One-China policy

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See also: Two Chinas

The One-China policy (simplified Chinese: 一个中国; traditional Chinese: 一個中國 政策 ; pinyin: yī gè Zhōngguó) generally refers to the policy or view advocated by the People's Republic of China (PRC, commonly known simply as "China") toward other countries to recognize the PRC government in Beijing as the sole legitimate government of mainland China and Taiwan. Countries seeking diplomatic relations with the PRC must acknowledge this policy and break official relations with the Republic of China (ROC, commonly known as and hereafter referred to as "Taiwan"). The PRC claims that Taiwan is part of China and part of the PRC's sovereign territory, although it has never controlled the Taiwan Area of the Republic of China and its associated territories.

After the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the Republic of China (ROC) government of the Kuomintang in Taiwan continued to claim legitimacy as government of China until President Lee Teng-hui’s constitutional changes in 1991.[1] Despite the constitutional changes of the ROC, the current ROC president has re-asserted the claim on mainland China as recently as October 8, 2008.[2] The One-China policy does not imply recognition of PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan. The United States (US) and other industrialized democracies have specifically only "acknowledged" or "taken note" of the PRC position, but not adopted it as their own [3]. The position of the US on Taiwan’s status is that at present it is undetermined [4], and that its future should be determined peacefully, through a democratic mechanism such as a plebiscite and with the express consent of the people of Taiwan [5]

The US government has also emphasized that the One China policy is also different from the One China principle (一中原則), which is the position of the PRC government, stating that Taiwan has always been an inalienable part of China [6].

Diplomatically, all countries having official relations with the ROC recognize the ROC as the sole legitimate government of the whole of China.[7]

Contents

[edit] History

Before the early 1600s Taiwan was inhabited by aborigines, and that since then it has been ruled by the Dutch (1624–1662), the Spanish (1626–1642, Northern Taiwan only), the Chinese, and the Japanese (1895–1945), while France also briefly held sway over Northern Taiwan in 1884-85 [8].

It was an outlying prefecture of Fukien Province under the Manchu / Ch’ing government from 1683 until 1887, when it was officially made a province of China. Taiwan remained province for 8 years until it was ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. In 1942-43 both the Chiang Kai-shek government and Mao Tse-tung’s Chinese Communist Party began laying claim to sovereignty over Taiwan.[9][10].

In 1945, Chiang's government gained control of Taiwan. Four years later this government lost control of Mainland China to Mao and Chiang's government moved to Taiwan. The state still governs Taiwan but transformed into a democracy in the 1990s following decades of martial law. This change in the political system allowed open discussion as Taiwan's identity for the first time since the takeover by Chiang.

[edit] Viewpoints within Taiwan

Within Taiwan there is a distinction between the positions of the Kuomintang and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP): the Kuomintang maintains its claim that under the ROC Constitution (passed by the Kuomintang government in 1947 in Nanking) the ROC has sovereignty over most of China (including by their interpretation both mainland China and Taiwan) and, according to some interpretations of that constitution, Mongolia.

The Democratic Progressive Party does not agree with the One China principle and states that Taiwan and China are two separate countries. The DPP believes that the people of Taiwan have the right to self-determination without outside coercion [11]

[edit] Legal positions

Neither the ROC nor the PRC government recognizes the other as a legitimate national government. The legal position in each jurisdiction is as follows.

[edit] People's Republic of China (PRC)

"Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China. It is the lofty duty of the entire Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland."[12]
Article 2:
There is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. China's sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division. Safeguarding China's sovereignty and territorial integrity is the common obligation of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included.
Taiwan is part of China. The state shall never allow the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces to make Taiwan secede from China under any name or by any means.[13]
Article 5:
Upholding the principle of one China is the basis of peaceful reunification of the country.
To reunify the country through peaceful means best serves the fundamental interests of the compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. The state shall do its utmost with maximum sincerity to achieve a peaceful reunification.
After the country is reunified peacefully, Taiwan may practice systems different from those on the mainland and enjoy a high degree of autonomy.[13]

