Kurdistan Workers Party

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Kurdistan Workers' Party
Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, (PKK)
The current PKK flag used since 2005
The current PKK flag used since 2005
Operational 1978-present
Led by The current official leader is Murat Karayilan. Abdullah Öcalan (also known as "Apo") was one of the founders and still directs the party from his prison cell, through his lawyer.[1][2][3]
Objectives The creation of an independent socialist state of Kurdistan in parts of present Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Cultural and political rights for the Kurdish population in Turkey.[4]
Active region(s) Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria
Ideology Kurdish nationalism
Major actions Assassination, Bombing Attacks, Chemical Warfare, Drug Trafficking, Extortion, Human Trafficking,Kidnapping, Sabotage, Suicide Bombing[5][6][7][8]
Status Designated as Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US State Department[9][10]
Designated as Proscribed Group by the UK Home Office[citation needed]
Designated as terrorist group by EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.[citation needed]
Size 6000[11]

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan or PKK, also called KADEK, Kongra-Gel, and KGK[10]) is a militant organization founded in the 1970s and led by Abdullah Öcalan. The PKK's ideology is founded on revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and Kurdish nationalism. The PKK's goal has been to create an independent, socialist Kurdish state in Kurdistan; a geographical region that comprises parts of southeastern Turkey, northeastern Iraq, northeastern Syria and northwestern Iran, where the Kurdish population is the majority. This goal has now been moderated to claiming cultural and political rights for the Kurdish population within the state of Turkey.[1]

The PKK has fairly wide support among the Kurdish population in Turkey, and limited support in other parts of Kurdistan.[12][13] It is listed as a terrorist organization internationally by a number of states and organizations, including the United States,[10] NATO and the European Union.[14] The organisation is listed as one of the 12 active terrorist organisation in Turkey as of 2007 according to the Counter-Terrorism and Operations Department of Directorate General for Security (Turkish police).[15] Turkey labeled the organization as an ethnic secessionist organization that uses terrorism and the threat of force against both civilian[14][16] and military targets for the purpose of achieving its political goal.

Contents

[edit] Name

The group most commonly referred to as the PKK despite among the organization's self declared name changes, names used by its branches, and vassal structures established. For the purposes of convenience in this article we refer to the group as the organization.

The organization introduced to the intelligence community as "Apocus" in the late 1979 more than a year after it's establishment in 1978 from ex-members of existing leftish groups.

During more than three decades of existence, organization declared name changes without changing its organizational structure, such as Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan, PKK); Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan (KADEK); Kurdish Freedom Hawks (TAK); Halu Mesru Savunma Kuvveti (HSK). Organization adapted a decentralized structure to help the growing effectiveness[17] and these new branches adapted different names. Armed wing active in south-east Turkey used HPG (People's Forces of Defence) and another armed force was the People's Defense Force. The organization held especially by a vassal or tenant to the major control over established structures such as Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress; Kurdistan People's Congress (KHK); People's Congress of Kurdistan. As of April 30, 2007, all the social arrangements, all the activities declared, using the listed names are classified as originated from the same organization (commonly known as PKK) by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism of USA as published in Country Reports on Terrorism.[10]

Also the Youth Council of Kurdistan (YCK), an establishment of the organization initially created on October 25 1987, aim to organise and recruit the youth more systematically, extended to branches; Free Youth Movement of Kurdistan (TECAK), The Independent Youth Movement in Turkey (BAGEH), Democratic Youth Movement in Iran, Independent Youth Movement in Iraq (TCM), Free Youth Movement in Syria (TCA), The Free Youth Movement (ÖGH) in Europe and in the Commonwealth of Independent State.[18]

[edit] Ideology

Former flag displaying the communist hammer and sickle
Former flag displaying the communist hammer and sickle

The organization originated in the 1970s from the radical left in Turkey and drew its leaders, members from other existing leftish groups, mainly Dev-Genç.[19].

During 1980's, the organization was a secular insurgent political movement.[19] During 1980's the organization included and cooperated with other ethnic groups (including ethnic Turks) who were following the radical left. Following the collapse of the USSR, the PKK largely abandoned its communist roots, attempting to better accommodate nationalistic views and Islamic beliefs.

The organization emerged from the Workers Party of "Kurdistan" heritage. With the time fundamentally transforming from a party of Kurdistan to a party of Turkey[20]. The profound shift implied a recognition of national sovereignty of "Republic of Turkey" (within which the claim is made for regional autonomy), rather than a fight for national independence.[20]. This positional change was criticized as a method change rather than a real ideological change.

