Mongol military tactics and organization

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The Mongol military tactics and organization helped the Mongol Empire to conquer nearly all of continental Asia, the Middle East and parts of eastern Europe. In many ways, it can be regarded as the first "modern" military system.

The original foundation of that system was an extension of the nomadic lifestyle of the Mongols. Other elements were invented by Genghis Khan, his generals, and his successors. Technologies useful to attack fortifications were adapted from other cultures, and foreign technical experts integrated into the command structures.

For the larger part of the 13th century, the Mongols lost only a few battles using that system, but always returned to turn the result around in their favor. In many cases, they won against significantly larger opponent armies. Their first real defeat came in the Battle of Ain Jalut in 1260, against the first army which had been specifically trained to use their own tactics against them. That battle ended the western expansion of the Mongol Empire, and within the next 20 years the Mongols also suffered defeats in attempted invasions of Vietnam and Japan. But while the empire became divided around the same time, its combined size and influence remained largely intact for more than another hundred years.

Contents 1 Organization and characteristics 1.1 Decimal system 1.2 Breaking tribal connections 1.3 Mobility 1.4 Training and discipline 1.5 Cavalry 2 Logistics 2.1 Supply 2.2 Communications 3 Weapons 3.1 Mongol bow 3.2 Sword 3.3 Siege warfare 3.3.1 Catapults and machines 3.3.2 Kharash 4 Strategy 4.1 Intelligence and Planning 4.2 Psychological warfare and deception 4.2.1 Feigned retreat 5 Ground tactics 5.1 Approach and engagement 5.1.1 Flanking 5.1.2 Encirclement and opening 5.1.3 Feigned retreat 5.1.4 Splitting and disorganization 6 See also 7 References 8 External links

[edit] Organization and characteristics

[edit] Decimal system

Genghis Khan organized the Mongol soldiers into groups based on the decimal system. Units were recursively built from groups of 10 (Arav), 100 (Zuut), 1,000 (Minghan), and 10,000 (Tumen), each with a leader reporting to the next higher level. Tumens, and sometimes Minghans, were commanded by a Noyan, who was often given the task to administer specific conquered territories. From two to five Tumens would then form a hordu meaning army corps or field army, from which the word "Horde" is derived, under the command of the Khans or their generals (boyan).

The leaders on each level had significant licence to execute their orders in the way they considered best. This command structure proved to be highly flexible and allowed the Mongol army to attack en masse, divide into somewhat smaller groups to encircle and lead enemies into an ambush, or divide into small groups of 10 to mop up a fleeing and broken army.

[edit] Breaking tribal connections

When integrating new soldiers into the army, Genghis Khan divided the soldiers under different leaders to break up the social and tribal connections, so there was no division based on heritage of tribal alliances. Promotion was mainly based on merit. Each unit leader was responsible for the preparedness of his soldiers at any time and would be replaced if this was found lacking.

Promotions were granted on the basis of ability, not birth, with the possible exception of Genghis Khan's relatives, who were given the highest levels of command. A good example would be Subutai, the son of a blacksmith (a very honorable profession, but not normally predestined for leadership).

In the Russian and East European campaigns for example, nominal command went to Batu Khan, the grandson of Genghis. Two other princes of the Blood commanded wings of that army. But all three Princes were under the operational control of Subutai. Upon receiving word of the death of Ögedei Khan (son and successor of the Great Khan himself) in 1243, it was Subutai who reluctantly reminded his three princes of their dynastic duties and ordered the Tumens to ride back home, sparing Europe from further devastating blows

[edit] Mobility

Each Mongol soldier typically maintained between 3 or 4 horses.^[1] Changing horses often allowed them to travel at high speed for days without stopping or wearing out the animals. Their ability to live off the land, and in extreme situations off their animals (mare's milk especially), made their armies far less dependent on the traditional logistical apparatus of western agrarian armies. In some cases, as during invasion of Hungary on early 1241, they covered up to 100 miles per day, which was unheard of by other armies of the time.

