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26 October 2006: South Africa: Whatever Else We Do, Let’s Leave the Army Out of Cash in Transit Heists

 

The recent sharp increase in cash-in-transit heists in South Africa has understandably, drawn considerable criticism from both the private security sector and the public of the police’s capacity to combat this scourge. In recent weeks attacks have claimed the lives of four security guards and a 15-month-old infant. Private security companies and their employees are now struck with fear. Labour unions representing security guards have threatened strike action and, most notably, called on the government to deploy the army in support of these guards as they are, quite simply, outnumbered and outgunned. However, such deployment of the army contains several pitfalls.

 

By the third week of October the media was calling on government to deploy the army to assist the police and security guards in protecting cash-in-transit vehicles in the major urban centres of South Africa. These attacks have been noted to occur more frequently near public spaces such as shopping malls, banks and on highways. The increase could be attributed to improvement in physical security within financial institutions such as banks. As a result, vehicles transporting large amounts of cash have become the soft targets of highly organised criminal gangs, who are brazen and often quite brutal in their approach. These gangs, which tend to be heavily armed with automatic and semi-automatic firearms, operate in large groups of between ten and thirty people, each one with a designated task. . Their operations are carried out in military-style, hence the call for the army to be deployed to protect vehicles transporting large amounts of cash.

 

The use of military personnel to protect cash-in-transit vehicles would be a welcome development on the part of security companies, but among the general public this may generate a siege mentality and spawn fears that South Africa has somehow become a military state. Much literature exists arguing against the use of the military to do normal police-work. Deploying the military in urban areas, could threaten the autonomy and authority of the police, and possibly negatively impact on South Africa’s hard-earned democracy. Chapter 11 of the Constitution declares that the South African Police Service (SAPS) is the only law enforcement agency, responsible for all policing within the borders of South Africa. Although SAPS acknowledges that it has problems of capacity, police personnel are trained in criminal procedure and required to operate within the ambit of the law. The army on the other hand, is not trained in law enforcement in civilian areas. Army personnel are trained to use maximum force on the battlefield whereas police personnel are trained to use force as a last resort. Deploying the military in urban areas would very likely escalate the already unacceptable levels of violence associated with these attacks. Cash-in-transit heist gangs are not enemies in a war. Instead, they are criminals and should be treated as such and according to the provisions of the country’s criminal procedure laws.. Furthermore, using the army to assist in combating cash-in-transit heists could lead to the type of inter-service rivalry between the SAPS and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) that we have already witnessed between the ‘Scorpions’ of the National Prosecuting Authority and the SAPS.

 

Recently the Department of Defence advocated a minimal role in this regard, as it has been involved in these functions since the advent of democracy in 1994 at great cost to the defence budget. Although policing is designated by the Constitution as one of the SANDF’s secondary functions, it is highly unlikely that it would welcome deployment in this role. Domestic deployment of the army has a tendency to politicise the military.  Evidence of this can be found in the apartheid government’s “Total Strategy” of the 1980s. Deploying the army would be an expensive undertaking that would provide the military with a stronger claim for a larger share of the state’s budget. Democracy requires that the military stay out of partisan politics and crime is a major political issue in South Africa.

 

What is required to deal effectively with South Africa’s problem of cash-in-transit robberies is an increase in the capacity of criminal law enforcement agencies to combat violent crime.Improved investigative and intelligence capacity and co-ordination would greatly strengthen the law enforcement agencies’ abilities to identify and clamp down on the activities of these criminal gangs. The role of the National intelligence Agency in gathering intelligence on such gangs should be expanded, especially given the alleged links between these gangs and former combatants from neighbouring countries. Special units such as the SAPS Special Task Force could play a more visible role in combating these gangs thereby acting as a short term deterrent. But in the long term this scourge can only be effectively dealt with through meticulous investigation and prosecution. Increased co-operation between SAPS and NIA is crucial to any success in apprehending these gangs. More importantly, security companies need to take responsibility and provide their personnel with better equipment, training, additional personnel and better salaries. The latter should be coupled with integrity systems that would serve to discourage guards from selling information to criminals. A task team comprising SAPS, NIA, the security companies and business, should be established to find innovative ways to combat and prevent these activities. 

 

Cash-in-transit heists are indeed an unacceptable and tragic problem in South African society, but the problem requires a criminal justice solution, not a military one.

 

Justin Sylvester, Corruption and Governance Programme, ISS Cape Town Office

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