Sinai and Palestine Campaign
The Sinai and Palestine Campaigns occurred in the Middle Eastern Theatre of World War I when a series of battles were fought between British Empire, German Empire and Ottoman Empire forces. These engagements began on 26 January 1915 when an Ottoman force invaded British Mandated Egypt and unsuccessfully attempted to interrupt the vital supply line running through the Suez Canal. Early in 1916 British Empire units began to push their defences of the Suez Canal into the Sinai Peninsula when several engagements were fought about Katia and other oases. In August 1916 two British Empire divisions at Romani were attacked by a substantial Ottoman army which was defeated. The Anzac Mounted Division supported by the 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division pushed on across the northern Sinai fighting a substantial Ottoman rearguard at Bir el Abd, and Ottoman garrisons at Magdhaba and Rafa (on the southern border of Egypt and the Ottoman Empire). In 1917 British Empire forces extended their area of operation into Ottoman Palestine fighting two unsuccessful battles at Gaza in March and April. At the end of October, after six months of preparations, reconnaissances and minor operations the Egyptian Expeditionary Force succeeded in capturing Beersheba and a week later the whole Gaza to Beersheba line. Subsequently this force conducted a fighting advance northwards to Jaffa by mid November and into the Judean Hills capturing Jerusalem early in December 1917. In February 1918 Jericho was captured beginning the seven month's long occupation of the Jordan Valley. During this occupation a British Empire force advanced eastwards into the hills of Moab to Amman at the end of March and at the end of April another force advanced eastwards and captured Es Salt. However both these operations ended in the withdrawal of all British Empire forces. In mid September 1918 Amman was again attacked when the town and substantial Ottoman army prisoners in the area were captured. At the same time the main attack was made on the Mediterranean coast which drove northwards at great speed cutting off and capturing substantial Ottoman army units in the Judean Hills. Several substantial rearguard positions were attacked and defeated before Damascus was also captured. British Empire units had reached Aleppo by the time an Armistice was signed with the Ottoman Empire.
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[edit] The Sinai Campaign – Defence of the Suez Canal
Britain gained control of Egypt by force of arms in the late 19th Century, and established a British protectorate over the country, soon after the beginning of the First World War. Egypt had formerly been part of the Ottoman Empire for 400 years and showed quite early on in the war, possibly with encouragement from Germany that it was keen to be reinstated in Egypt. The Suez Canal was Germany's prime concern but unrest was also fomented by the Senussi to the west of Cairo and to the south in Sudan. See Senussi Campaign.
[edit] Defence of Egypt; Eastern Frontier
The Commander–in–Chief of the British Protectorate of Egypt, Major–General Sir John Maxwell, who had previously served in Egypt (having fought at the Battle of Tel el-Kebir in 1882), and in the Sudan in 1885 and 1898, described his appointment and the situation in Egypt when he arrived:
“ | On August 29th, 1914 I was at the Headquarters of Marshal Joffre, at Vitry le Francois, where I received orders from Field–Marshall Earl Kitchener to proceed at once to Egypt and take over the command there. Somewhat disconcerted, I complied and arrived September 8th in that country.
When I left France the French and British armies were in full retreat to the line of the Marne. Our little Army, after magnificent and strenuous resistance, had suffered terribly, and the question of reinforcements was paramount. It was, therefore, no surprise when, on my arrival in Egypt, I received orders to send every British soldier at once to England. I was informed that large forces were expected to be passing through the Suez Canal en route to Europe, and that a Territorial Division would be sent as soon as possible. The situation I found was by no means a pleasant one. The Ottomans were sitting on the fence, the Khedive Abbas was in Constantinople intriguing against us. The population of Egypt was some 12 millions, the great majority Moslems, in sympathy with their co–religionists the Turks; of the European population, the majority was Italian, Greek, German and Austrian, with a good proportion of Ottomans and Turko–Egyptians, Syrians and Armenians. The British and French were in a decided minority.[1] |
” |
The Suez Canal very quickly became of great importance to both sides. To Germany and the Ottoman Empire the canal represented the closest and weakest link in British communications. To the British the Canal was of vital strategic importance. Instead of having to travel around the Cape of Good Hope, the Suez Canal cut the travelling time from Britain to India, New Zealand and Australia. In addition to facilitating the supporting of the British war effort in the European sector by the Colonies and Dominions, it was also a major base particularly during the Gallipoli campaign.