In 1999, following the capture of Ocalan, organization announced a "peace initiative," and spoken more often about cultural or linguistic rights[10]. The group's hard-line militant wing took control and renounced the self-imposed cease-fire with the turn of 2004.[10] During this period on 17 July 2005, one of the chief executive of the PKK, Hasan Özen who wanted to leave the organization, was murdered in Austria. In Diyarbakir, on 6 July 2005, the organization killed Hikmet Fidan the former founder of the People’s Democratic Party (HADEP), a legal branch of the PKK, after he split from the PKK and formed an alternative organization called PWD with Osman Ocalan.

Currently, it is labeled as an ethnic secessionist organization that uses terrorism and the threat of force against both civilian and military targets for the purpose of achieving its political goal.

[edit] History

October 22, 2007, demonstration against the PKK in Kadıköy, Istanbul.
October 22, 2007, demonstration against the PKK in Kadıköy, Istanbul.

In the early 1970s, the organization's core was called the Ankara Democratic Patriotic Association of Higher Education or Apocular ("Apoists"), which was made up largely of students, led by Abdullah Öcalan (nicknamed "Apo") in Ankara. The group soon moved its focus to large Kurdish population in south-east Turkey.

On 27 October, 1978, the group adapted the name Kurdistan Workers Party with the official release of the "Proclamation of Independence of PKK." The organization soon found itself in conflict with right-wing entities with its largely communist ideology. In 1979, organization attempted to assassinate Kurdish tribal leader Mehmet Celal Bucak as a propaganda-of-the-deed claiming "exploiting the peasants," and "collaborating with Turkey." This marked a period of intense urban warfare between radical political elements. The military coup largely ended this period, with members of the organization being subject to capital punishment, going to prison, or fleeing to Syria. On November 10, 1980, the Turkish Consulate in Strasbourg, France was bombed resulting a significant material damage but no injuries and operation claimed jointly by the ASALA and the organization, which they claimed to be the start of a "fruitful collaboration."[21]

Starting in 1984, using the training camps located in Syria, the organization transformed itself into a paramilitary organisation and launched conventional attacks as well as continuing with the bombings against governmental installations, military and civilian targets, many of whom were connected to the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), a multi-sector integrated regional development project based on the concept of sustainable development for more than nine million people living in the southeastern Anatolia region. During 1990s, the organization moved to a less centralized form, taking up operations in a variety of European and Middle Eastern countries and became a trans-nationalized organization. Following the collapse of the USSR, the PKK largely abandoned its communist roots, attempting to better accommodate nationalistic views and Islamic beliefs. In the mid 1990s, it also began to shift from conventional bombing to suicide bombing, launching 15 such attacks between 1995 and 1999. The 11 of 15 suicide bombers were women.

In the late 1990s, the Turkish army began to gain the upper hand in its ground war with the organization and post-Cold War shifts in international politics resulted in the group losing much of its support among other states. In 1999, Öcalan was captured, prosecuted and sentenced to death. Turkey abolished the death penalty on 3 August 2002 as part of a raft of reforms aimed at preparing the country for European Union membership, and Öcalan was commuted to life imprisonment.[22] Öcalan took his case to the European Court of Human Rights which conclusion held that there had been violation of Article 6 (right to fair trial), as there was one military judge among six judges trying Abdullah Öcalan, there was no violation of Article 2 (right to life).[23] With downgraded security concerns, the Turkish parliament began a controlled process of dismantling the legal control, using the term "normalization" or "rapprochement" depending on the sides of the issue. A ban on publishing using Kurdish language (1983) was dropped in 1991, with more thorough reforms, such as the lifting of the ban on broadcasting in Kurdish, adopted in the 2000s with the decrease in PKK's activities.[24]

Following a call by the captured Öcalan for a peaceful solution, the PKK found itself blacklisted in many countries. Consequently, the PKK went through a series of changes and implemented a unilateral truce, which ended in 2003.[25] On April 2, 2004, the Council of the European Union added the PKK to its list of terrorist organisations. Later that year, the US Treasury moved to freeze assets of branches of the PKK.