The mobility of individual soldiers made it possible to send them on successful scouting missions, gathering intelligence about routes and searching for terrain suited to the preferred combat tactics of the Mongols.

During the invasion of Russia, the Mongols used frozen rivers as highways, and winter, the time of year usually off limits for any major activity due to the intense cold, became the Mongols' preferred time to strike.

To avoid the deadly hail of missiles, enemies would frequently spread out, or seek cover, breaking up their formations and making them more vulnerable to the lancers' charges. Likewise, when they packed themselves together, into dense square or phalanx style formations, they would become more vulnerable to the arrows. Once the enemy was deemed sufficiently weakened, the noyans would give the order and the drums would beat and the signal flags wave, telling the lancers to begin their charge. Often the devastation of the arrows was enough to rout an enemy, so the lancers were only needed to help pursue and mop up the remnants.

When facing European armies, with their emphasis on heavy cavalry, it was obviously not the Mongol's style to engage in heavy melee combat against a strong and unshaken foe, but rather picked off the heavy cavalry at long distances with their bows. In the few cases where armor actually withstood their arrows, the Mongols simply killed the Knight's horses, leaving a heavily armored man afoot, unable to go any distance. At the Battle of Mohi, the Mongols left open a gap in their ranks, luring the Hungarians into retreating through it, which resulted in their being strung out over all the countryside, and easy pickings for mounted archers who simply galloped along and picked them off, while the lancers skewered them as they fled. At Legnica, the few Teutonic, Templar and Hospitaller knights were able to make a stand dismounted, and inflicted unusually heavy casualties on the Mongols - but were killed in the end. The Mongols simply accepted the casualties, and destroyed the Knights.

[edit] Training and discipline

Most European armies consisted of a few professional men at arms, and knights, and large levies of peasants or militia. Only the Knights and the few professional fighting men trained regularly, and their training emphasized individual combat, such as jousting, rather than group combat tactics. The Mongol armies, by contrast, constantly practiced horsemanship, archery, and unit tactics, formations and rotations. This training was maintained by a hard, but not overly harsh or unreasonable, discipline.

Officers and troopers alike were usually given a wide leeway by their superiors in carrying out their orders, so long as the larger objectives of the plan were well served and the orders promptly obeyed. The Mongols thus avoided the pitfalls of overly rigid discipline and micromanagement which have proven a hobgoblin to armed forces throughout history. However, all members had to be unconditionally loyal to each other and to their superiors, and especially to the Khan. If one soldier ran from danger in battle, then he and his nine comrades from the same arban would face the death penalty together.

One unique training method that the Mongols used were huge hunting excursions organized annually on the steppe. The Mongol horsemen would make a great circle, and drive all manner of animals in towards the center. Practicing the dynamic maneuvers also to be used on a battlefield, the Mongols would trap all the animals of various types in their encirclement, and on the order of their commander, begin the slaughter. If any hunter killed any creature before the appointed time, or if one allowed an animal to escape from the ring, they would be punished. This was an excellent way for the Mongols to train, and enjoy the recreation of hunting, as well as gather huge amounts of food for massive feasts.

[edit] Cavalry

Six of every ten Mongol troopers were light cavalry horse archers, the remaining four were more heavily armored and armed lancers. Mongol light cavalry soldiers, called keshik, were extremely light troops compared to contemporary standards, allowing them to execute tactics and maneuvers that would have been impractical for a heavier enemy (such as European knights). Most of the remaining troops were heavier cavalry with lances for close combat after the archers had brought the enemy into disarray. All soldiers usually carried scimitars or axes as well.

Mongol armour was usually light — boiled leather, perhaps studded with metal beads. Heavier armed soldiers would usually be equipped with leather armor backed with metal or horn plates, or with chain mail if available. As a protection from arrows, a Mongol might wear a shirt made up of raw silk, as the threads are hard to break and this makes the cleaning of a wound easier, with a corresponding reduced risk of infection.