However at the beginning of the war, defence of the Suez Canal posed a number of problems. There was no road to the canal from Cairo, only one railway track crossed the 30 miles (48 km) of desert from Cairo to Ismaïlia on the Canal before branching north to Port Said and south to Suez. These three Canal towns relied on fresh water from the Nile via the Sweetwater Canal to the main gates and sluices near Ismailia, making control of the central area around Ismailia of great strategic importance. At the beginning of the war, the Sinai Peninsula was policed by a token defence force which very quickly evacuated the area at the beginning of hostilities between Britain and the Ottoman Empire, in November 1914.
The 30,000 strong defenders of the Suez Canal consisted of the 10th Indian Division and 11th Indian Division, the Indian Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade, the Bikaner Camel Corps, three batteries of Indian mountain artillery and one Egyptian battery supported by the guns of Allied shipping in the canal. This force was required to defend the Canal from damage or destruction along its entire length, with their main defences mounted on the western / Cairo side of the canal.[2]
[edit] Ottoman advance towards the Suez Canal
At the urging of their German ally, the Ottomans mounted an attack against the British and Egyptian forces in Egypt to shut the Suez Canal in the First Suez Offensive.[citation needed]
The Bavarian Colonel Kress von Kressenstein had been appointed Chief of Staff of the 8th Corps on arrival from Constantinople on 18 November 1914.[3] The 8th Corps comprised the 8th, 10th, 23rd, 25th, and 27th Infantry Divisions and contingents of Sinai Bedouins, Druses, Kurds, Mohadjirs, Chercassians from Syria and Arabs.[4] The role of these contingents of Muslims was to foment revolt against the British in Egypt.[5] In January 1915 von Kressenstein's force concentrated 20,000 men near Beersheba with nine field batteries and one 5.9 inch howitzer.[6] The force which was to cross the Sinai comprised the 10th Infantry Division and a cavalry regiment and the first echelon of about 13,000 men including the 23rd, 25th and 27th Infantry Divisions with 1,500 Arabs, eight batteries of field artillery. A second echelon of 12,000 men was made up of 20th and 23rd Infantry Divisions.[7][8] The Ottoman plan was for a single infantry division to capture Ismailia and cross the canal before being reinforced by a second infantry division which would be supported on the east bank of the canal by two additional divisions. A further division would be available to reinforce the bridgehad on the west bank of the Suez Canal.[3]
In order to move large numbers of troops quickly and resupply them more effectively the railway was pushed to the southern border of the Ottoman Empire on the Egyptian frontier. Railhead had reached Sileh during the autumn of 1914 about 275 miles (443 km) from the Suez Canal. (By May 1916 it was extended to Beersheba and El Auja.)[9] The force moved south by rail, continuing on foot via el Auja carrying iron pontoons for crossing and attacking the Suez Canal at Serapeum and Tussum.[10] On 13 January 1915 it was known to the British that strong columns were passing through el Auja and El Arish.[11] The force move from towards the Suez Canal in three echelons; the main group along the central route with smaller forces on the northern and southern routes.[12]
The northern group of about 3,000 men moved via Magdhaba to El Arish and thence along the northern route towards Port Said. The central group of about 6,000 or 7,000 men moved via the water cisterns at Moiya Harab and the wells at Wady um Muksheib and Jifjafa towards Ismailia.[13] This was at the mid point of the Suez Canal where the railway and vital water pumping equipment which sustained the towns and the troops defending the Canal, were located. Without this infrastructure a defence of the Canal would be very difficult.[13][14] The third group of about 3,000 moved via Nekl southwards towards the town of Suez at the southern end of the Suez Canal.[13][Note 1]
[edit] First Suez Offensive
Fighting began on 26 and 27 January 1915 when two smaller flanking columns of the Ottoman Army made secondary attacks near Kantara in the northern sector of the Suez Canal and near the town of Suez in the south.[15] The main fighting also known as 'Actions on the Suez Canal' occurred east of the Suez – Kantara Railway from 3 to 4 February 1915.[16] Kress von Kressenstein's Ottoman Suez Expeditionary Force arrived at the Canal on 2 February 1915 and the main attacks occurred in the center of the Suez Canal about Ismailia on the morning of 3 February 1915 when the Ottomans were successful in crossing the canal.[11][17]