Since Post-invasion Iraq, 2003–present, according to Turkey, Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdish region in northern Iraq, and US forces have not done enough to combat with the organization and secure the Iraqi-Turkish border, causing tensions between the Iraqi and Turkish governments.[26][27] On the 17 October 2007, the Turkish parliament approved a military incursion into Iraq to pursue the PKK fighters. The vote for incursion won with an overwhelming 507 to 19.[28] Action was delayed on request by the US government on the condition that "swift steps" were taken to deal with the militants. On December 16th, 2007, after the October 2007 clashes in Hakkari the Turkish Armed Forces started preparations for 2008 Turkish incursion into northern Iraq.

[edit] 2008 to date

On 22 February 2008, the Turkish military carried out a major incursion into northern Iraq to attack PKK bases there. An estimated 10,000 Turkish troops were deployed for the incursion along with armoured vehicles and aircraft.[29] The incursion sparked calls from the Iraqi and US governments for the incursion to end.

On 29 February 2008 the Turkish military announced that the incursion was finished and pulled out of northern Iraq, claiming that they had achieved their objectives. The military claimed 240 PKK rebels killed and for the loss of 27 Turkish soldiers.[30]

After a terrorist attack in Istanbul on 27 July 2008, Turkish authorities blamed the PKK. Spokesmen for the organization emphatically denied being involved.

On 7 August 2008 the PKK claimed responsibility for an explosion that has halted the flow of oil through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.[31]

[edit] Activities

Activities of the Kurdistan Workers Party by Region[5][32]
Target Activity Category Turkey Northern
Iraq
Western
Europe
Government Demonstrations/Protests[5] Yes Yes Yes
Riots[5] Yes Yes
Kidnapping[5] Yes Yes
Assassination[5] Yes Yes
Sabotage[5] Yes
Chemical warfare[33] Yes
Bombing
Attacks
[5]
Post/Train/Power Yes
Police Yes
Outposts Yes
Armed
Attacks[5]
Military Yes Yes
Police Yes
Village Guards Yes
Civilian Kidnapping[5] Yes
Assassination[5] Yes Yes
Bombing
Attacks
Villages Yes Yes
Touristic Facilities[5] Yes
Commercial Units[5] Yes
Organized Crime Extortion[6] Yes Yes
Drug Trafficking[7] Transit Transit Destination
Human Trafficking[7] Origin Origin

During it's establishment in the mid 1970s, amid violent clashes in the whole of Turkey, organization used classic terrorism methods, such as failed assassination of Mehmet Celal Bucak as a propaganda-of-the-deed.[34]. After the 1980 military coup the organization developed into a paramilitary organization using resources it acquired in Bekaa valley in part of ex-Syrian-controlled Lebanon. After 1984, PKK began to use Maoist theory of people's war.[35][36] There are three phases in this theory. The militant base during the initial years was coming from different sources, so the first two phases were diffused to each other.

[edit] 1978-1984

In the first phase (1978-1984), the PKK tried to gain the support of the population. It attacked the machinery of government and distributed propaganda in the region. PKK tactics were based on ambush, sabotage, riots, protests, and demonstrations against the Turkish government. PKK has also been accused of violent attacks on individual civilians or residential areas (Kurds and non-Kurds alike), who refused to co-operate with the PKK or were suspected of collaborating with the Turkish authorities. During these years, the PKK fought a turf war against other predominantly Kurdish organisations in Turkey. The PKK effectively used the prison force to gain appeal among the population.[37][38] In the whole Turkey, this period was characterized by violent clashes which culminated in the 1980 military coup.

During this time, the organization argued that its violent actions were justified by the need to defend Kurds in the context of what it considered as the massive cultural suppression of Kurdish identity (including the 1983 Turkish Language Act Ban) and cultural rights carried out by other governments of the region.