The Mongolian horses are relatively small, so they would lose short distance races under equal conditions. Since most other armies carried much heavier armor, the Mongols could still outrun most enemy horsemen in battle. In addition, the Mongolian horses were extremely durable and sturdy, allowing the Mongols to move over large distances quickly, often surprising enemies that had expected them to arrive days, if not weeks, later.

All horses were equipped with stirrups, which had been invented by China (Jin Dynasty) quite some time before. This technical advantage made it easier for the Mongol archers to turn their upper body, and shoot in all directions, including backwards.

The primary weapon of the Mongol forces was the Mongol bow. It was a reflex bow made from composite materials (wood, horn, and sinew), and at the time unmatched for accuracy, force, and reach. The reflex geometry allowed to make it relatively small so it could be used from horseback.

Targeted shots were possible at a range of 80 or 100 m, which determined the optimal tactical approach distance for light cavalry units. Ballistic shots could hit enemy units (without targeting individual soldiers) at distances of up to 400 m, useful for surprising and scaring troops and horses before beginning the actual attack. They used a wide variety of arrows, depending on the target and distance. Plate armor could be penetrated at close range, using special heavy arrows.

[edit] Logistics

[edit] Supply

The Mongol armies traveled very light, and were able to live largely off the land. Their equipment included fish hooks and other tools meant to make each warrior independent of any fixed supply source. The most common travel food of the Mongols was dried and ground meat "Borts", which is still common in the Mongolian cuisine today. Borts is light and easy to transport, and can be cooked with water similarly to a modern "instant soup".

To ensure they would always have fresh horses, each trooper usually had 3 or 4 mounts.^[1] And since most of the Mongols' mounts were mares, they could live off their horses' milk or milk products when need arose. In dire straits, the Mongol warrior could drink blood from his string of remounts.

Heavier equipment was brought up by well organized supply trains. Wagons and carts carried, amongst other things, large stockpiles of arrows. The main logistical factor limiting their advance was finding enough feed and water for their animals. In all campaigns, the soldiers took their families along with them.

[edit] Communications

The Mongols established Yam, a system of postal-relay horse stations, thus creating a mail service much like the later Pony Express of the U.S. frontier era. The Mongol mail system was the first such empire-wide service since the Roman Empire. Additionally, Mongol battlefield communication utilized signal flags and to a lesser extent, signal arrows to communicate movement orders during combat.

[edit] Weapons

[edit] Mongol bow

Main article: Mongol bow

The main weapon of the Mongols were the bow and it had different kind of arrows.

[edit] Sword

Mongol sword was a slightly curved sword that is good for slashing instead of stabbing someone.

[edit] Siege warfare

[edit] Catapults and machines

Technology was one of the important facets of Mongolian warfare. For instance siege machines were an important part of Genghis Khan's warfare, especially in attacking fortified cities. The siege engines were disassembled and were carried on horses to be rebuilt at the site of the battle.

The engineers building the machines were recruited among captives, mostly from China and Persia. When they slaughtered whole populations, they almost always spared the engineers and technicians, swiftly assimilating them into the Mongol armies.

[edit] Kharash

A commonly used tactic was the use of what they called "kharash". During a siege the Mongols would drive before themselves a crowd of local residents which had the role of being an "alive board" or "human shields" as it is now known. The kharash were also forced ahead to breach walls.

[edit] Strategy

The Mongol battlefield tactics were a combination of masterful training combined with excellent communication and the ability to follow orders in the chaos of combat. They trained for virtually every possibility, so when it occurred, they could react accordingly. Unlike many of their foes, the Mongols also protected their ranking officers well. Their training and discipline allowed them to fight without the need for constant supervision or rallying, which often placed commanders in dangerous positions.