The attacks failed to surprise the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade and the Bikanir Camel Corps who were on garrison duty along the canal. The Indian defenders stopped von Kressenstein's force from establishing themselves on the western side of the Suez Canal, suffering casualties of about 150 men.[18][19][20] After two days of fighting, the Ottomans were finally defeated suffering the loss of some 1,500 men including 716 prisoners.[21]
The Ottoman Suez Expeditionary Force had been at the end of their supply lines by the time the reached the Suez Canal forcing them to quickly retreat. These troops probably joined the large garrisons at El Arish, Magdhaba and Aujah, from where von Kressenstein launched a series of raids and attacks in his attempts to disrupt traffic on the Suez Canal.[22][23][24]
[edit] Improvements to Suez Canal Defences
In November 1915, Lord Kitchener, the, Secretary of State for War had identified the weakness of defending the Suez Canal from the western side of the canal, and von Kressenstein's raiding parties confirmed it. However it was not until towards the end of 1915, as the Gallipoli campaign was drawing to its conclusion, that the War Cabinet in London authorised new positions to be established about 11,000 yards (10 km) east of the Canal in the desert, to strengthen defence of the canal against long range guns, and to provide additional troops.[25]
Port Said became Headquarters of these new defences, with an Advanced Headquarters at Kantara. The defences were organised into three sectors:
- No. 1 (Southern): Suez to Kabrit HQ Suez - IX Corps
- No. 2 (Central): Kabrit to Ferdan HQ Ismailia - I Anzac Corps
- No. 3 (Northern): Ferdan to Port Said - XV Corps [26][27]
[edit] 1916 Forward Defence of Suez Canal
At the end of 1915 General Sir John Maxwell commanded the Force in Egypt with headquarters at Cairo. He was responsible for troops in the Egyptian Delta, the Western Desert and the Sudan and administered martial law over the whole region including the Suez Canal. The British War Office was responsible for the Levant Base which was responsible for the British Empire forces in Salonika, Gallipoli, Mesopotamia and India had its headquarters at Alexandria. The retreating forces on Gallipoli and divisions from the United Kingdom formed the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Murray had his headquarters at Ismailia. After the evacuation from Gallipoli the total British force in Egypt was nearly 400,000 men in 13 infantry and mounted divisions; this force was regarded as the strategic reserve for the whole Empire. In March 1916 Sir Archibald Murray took command of all these forces which were united into the new Egyptian Expeditionary Force.[28][29]
Murray believed a more cost effective defence of the Suez Canal than the static defences recently established, would be a British advance into the Sinai to establish long term occupation of Qatiya/Katia. This was agreed to by the War Office but they did not agree to his more ambition plan to advance to the border with the Ottoman Empire. He believed that the area captured in an advance to El Arish or Rafa could be held with fewer troops than would be needed for a passive defence of the Suez Canal.[30] Murray had estimated a force of 250,000 could cross the Sinai and that 80,000 troops could be maintained in the Katia area. If such a large Ottoman force were to reach Katia then the British would need a very large force to defend the Suez Canal.[31] [Note 2] The British decision to occupy the oasis area which stretched eastwards from Romani and Katia to Bir el Abd along the ancient silk road would deny this valuable area of reliable drinking water to the Ottoman Empire with its potential to sustain a large invasion force.[32]
Murray planned a 50,000 strong garrison in the Katia area and obtained authority to build a pipeline to pump fresh Nile water and a railway to transport the infantry divisions and the large quantities of supplies required to sustain these troops.[33] He also decided to empty the water cisterns at Moya Harab so the central Sinai route could not again be used by Ottoman columns advancing from Palestine and to maintain some troops at Suez to defend the town.[34] These operation began in February 1916 when construction started on the 25 miles (40 km) stretch of 4 foot 8 inch standard gauge Sinai railway and water pipeline from Qantara/Kantara to Qatiya/Katia.[32][33] By the end of March or early in April 16 miles (26 km) of track including sidings had been laid.[35]
[edit] Destruction of water on the central road across Sinai
As long as the water cistern and wells on the central road remained intact, the enemy could move across the Sinai Peninsula to threaten the Canal at any time. The decision was taken in March 1916 to destroy them and two completely successful operations were launched against these water sources.