[edit] 1984-1999

In the second phase (1984-1999), which followed the return of civilian rule in 1983, escalating attacks were made on the government's military and vital institutions all over the country. The objective was to destabilise Turkish authority through a long, low-intensity confrontation. In addition to skirmishing with Turkish military and police forces and local village guards, the PKK has conducted suicide bombing on government and police installations, as well as at local tourist sites. Kidnapping and assassination against government officials and Kurdish tribal leaders who were named as puppets of the state were performed as well. Widespread sabotages were continued from the first stage. PKK performed kidnapping western tourists, primarily in Istanbul but also at different resorts. Its actions have taken place mainly in Turkey and against Turkish targets in other countries, although it has on occasions co-operated with other Kurdish nationalist paramilitary groups in neighboring states, such as Iraq and Iran.[39] PKK has also attacked Turkish diplomatic and commercial facilities across Western Europe. In effect, the Turkish state has led a series of counter-insurgency operations against the PKK, accompanied by political measures, starting with an explicit denunciation of separatism in the 1982 Constitution, and including proclamation of the state of emergency in various PKK-controlled territories starting in 1983 (when the military relinquished political control to the civilians). This series of administrative reforms against terrorism included in 1985 the creation of village guard system by the then prime minister Turgut Özal who is of partial Kurdish descent.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, in an effort to win increased support from the Kurdish peasantry, the PKK altered its leftist secular ideology to better accommodate and accept Islamic beliefs. The group also abandoned its previous strategy of attacking Kurdish civilians, focusing instead on government and tourist targets.[40] In its campaign, the organization has been accused of carrying out atrocities against both Turkish and Kurdish civilians and its actions have been criticised by human rights groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Actions of the Turkish state in the past have also been criticised by these same groups.

All in all, this low intensity conflict which has lasted more than thirty years has had a number of effects in the Turkish territory.

[edit] 1999-current

In the third phase (1999-current), after capture of Ocelan, according to Maoist theory of people's war claims that the conventional fighting should be established to seize cities, overthrow the government and take control of the country. This stage has never achieved. In effect, after the capture of Ocelan, activities of the organization never reached to previous levels.

Since the 1999, the organization begin to use improvised explosive devices rather than direct confrontation.

[edit] Tactics

The areas in which the group operates are generally mountainous rural areas and dense urban areas. The mountainous terrain offers an advantage to members of the PKK by allowing them to hide in a network of caves and making military air operations, especially helicopter use, hazardous for the Turkish Armed Forces. While in urban areas, PKK members are often able to blend in with the local population.

The group has been planting mines.[41] Use of these mines has led to civilian deaths, in part due to accidental triggering by civilian trucks and buses rather than the intended military armoured vehicles.[41]

The PKK is known to use children within its militant force. Uğur Esentur of Ankara University has examined the motivations of some of these children for his doctoral research.[42] Of those surveyed, 86% had joined the PKK to bolster their families incomes following offers that it would provide for their families in return.[43] All of the children reported that these offers were not fulfilled.[43] 80% of those surveyed also reported that they had actively stopped other family members—usually younger brothers—from joining the organization too.[43] The study also reported that 60% of those surveyed had an education level below high school level.[43]

When asked why they stayed in the PKK rather than turning themselves in to the authorities, two thirds stated that they were afraid of being caught by the PKK as reprisals are not just limited to physical harm towards the militant; their families would be at risk as well.[43] Five percent said that it was from fear of punishment by the Turkish Republic.[43] The study also examined attitudes toward gender equality within the organization. 88% of the subjects reported that, despite its Marxist ideology and claims that equality is a key objective, there was no equality within the organization.[43]

[edit] Resources

[edit] Financial

The organization's annual budget has been estimated at $86 million USD.[44]

The PKK receives a proportion of its funding in the form of private donations, from both organisations and individuals from around the world. Some of these supporters are Kurdish businessmen in south-eastern Turkey, sympathisers in Syria and Iran, and Europe. Parties and concerts are organized by branch groups.[45] Additionally, it is believed that the PKK earns money through the sale of various publications, as well as receiving revenues from legitimate businesses owned by the organization.[46] The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) also has been financing its separatist movement by extorting narcotics traffickers and engaging in the trade themselves. The PKK is heavily involved in the European drug trade, especially in Germany and France.[47] French law enforcement estimates that the PKK smuggles 80% of the heroin in Paris.[48] The British Foreign Office has made a similar estimate for Britain.[49]

[edit] Human

According to information provided by the Intelligence Resource Program of the Federation of American Scientiststhe strength of the organization in terms of human resources consists of approximately 4,000 to 5,000 militants of whom 3,000 to 3,500 are located in northern Iraq.[50]

A study carried out by the Counter-Terrorism and Operations Department of Directorate General for Security over a sample of files about people convicted of being a terrorist under Turkish laws including 262 militants from the organization has found that 54% of the members are aged 14 to 25, 34% 26 to 37 and 12% 38 to 58. University graduates make up 11 % of the members, high school graduates 16 %, secondary school graduates 13 %, primary school graduates 39%, literate non-graduates 12% and illiterates 9%.[51]

[edit] International support

At the height of its campaign, the organization received support from many countries. The level support given have changed through out this period.

