Draža Mihailović

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Dragoljub Mihailovic
1893–1946
Nickname	Чича Дража or Čiča Draža
Place of birth	Ivanjica, Kingdom of Serbia
Place of death	near Belgrade, Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia
Allegiance	Allies of World War I and Allies of World War II
Service/branch	Army
Years of service	1910-1946
Rank	General
Commands	Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland
Awards	Legion of Merit

Dragoljub "Draža" Mihailović (Serbian Cyrillic: Драгољуб "Дража" Михаиловић; also known as Чича or Čiča) (April 27, 1893 - July 17, 1946) was a Serbian general now primarily remembered as leader of the resistance movement Yugoslav Royal Army in the Fatherland during World War II.

After the war, he was tried by the Communist Partisans for crimes against the Partisans in the Civil War and for high treason not accepting Tito, shot and then buried in an unmarked grave. However, at the same time an independent U.S. commission concluded that Mihailović was not a collaborator. U.S. President Harry S. Truman posthumously awarded him the Legion of Merit for contribution to the Allied victory.

Contents 1 Early life 2 World War II 3 Chetnik Crimes Against Bosniaks and Croats 3.1 Relations with the Communists 3.2 Relations with the British and Americans 3.3 In Bosnia 4 Trial 4.1 Controversies over "Instructions" 5 Rehabilitation 6 Bibliography 7 See also 8 External links 8.1 Photos

[edit] Early life

Born in Ivanjica, Kingdom of Serbia, Mihailović went to the Serbian military academy in October 1910 and as a cadet fought in the Balkan Wars 1912–1913. In July 1913 he was given rank of Second Lieutenant as the top soldier in his class. He served in World War I and together with the Serbian army marched through Albania in 1915 during the long retreat of the Serbian army. He later received several decorations for his achievements on the Salonica front.

Between the wars he became an elite staff officer and achieved the rank of colonel. He also served as military attaché in Sofia and Prague.

His military career almost came to an abrupt end after several incidents, the most important one being the idea of dividing the Yugoslav army along national lines into (Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes), for which he was sentenced to 30 days imprisonment. World War II found Mihailović occupying a minor position of assistant to chief of staff of the Second Army.

In the last years before WWII, he was stationed in Celje, Slovenia (then Drava Banovina), where he was involved in several incidents of violent confrontation with the local ethnic Germans.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] World War II

Following the Yugoslav defeat by Germany in April 1941, a small group of officers and soldiers led by Mihailović refused to surrender, and retreated in hope of finding Yugoslav army units still fighting in the mountains. After arriving at Ravna Gora, Serbia on May 8, he realized that his group of seven officers and twenty four non-commissioned officers and soldiers was the only one.^[1] At Ravna Gora, Mihailović organized the Chetniks detachment of the Yugoslav Army, which became the Military-Chetnik Detachments and finally the Yugoslav Army of the Homeland (Југословенска војска у отаџбини or Jugoslovenska vojska u otadžbini).

The first Chetnik formations led by Mihailović were formed around Ravna Gora on June 14. Most of 1941 was spent consolidating the scattered army remnants elsewhere and raising new forces. The stated goal of the Chetniks was the liberation of the country from the occupying armies including the forces of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and the Ustaše (the fascist regime of the Independent State of Croatia).

However, Mihailović decided against a mass uprising because of catastrophic Serb losses in World War I, in which the Kingdom of Serbia lost a quarter of its male population to the war.^[2] Instead, Mihailović gathered men and weapons in the easily defensible Serbian mountains, waiting for an Allied landing in the Balkans, upon which he could attack any Germans or Italians from behind. Mihailović generally discouraged overt sabotage due to the ferocious German reprisals (such as more than 3,000 killed in Kraljevo and Kragujevac) unless some great gain could be accomplished; instead, he favored delayed sabotage that could not easily be traced.

