Print this page

30 May 2007: Piracy in Somali Waters Hits Food Aid
The Star, 22 May 2007

 

Mogadishu, Somalia – A ship carrying 850 tons of food to impoverished Somalis has refused to leave a Kenyan port because of piracy off Somalia’s lawless coast. This came after a failed hijack attempt on a World Food Programme (WFP) boat, killing a Somali guard on Saturday 19 May. The shipping agency contracted by the WFP demanded that the Kenyan government provide security for travel into Somali waters.

 

Commentary

 

On 29 November 2006 an ISS Today article stated: “The achievement of human security and development in Africa cannot be achieved if Africa’s maritime interests and the threats thereto are ignored. Piracy is a real and serious threat to the continent and is slowly but surely creeping towards Southern and South Africa. Early recognition of the problem and development of collective strategies and associated capabilities are essential in confronting the threat”. The recent increase in piracy incidents around the Horn of Africa further underlines this warning. This year, eight piracy attacks have already occurred off the Somali coast compared to 20 incidents reported off the Horn of Africa for 2006 as a whole.(1) Furthermore the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) in its Piracy Alert of 15 May warns, “Heavily armed pirates are subjecting vessels to violent attacks while in international waters. The attacks have been targeted towards vessels not calling at Somalia. Vessels, not calling at Somalia, are advised to steer at least 200 NM clear of Somali waters at all times”.(2)

 

Contrast this situation with the report in Defence News of 9 April 2007 under the heading “Threats decline in the Malacca Strait – International military cooperation curtails piracy”. The Malacca Straits have traditionally been one of the focal points of world piracy but incidents of piracy and attempted piracy there have declined from 46 in 2004 to 19 in 2005 and 16 in 2006 according to Defence News. The decline in piracy in those waters is ascribed to the implementation of a ship and port facility security code that requires both ports and ships to have security officers, and to increased air and sea patrols conducted by Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore on a 24/7 basis. The key to this is tri-nation cooperation, pooling resources and avoiding conflicts of interest and effort. The International Maritime Bureau reports, “Reported incidents of piracy dropped significantly in South East Asia. Indonesia recorded nine incidents, down dramatically from 19 last year. Two incidents were recorded in the Malacca Straits. This area now represents an excellent example of how cooperation between authorities can tackle and suppress piracy attacks”.(3)

 

In the Somali case, the refusal of the WFP ship’s captain and the IMB alert clearly demonstrate the magnitude of the threat that piracy presents to international and national, blue water and coastal shipping around the African coast. Pirates are not petty criminals or small-time crooks. They comprise highly organised and structured groups, well connected to international crime syndicates for information and markets, and employ military means in their attacks. They operate off ‘mother ships’ and use high-power fast-attack craft armed with surface-to-surface missiles, rocket-propelled grenades, heavy calibre machine-guns, anti-aircraft guns and even armed helicopters. Combating piracy therefore clearly requires integrated international, regional and national responses as demonstrated by the cooperation between Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore in the Malacca Straits.

 

Unfortunately one man’s bread is another man’s poison, and as success is reached against piracy in one region, the scourge will simply move to another, as is the experience with organised crime. Commenting on the decrease in piracy elsewhere, IMB Director Captain Pottengal Mukundan says, “Despite this positive trend, there are a number of regions that continue to be plagued by piracy, most notably Nigeria and Somalia.”(4) In addition to detailing piracy incidents, the report identifies ports and anchorages that are more prone to violent attacks. Balongan in Indonesia, Dar es Salaam in Tanzania and Lagos in Nigeria were highlighted as ports frequently targeted by pirates.

 

The Horn of Africa and the Somali coastline are a classic example of a maritime choke point where ships are forced together by geographic realities and where control of the seas and law enforcement are weak. With the continuing internal turmoil in Somalia, it can thus be expected that international pirates will exploit this situation to the full; all this, unfortunately, to the detriment of human security in Somalia. It is, as always, the most impoverished Somalis, who are in drastic need of food aid that will bear the ultimate brunt of these criminal attacks.

 

Combating piracy requires effective early warning and intelligence systems, credible deterrent and reaction forces capable of delivering firepower effectively, high mobility, flexibility and reach, and the ability to sustain operations for long periods. These capabilities are unfortunately sorely lacking in Africa. Africa lacks maritime air surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. African navies have few combat ships capable of sustained operations and few fast patrol or strike craft that can operate from secondary ports.

 

The success story in the Malacca Straits provides some guidance to African states about how to face the piracy threat to the continent and her people. As stated in the IMB report, this area now represents an excellent example of how cooperation between authorities can tackle and suppress piracy attacks. The key lies in regional and sub-regional maritime cooperation, pooling resources and avoiding conflicts of interest and effort.

 

No African country, on its own, can successfully combat the increasing threat of piracy. Doing so successfully will require collective strategies and sharing of information and responsibilities. It is therefore important to re-think the logic of the force design of African militaries based on the sole concept of ‘defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state against external military aggression’. There is a near total focus on land forces, with scant attention given to the maritime dimension. This phenomenon is also evident in the Common African Defence and Security Policy and the design of the African Standby Force and its regional brigades. Combating piracy requires collective maritime early warning and intelligence mechanisms, maritime air surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and fast-reaction naval vessels that can support law enforcement agencies in apprehending and combating heavily armed pirates. Developing these capabilities collectively will do more for human security in Africa than conventional armed forces designed to combat non-existent enemies.

 

Len le Roux, Defence Sector Programme, ISS Pretoria

---

DISCLAIMER