[edit] Republic of China (ROC)

"The territory of the Republic of China according to its existing national boundaries shall not be altered except by resolution of the National Assembly." (Effective 1948 to 2000.)
"The territory of the Republic of China, defined by its existing national boundaries, shall not be altered unless initiated upon the proposal of one-fourth of all members of the Legislative Yuan, passed by three-fourths of the members of the Legislative Yuan present at a meeting requiring a quorum of three-fourths of all the members, and approved by three-fourths of the delegates to the National Assembly present at a meeting requiring a quorum of two-thirds of all the delegates." (Effective 2000 to 2005)
"The territory of the Republic of China, defined by its existing national boundaries, shall not be altered unless initiated upon the proposal of one-fourth of the total members of the Legislative Yuan, passed by at least three-fourths of the members present at a meeting attended by at least three-fourths of the total members of the Legislative Yuan, and sanctioned by electors in the free area of the Republic of China at a referendum held upon expiration of a six-month period of public announcement of the proposal, wherein the number of valid votes in favor exceeds one-half of the total number of electors." (Effective 2005 to present)

In accordance with this legal position, legislation passed by the Legislative Yuan is signed by the President of the ROC. Only voters residing in the "free area" are eligible to vote and be elected in ROC elections. The ROC's constitution still raises claims of sovereignty over Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, territories that today constitute the PRC, but, according to some interpretations, also over Mongolia, Tuva (Russia), and other, minor areas which today are part of Afghanistan, Myanmar, India or Japan.[citation needed]

[edit] Evolution of the policy

One interpretation, which was adopted during the Cold War, is that either the PRC or the ROC is the sole rightful government of all China and that the other government is illegitimate. While much of the western bloc maintained relations with the ROC until the 1970s under this policy, much of the eastern bloc maintained relations with the PRC. While the government of the ROC considered itself the remaining holdout of the legitimate government of a country overrun by what it thought of as Communist rebels, the PRC claimed to have succeeded the ROC in the Chinese Civil War. Though the ROC no longer portrays itself as the sole legitimate government of China, the position of the PRC remained unchanged until the early 2000s, when the PRC began to soften its position on this issue to promote Chinese reunification.

The revised position of the PRC was made clear in the Anti-Secession Law of 2005, which although stating that there is one China whose sovereignty is indivisible, does not explicitly identify this China with the PRC. (Almost all PRC laws have a suffix (prefix in Chinese grammar) "of the People's Republic of China" in their official names, but the Anti-Secession Law is an exception.) Beijing has made no major statements after 2004 which identify one China with the PRC and has shifted its definition of one China slightly to encompass a concept called the '1992 Consensus': both sides of the Taiwan strait recognise there is only one China — both mainland China and Taiwan belong to the same China, but agree to differ on the definition of that one China.

One interpretation of one China is that there exists only three[clarification needed] geographical regions of China, which was split into two Chinese governments by the Chinese Civil War. This is largely the position of current supporters of Chinese reunification in Mainland China who believe that this "one China" should eventually reunite under a single government. Starting in 2005, this position has become close enough to the positions of the PRC to allow for high-level dialogue between the Communist Party of China and the Pan-Blue Coalition of Taiwan.

[edit] Policy position in the PRC

In practice, official sources and state-controlled media never refer to the "ROC government", and seldom to the "government of Taiwan". Instead, the government in Taiwan is referred to as the "Taiwan authorities". The PRC does not accept or stamp Republic of China passports. Instead, a Taiwan resident visiting Mainland China, Hong Kong or Macau must use a Taiwan Compatriot Entry Permit.[citation needed]

[edit] Policy position in the ROC

The only official statement of the ROC on its interpretation of the One-China Principle dates back to 1 August 1992. At that time, the National Unification Council of the ROC expressed the ROC's interpretation of the principle as:[14]