Whenever possible, Mongol commanders found the highest ground available, from which they could make tactical decisions based on the best view of the battlefield as events unfolded. Furthermore, being on high ground allowed their forces to observe commands conveyed by flags more easily than if the ground were level. In addition, keeping the high command on high ground made them easier to defend. Unlike the European armies, which placed enormous emphasis on personal valor, and thus exposed their leaders to death from anyone bold enough to kill them, the Mongols regarded their leaders as a vital asset. A general such as Subutai, unable to ride a horse in the later part of his career, due to age and obesity, would have been ridiculed out of most any European army of the time.^[2] No one would have respected him, let alone obeyed his orders. But the Mongols recognized and respected the still powerful military mind buried within the old fat man, who after all, had been one of the Genghis Khan's most able subordinates, and so they cheerfully hauled him around in a cart.

[edit] Intelligence and Planning

The Mongols carefully scouted and spied out their enemies in advance of any invasion. For instance, prior to the invasion of Europe, Batu and Subutai sent spies for almost ten years into the heart of Europe, making maps of the old Roman roads, establishing trade routes, and determining the level of ability of each principality to resist invasion. They made well educated guesses as to the willingness of each principality to aid the others, and their ability to resist alone or together.

Also, when invading an area, the Mongols would do all that is necessary to completely conquer the town or cities such as diverting rivers from the city/town, closing supplies to the city and waiting for its inhabitants to surrender, gathering civilians from the nearby areas to fill the front line for the city/town attack before scaling the wall, and pillaging the surrounding area and killing some of the people, then letting some survivors flee to the main city to report their losses to the main populace (subtle use of psychological war), simultaneously drain the resources of the city with the sudden influx of refugees.

[edit] Psychological warfare and deception

The Mongols used psychological warfare successfully in many of their battles, especially in terms of spreading terror and fear to towns and cities. They would often offer an opportunity for the enemy to surrender and pay tribute or have their city ransacked and destroyed. They knew that sedentary populations were not free to flee danger, as nomad populations were, and also knew that destruction of their cities was the worst loss a sedentary population could expect. When cities accepted the offer they were spared, but were of course required to support the conquering Mongol army with manpower, supplies, and other services.

If the offer was refused, however, they would invade and destroy the city or town, but allow a few civilians to flee and spread terror by reporting of their loss. Those reports were an essential tool to incite fear in others. Their reputation for terror was so great, there were tales of lone Mongol soldiers riding into villages and killing the inhabitants one by one without resistance, as it was known that to resist was to bring forth the whole of the Mongol army.^[3] However, both sides often had a similar if differently motivated interest in overstating the enormity of the reported events: the Mongols' reputation would increase and the townspeople could use their reports of terror to raise an army. For that reason, specific data (eg. casualty figures) given in contemporary sources needs to be evaluated carefully.

The Mongols also used deception very well in their wars. For instance, when approaching a mobile army the units would be split into three or more army groups, each trying to outflank and surprise their opponents. This created many battlefield scenarios for the opponents where the Mongols would seem to appear out of nowhere and that there were seemingly more of them than in actuality. Flanking and/or feigned retreat if the enemy could not be handled easily was one of the most practiced techniques. Other techniques used commonly by the Mongols were completely psychological and were used to entice/lure enemies into vulnerable positions by showing themselves from a hill or some other predetermined locations, then disappearing into the woods or behind hills while the Mongols' flank troops already strategically positioned would appear out of nowhere from the left, right and/or from their rear. Also during the initial states of battlefield contact, while camping in close proximity of their enemies at night they would feign numerical superiority by ordering each soldier to light at least five fires, which would appear to the enemy scouts and spies that their force was almost five times larger than it actually was.

Another way the Mongols utilized deception and terror was by tying tree branches or leaves behind their horses and letting the foliage drag behind them across the ground; by traveling in a systematic fashion, the Mongols could create a dust storm behind hills, in order to create fear and appear to the enemy to be much larger than they actually were, thereby forcing the enemy to surrender. Because each Mongol soldiers had more than one horse, they would let the prisoners and the civilians to ride their horses for a while before the conflict also to fake numerical superiority^[4].

