Conflict in the Niger Delta

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The current conflict in the Niger Delta arose in the early 1990s due to tensions between the foreign oil corporations and a number of the Niger Delta's minority ethnic groups who felt they were being exploited, particularly the Ogoni and the Ijaw. Ethnic and political unrest has continued throughout the 1990s and persists as of 2007 despite the conversion to democracy and the election of the Obasanjo government in 1999. Competition for oil wealth has fueled violence between innumerable ethnic groups, causing the militarization of nearly the entire region by ethnic militia groups as well as Nigerian military and police forces (notably the Nigerian Mobile Police). Victims of crimes are fearful of seeking justice for crimes committed against them because of growing "impunity from prosecution for individuals responsible for serious human rights abuses, [which] has created a devastating cycle of increasing conflict and violence"The regional and ethnic conflicts are so numerous that fully detailing each is impossible and impractical. However, there have been a number of major confrontations that deserve elaboration.

Contents 1 An environment of crisis: background 2 The case of Ogoniland (1992-1995) 3 The Nigerian oil crisis 4 Solving the Niger Delta Crisis 5 References

[edit] An environment of crisis: background

See also Environmental issues in the Niger Delta and Petroleum in Nigeria

Nigeria, after nearly four decades of oil production, had by the early 1990s become almost completely dependent on petroleum extraction economically, generating 25% of its GDP (this has since risen to 40% as of 2000). Despite the vast wealth created by petroleum, the benefits have been slow to trickle down to the majority of the population, who since the 1960s have increasingly been forced to abandon their traditional agricultural practices. Annual production of both cash and food crops dropped significantly in the latter decades of 20th century, cocoa production dropped by 43% (Nigeria was the world's largest cocoa exporter in 1960), rubber dropped by 29%, cotton by 65%, and groundnuts by 64%.^[1] In spite of the large number of skilled, well-paid Nigerians who have been employed by the oil corporations, the majority of Nigerians and most especially the people of the Niger Delta states and the far north have become poorer since the 1960s

The Delta region has a steadily growing population estimated to be over 30 million people as of 2005, accounting for more than 23% of Nigeria's total population. The population density is also among the highest in the world with 265 people per kilometre-squared (reference NDDC). This population is expanding at a rapid 3% per year and the oil capital, Port Harcourt, along with other large towns are growing quickly. Poverty and urbanization in Nigeria are on the rise, and official corruption is considered a fact of life. The resultant scenario is one in which there is urbanization but no accompanying economic growth to provide jobs. This has led to a section of the growing populace assisting in destroying the ecosystem that they require to sustain themselves.

[edit] The case of Ogoniland (1992-1995)

Ogoniland is a 404-square-mile (1,050 km²) region in the southeast of the Niger Delta basin. Economically viable oil was discovered in Ogoniland in 1957, just one year after the discovery of Nigeria's first commercial petroleum deposit, with Shell and Chevron setting up shop throughout the next two decades. The Ogonis, a minority ethnic group of about half a million people who call Ogoniland home, and other ethnic groups in the region attest that during this time, the government began forcing them to abandon their land to oil companies without consultation, and offering negligible compensation. This is further supported by a 1979 constitutional addition which afforded the federal government full ownership and rights to all Nigerian territory and also decided that all compensation for land would "be based on the value of the crops on the land at the time of its acquisition, not on the value of the land itself." The Nigerian government could now distribute the land to oil companies as it deemed fit. The 1970s and 1980s saw the government's empty promises of benefits for the Niger Delta peoples fall through, with the Ogoni growing increasing dissatisfied and their environmental, social, and economic apparatus rapidly deteriorating the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) was formed in 1992. MOSOP, spearheaded by Ogoni playwright and author Ken Saro-Wiwa, became the major campaigning organization representing the Ogoni people in their struggle for ethnic and environmental rights. Its primary targets, and at times adversaries, have been the Nigerian government and the oil company Royal Dutch Shell.

Beginning in December 1992, the conflict between Ogonis and the oil infrastructure escalated to a level of greater seriousness and intensity on both sides. Both parties began carrying out acts of violence and MOSOP issued an ultimatum to the oil companies (Shell, Chevron, and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation) which demanded some $10 billion in accumulated royalties, damages and compensation, and "immediate stoppage of environmental degradation", and negotiations for mutual agreement on all future drilling.

