneda during the coup. The junta officially declared that he committed suicide with a machine gun given to him by Fidel Castro, and an autopsy labelled his death as suicide. At the time few of his supporters accepted the explanation; today it is widely—though still not universally^[30]—accepted based on statements given by two doctors from the La Moneda Palace infirmary who say that they witnessed the suicide.^[31]

Vice Admiral Patricio Carvajal reports Allende's death: I will say this in English to avoid any interference. Allende committed suicide and is dead now.

[edit] Aftermath

Main article: Government Junta of Chile (1973)

Original members of the Government Junta of Chile (1973)

On September 13, the Junta dissolved Congress.^[32] At the same time, it outlawed the parties that had been part of the Popular Unity coalition, and all political activity was declared "in recess" ^[33]

Initially, there were four leaders of the junta: In addition to General Augusto Pinochet, from the Army, there were General Gustavo Leigh Guzmán, of the Air Force; Admiral José Toribio Merino Castro, of the Navy (who replaced Constitutionalist Admiral Raúl Montero); and General Director César Mendoza Durán, of the National Police (Carabineros de Chile) (who replaced Constitutionalist General Director José María Sepúlveda). Coup leaders soon decided against a rotating presidency and named General Pinochet permanent head of the junta^[34]

[edit] Debate

Over the years, both the active participants in the coup and their supporters have argued that the coup was essential for preserving freedom, democracy, and prosperity in Chile^[who?]. They claim that Salvador Allende wanted to establish a Cuban-style dictatorship, which would have destroyed human rights, as well as economic prosperity. They assert, therefore, that the forcible removal of Allende was a necessary and justified course of action^{[citation needed]}. Supporters also contend that the subsequent economic boom of the late 1980s and 1990s was a direct result of Pinochet's economic policy^{[citation needed]}.

Contrary to this view, opponents of the coup assert that the succeeding government was itself a repressive dictatorship, with several thousand documented cases of torture, as well as forced disappearances^{[citation needed]}. They state that Chile did not have a freely elected civilian government for the next 17 years and that, in the early Pinochet years, unemployment rose, real wages fell, and the divide between rich and poor grew, temporarily decreasing the economic prosperity of the average Chilean^{[citation needed]}.

A number of people and organizations^[who?] who supported the coup when it took place were later critical of Pinochet's regime^{[citation needed]}. They considered the activities of Allende's regime illegal, in a way that justified a coup, but asserted that Pinochet did not restore democracy as they had hoped.

[edit] U.S. Role in the 1973 Coup

Main article: U.S. intervention in Chile

While U.S. government hostility to the Allende government is unquestioned^[35], the extent of the U.S. role in the coup itself remains a controversial matter. Documents declassified during the Clinton administration show that the United States government and the CIA had sought the overthrow of Allende in 1970, immediately after he took office ("Project FUBELT"; U.S. efforts to prevent Allende taking office in 1970 are discussed in 1970 Chilean presidential election), but claims of their direct involvement in the actual coup are neither proven nor contradicted by publicly available documentary evidence; many potentially relevant documents still remain classified.

There is no doubt that the U.S. did intervene in its foreign policy initiatives surrounding Chile, working to deepen the economic crisis faced by Salvodor Allende in order to create the prerequisites for the eventual coup^[36].

[edit] State Terrorism

Main article: Allegations of state terrorism by the United States

The United States has also been accused of State Terrorism as a result of involvement in the coup against Salvador Allende, in which it has been claimed that the US was "intimately involved."^[37] Prof. Stohl writes, "In addition to nonterroristic strategies...the United States embarked on a program to create economic and political chaos in Chile...After the failure to prevent Allende from taking office, efforts shifted to obtaining his removal." Money authorized for the CIA to destabilize Chilean society, included, "financing and assisting opposition groups and right-wing terrorist paramilitary groups such as Patria y Libertad ("Fatherland and Liberty")."