As the Germans realized how much both Mihailović and Tito were impeding their occupation, they launched active attacks upon them personally in addition to the standard hunting of rebels. The Germans launched "Operation Mihailović" in late 1941, a manhunt to capture or kill him.^[3] When Hitler was informed that Mihailović's forces had killed 1,000 German soldiers, Hitler announced a new policy that for every German killed by the Chetniks, one hundred Serbs would be shot. In 1943, the German installed regime in Serbia offered a reward of 100,000 Reichsmarks for the capture of Mihailović, dead or alive.^[3]

[edit] Chetnik Crimes Against Bosniaks and Croats

As part of his opportunist policies in support of creating Greater Serbia, Mihailović issues the following instructions to his commanders on December 20, 1941:

"The mission of our units is: 1. Struggle for the freedom of all of our people under the scepter of His Majesty, the king Peter II; 2. Create Greater Yugoslavia, and within it Greater Serbia, ethnically clean within the borders of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Srem, Banat, and Backa; 3. Struggle for incorporation into our social structure of those unliberated Slovenian territories under Italy and Germany (Trieste, Gorica, Istria, and Kaernten), as well as Bulgaria and Northern Albania with Shkodra; 4. Cleansing from the state territory all national minorities and anti-state elements; 5. Create direct common borders between Serbia and Montenegro, as well as Serbia and Slovenia by cleansing Bosniak population from Sandžak, and Bosniak and Croat populations from Bosnia and Herzegovina; 6. Punish all Croats and Bosniaks who have mercilessly destroyed our people in the tragic days; 7. The areas cleansed of national minorities and anti-state elements are to be settled by Montenegrins (to be considered are poor, nationally patriotic, and honest families).

There may be no collaboration with Communists, as they are fighting against the dynasty and in favor of Socialist revolution. Albanians, Bosniaks, and Ustashe are to be treated in accordance with their merit for the horrendous crimes against our population, i.e. they are to be passed to the "People's Court". The Croats living on the territory under Italian occupation are to be treated based on their disposition at the given moment."

The exact number of Bosniak, Croat and other civilians murdered under the direct command of Draza's Chetniks has never been established. In his book Crimes Against Bosnian Muslims 1941-1945, historian Semso Tucakovic quoted that of 150,000 Bosniaks who lost lives in WWII, some 100,000 were murdered by Chetniks. He also listed at least 50,000 Bosnian Muslim names directly known to have perished from Chetniks. According to WW2 historian Vladimir Zerjavic, a total of 29 thousand Moslems and 18 thousand Croatians were killed by Chetniks during WW2. ^[4] Zerjavic figures have been cited as too conservative and figures of up to 300,000 non-Serbs have been suggested. ^[5]

Some of the major crimes perpetrated by Chetniks against ethnic Bosniaks in World War II include: - July 1941, Herzegovina (Bileca/Stolac) - 1,150 Bosniaks slaughtered; - December 1941/January 1942, Eastern Bosnia (Foca, Gorazde) - 2,050 Bosniaks slaughtered; - August 1942, Eastern Bosnia/Sandžak (Foca, Bukovica) - 1,000 Bosniaks slaughtered; - August 1942, Eastern Bosnia (Ustikolina, Jahorina) - 2,500 Bosniaks slaughtered; - October 1942 - Central Bosnia (Prozor) - 1,250 Bosniaks slaughtered; - January 1943, Sandžak (Bijelo Polje) - 1,500 Bosniaks slaughtered; - February 1943, Eastern Bosnia/Sandžak (Foca, Cajnice, Pljevlja) - 9,200+ Bosniaks slaughtered - the worst single massacre campaign by Chetniks in World War II.^[6]

[edit] Relations with the Communists

With the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Tito's Partisans joined the fight against the Germans. However, Tito adopted a radically different approach than Mihailović. Tito favored all-out resistance, striking at the Germans and Italians with everything he had. Mihailović saw his strategy as wanting to save the country with as few casualties as possible, while he thought that Tito wanted to burn the country and the old order to the ground to better prepare it for communism. According to Lieutenant Colonel Zivan L. Knezevich, chief of the military cabinet for the Prime Minister and one of Mihailović's senior advisors, "The Communist Partisans wanted immediately to lead the people into an open fight against the forces of occupation although the people were completely bare-handed and the fight could not have benefited anybody... [Mihailović] thought that the uprising was premature and that, without any gain in prospect, it would have brought disproportionately great sacrifices. He was not able to convince the Communist Partisans that an open fight could have only one result, namely, the annihilation of the population."^[7]