The Ogonis threatened to embark on mass action to disrupt their operation if the companies failed to comply. By this act, the Ogoni shifted the focus of their actions from an unresponsive federal government to the oil companies engaged in their own region. The rationale for this assignment of responsibility were the benefits accrued by the oil companies from extracting the natural wealth of the Ogoni homeland, and neglect from central government.

The government responded by banning public gatherings and declaring that disturbances of oil production were acts of treason. Oil extraction from the territory had slowed to a trickle of 10,000 barrels per day (1,600 m³/d) (.5% of the national total). However, because the withdrawal was a temporary security measure, it provided the government with a compelling reason to 'restore order'.^{[citation needed]}

Military repression escalated in May 1994. On May 21, soldiers and mobile policemen appeared in most Ogoni villages. On that day, four Ogoni chiefs (all on the conservative side of a schism within MOSOP over strategy) were brutally murdered. Saro-Wiwa, head of the opposing faction, had been denied entry to Ogoniland on the day of the murders, but he was detained in connection with the killings. The occupying forces, led by Major Paul Okuntimo of Rivers State Internal Security, claimed to be 'searching for those directly responsible for the killings of the four Ogonis.' However, witnesses say that they engaged in terror operations against the general Ogoni population. Amnesty International characterized the policy as deliberate terrorism. By mid-June, 30 villages had been completely destroyed, 600 people had been detained, and at least 40 had been killed. An eventual total of around 100,000 internal refugees and an estimated 2,000 civilian deaths was recorded.^{[citation needed]}

In May 1994, nine activists from the movement who would become known as 'The Ogoni Nine', among them Ken Saro-Wiwa, were arrested and accused of incitement to murder following the deaths of four Ogoni elders. Saro-Wiwa and his comrades denied the charges, but were imprisoned for over a year before being found guilty and sentenced to death by a specially convened tribunal, hand-selected by General Sani Abacha, on 10 November 1995. The activists were denied due process and upon being found guilty, were executed via hanging by the Nigerian state.^{[citation needed]}

The executions were met with an immediate international response. The trial was widely criticised by human rights organisations and the governments of other states, who condemned the Nigerian government's long history of detaining their critics, mainly pro-democracy and other political activists. The Commonwealth of Nations, which had also plead for clemency, suspended Nigeria's membership in response. The United States, the United Kingdom, and the EU all implemented sanctions, however, none of these had an impact on oil production.^{[citation needed]}

Shell asked the Nigerian government for clemency towards those found guilty, but its request was refused. However, a 2001 Greenpeace report found that "two witnesses that accused them [Saro-Wiwa and the other activists] later admitted that Shell and the military had bribed them with promises of money and jobs at Shell. Shell admitted having given money to the Nigerian military, who brutally tried to silence the voices which claimed justice".^[2]

As of 2006, the situation in Ogoniland has eased significantly, progressed by the transition to democratic rule in 1999. However, no attempts have been made by the government or an international body to bring about justice by investigating and prosecuting those involved in the violence and property destruction that have occurred in Ogoniland,^[3] although a class action lawsuit has been brought against Shell by individual plaintiffs.Cite error: Closing </ref> missing for <ref> tag

The intense confrontation between the NDPVF and NDV seems to have been brought about by Asari’s political falling out with the NDPVF’s financial supporter Peter Odili, governor of Rivers State following the April 2003 local and state elections. After Asari publicly criticized the election process as fraudulent, the Odili government withdrew its financial support from the NDPVF and began to support Tom’s NDV, effectively launching a paramilitary campaign against the NDPVF.

Subsequent violence occurred chiefly in riverine villages southeast and southwest of Port Harcourt, with the two groups fighting for control of bunkering routes. The conflagrations spurred violent acts against the local population, resulting in numerous deaths and widespread displacement. Daily civilian life was disrupted, forcing schools and economic activity to shut down and resulting in widespread property destruction.

The state campaign against the NDPVF emboldened Asari who began publicly articulating populist, anti-government views and attempted to frame the conflict in terms of pan-Ijaw nationalism and "self-determination." Consequently the state government felt the escalated the campaign against him by bringing in police, army, and navy forces that began occupation of the Port Harcourt in June 2004.