Support of Syria,[45][52] From early 1979 to 1999 Syria had provided valuable safe havens to PKK in the region of Beqaa Valley. After the undeclared war between Turkey and Syria, Syria placed restrictions on PKK activity on its soil. Turkey is expecting positive developments in its cooperation with Syria in the long term, but even during the course of 2005, there were PKK operatives of Syrian nationality operating in Turkey.

Support of Iran;[53][page # needed] Iran listed PKK as a terrorist organization after Iran's supply of resources to the PKK began to be used on its own soil. Iran provided PKK with supplies in the form of weapons and funds.

Support of Greece; retired Greek L.T. General Dimitris Matafias and retired Greek Navy Admiral Antonis Neksasis had visisted organization's Mahsun Korkmaz base camp in Bakaa valley in October 1988 along with parliamentarians from the panhellenic Socialist movement (PASOK).[54] At the time it was reported that the general has assumed responsibility for training. Greeks also dispatched arms through Greek Cypriot administration. [54] In December 1993, Greek European affairs minister Theodore Pangaios was quoted saying "we must supportive of the Kurdish people to be free".[55] Greece declained to join Germany and France including other eleven memebers at the EU to ban the organization.[55] During the 1990s, Greece[56]

Support of Republic of Cyprus was brought in question when Abdullah Öcalan was caught with a Cypriot passport to the name of Mavros Lazaros, a nationalist reporter.

The support of paramilitary groups; The organization developed links with paramilitary groups among other ethnic groups which has harboured historic grievances against Turkey such as the ethnic Armenian ASALA,[57] as well as groups which shared its left-wing nationalist ideology such as the Palestine Liberation Organisation, ETA, and, to a lesser degree, the Provisional Irish Republican Army.[57] Through the large Kurdish immigration in Germany, it has also formed close contacts with violent left-wing political groups in that country.

Support of the Soviet Union;[58] According to the former KGB-FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko, who was assassinated in 2006, PKK's leader Abdullah Ocalan was among the terrorists trained by KGB-FSB.[59] As of 2008, Russia still is not among the states that list PKK as a terrorist group.

Support of UK; TV broadcast for five years in UK, until its licence was revoked by the regulators Independent Television Commission (ITC) in 1999 due to a breach of ITC guidelines and perceived pro-PKK bias.

Support of various Europe states; Despite Brussels designation of the organization as a terrorist organization, the EU continues to permit the broadcasting of organization's networks on the Hot Bird 3 satellite owned by the French company Eutelsat. MEDYA TV started transmissions from studios in Belgium via a satellite uplink from France. MEDYA TV's licence was revoked by the French authorities. A few weeks later Roj TV began transmissions from Denmark. It has also been argued that the Netherlands and Belgium have supported the PKK by allowing its training camps to function in their respective territories. On November 22, 1998, Hanover's criminal police reported that three children had been trained by the PKK for guerrilla warfare in camps in the Netherlands and Belgium.[60] After the death of Theo van Gogh, with increasing attention on domestic security concerns, the Dutch police raided the 'PKK paramilitary camp' in the Dutch town of Liempde and arrested 29 people in November 2004.[61] Denmark allows Kurdish satellite television stations (such as ROJ-TV), which Turkey claims has links with the PKK, to operate in Denmark and broadcast into Turkey.[62]

Various PKK leaders, including Hidir Yalcin, Riza Altun, Zubeyir Aydar, and Ali Haydar Kaytan all lived in Europe and moved freely. The free movement was archived by the strong ties with influential persons. Danielle Mitterrand, the wife of the former President of France, had active connections during the 90s with elements of the organization's leadership that force a down graded relationships between these states.[63] Ali Rıza Altun, a suspected key figure with an Interpol arrest warrant in his name, after harboring him for some time Austria arranged a flight to Iraq.. Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gül summoned the Austrian ambassador and condemned Austria's action.[64] On September 30, 1995, While Ocelan was at Syria, Damascus opened contact with high ranking German CDU MP Heinrich Lummer and German intelligence officials.