Mihailović gradually came to view the Communists as no better than the Nazis. A telegram sent on February 22, 1943 described an incident where the Communists brought a German / Ustaše force upon a town in the Bihac Republic; the town fled, but the Communist force "abandoned" them to the enemy, which massacred them. Mihailović concluded that "This is the fight that the Communists wage, a fight which is directed by foreign propaganda with the aim of systematically annihilating our nation."^[8] The Communists and Royalists descended into a brutal civil war. Whenever territory changed hands between them, anyone thought sympathetic to the other side was publicly executed.^[9]

Kosta Milovanović Pećanac, a First World War uprising leader and former Chetnik himself, considered the Communists so grave a threat that he opted for cooperation with the Germans against them. Pećanac and Mihailović became rivals, both claiming the Chetnik heritage and with Pećanac commanding a much smaller allegiance than Mihailović. Because of his open collaboration with the Germans, Pećanac was shot in 1944 by Mihailović's Chetniks for treason upon his capture.

[edit] Relations with the British and Americans

The British Special Operations Executive were being sent to aid Mihailović's forces beginning with the autumn of 1941. Mihailović rose in rank, becoming the Minister of War of the exile government in January 11, 1942 and General and Deputy Commander-in-Chief on June 17 the same year. At first, the British had a policy of aiding anyone fighting the Germans. However, as the civil war between the Communists and the Royalists intensified, the British realized that many of the precious resources being committed to Yugoslavia were being used only to further the civil war. Captain Duane Hudson of the SOE's report indicated that while Mihailović could be trusted to participate in a "grand finale against the Axis"^[10], they were taking a more passive stance for the moment. Additionally, the Royalists had dealings with Italian forces in Montenegro. Later SOE operatives confirmed the initial report; while Mihailović clearly hated the Germans, they might hate the Communists even more. Both sides seemed to deal with the Italians on the side, a major worrying factor for the British.^[3] They didn't like the idea of Mihailović seemingly sitting out the war while Tito was out killing troops and blowing up installations. The British requested Mihailović to be more active in his insurgency efforts, though without much success. Support was scaled back for both sides.

By early 1943, the Royalists' support was beginning to collapse with the British. Randolph Churchill, the Prime Minister's son, was stationed at Tito's headquarters, where he reported directly to his father with reports of the Partisan's glorious victories which he made little attempt to verify. Furthermore, Communist sympathizers in the SOE and other agencies such as James Klugmann were systematically framing the situation to their superiors in ways that favored Tito's forces over Mihailović's. Several sources (especially Michael Lees 1991 and David Martin 1990) say that some reports were outright falsified by British Communists and sympathizers in Cairo whose doctored reports of Chetnik "inactivity" or "collaboration" were believed by Churchill. Mihailović, for his part, was frustrated with the British lack of aid and instructions over how to run "his" insurgency. On February 28, 1943, Mihailović delivered an ill-advised speech to a group of his supporters saying that the Serb people were now "completely friendless" and that "The English are now fighting to the last Serb in Yugoslavia." Mihailović said that his enemies were now the Partisans, the Ustaše, the Moslems, and the Croats. When he had dealt with them, he would turn his attention toward the Italians and Germans. He then stated, at least according to the British liaison, that he needed no further contact with the Western democracies whose "sole aim was to win the war at the expense of others." ^[11] He may have also considered Jews as an enemy since anti-semitism was common in Serbia before World War II.

These comments doomed hopes of continued British support. By the middle of 1943, the Partisan movement had survived an intense period of Axis pressure. At the Tehran Conference in November 1943, a decision was made by the Allies to cease their support of the Chetniks, and switch support to Tito's Partisans.