  1. The two sides of the Strait have different opinions as to the meaning of "one China." To Beijing, "one China" means "the People's Republic of China (PRC)," with Taiwan to become a "Special Administrative Region" after unification. Taipei, on the other hand, considers "one China" to mean the Republic of China (ROC), founded in 1912 and with de jure sovereignty over all of China. The ROC, however, currently has jurisdiction only over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. Taiwan is part of China, and the Chinese mainland is part of China as well.
  2. Since 1949, China has been temporarily divided, and each side of the Taiwan Strait is administered by a separate political entity. This is an objective reality that no proposal for China's unification can overlook.
  3. In February 1991, the government of the Republic of China, resolutely seeking to establish consensus and start the process of unification, adopted the "Guidelines for National Unification". This was done to enhance the progress and well-being of the people, and the prosperity of the nation. The ROC government sincerely hopes that the mainland authorities will adopt a pragmatic attitude, set aside prejudices, and cooperate in contributing its wisdom and energies toward the building of a free, democratic and prosperous China.

However, political consensus and public opinion in Taiwan has evolved since 1992. There is significant difference between each faction's recognition for and understanding of the One China principle. The Pan-Blue Coalition parties, consisting of the Kuomintang, the People's First Party, and the New Party, accept the One China principle. In particular, the current President of the Republic of China, Ma Ying-Jeou, stated in 2006 when he was the Kuomintang chairman that "One China is the Republic of China". Until the 1990s, the authoritarian regime actively claimed that the ROC is the only legitimate "One China" while the PRC is illegitimate.

The Pan-Green Coalition parties, consisting of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union, are more hostile to the policy, as they view Taiwan as a country separate from China. The former ROC President, Chen Shui-bian of the DPP, regards acceptance of the "One China" principle as capitulation to the PRC, and prefers to view it as nothing more than a topic for discussion, in opposition to the PRC's insistence that the "One China" principle is a prerequisite for any negotiation.

When the Republic of China established diplomatic relations with Kiribati in 2003 the ROC officially declared that Kiribati could continue to have diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. Despite the declaration, however, all countries maintaining official ties with Taipei continue to recognize the ROC as the sole legitimate government of China.[7]

In accordance with the One China principle, the ROC does not recognize or stamp PRC passports. Instead, mainland Chinese residents visiting Taiwan and other territory under ROC jurisdiction must use a mainland China resident pass issued by the ROC authorities.

[edit] One-China policy and diplomatic relations

The One-China Principle is also a requirement for any political entity to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. The PRC has traditionally attempted to get nations to recognize that "the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China... and Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China." However, many nations are unwilling to make this particular statement and there was often a protracted effort to find language regarding one China that is acceptable to both sides. Some countries use terms like "acknowledge", "understand", "take note of", while others explicitly use the term "support" or "recognize" for Beijing's position on the status of Taiwan.

The name "Chinese Taipei" is used in some international arenas since "Taiwan" suggests that Taiwan is a separate country and "Republic of China" suggests that there are two Chinas, and thus both violate the One-China Principle. Taiwan could also be used as shorthand for the Customs Union between Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. For example, in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Declaration on the March 2007 elections, issued on behalf of the European Union and with support of 37 countries, express mention is made of "Taiwan."

Most countries that recognize Beijing circumvent the diplomatic language by establishing "Trade Offices" that represent their interests on Taiwanese soil, while the ROC government represents its interests abroad with TECRO, Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office. The United States (and any other nation having diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China) does not have formal diplomatic relations with the ROC. Instead, external relations are handled via nominally private organizations such as the American Institute in Taiwan or the Canadian Trade Office in Taipei.

In the case of the United States, the One-China Policy was first stated in the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972: "the United States acknowledges that Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States does not challenge that position." The United States has not expressed an explicitly immutable statement regarding whether it believes Taiwan is independent or not. Instead, Washington simply states that they understand the PRC's claims that the country claims Taiwan as its own. In fact, many scholars agree that US One-China Policy was not intended to please the PRC government, but as a way for Washington to conduct international relations in the region, which Beijing fails to state.