Professor Gareau, writes on the subject: "Washington's training of thousands of military personnel from Chile who later committed state terrorism again makes Washington eligible for the charge of accessory before the fact to state terrorism. The CIA's close relationship during the height of the terror to Contreras, Chile's chief terrorist (with the possible exception of Pinochet himself), lays Washington open to the charge of accessory during the fact." Gareau argues that the fuller extend involved the US taking charge of coordinating counterinsurgency efforts between all Latin American countries. He writes, "Washington's service as the overall coordinator of state terrorism in Latin America demonstrates the enthusiasm with which Washington played its role as an accomplice to state terrorism in the region. It was not a reluctant player. Rather it not only trained Latin American governments in terrorism and financed the means to commit terrorism; it also encouraged them to apply the lessons learned to put down what it called “the communist threat.” Its enthusiasm extended to coordinating efforts to apprehend those wanted by terrorist states who had fled to other countries in the region....The evidence available leads to the conclusion that Washington's influence over the decision to commit these acts was considerable."^[38]"Given that they knew about the terrorism of this regime, what did the elites in Washington during the Nixon and Ford administrations do about it? The elites in Washington reacted by increasing U.S. military assistance and sales to the state terrorists, by covering up their terrorism, by urging U.S. diplomats to do so also, and by assuring the terrorists of their support, thereby becoming accessories to state terrorism before, during, and after the fact." ^[39]

Scholars have written on Chile as an example of State Terrorism of a very open kind that did not attempt a façade of civilian governance, and that had a "September 11th effect" through the hemisphere. Professor of History Thomas Wright, argues that "unlike their Brazilian counterparts, they did not embrace state terrorism as a last recourse; they launched a wave of terrorism on the day of the coup. In contrast to the Brazilians and Uruguayans, the Chileans were very public about their objectives and their methods; there was nothing subtle about rounding up thousands of prisoners, the extensive use of torture, executions following sham court-marshal, and shootings in cold blood. After the initial wave of open terrorism, the Chilean armed forces constructed a sophisticated apparatus for the secret application of state terrorism that lasted until the dictatorship’s end...The impact of the Chilean coup reached far beyond the country’s borders. Through their aid in the overthrow of Allende and their support of the Pinochet dictatorship, President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, sent a clear signal to all of Latin America that anti-revolutionary regimes employing repression, even state terrorism, could count on the support of the United States. The U.S. government in effect, gave a green light to Latin America’s right wing and its armed forces to eradicate the left and use repression to erase the advances that workers - and in some countries, campesinos - had made through decades of struggle. This “Septmember 11 effect” was soon felt around the hemisphere.” ^[40]

Prof. Gareau concludes, "The message for the populations of Latin American nations and particularly the Left opposition was clear: the United States would not permit the continuation of a Socialist government, even if it came to power in a democratic election and continued to uphold the basic democratic structure of that society."^[41]

[edit] Quotes

• "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people. The issues are much too important for the Chilean voters to be left to decide for themselves." — Henry Kissinger

• "Not a nut or bolt shall reach Chile under Allende. Once Allende comes to power we shall do all within our power to condemn Chile and all Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty." — Edward M. Korry, U.S. Ambassador to Chile, upon hearing of Allende's election.

• "Make the economy scream [in Chile to] prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him" — Richard Nixon, orders to CIA director Richard Helms on September 15, 1970

• "It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It would be much preferable to have this transpire prior to 24 October [1970] but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date. We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end, utilizing every appropriate resource. It is imperative that these actions be implemented clandestinely and securely so that the USG and American hand be well hidden..." — A communique to the CIA base in Chile, issued on October 16, 1970

• "[Military rule aims] to make Chile not a nation of proletarians, but a nation of entrepreneurs." — Augusto Pinochet^[42]

• "We didn't do it. I mean we helped them. [Garbled] created the conditions as great as possible. — Henry Kissinger conversing with President Nixon about the coup. Telephone call from Kissinger to Nixon