The Chief of the Turkish General Staff during 2007, General Yaşar Büyükanıt, stated that even though the international struggle had been discussed on every platform and even though organizations such as the UN, NATO, EU make statements of serious commitment, to this day the necessary measures had not been taken.[65] According to Büyükanıt; "this conduct on one side has encouraged the terrorists, on the other side it assisted in widening their [the terrorists] activities. The most distressful part of it is that many of the European countries being a member of NATO, an organization that had announced that terrorism was the greatest threat to itself.[65]" Sedat Laciner, of the Turkish think tank ISRO, says that US support of the PKK undermines the US war on terrorism.[66] Seymour Hersh claimed that the U.S. supported PEJAK, the Iranian branch of the PKK.[67] The head of the PKK's militant arm, Murat Karayilan, claimed that Iran attempted to recruit the PKK to attack coalition forces, adding that Kurdish guerrillas have launched a clandestine war in north-western Iran, ambushing Iranian troops.[68] A former militant, who recently had turned himself in to the Turkish police, claimed that the weapons for in the north of Iraq were provided by US armoured vehicles.[69][70] In July 2007, the weapons captured from the PKK operatives and their origins published by the Turkish General Staff indicates that the operatives delete some of the serial numbers from their weapons. The total number of weapons and for tracable ones the origins were:[71]

The organization's choice & origins of the traceable weapons (July 2007)[71]
Type Quantity Sources
AK-47 Kalashnikovs 4,500 71.6% originating from the USSR, 14.7% from China, 3.6% from Hungary, 3.6% from Bulgaria
Rifles
[72]
5,713 of (959 traceable) 45.2% from Russia, 13.2% from United Kingdom, and 9.4% from United States.
rocket launchers 1,610 (313 traceable) 85% from Russia, 5.4% from Iraq, and 2.5% from China in origin.
pistol 2,885 (2,208 traceable) 21.9% from Czechoslovakia, 20.2% from Spain, 19.8% from Italy
grenade 3,490 (136 traceable) 72% from Russia, 19.8% from United States, 8% from Germany,
mines 11,568 (8,015 traceable) 60.8% from Italy, 28.3% from Russia, 6.2% from Germany

[edit] Effects

As a self-styled revolutionary left-wing organization, the PKK has cited "mass violence by the Turkish state on the Kurd identity" to justify its activities.[citation needed] The main goal of its activities was to alienate the people from the state by pushing security forces into more and more overt and repressive counter-measures. The Political-Justice section extends the results of this ideology and methods of the democratic processes and the justice system in Turkey. In a democratic system, an ideology that questions the state's legitimacy, will of its population and its security apparatus was difficult to be accepted as a political view, which was shaped under HEP/DEP/HADEP story. Turkish government authorities did not negotiate with the organization, so regional NGOs there were no communication channels between the sides. The ill-formed language ban of 1983 and Terrorism Act of 1991 were significant events. Also, amnesties were interesting events during the conflict time, as each amnesty gave more human resources to the organization. The prison as a rehabilitation concept was a failure. The people who were jailed for non-violent activities were becoming militants during their jail time. Government's military operations against the prisons were the highest point in this failure.

As a revolutionary left-wing organization, the PKK perceived Turkish society as one that was deformed by capitalism and imperialism. The PKK unleashed its aggression on enemies spanning all classes (farmers, business, etc.) and those that it considered puppets of the state. The cost of the PKK's actions are significant. PKK had drastic effects on regional economy, as targeted infrastructure of the region. Regions' inability to join the economical activities were associated with the work force, costs (insurance premiums, facility costs, loss of trained personnel etc.), and productivity (loss of work time, travel restrictions, inability to move rapidly etc). The region has had a very high historical tourism potential and it has been dormant because of the terrorism threat for many years.

The integration into social and economical activities are developed within the education system. Educational activities were targeted by the PKK. Because the majority of the people are very resilient to the effects of political violence, young people form a high risk group because of their undeveloped personalities. The effects of political violence on the newer generations is an important issue because, at the moment, the new generation in areas affected by the conflict have no experience living under what would be considered normal conditions.

This conflict became part with the negotiations between Turkey and the European Union (EU) about its eventual integration to the EU.

[edit] Toll

Further information: Turkey–Kurdistan Workers Party conflict

More than 37,000 people have died since the beginning of the PKK's armed struggle in 1984.[73] According to Denise Natali, the Turkish Armed Forces have destroyed some 8000 Kurdish communities and created 3 to 4 million refugees in the process.[74]

According to official figures released by the Turkish military for the 1984-2008 period:[11]

  • 32,000 militants have been killed.
  • 14,000 militants have been captured alive.
  • 5,560 civilians have been killed.
  • 6,482 soldiers have been killed.