When President Jimmy Carter in 1979 broke off relations with the ROC in order to establish relations with the PRC, Congress responded by passing the Taiwan Relations Act that maintained relations, but stopped short of full recognition of the ROC. In 1982 President Ronald Reagan also saw that the Six Assurances were adopted, the fifth being that the United States would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. Still, United States policy has remained ambiguous. During the House International Relations Committee on April 21 of 2004, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, James A. Kelly, was asked by Rep. Grace Napolitano (D-CA) whether America’s commitment to Taiwan’s democracy conflicted with the so-called One-China Policy. He admitted the difficulty of defining the U.S.'s position: "I didn’t really define it, and I’m not sure I very easily could define it." He added, "I can tell you what it is not. It is not the One-China principle that Beijing suggests." [1]

The position of the United States, as clarified in the China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy report of the Congressional Research Service (date: July 9, 2007) is summed up in five points:

  1. The United States did not explicitly state the sovereign status of Taiwan in the three US-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982.
  2. The United States "acknowledged" the "One China" position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
  3. US policy has not recognized the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan;
  4. US policy has not recognized Taiwan as a sovereign country; and
  5. US policy has considered Taiwan's status as undetermined. In an interview with Chinese students on November 16, 2009 President Barack Obama reconfirmed that the United States supports the One China Policy[15].

For any country that wants to establish diplomatic relationship with the PRC, it must first discontinue any formal relationship with the ROC by the request of the PRC government.[citation needed] In order to compete for other countries' recognition, each government gives money to those remaining few small countries. Both the PRC and ROC governments have accused each other of monetary diplomacy. Several small African and Caribbean countries have established and discontinued diplomatic relationships with both sides several times in exchange for huge financial support from each side.

Of the 192 members of the United Nations, only Bhutan has chosen to recognize neither the People's Republic of China nor the Republic of China. All remaining governments have recognized one or the other, recognizing that government as the sole legitimate government of all China.

[edit] One-China policy and cross-strait relations

The acknowledgment of the One China Principle is also a prerequisite by the People's Republic of China government for any cross-strait dialogue be held with groups from Taiwan. The PRC's One-China policy rejects formulas which call for "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" [16] and has stated that efforts to divide the sovereignty of China could be met with military force.

The PRC has explicitly stated that it is flexible about the meaning "one China," and that "one China" may not necessarily be synonymous with the PRC, and has offered to talk with parties on Taiwan and the government on Taiwan on the basis of the Consensus of 1992 which states that there is one China, but that there are different interpretations of that one China. For example, in Premier Zhu Rongji's statements prior to the 2000 Presidential Election in Taiwan, he stated that as long as any ruling power in Taiwan accepts the One China Principle, they can negotiate and discuss anything freely. However, the One-China Principle would apparently require that Taiwan formally give up any possibility of Taiwan independence, and would preclude any "one nation, two states" formula similar to ones used in German Ostpolitik or in Korean reunification. Chen Shui-bian, president of the Republic of China between 2000 and 2008 repeatedly rejected the demands to accept the One China Principle and instead called for talks to discuss One China itself. With the January and March 2008 elections in Taiwan, and the election of Ma Ying-jeou as the President of the ROC, who was inaugurated on May 20, a new era of better relations between both sides of the Taiwan Strait was established[17]. KMT officials visited Mainland China, and the Chinese ARATS met in Beijing with its Taiwanese counterpart, the Straits Exchange Foundation. Direct charter flights were therefore established.

One China was the formulation held by the ROC government before the 1990s, but it was asserted that the one China was the Republic of China rather than PRC. However, in 1991, President Lee Teng-hui indicated that he would not challenge the Communist authorities to rule mainland China. This is a significant point in the history of Cross Straits relations in that a president no longer claims administrative authority over mainland China. Henceforth, Taiwan independence movement gained a political boost, and under Lee's administration the issue is no longer who rules mainland China, but who claims legitimacy over Taiwan and the surrounding islands. Over the course of the 1990s, President Lee appeared to drift away from the One-China formulation, leading many to believe that he was actually sympathetic to Taiwan independence. In 1999, Lee proposed a Special state-to-state relations for mainland China-Taiwan relations which was received angrily by Beijing, which ended semi-official dialogue until June 2008, when ARATS and SEF met, and in which President Ma Ying-jeou reiterated the 1992 Consensus and the different interpretation on "One China".

