Stephen Harper boldly claims to be “passionately committed to protecting and defending” the North. “Canada has a choice when it comes to defending our sovereignty over the Arctic. We either use it or lose it,” he says. “Make no mistake; this government intends to use it.”
The prime minister certainly talks the talk. He’s challenged US Ambassador David Wilkins over the status of the Northwest Passage, and promised a deepwater port, a cold weather training centre, and up to eight ice-strengthened patrol vessels for the Canadian Forces. He’s even promised a $720-million icebreaker for the Canadian coast guard. Just the same, it’s easy to publicly berate a foreign emissary for electoral purposes; the port and buildings for the training centre already exist, and the shipbuilding contracts are not yet signed. Perhaps a clearer indication of Harper’s commitment to Arctic sovereignty lies in the government’s dealings with MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. of Richmond, BC.
In January, mda announced the sale of its space program to Alliant Techsystems (atk), a massive US arms manufacturer. The deal can be blocked, and in April the government, facing mounting opposition, issued an “initial rejection” letter saying that the sale would not be a “net benefit” to Canada. By Canadian law atk was granted thirty days to amend its offer. If the sale ultimately goes through, it will include the newly launched Radarsat-2 remote sensing satellite. Designed specifically with the Arctic in mind, it generates images of remarkably high definition, even at night and through clouds, and is the perfect tool for tracking ships and mapping sea ice, especially during the long, dark polar winter.
Radarsat-2 was developed through a public-private partnership between mda and the Canadian Space Agency, with taxpayers contributing $445 million (about 85 percent) of the total cost. It was a sweet deal for the company, and president and ceo Daniel Friedmann predicted that Radarsat-2 would, over its seven-year projected lifespan, generate up to $1 billion in revenue for mda. But the anticipated benefits for Canada were also significant. The government obtained the right to Radarsat-2 imagery of a value equivalent to its financial contribution, and, more important, acquired “shutter control” — the ability to restrict the kinds of images downloaded from the satellite for reasons of national security — as well as “priority access” in cases of emergency, such as forest fires, oil spills, or suspect vessels entering Canada’s North.
This shutter control and priority access are now at stake. If mda’s space program is sold to atk, the US will most likely replace Canada as the licensing authority for Radarsat-2. Ottawa will lose the ability to control the satellite and commandeer it in emergencies, which could enable it to be used in ways that might well contradict our interests. Suppose the US sends a ship into the Northwest Passage without Canada’s consent. Or that it attacks Iran in the absence of UN authorization or a truly Radar imminent threat. In both instances, Radarsat-2 imagery would facilitate American law-breaking. (atk says it will abide by all existing contracts.)
Even if Canada were to remain the licensing authority and notionally retain control, this could break down after the satellite was sold. Suppose Canada wanted priority access for Arctic sovereignty purposes just as a crisis was developing between the US and Russia. The Pentagon would likely want all of the satellite’s airtime, and atk might well acquiesce. After all, the US government is already atk’s principal customer, buying vast quantities of small arms ammunition, land mines, cluster bombs, and depleted uranium shells, as well as rocket engines for nuclear missiles and missile defence interceptors from the company.
A chief argument for selling Radarsat-2 is that some control over the satellite has already been ceded to the US. Radarsat-2 was supposed to have been launched by nasa in 2001, in return for a specified amount of free data. But that plan was axed after Washington expressed concern that hostile countries or groups might purchase fine images of US facilities and military forces. This, along with various technical problems, caused the launch date to slip from 2001 to 2003, and then to 2005. Radarsat-2 was finally sent into orbit on December 14, 2007 — on a Russian-made Soyuz rocket that blasted off from Kazakhstan.
Early on, the Canadian government sought to address US concerns by negotiating a bilateral treaty. The pact, signed by then Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy and US secretary of state Madeleine Albright in 2000, imposed restraints on the use of the satellite, with the details being deemed “commercially confidential” and confined to an unpublished annex, or side agreement. In 2005, when Members of Parliament were asked to adopt legislation enabling the licensing of Radarsat-2, they were not allowed to see the annex. Conservative MP Ted Menzies asked, “Does the minister have the power to trump this annex in the treaty? They claim the minister has shutter control, but they won’t tell us if the annex trumps the minister.”
One can speculate as to the contents of the annex. Washington undoubtedly obtained control over any images of US military facilities and real or potential theatres of operation, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran. It may also have secured the power to conscript Radarsat-2 in support of its intelligence and military operations more generally, thus negating Canada’s right of priority access. When I put this last speculation to Axworthy in March 2005, it elicited a wry smile.
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