[edit] Feigned retreat

Main article: Feigned retreat

The Mongols commonly practiced the feigned retreat, which is perhaps the most difficult battlefield tactic to execute. This is because a feigned rout amongst untrained troops can often turn into a real rout if an enemy presses into it.^[5] Pretending disarray and defeat in the heat of the battle, the Mongols would suddenly appear panicked and turn and run, only to pivot when the enemy was drawn out, destroying them at their own leisure. Once this feigned retreat became known to the enemy, they retreated for days or weeks to falsely convince the chasers that they were defeated and only to charge back once the enemy has their guards down or retreated back to join their main formation.

[edit] Ground tactics

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The tumens would typically advance on a broad front, five lines deep. The first three lines would be comprised of horse archers, the last two of lancers. Once an enemy force was located, the Mongols would try to avoid risky or reckless frontal assaults (in sharp contrast to their European and Middle-Eastern opponents). Instead they would use diversionary attacks to fix the enemy in place, while their main forces sought to outflank or surround the foe. First the horse archers would lay down a withering barrage of arrow fire. Additional arrows were carried by camels who followed close by, ensuring a plentiful supply of ammunition.

[edit] Approach and engagement

Mongols didn't make direct approach against their enemies since any instance against more protected European fighters by the less protected and mobile Mongol force would be disastrous.

[edit] Flanking

In all battlefield situations, the troops would be divided into separate formations of 10, 100, 1,000 or 10,000 depending on the requirements. If the troop split from the main force is significant like 10,000 or more they would be handled over to a significant or second in command leader while the main leader concentrates on the front line. The leader of the Mongols would generally give the tactics used to attack the enemy. For instance the leader might say when seeing a city or town, "500 to the left and 500 to the right" of the city and those would be relayed to the 5 units of 100 soldiers and they would try to flank or encircle the town to the left and right.

[edit] Encirclement and opening

The main reason for this is to encircle the city so that they cannot escape and to obviously overwhelm from both sides. If situation deteriotated on one of the fronts or sides, the leader from the hill directed the army to support the other. If it appears that there is going to be significant loss, the Mongols would retreat to save their troops and would engage the next day or the next month after having studied the enemies tactics and defences in the first battle already or again send a demand to surrender after inflicting some form of damage. There is no fixture on when and where units should be deployed, but it was dependent on the circumstances during the battle and the flanks and groups had full authority on what they should do at the moment of battle like supporting other flanks or doing their own feigned retreat as conditions seem appropriate in small groups of 100 to 1000 as long as the battle commences according to the general directive and the opponents are eliminated.

[edit] Feigned retreat

If a certain flank is being overwhelmed they are generally ordered to contain the situation by withdrawing and supporting the main force or flank or execute the feigned retreat as situations permit. Withdrawal of a certain flank would generally give a wide opening on the side, which the enemies can use to escape or fight. If the enemy escapes they would give chase, which usually results them being killed because the Mongols are more mobile and again executive feigned retreat on the routed enemies or again create flank on the escaped units on a much smaller scale of like 50 to 100. Once the mobility of the army was reduced by constant firing of arrows and movement and have their horses killed under them, in the end the close combat heavily armed units would finish them off by sword or the whole unit would overwhelm them.

[edit] Splitting and disorganization

The main objective of the Mongols was to create disorganization in its enemies when they will become more vulnerable and take away their advantages in this case horse and supply as much as possible, which then the Mongols can take as long as they want to finish their opponents off. If a flanks' feigned retreats jeopardizes the overall troop strength, they are not ordered to feigned retreat on their own but to join the side that is taking a heavy toll, which is why the communication (in this case messenger) was very critical. On the other hand, the flank taking a heavy toll might do feigned retreat on their own if they are not suppose to expect support from the other flanks. As long as the casuality is low, Mongol armies were allowed to do as much feigned retreat as they want, which would create the situation that there will be multiple feigned retreats in one battle and by splitting the enemies. For instance, if two flanks do feigned retreat, there would be two feigned retreats on two enemy units. Of those two flanks, the units inside the flanks might want to create another flank, which would create in total 4 flanks and possibly another 4 feigned retreats at the same time and so on. The safest technique for Mongols to keep the casualty low was to withdraw completely or more commonly feigned retreat since there isn't much difference between the two since the Mongols are more mobile and can attack at will.