On 21 March, the Australian 8th Light Horse Regiment and the Bikaner Camel Corps destroyed the water sources at Wady um Muksheib and Moya Harab. On 11 April the 9th Light Horse Regiment, camels and supporting engineers with 30 Light Horsemen armed as Lancers, destroyed the water wells and their pumping equipment at Jifjafa.[36] As a consequence of these operations, the northern route along the series of oases which stretch from El Arish to Romani and the southern route from el Auja via Nekhl to Suez were the only ways across the Sinai Peninsula.
Later in June 1916 units of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade formed the Munsheib column, which drained pools and cisterns in the wadi.[37]
[edit] Affair of Katia
Also known as the Affair of Qatia and First Pelusium, this enemy surprise attack occurred on Easter Sunday, St George's Day 23 April 1916, east of the Canal and north of El Ferdan Station.[16] The 5th Mounted Brigade Yeomanry was guarding the water pipeline and railway being built out into the desert towards Romani, when a Ottoman raiding force attacked the scattered squadrons at Katia and Oghratina, east of Romani. Almost three squadrons of the Yeomanry were surprised and overwhelmed.[38][39][40]
[edit] Occupation of Romani
The Affair of Katia reinforced the strategic importance of this oases area; it could support large amounts of troops which could threaten the Suez Canal, or the Sinai Peninsula. Neither side could afford to ignore such a large force in this area as a force would always be threatened by a flank attack.[41] The Australian 2nd Light Horse Brigade and New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigades of General Chauvel's Anzac Mounted Division were ordered to occupy the area and engage in aggressive patrolling and reconnaissance work. The Australian 1st Light Horse Brigade soon joined them.
The problems of occupation in this forward position on the edge of the huge sand dunes in the desert were great. Camel transport of the Egyptian Camel Transport Corps supplied all water, food, shelters, other goods, equipment and ammunition, until the railway and water pipeline were constructed to Pelusium Station and Romani. Bully beef and biscuits was the ration in this forward area, as badly packed and poorly supervised methods of transporting fresh meat and vegetables resulted in them arriving at Romani in a putrid condition.[42]
Other problems included flies attracted to horse litter, etc. and the constant battle to provide safe sanitary arrangements and disposal of garbage. To burn refuse, incinerators were constructed by stacking used bully beef tins filled with sand.[43] During this period, poor diet, severe weather conditions, precious little shelter from the sun and virtually non-existent comfortable rest periods, were combined with constant patrol work.[44]
In mid May 1916 the railway was completed to Romani. Much greater quantities of stores and equipment could be transported to the forward position and it was possible for the 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division to be deployed at Romani. As soon as they arrived they began work, digging trenches in the sand to create a defensive line with redoubts, stretching south from Mahemdia near the Mediterranean coast to Katib Gannit a high point in front of Romani.[41]
All this military activity on the western edge of the strategically sensitive oases area, from Bir el Abd to Romani, brought reprisal in the form of a bombing raid by Ottoman airplanes, the first of many, at the beginning of June. Eight troops of the 1st Light Horse Brigade were killed and 22 wounded. About 100 horses were lost.[45] At this time the forward Ottoman air base was at Bir el Mazar, 42 miles (68 km) east of Romani.[46]
[edit] Reconnaissances May to June 1916
Early reconnaissances by the Anzac Mounted Division covered considerable distances from Romani as far as Ogratina, to Bir el Abd and Bir Bayud. The longest raid was made by the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade to Salmana, covering 100 kilometres (62 mi) in 36 hours.[47]