The government forces collaborated with the NDV during the summer, and were seen protecting NDV militiamen from attacks by the NDPVF. The state forces failed to protect the civilian population from the violence and actually increased the destruction of citizens' livelihood. The Nigerian state forces were widely reported to have used the conflict as an excuse to raid homes, claiming that innocent civilians were cahoots with the NDPVF. Government soldiers and police obtained and destroyed civilian property by force. The NDPVF also accused the military of conducting air bombing campaigns against several villages, effectively reducing them to rubble, because it was believed to be housing NDPVF soldiers. The military denies this, claiming they engaged in aerial warfare only once in a genuine effort to wipe out an NDPVF stronghold.

Innocent civilians were also killed by NDPVF forces firing indiscriminately in order to engage their opponents. At the end of August 2004 there were several particularly brutal battles over the Port Harcourt waterfront; some residential slums were completely destroyed after the NDPVF deliberately burning down buildings. By September 2004, the situation was rapidly approaching a violent climax which caught the attention of the international community.^[4]

[edit] The Nigerian oil crisis

This article does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unverifiable material may be challenged and removed. (June 2007)

After launching a mission to wipe out NDPVF, approved by President Olusegun Obasanjo in early September, Mujahid Dokubo-Asari declared “all-out war” with the Nigerian state as well as the oil corporations and threatened to disrupt oil production activities through attacks on wells and pipelines.^{[citation needed]} This quickly caused a major crisis the following day on September 26, as Shell evacuated 235 non-essential personnel from two oil fields, cutting oil production by 30,000 barrels per day (4,800 m³/d).

[edit] Solving the Niger Delta Crisis

1. Create more states in Niger Delta to bring development closer to the people. Agitations for more states in the Eastern Niger Delta has been well known for a long time. Cross River State is more than big enough to be three states with the northern part being Ogaja State, the Southern part being Calabar State and the central part being Cross River State. In the present Akwa Ibom State, the Annang area should be a state which they have been championing for as Atai State. New states in the Western Niger Delta should be as demanded by the area.

2. Recognize Eastern Niger Delta and Western Niger Delta as separate region for developmental purposes.

3. Develop Calabar and equip with brach offices of Federal Ministries and foreign consulate offices

4. Develop Port Harcourt and equip with brach offices of Federal Ministries and foreign consulate offices. Caution: See solution #5 below. News reports on crisis in Western Niger Delta seem to show that the natives of the area such as the Ijaws do not feel like they control Port Harcourt.

5. Develop at least one new city in each of the Niger Delta States

6. Help the new states and the regional centers with infrastructure development.

7. The leaders of Niger Delta States need to realize that they have very limited time to develop their state as they will be out of oil very soon and the area may become the poorest in all of Africa if care is not taken. Oil has been produced from the area for decades. Unfortunately, this resources will soon be depleted and that is why resource control is not a part of this suggested solution.

[edit] References

1. ^ [Where Vultures Feast](Okonta and Douglas, 2001)
2. ^ Contamination in Paulina by Aldrin, Dieldrin, Endrin and other toxic chemicals produced and disposed of by Shell Chemicals of Brazil (Greenpeace, 2001)
3. ^ THE NIGER DELTA: NO DEMOCRATIC DIVIDEND (Human Rights Watch, 2002)
4. ^ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named HRW05

Responding to Crisis in Nigeria] U.S. Institute of Peace Briefing, April 2006 Strategies for Peace in the Niger Delta] U.S. Institute of Peace Briefing, December 2005 Nigeria's shadowy oil rebels] (BBC) Peace and Security in the Niger Delta: Baseline Study] WAC Global Services Baseline Study, December 2003 MASSOB-Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra]

Creating New Africa Command to Coordinate Military Efforts] (February 6, 2007)

The U.S. Military's Growing Role in Africa] Africa gets US military command] "Blood Oil"] by Sebastian Junger in Vanity Fair',,February 2007 (accessed 28 January 2007) Curse of the Black Gold: Hope and Betrayal in the Niger Delta"] -- article from National Geographic Magazine (February 2007) International Reports,Documents and Legal Resources] Crisis briefing on violence in Nigeria] from Reuters AlertNet