Against more mobile armies such as the Turkic armies, which their mobility and arms are similar, the Mongols would also strategize how they should engage them like creating more flanks and more distances between the separate units and general discipline of its army.

[edit] See also

• Timeline of Mongol invasions

[edit] References

• Amitai-Preiss, Reuven. The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 1998
• Chambers, James, The Devil's Horsemen: The Mongol Invasion of Europe
• R.E. Dupuy and T.N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia Of Military History: From 3500 B.C. To The Present. (2nd Revised Edition 1986)
• Hildinger, Erik, Warriors of the Steppe: A Military History of Central Asia, 500 B.C. to A.D. 1700 *Morgan, David -- The Mongols, ISBN 0-631-17563-6
• Jones Archer ., -- Art of War in the Western World [1]
• May, Timothy. "The Mongol Art of War." [1] Westholme Publishing, Yardley. 2007.
• Nicolle, David, -- The Mongol Warlords Brockhampton Press, 1998
• Charles Oman, The History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages (1898, rev. ed. 1953)
• Saunders, J.J. -- The History of the Mongol Conquests, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1971, ISBN 0-8122-1766-7
• Sicker, Martin -- The Islamic World in Ascendancy: From the Arab Conquests to the Siege of Vienna, Praeger Publishers, 2000
• Soucek, Svatopluk -- A History of Inner Asia, Cambridge, 2000
• Verbruggen, J.F., -- The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages, Boydell Press, Second English translation 1997, ISBN 0851155707

[edit] External links

Medieval History: Mongol Invasion of Europe at http://historymedren.about.com/library/prm/bl1mongolinvasion.htm

v • d • e Mongol Empire
Politics, organization and daily life	Military campaigns and battles		People		Terms
Organization of the Mongol Empire under Genghis Khan Mongol military tactics and organization Daily life in the Mongol Empire Christianity among the Mongols Franco-Mongol alliance Armeno-Mongol alliance Destruction under the Mongol Empire Khanates Ilkhanate Chagatai Khanate Golden Horde Yuan Dynasty Notable cities Karakorum Samarkand Sarai Batu Sarai Berke Tabriz Dadu Bolghar Bukhara Ukek Majar Azaq Saray-Jük Xacitarxan		Asia Invasion of Central Asia Invasion of East Asia 1205–1209 Western China 1211–1234 Northern China Mongol invasions of Korea Battle of Bun'ei (first) Battle of Ngasaunggyan (first) Battle of Yamen Battle of Kōan (second) Battle of Pagan (second) Battle of Bạch Đằng (1288) (third) Mongol invasions of Vietnam (first) 1292 India (first) 1293 Java 1297 India (second) 1299 India (third) Invasion of Middle East Battle of Köse Dag 1251–1259 Persia and Mesopotamia (Timur) Battle of Baghdad (1258) Mongol invasions of Syria Battle of Ain Jalut (first) Mongol raids into Palestine Battle of Wadi al-Khazandar (third) Invasion of Europe Mongol invasions of Georgia Battle of Kalka River Battle of Samara Bend (first) Mongol invasion of Volga Bulgaria (second) Mongol invasion of Rus Battle of Legnica Battle of Mohi Timeline of the Tataro-Mongol Yoke in Russia		Emperors and rulers Genghis Khan Börte Ögedei Khan Tolui Khan Töregene Khatun Güyük Khan Möngke Khan Chagatai Khan Kublai Khan Prominent military generals Subutai Jebe Muqali Negudar Bo'orchu Borokhul Jelme Chilaun Khubilai Aju Bayan of the Baarin Kadan Burundai Nogai Khan		Titles Khagan Khan and Khatun Khanum Jinong Khong Tayiji Noyan Kheshig (Khevtuul) Political and military terms Yam Pax Mongolica Yassa Kurultai Nerge Mangudai Tumen