During these early patrols and reconnaissances the troops and their commanders, unused to the conditions, suffered considerably from heatstroke and thirst.[48] Returning during the hottest part of the day after a sleepless night far from base, and very little water, 160 men collapsed from heat exhaustion.[49]
An important innovation in the getting of water, which enabled the mounted units to operate more effectively over wide areas of rocky desert areas and sand dunes on reconnaissance, was the Spear Point, developed by Australian Engineers designed to be attached to a pump:
A 2 ½ inch pipe was pointed, perforated and covered with a sheet of fine perforated brass. This was driven down into the water area by means of a small pulley bar and monkey, or by a sledge–hammer; and additional lengths of pipe were added if necessary. The ordinary General Service "Lift and Force Pump" was then attached. This arrangement proved so efficient that "Spear Points" were issued to every Squadron in the Division, and the RE Troops carried a number of them. Our men were thus enabled to get water at any of the hods in the desert in a very short space of time.[50]
Once the brackish water was found, a medical officer assessed it as either drinking water, horse water or not fit for horses, and signs were erected.[51]
In June the 1st Light Horse Brigade carried out reconnaissances to Bir Bayud, Sagia and Ogratina, to Bir el Abd, Hod el Ge'eila, Hod um el Dhauanin and Hod el Mushalfat.[52] Another routine reconnaissance by 2nd Light Horse Brigade took place on 9 July to El Salmana. Just ten days later, El Salmana was occupied by the Ottomans as they concentrated for the Battle of Romani.[53]
In the middle of June the No. 1 Australian Squadron, Australian Flying Corps began active service with "B" Flight at Suez doing reconnaissance work and on 9 July "A" Flight was stationed at Sherika in Upper Egypt with "C" Flight based at Kantara.[54]
[edit] Battle of Romani
The Battle of Romani took place near the Egyptian town of Romani 23 miles (37 km) east of the Canal, from 3–5 August 1916. The Allied troops involved were the Anzac Mounted Division, under General Harry Chauvel and the 52nd (Lowland) Division. The Ottoman force was advancing to place the Canal within artillery range to stop or disrupt vital Allied traffic through the waterway. It was led once again by von Kressenstein and numbered 12,000, mainly from the 3rd Infantry Division, with Bedouin irregulars, German machine-gunners and Austrian artillery.
The Australian 1st and 2nd Light Horse Brigades had made contact with the Ottomans on 20 July; thereafter alternate brigades gained touch with the enemy each day until the night of 3/4 August, when sustained fighting began in the early hours. By about midday on 4 August, the advancing Ottoman division had pushed the two Australian brigades back to a point where the 52nd Infantry Division in their trenches were able to attack the enemy's right flank, and the New Zealand Mounted Rifle and 5th Mounted Brigades arrived to extend the Australian line on the Ottomans' left flank. The Ottoman advance was stopped by the fire brought to bear on them by these combined British infantry and Australian and New Zealand mounted forces and the deep sand, the mid summer mid day heat and thirst.[55][56][57][58][59]
In these extremely tough conditions, the British infantry were unable to move effectively against the enemy the next day, and the Anzac Mounted Division was unable to stop the Ottomans making an orderly retreat to Katia and eventually back to their base at Bir el Abd. This base was abandoned on 12 August 1916 after fierce fighting at the extremity of their lines of communication, by the Anzac Mounted Division on 9 August.[60][61][62][63][64]
The battle cost the Allies 1,202 casualties of which 222 were killed, 71 died of wounds 909 were wounded; more than half of these were Australians; 104 killed, 32 died of wounds and 487 wounded.[65]
This was the first substantial Allied victory against the Ottoman Empire in World War I. It ended the Defence of the Suez Canal campaign and this vital waterway was never again threatened by land forces during the remainder of the war. Thereafter the Allies were on the offensive, pushing the Ottoman Army back across the Sinai.
