McCollum memo

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The McCollum memo was a memorandum proposal which outlined the general situation and possible courses of action available to the United States in response to the actions of the Japanese Empire in the South Pacific and its relations to the Axis Powers in Europe in October of 1940. More than a year before the Pearl Harbor attack, Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum of the Office of Naval Intelligence submitted the memo to Navy Captains Walter Anderson and Dudley Knox. The October 7, 1940 memo contained an 8-part plan to counter rising Japanese hegemony over East Asia, and a pre-Pearl Harbor estimation of the Pacific situation. The memo remained classified until 1994.

[edit] Background

It is often referred to as the McCollum Memo because it was written by then Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) Arthur H. McCollum, or the Eight Action Memo because in it McCollum proposes eight actions to be taken against the rising Japanese Empire.

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If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully prepared to accept the threat of war. -- A. H. McCollum

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The McCollum memo was first widely disseminated with the publication of Robert Stinnett's book Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor. Stinnett presents the memo as part of his argument that the Roosevelt Administration conspired to provoke the Japanese to attack the United States, pursuant to a complex scheme to bring the United States into the European war, without generating ado over broken political promises. Roosevelt had recently issued a campaign promise that the United States would not become entangled in Europe's war under his watch.

The memo was read and appended by Captain Knox. Knox at first seems to oppose the 8-step plan, but ultimately concurs. Specifically, he wrote (Page 6):

It is unquestionably to our interest that Britain be not licked - just now she has a stalemate and probably can't do better. We ought to make certain that she at least gets a stalemate. For this she will probably need from us substantial further destroyers and air-reinforcements to England. We should not precipitate anything in the Orient that would hamper our ability to do this - so long as probability continues. If England remains stable, Japan will be cautious in the Orient. Hence our assistance to England in the Atlantic is also protection to her and us in the Orient. However, I concur in your courses of action. We must be ready on both sides and probably strong enough to care for both.

Evidence that the memo or derivative works reached President Roosevelt, senior administration officials, or the Admiralty is largely circumstantial. Captains Knox and Anderson were two of Roosevelt's closest military advisors, which suggests that Roosevelt may well have been influenced by the memo. Also, Admiral Nimitz turned down the coveted command the Pacific fleet [PACCOM] so that he would not become the scapegoat if the Japanese surprise attacked the United States. In a History Channel interview, Admiral Chester Nimitz Jr. described his father's political maneuver: "He said, 'It is my guess that the Japanese are going to attack us in a surprise attack. There will be a revulsion in the country against all those in command at sea, and they will be replaced by people in positions of prominence ashore, and I want to be ashore, and not at sea, when that happens.'" (Interview for the History Channel Program Admiral Chester Nimitz, Thunder of the Pacific)

It is not widely accepted that the memo was the blueprint for war, or even a preliminary blueprint for war.^[who?] The memo does illustrate, however, that at least one person in the Office of Naval Intelligence promoted the idea of goading Japan into war: the memo states "It is not believed that in the present state of political opinion the United States government is capable of declaring war against Japan without more ado [...] If by [the elucidated 8-point plan] Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better." That McCollum's clearly stated ambitions came to fruition on December 7, 1941, when the Japanese attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor, is widely viewed^{[citation needed]} to be coincidence.

By the time of the Hewitt Inquiry into the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, McCollum was promoted to captain (Hewitt Inquiry Report).

[edit] References

http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/McCollum/index.html