After the election of Chen Shui-bian in 2000, the policy of the ROC government was to propose negotiations without preconditions. While Chen did not explicitly reject Lee's two states theory, he did not explicitly endorse it either. Throughout 2001, there were unsuccessful attempts to find an acceptable formula for both sides, such as agreeing to "abide by the 1992 consensus." Chen, after assuming the Democratic Progressive Party chairmanship in July 2002, moved to a somewhat less ambiguous policy, and stated in early August 2002 that "it is clear that both sides of the straits are separate countries." This statement was strongly criticized by opposition Pan-Blue Coalition parties on Taiwan, which support a One-China Principle, but oppose defining this "One China" as the PRC.

The One China policy became an issue during the 2004 ROC Presidential election. Chen Shui-bian abandoned his earlier ambiguity and publicly rejected the One-China Principle claiming it would imply that Taiwan is part of the PRC. His opponent Lien Chan publicly supported a policy of "one China, different interpretations," as done in 1992. At the end of the 2004 election, Lien Chan and his running mate, James Soong, later announced that they would not put ultimate unification as the goal for their cross-strait policy and would not exclude the possibility of an independent Taiwan in the future. In an interview with Time Asia bureau prior to the 2004 presidential elections, Chen used the model of German and European Union as examples of how countries may come together while in the Soviet Union, a country may fragment.

In March 2005, the PRC passed an Anti-Secession Law which authorized the use of force to prevent a "serious incident" that breaks the One China policy, but which at the same time did not identify one China with the People's Republic and offered to pursue political solutions. At the same session of the PRC Congress, a large increase in military spending was also passed, leading blue team members to interpret those measures as forcing the ROC to adhere to the One China Policy or else the PRC would attack.

In April and May 2005, Lien Chan and James Soong made separate trips to Mainland China[18], during which both explicitly supported the Consensus of 1992 and the concept of one China and in which both explicitly stated their parties' opposition to Taiwan independence. Although President Chen at one point supported the trips of Lien and Soong for diffusing cross-strait tensions[19]., he also attacked them for working with the "enemy" PRC[citation needed]. On April 28, 2008, Honorary Chairman Lien Chan of the then opposition Kuomintang visited Beijing and met with Hu Jintao for the fourth time since their historic encounter on April 29, 2005 in their respective capacity as party leaders of both the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT. Lien also met Chen Yunlin, director of the PRC's Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council.[20].

On May 28, 2008, Kuomintang Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung made a landmark visit to Beijing[21]., and met and shook hands with the Communist President Hu Jintao, at the Great Hall of the People. He also visited the mausoleum of Sun Yat-Sen. Hu Jintao called for resuming exchanges and talks, based on the 1992 Consensus, between mainland China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and Taiwan's Strait Exchange Foundation, as early as possible, and practically solving problems concerning the two sides through talks on equal footing. Once the ARATS-SEF dialogue is resumed, priority should be given to issues including cross-Strait weekend chartered flights and approval for mainland China residents traveling to Taiwan, which are of the biggest concern to people on both sides of the Strait. "The KMT has won two important elections in Taiwan recently, Wu said, which showed that the mainstream opinion of the Taiwan people identified with what the KMT stood for, and most of the Taiwan people agree that the two sides on the strait can achieve peaceful development and a win-win situation."[22]. Wu also told reporters that he had stressed to Hu that Taiwan needed an international presence. "The Taiwanese people need a sense of security, respect and a place in the international community," Wu said. Hu was also quoted as having promised to discuss feasible measures for Taiwan to take part in international activities, particularly its participation in World Health Organization activities.[23].