[edit] Arab Revolt
The British were keenly interested in the activities of the Sherif Hussein, Amir of Mecca, whose Sharifian Army took over Mecca and Jedda in the south western Arabian Peninsula from their Ottoman garrisons, on 5 and 16 June 1916. A large Ottoman garrison held out at Taif until towards the end of September when they capitulated, and Sherif Hussein's third son Feisal attacked the Ottoman garrison at Medina.
On the basis of this success the British hoped to extend the Arab Revolt and bring instability along the enemy's Hejaz Railway which runs north – south from Istanbul to Damascus and on to Amman, Maan, Medina and to Mecca. Built by the Ottomans with German assistance for the transportation of pilgrims, the railway was an important element in the Ottoman Army's lines of communication, as well as a strategically important support for both defensive and offensive operations; the station buildings being solidly built of stone and capable of being strong defensive positions.
With the balance of power in northern Sinai moving in favour of the British, the Sherif was encouraged to seek support for his revolt from as far north as Baalbek, north of Damascus.[15][66][67] In London, the War Office, hoping to foment widespread action throughout the Arab lands of the Turkish Empire, encouraged General Murray to advance to El Arish.[68][69]
[edit] Allied advance across the Sinai
At the conclusion of the Battle of Romani on 12 August 1916 the Ottoman Army had been pushed back to its forward position at Bir el Abd, the last oasis in the series stretching from the Romani area. The enemy's main forward base was pushed back to El Arish, with a fortified advanced post at Bir el Mazar, where a small group of wells provided reliable water.[70][71]
The Egyptian Expeditionary Force required infrastructure in the form of the railway to haul the huge amounts of ammunition and supplies required to support an advance to El Arish, and the pipeline to provide reliable water in order to move and sustain the large fighting force, supported by service units and administration, across the Sinai Peninsula to El Arish.[72] From the middle of August to the Battle for Magdhaba on 23 December 1916 was a time of waiting for the necessary infrastructure to be put in place. These four months have often been described as a period of rest for the Anzac Mounted Division as there were no major battles.[73][74][75] However, the mounted troops were busy providing screens for the construction, patrolling newly occupied areas and carrying out reconnaissances to augment aerial photographs to improve maps of the newly occupied areas.[76]
The whole country to within 20 miles (32 km) of El Arish was thoroughly explored and all wells tested and noted. Interesting archaeological remains were also found including Mount Cassius, a sand hill 200 feet (61 m) high, which has a steep cliff–like face on one side showing a line of broken Roman pottery, bricks and stone a few feet thick about 50 feet (15 m) from the top, remnants of Cassius' fortified camp of 300 BC.[77]
During one of the patrols, on 19 August, a group of 68 Ottoman soldiers was found half dead from thirst by the 5th Light Horse Regiment (2nd Light Horse Brigade) who, rather than attacking them, gave them water and their rides. The commanding officer and his men led the amazed Ottomans on their horses for 5 miles (8.0 km) through deep sand until met by transport. 'This was a very queer sight and worthy of a moving picture [of these] poor sacrifices of the Huns'.[78]
British infantry was brought forward to fortify and provide garrisons along the length of the railway. They formed a firm base for mobile operations and defence in depth for the huge administrative organization advancing with the railway, in support of the Anzac Mounted Division and the 52nd Infantry Division.[76] The movement of the infantry across Sinai was eased by construction of wire netting roads also used by Egyptian Labour Corps, light vehicles, cars and ambulances. This reasonably stable surface which did not sink, was constructed from two or four rolls of rabbit wire; one inch mesh wire rolled out side by side, wired together with the edges fixed into the sand with long steel or wooden pegs to produce a reasonable track.[79][80]
Although the front had moved eastwards across the Sinai, it was still necessary to maintain defence units on the Canal. While serving as part of Canal Defence at Gebel Heliata, Serapeum, the 12th Light Horse Regiment commemorated 28 August: 'Today being the Anniversary of the Regiment landing on Gallipoli, a little latitude was given to all hands, and an enjoyable evening was spent in the men's canteen.'[81]
German airmen bombed Port Said on 1 September 1916 and Australian and British airmen answered with a bombing raid on Bir el Mazar three days later, when twelve bombs silenced the anti–aircraft guns and blew several tents to pieces. Bir el Mazar was again bombed on 7 September. As part of the advance across the Sinai the Australian Flying Squadron's "B" Flight moved their hangars from Suez forward to Mahemdia 4 miles from Romani on 18 September and "C" Flight moved to Kantara on 27 September 1916.[82]
[edit] Bir el Mazar Raid September 1916
A great reconnaissance in force to Bir el Mazar was carried out by the 2nd and 3rd Light Horse Brigades, the 1st Battalion of the Imperial Camel Corps, the New Zealand Machine Gun Squadron and the Hong Kong and Singapore Battery on 16–17 September 1916.