According to a July 1998 article in Le Monde diplomatique, the conflict has weighed heavily on the Turkish state's budget.[75] In 1993, a sum of $70m was allocated from the prime minister’s secret funds. According to government inspector Kutlu Savaş, this sum was used mainly for procuring weapons and anti-terrorist equipment from Israel and for external operations. Irregular units in the conflictual zones have had to find ways to finance themselves, including racketeering and secret funding. Sedat Bucak has been alleged by the French newspaper to have under his orders 20,000 men, while the village guards pro-government Kurdish militias created in the mid-1980s would number to a total of 64,000.[75]

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b Tahiri, Hussein. The Structure of Kurdish Society and the Struggle for a Kurdish State. Costa Mesa, California: Mazda Publications 2007. pp 232 ff
  2. ^ Bila, Fikret (2007-11-07). "Kenan Evren: 'Kürtçeye ağır yasak koyduk ama hataydı'" (in Turkish), Milliyet. Retrieved on 2008-07-30. "Şimdi İmralı'dan PKK'yı yönetiyor. Cezaevinden avukatları kanalıyla." 
  3. ^ "Ocalan: Which way now?", BBC (2000-11-21). Retrieved on 2007-09-01. 
  4. ^ Howard, Michael (2005-05-13). "Radical firebrand who led bloody nationalist war", Guardian. Retrieved on 2008-08-01. 
  5. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Barnhart, Stephen R. New International Terrorism and Political Violence Guide. Trafford Publishing, 107-109. ISBN 1553692438. 
  6. ^ a b "1997 Global Terrorism: Europe and Eurasia Overview". United States Department of State (1997). Retrieved on 2008-02-23.
  7. ^ a b c "Our Alliance Against Terrorism". United States Department of State. Retrieved on 2007-07-15.
  8. ^ "PKK 'behind' Turkey resort bomb", BBC News (2005-07-17). Retrieved on 2008-06-29. 
  9. ^ "Foreign Terrorist Organizations List". United States Department of State (2002-10-23). Retrieved on 2008-02-23. - USSD Foreign Terrorist Organization
  10. ^ a b c d e f "Chapter 6—Terrorist Groups". Country Reports on Terrorism. United States Department of State (2005-04-27). Retrieved on 2008-07-23.
  11. ^ a b "Bir dönemin acı bilançosu" (in Turkish), Hürriyet (2008-09-16). Retrieved on 2008-09-17. 
  12. ^ "Profile: PKK rebel group", BBC News (2007-10-15). 
  13. ^ Tahiri, Hussein. The Structure of Kurdish Society and the Struggle for a Kurdish state. Costa mesa 2007, Mazda Publishers, chapters 7 & 8
  14. ^ a b "Turkish Kurds: some back the state", Christian Science Monitor (2007-07-06). 
  15. ^ Türkiye'de Halen Faaliyetlerine Devam Eden Baslica Terör Örgütleri (Turkish)
  16. ^ "PKK baskınına uğrayan Kürt köyleri ABD gazetesine haber oldu" (in Turkish), Milliyet (2007-07-07). 
  17. ^ Joost Jongerden, PKK, CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1 page 128
  18. ^ Necati Alkan "Youth and Terrorism: Example of PKK", NATO, HSD. EAP. ARW 982906 International Workshop on POLITICAL VIOLENCE, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORISM & YOUTH, September 2007, page 8
  19. ^ a b Joost Jongerden, PKK, CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1 page 127
  20. ^ a b Joost Jongerden, PKK, CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1 page 129
  21. ^ MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. "Incident Profile: Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) attacked Diplomatic target (November 10, 1980, France)". Retrieved on 2007-04-17.
  22. ^ UNESCO. 2002. "Death penalty abolished in Turkey". The new Courier n°1.
  23. ^ "Chamber Judgment In The Case Of Öcalan v. Turkey". European Court of Human Rights (March 2003). Archived from the original on 2005-02-10. Retrieved on 2007-10-22.
  24. ^ Ferhad Ibrahim, Gülistan Gürbey (2000). The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Obstacles and Chances for Peace and Democracy. ISBN 0312236298. 
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[edit] Further reading

[edit] External links

  • Hêzên Parastina Gel (People Defense Forces) A PKK-affiliated organization. (Kurdish) (Turkish) (English) (Arabic) (German)
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