[edit] In Bosnia

The Royalists advanced into eastern Bosnia in 1943 where they engaged in heavy combat with the Ustaše, resulting in several incidents of war crimes against people who supported the other faction by both sides. For instance, Croat historian Vladimir Zerjavic claims that roughly 40,000 lost their lives to forces affiliated with the Chetniks;^[12] many Serbs were also killed by the Ustaše in reprisals. It is unclear however how much say Mihailović himself had in these incidents. The Chetnik movement was highly decentralized, and in that way was more like a collective of many small regional guerrillas which shared the same name, rather than a unified army under complete control of Mihailović and his staff.

Towards the end of the war, Mihailović went into hiding in East Bosnia. Nikola Kalabić, his comrade from war was the only person who knew where Mihajlović was. In exchange for freedom, since Kalabić was wanted as well, he revealed where Draža Mihajlović was hiding. But, there is no material evidence that Kalabić betrayed Mihajlović.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Trial

Main article: The Trial of Draža Mihailović

Mihailović was captured on March 13, 1946 by agents of OZNA (Odeljenje za Zaštitu Naroda — Department for Protection of People). He was charged on 47 accounts. In the end the court found him convicted for 8 accounts, including crimes against the Yugoslav Partisans and high treason not accepting Tito, alone sufficient for a death penalty. The trial lasted from June 10 to July 15, he was found guilty and sentenced to death by firing squad on July 15th. The Presidium of the National Assembly rejected the clemency appeal on July 16. He was executed together with nine other officers in the early hours of 18 July 1946, in Lisiciji Potok, about 200 meters from the former Royal Palace, and buried in an unmarked grave on the same spot. His main prosecutor was Miloš Minić, later minister of foreign affairs for the Communist government of Yugoslavia. There are controversies over the true liberty and the resources of Mihailovic's defense during the process.

His execution was a striking point in Franco–Yugoslav relations and Charles de Gaulle, Mihailović's friend, refused to visit Yugoslavia due to what he viewed as Mihailović's murder by Marshal Tito's communist regime.

[edit] Controversies over "Instructions"

During the trial, the communists claimed that Mihailović issued the following order on 20 December 1941 (titled "Instrukcija"):

"The mission of our units is:

1. Struggle for the freedom of all of our people under the scepter of His Majesty, the king Peter II;

2. Create Greater Yugoslavia, and within it Greater Serbia, ethnically clean within the borders of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Srem, Banat, and Backa;

3.Struggle for incorporation into our social structure of those unliberated Slovenian territories under Italy and Germany (Trieste, Gorica, Istria, and Kaernten), as well as Bulgaria and Northern Albania with Shkodra;

4. Cleansing from the state territory all national minorities and anti-state elements;

5. Create direct common borders between Serbia and Montenegro, as well as Serbia and Slovenia by cleansing Bosniak] population from Sandžak, and Bosniak and Croat populations from Bosnia and Herzegovina;

6. Punish all Croats and Bosniaks who have mercilessly destroyed our people in the tragic days;

7. The areas cleansed of national minorities and anti-state elements are to be settled by Montenegrins(to be considered are poor, nationally patriotic, and honest families).

There may be no collaboration with Communists, as they are fighting against the dynasty and in favor of Socialist revolution. Albanians, Bosniaks, and Ustashe are to be treated in accordance with their merit for the horrendous crimes against our population, i.e. they are to be passed to the "People's Court". The Croats living on the territory under Italian occupation are to be treated based on their disposition at the given moment."