[edit] Academic commentary

Edward L. Dreyer states “Although the ‘One China’ doctrine is useful to the PRC’s current polemics and diplomacy, it is difficult to reconcile with the actual course of Chinese history…during its millennia of record history, China was often divided for very long periods…The assertion that Taiwan and other territories have always been part of a unified China, whose borders are similar to those of contemporary China, is also challenged by reality. Even in those periods in which it is reasonable to speak of a unified China, the territory included therein usually has been confined largely to China proper: the 18 provinces east of the Himalayas and south of the Mongolian steppe. Tibet, Outer Mongolia, and Taiwan were never…ruled by dynasties of indigenous origin.” [24]

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ Lee Teng-hui 1999 interview with Deutsche Welle: http://www.fas.org/news/taiwan/1999/0709.htm
  2. ^ "Ma refers to China as ROC territory in magazine interview". Taipei Times. 2008-10-08. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/10/08/2003425320. 
  3. ^ Congressional Research Service: Evolution of the "One China" policy, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL30341_20090817.pdf
  4. ^ John Tkacik: Taiwan’s unsettled status: http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/06/Taiwans-Unsettled-International-Status-Preserving-US-Options-in-the-Pacific )
  5. ^ Taiwan Relations Act, http://www.taiwandocuments.org/tra01.htm and Congressional resolution on "consent of the people of Taiwan", http://www.taiwandc.org/nws-2001-12.htm
  6. ^ Assistant Secretary James Kelly, "The Taiwan Relations Act: The Next Twenty-Five Years," testimony before the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, April 21, 2004, p. 32, at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa93229.000/hfa93229_0f.htm
  7. ^ a b Nationalist Era Policy
  8. ^ James W. Davidson: The Island of Formosa, Past and Present. Published by Macmillan & Co., London 1903, republished in 1988 by SMC Publishing, Taipei
  9. ^ Richard Bush: At Cross Purposes, US-Taiwan Relations since 1942. Published by M.E. Sharpe, Armonk NY, 2004
  10. ^ Alan Wachman: Why Taiwan? Geostrategic rationales for China’s territorial integrity. Published by Stanford University Press Stanford, CA 2007.
  11. ^ http://www.taiwandc.org/nws-9920.htm
  12. ^ "CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA". The People's Daily — Read 3rd paragraph, 10th line-. 1982-12-04. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html. 
  13. ^ a b "Anti-Secession Law". The People's Daily. 2005-03-14. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200503/14/eng20050314_176746.html. 
  14. ^ National Unification Council, Resolution of August 1, 1992 on the meaning of "one China", 1 August 1992.
  15. ^ Po, Vivian. "Chinese Media Perspectives on Obama's Visit". New American Media. http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=18992bb1b9c01b8d64b5813aab5490ef. Retrieved 2009-11-18. 
  16. ^ "White Paper--The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue". Embassy of the PRC in the USA. 1993-08-06. http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/White%20Papers/t36705.htm. 
  17. ^ "Taiwan’s new president makes immediate overtures to China". WSWS. 2008-06-04. http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/jun2008/taiw-j04.shtml. 
  18. ^ "People First Party leader visits China after KMT head's return". Taiwan Journal. 2005-05-13. http://taiwanjournal.nat.gov.tw/site/Tj/ct.asp?xItem=21298&CtNode=122. 
  19. ^ "Lien's China trip highlights tensions". BBC. 2005-04-27. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4489739.stm. 
  20. ^ "KMT's Lien to meet China's President Hu for fourth time". The China Post. 2008-04-27. http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan%20relations/2008/04/27/153774/KMT's-Lien.htm. 
  21. ^ "Kuomintang Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung arrives in Beijing". China Daily. 2008-05-27. http://en.bcnq.com/china/2008-05/27/content_6715745.htm. 
  22. ^ "KMT Returns to China". Lc Backer Blog. 2008-05-31. http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2008/05/kmt-retruns-to-china.html. 
  23. ^ "China promises to resume cross-strait dialogue: KMT chief". Global Security. 2008-05-28. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/taiwan/2008/taiwan-080528-cna02.htm. 
  24. ^ Edward L. Dreyer: The Myth of "One China". Published in Peter C. Y. Chow: The "One China" Dilemma, 1st edition, 2008, p. 19. ISBN 978–1–4039–8394–7.

[edit] External links

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