[edit] Additional information

[edit] See also

[edit] Media

• Chile - Toad the Wet Sprocket
• The Ballad of Victor Jara - Rod MacDonald
• Missing
• Machuca
• La Faute à Fidel (Blame it on Fidel, 2007)
• La Batalla de Chile (The Battle of Chile, three-part documentary)

[edit] External links

Wikinews has related news:

Chile remembers its own September 11 anniversary

• The site of the Chilean Anti-Communist League with facts and pictures of that time.
• CIA acknowledges involvement in Allende's overthrow Pinochet's rise, CNN.
• La Tercera, Chilean newspaper, September 11, 1973 (Spanish)
• La Tercera, El Once, includes news of different newspaper of days previous to the coup (Spanish)
• Las 24 horas que estremecieron a Chile. Detailed minute-by-minute account of the events of September 11, 1973 by historian Ascanio Cavallo, on the site of La Tercera. (Spanish)
• Cronología, Salvador-Allende.cl, originally published in Archivo Salvador Allende, number 14. An extensive Spanish-language site providing a day-by-day chronology of the Allende era. This is clearly a partisan, pro-Allende source, but the research and detail are enormous. (Spanish)
• Resolution of August 22, 1973 "Declaration of the Breakdown of Chile’s Democracy." (Wikisource)
• Alternate source of the Resolution of August 22, 1973, on the site of José Piñera. (English) (German) (Spanish) (French) (Polish)
• "Never Again: An essay about the breakdown of democracy in Chile" by José Piñera, a former Minister of Pinochet (examination of events leading up to, and implications regarding, the Resolution of August 22, 1973. (English) (Spanish) (Italian) (Mirror site)
• Allende's August 24, 1973 response to the Chamber of Deputies' declaration, on the site of José Piñera.
• National Security Archive's Chile Documentation Project which provides documents obtained from FOIA requests regarding U.S. involvement in Chile, beginning with attempts to promote a coup in 1970 and continuing through U.S. support for Pinochet
• Sources on the coup
• Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents relating to the Military Coup, 1970-1976, GWU
• US Dept. of State FOIA Church Report (Covert Action in Chile)

[edit] Footnotes and references

[edit] References

• Simon Collier & William F. Sater (1996). A History of Chile: 1808-1994. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Julio Faundez (1988). Marxism and democracy in Chile: From 1932 to the fall of Allende, New Haven: Yale University Press.
• Ignacio González Camus, ed. (1988). El día en que murió Allende (The day that Allende Died), Chilean Institute of Humanistic Studies (ICHEH) / CESOC.
• Anke Hoogvelt (1997). Globalisation and the postcolonial world, London: Macmillan.
• Thomas Karamessines (1970). Operating guidance cable on coup plotting in Chile, Washington: National Security Council.
• Jeane Kirkpatrick (1979). "Dictatorships and Double Standards", Commentary, November, pp 34-45.
• Henry Kissinger (1970). National Security Decision 93: Policy Towards Chile, Washington: National Security Council.
• Richard Norton-Taylor (1999). "Truth will out: Unearthing the declassified documents in America which give the lie to Lady Thatcher's outburst", The Guardian, 8 July 1999, London: Guardian Newspapers Ltd.
• Alec Nove (1986). Socialism, Economics and Development, London: Allen & Unwin.
• James F. Petras & Morris H. Morley (1974). How Allende fell: A study in U.S.–Chilean relations, Nottingham: Spokesman Books.
• Sigmund, P.E. (1986). "Development Strategies in Chile, 1964-1983: The Lessons of Failure", Chapter 6 in I.J. Kim (Ed.), Development and Cultural Change: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, New York: Paragon House Publishers, pp. 159-178.
• Valenzuela, J.S., & Valenzuela, A. (1993). "Modernisation and Dependency: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Latin-American Underdervelopment", in M.A. Seligson & J.T. Pass-Smith (Eds.), Development and Underdevelopment: The Political Economy of Inequality, Boulder: Lynnes Rienner, pp. 203-216.