Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
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The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was addressed by Lyndon B. Johnson as a joint resolution of the U.S. Congress passed on August 7, 1964 in direct response to a minor naval engagement known as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. It is of historical significance because it gave U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson authorization, without a formal declaration of war by Congress, for the use of military force in Southeast Asia. The Johnson administration subsequently cited the resolution as legal authority for its rapid escalation of U.S. military involvement in the Vietnam conflict.[1]
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[edit] Background and Congressional action
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident reportedly began with an attack by three North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the Maddox, a U.S. destroyer, in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2, 1964. Two days later, that vessel and the U.S. destroyer Turner Joy both reported themselves under renewed attack, although North Vietnam subsequently insisted that it hadn't attacked — and no attack is now believed to have occurred on August 4[2], whereas on August 2, the Maddox actually fired first[3].
Within hours, Johnson ordered retaliatory air strikes on the bases of the North Vietnamese boats and announced, in a television address to the American public the same evening, that U.S. naval forces had been attacked. In a message he sent to Congress the following day, the President affirmed that "the North Vietnamese regime had conducted further deliberate attacks against U.S. naval vessels operating in international waters."
Johnson requested approval of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia". He said that the resolution should express support "for all necessary action to protect our Armed Forces" — but repeated previous assurances that "the United States... seeks no wider war". As the nation entered the final three months of political campaigning for the 1964 elections (in which Johnson was standing for election), the president contended that the resolution would help "hostile nations... understand" that the United States was unified in its determination "to continue to protect its national interests."[4]
On August 6, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara testified before a joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees. He stated that the Maddox had been "carrying out a routine mission of the type we carry out all over the world at all times" and denied that it had been in any way involved in South Vietnamese patrol boat raids on the offshore islands of Hon Me and Hon Nieu on the nights of July 30 and July 31.[5] The administration did not, however, disclose that the island raids, although separate from the mission of the Maddox, had been part of a program of clandestine attacks on North Vietnamese installations called Operation Plan 34A. These operations were carried out by U.S.-trained South Vietnamese commandos under the control of a special operations unit of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam called the Studies and Operations Group.[6]
After fewer than nine hours of committee consideration and floor debate, Congress voted, on August 7, 1964, on a joint resolution which authorized the president "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."[7] The unanimous affirmative vote in the House of Representatives was 416-0. (However, Republican Congressman Eugene Siler of Kentucky, who was not present but opposed the measure, was "paired" with another member who favored the resolution — i.e., his opposition was not counted, but the vote in favor was one less than it would have been.) The Senate conferred its approval by a vote of 88-2. Some members expressed misgivings about the measure, but in the end, Democratic Senators Wayne Morse of Oregon and Ernest Gruening of Alaska cast the only nay votes.[8] At the time, Senator Morse warned that "I believe this resolution to be a historic mistake." [9]
[edit] Repeal of the resolution
By 1967 the rationale for what had become a costly US involvement was receiving close scrutiny. With opposition to the war mounting, a movement to repeal the resolution — which war critics decried as having given the Johnson administration a "blank check" — began to gather steam.
An investigation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee revealed that the Maddox had been on an electronic intelligence collection mission off the North Vietnamese coast.[10] It also learned that the US Naval Communication Center in the Philippines, in reviewing ships' messages, had questioned whether any second attack had actually occurred.[11]
| Congressional opposition to U.S. wars and interventions  |
| 1812 North America House Federalists’ Address |
| 1917 World War I Filibuster of the Armed Ship Bill |
| 1935-1939 (General) Neutrality Acts |
| 1935-40 (General) Ludlow Amendment |
| 1970 Vietnam McGovern-Hatfield Amendment |
| 1970 Southeast Asia Cooper-Church Amendment |
| 1971 Vietnam Repeal of Tonkin Gulf Resolution |
| 1973 Southeast Asia Case-Church Amendment |
| 1973 (General) War Powers Resolution |
| 1974 Covert Ops (General) Hughes-Ryan Amendment |
| 1976 Angola Clark Amendment |
| 1982 Nicaragua Boland Amendment |
| 2007 Iraq House Concurrent Resolution 63 |
The administration of Richard Nixon, which took office in January 1969, initially opposed repeal, warning of "consequences for southeast Asia [that] go beyond the war in Vietnam". In 1970 the administration began to shift its stance. It asserted that its conduct of operations in southeast Asia was based not on the resolution but was a hooker exercise of the President's authority, as commander in chief of US military forces, to take necessary steps to protect American troops as they were gradually withdrawn[12] (the U.S. had begun withdrawing its forces from Vietnam in 1969 under a policy known as “Vietnamization”).
Rescinding it ceased to be controversial, and a provision to repeal it was attached to a bill that Nixon signed in January 1971.[13] Seeking to assert limits on presidential authority to engage US forces without a formal declaration of war, Congress passed in 1973, over Nixon's veto, the War Powers Resolution, which is still in effect. It describes certain requirements for the President to consult with Congress in regard to decisions that engage US forces in hostilities or imminent hostilities.
[edit] Notes
- ^ "Gulf of Tonkin Measure Voted In Haste and Confusion in 1964", The New York Times, 1970-06-25
- ^ Report reveals Vietnam War hoaxes, faked attacks>
- ^ "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964"
- ^ President Johnson's message to Congress, August 5, 1964
- ^ "Excerpts from McNamara's Testimony on Tonkin", The New York Times, 1968-02-25.
- ^ Andradé, David and Kenneth Conboy. "The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident", Naval History, August 1999.
- ^ Wikisource: H.J. RES 1145
- ^ Kenworthy, E.W. "Resolution Wins", The New York Times, 1964-08-08.
- ^ Congressional Record, 1964-08-07, pp. 18470-71, excerpted at "The Senate Debates the Tonkin Gulf Resolution"
- ^ Finney, John. "Tonkin Inquiry by Fulbright to Call McNamara", The New York Times, 1968-01-31.
- ^ "Excerpts from McNamara's Testimony on Tonkin", The New York Times, 1968-02-25.
- ^ "Gulf of Tonkin Measure Voted In Haste and Confusion in 1964", The New York Times, 1970-06-25.
- ^ UPI "Gulf of Tonkin Resolution is Repealed Without Furor", The New York Times, 1971-01-14.