According to Lucien Karchmar ^[13], inescapable conclusion is that this document was forged by Djurisic himself. Karchmar arguments are the following:

a) No original of this document seems to have been found,but only a copy attested by Djurisic as being genuine.

b) The order is firmly connected in Chetnik memorial litterature with the presumed personal encounter between Mihailovic and Djurisic ; but this encounter did not take place. This is attested not only by Perhinek's testimony in Zivanovic,Vol.I, but also by various officers who were with or near Mihailovic's headquarters during this period, and who aver that Djurisic never came, and that Mihailovic met him for the first time in June 1942. It is symptomatic that the various stories do not agree on where the meeting took place; e.g. Joksimovic, in Njegos 1, p.99, says that it was on Mt.Golija, whereas Minic(p.124) chooses Ravna Gora.

c) The order is dated 20 December 1941, which makes it physically impossible that Djurisic could have obtained it from Mihailovic and brought it back with him to Montenegro. Djurisic left Zaostro in the first half of December and took about 10 days to get to Golija, which he had barely reached on December 20. He took about same length of time to return, since he was back in Zaostro on January 1 or 2. Had he continued with a round trip from Golija to Ravna Gora, his journey would have lasted at least two or three weeks longer; witness the time it took Perhinek to get from Ravna Gora to Golija. Not only would he have had to dodge German and Nedic troops, but the problem of locating Mihailoviæ would have consumed much time; the latter was in constant movement about the hills of Western Serbia, and his own staff was sometimes unable to contact him. The same time element makes it impossible that a courier bearing a document dated from December 20 could have caught up with Djurisic before his return to Montenegro. There would have been, in any case, no reason for Mihailovic to write the order and rush it off posthaste to Djurisic (to whom he had already sent the authorisation of October 15) unless he knew that was in Serbia; again, the time element makes this impossible. But Djurisic had to date the forgery so that it would accord with his story of having been to visit Mihailovic; i.e. to the midpoint of his journey.

d) The document refers at least twice to verbal instructions and explanations on various points given to Djurisic by Mihailovic. Since their meeting never took place, such instructions were impossible. Djurisic obviously put in these bits to allow himself, latter on, to manufacture "official" policy on any point he forgot to include in the order.

e) The tone and contents of the document are far more "Montenegrin" than "Serbian", and in particular seem to reflect the character of Djurisic rather than that of Mihailovic. The bloodthirsty intransigence, and especially the grim hatred of the Moslems, are essentially Montenegrin; to the Srbijanci, unlike the Vasojevici, the Moslem problem was of secondary importance. The primary problem to Mihailovic was NDH and the Ustase, and he would doubtless have wanted to turn Montenegrians in that direction. The order hardly mentions Croats, but goes on and on about action against the Moslems.

f) The fact that the document contains some genuine Mihailovic ideas (e.g. the liberation of Istria, federation of Bulgaria, creation of a large Serbian unit within Yougoslavia) is easily explained. Perhinek, having spent several weeks at Mihailovic's headquarters, would have been conversant with the ideas expressed by the latter and by his staff, and would have communicated them to Djurisic.

[edit] Rehabilitation

Evidence of Mihailović’s loyal Allied and anti-Axis actions, all the way to the end of the occupation, comes from the 500 to 600 Allied (mostly UK and US) military personnel who were rescued by Mihailović forces, during Operation Halyard, over almost the entire area where Mihailović forces existed. These British and American personnel often remained with Mihailović and his various forces for months at a time, before they were able to be flown back to the West. As an independent American commission concluded in 1946, these Allied airmen were instructed by their American and British superiors to look for any signs of collaboration, they were given freedom of movement by Mihailović forces, and yet not one of these hundreds testified of Mihailović collaboration with the Axis. Several of these western military personnel gave very detailed testimony of witnessing, and in some cases participating in, anti-Axis actions, even after the Chetniks were abandoned by the Western Allies. The independent American commission that took testimony from some of these airmen concluded:

"ALLEGED COLLABORATION WITH THE ENEMY No evidence was adduced before the commission which tended to show any collaboration between General Mihailović and the Axis powers. On the contrary, all the evidence tended strongly to disprove the existence of any such collaboration. …all classes of witnesses were constantly on the lookout for collaboration, had full opportunity to discover it, and would be expected to discover it if it had existed. … all the witnesses testified that in Mihailović territory they were allowed to go freely, and without escort, wherever they wanted, to talk without restriction to civilians and soldiers alike, and to make observations as they wished.

OPERATIONS AGAINST THE ENEMY The evidence of American officers before the Commission indicated not merely the absence of collaboration between General Mihailović and the Axis powers, but also establish that General Mihailović and his men continued to conduct hostile operations against both the Germans and the Italians, even after the Allies had stopped sending him supplies and had concentrated their support in favor of Marshal Tito, and even after the date of the Italian surrender. American officers testified to numerous specific operations of this kind in which they had themselves participated with General Mihailović or with troops acting under his direction.

HOSTILITIES BETWEEN CHETNIKS AND PARTISANS The statement of the Minister of the Interior of the present Yugoslavia … says that … General Mihailović will be charged with '…murder, arson, plundering and the handing over to the Germans of members of our National Liberation Army.' No evidence was adduced before the Commission which tended to support these charges … " (see David Martin 1978).

Due to the efforts of Major Richard L. Felman and his friends, President Harry S. Truman, on the recommendation of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, posthumously awarded Mihailović the "Legion of Merit", for contribution to the Allied victory. For the first time in history, this high award was classified secret by the State Department so as not to offend the communist government of Yugoslavia.

"General Dragoljub Mihailovich distinguished himself in an outstanding manner as Commander-in-Chief of the Yugoslavian Army Forces and later as Minister of War by organizing and leading important resistance forces against the enemy which occupied Yugoslavia, from December 1941 to December 1944. Through the undaunted efforts of his troops, many United States airmen were rescued and returned safely to friendly control. General Mihailovich and his forces, although lacking adequate supplies, and fighting under extreme hardships, contributed materially to the Allied cause, and were instrumental in obtaining a final Allied victory." March 29, 1948, Harry S. Truman.

Almost sixty years later, on May 9, 2005, Draža Mihailović's daughter Gordana was presented with a decoration bestowed posthumously on Draža Mihailović by U.S. President Truman in 1948.

[edit] Bibliography

• Freeman, Gregory A. (September 2007). The Forgotten 500. 80 Strand, London: Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-451-22212-1. 
• Juce, Sinoc. Pjetlovi nad Tigrovima Sanski Most, BiH: Begovic-Bosanska Krajina Press 2007
• Lees, Michael. The Rape of Serbia: The British Role in Tito's Grab for Power, 1943-1944. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1991.
• Martin, David. Ally Betrayed: The Uncensored Story of Tito and Mihailović. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1946.
• Martin, David. Patriot or Traitor: The Case of General Mihailović: Proceedings and Report of the Commission of Inquiry of the Committee for a Fair Trial for Draja Mihailović. Hoover Archival Documentaries. Hoover Institution Publication, volume 191. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1978.[1]
• Martin, David. The Web of Disinformation: Churchill’s Yugoslav Blunder. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990.
• Roberts, Walter R. Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941–1945. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1973.
• Trew, Simon. Britain, Mihailović, and the Chetniks, 1941–42. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin’s Press in association with King’s College, London, 1998.
• Tucakovic, Semso. ""Srpski zlocini nad Bosnjacima Muslimanima 1941. - 1945." Sarajevo: El Kalem, 1995.

[edit] See also

• Trial of Draža Mihailović

[edit] External links

• Execution of Draza's Instructions by his Commander, "Bloody Priest" Momcilo Djujic
• Trial of Draza Mihajlovic
• General Mihailovich on TIME Magazine cover, 1942
• V-E Day celebrations in Serbia with Chetnik and U.S. veterans
• Mihailović's bio at Columbia Encyclopedia
• Biography of Dragoljub-Draža Mihailović at Vojska.net
• SUC Biography
• Congressional Record on Mihailović
• General Mihailović's Legion of Merit
• Tribute to Mihailović
• Draža Mihailović In Memoriam
• Erection of Mihailović monument in US
• Stenographic record of trial

[edit] Photos

• Photo gallery (French)
• 100th Anniversary of Chetnik Movement