At the limit of their lines of communication this force was not able to capture the 2000 strong, well entrenched garrison which made a determined stand. After demonstrating the strength of the advancing army, they successfully withdrew back to Anzac Mounted Division's Headquarters at Bir Sulmana 20 miles (32 km) to the west. The Ottoman force abandoned Bir el Mazar shortly after.[71][76][83][84]
The report of the 2nd Light Horse Brigade described their 5th Light Horse Regiment being fired on by anti–aircraft guns during the operations and reported one man killed and 9 wounded.[85] The 3rd Light Horse Brigade recorded that the troops of the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade and the artillery battery were unable to move quickly enough to take part in the attack, and their brigade lost three killed, three wounded and two injured.[86]
Airmen of No. 1 and No. 14 Squadrons confirmed anti-aircraft guns fired on the light horse, describing the ground engagement as so tough the Ottomans resorted to this extreme measure, turning their anti–aircraft guns away from the attacking planes. The Ottomans withdrew to the Wady El Arish, with garrisons at Lahfan and Magdhaba.[87]
Subjected to further bombing air raids, by 2 October aerial reconnaissance photographs revealed the German aircraft hangars formerly at El Arish had disappeared.[88] By 25 October there was no anti–aircraft fire reported over El Arish and reductions in the enemy force based there were apparent.
By this time the railway construction was well passed Salmana where a British forward airdrome was under construction and No. 1 Squadron were involved in photographing the area around El Arish and Magdhaba, and No. 14 Squadron were reconnoitring Rafa.[89]
[edit] Maghara Hills Raid October 1916
As the Allies advanced, an Ottoman-occupied position on the right flank at Bir El Maghara 50 miles (80 km) south east of Romani, began to be a threat to their advance. Major–General A.G. Dallas was put in command of a column of 800 Australian Light Horse, 400 City of London Yeomanry, 600 Mounted Camelry and 4,500 camels from the Egyptian Camel Transport Corps, with another 200 camels for the Army Medical Corps. The column formed at Bayoud and moved off on 13 October on a two nights march via Zagadan and Rakwa to the Maghara Hills.
On arrival A & C Squadrons of the 12th Light Horse Regiment positioned in the centre, with the 11th Light Horse Regiment on the right and the Yeomanry on the left flanks, dismounted at the foot of the hills. Handing over their lead horses in excellent cover these dismounted men then scaled the heights and surprised the defenders but failed to capture the main defensive position. The 11th Light Horse Regiment captured 7 Turkish prisoners and 3 Bedouins, retiring the way they came to base on 17 October and back to railhead Ferdan on the Suez Canal, on 21 October 1916.[76][90]
[edit] Creation of Eastern Frontier Force
In September, 1916 General Murray moved his headquarters from Ismailia on the Suez Canal back to Cairo in order to more efficiently command the continuing threat from the Senussi in the Western Desert. General Lawrence was transferred to France where he served as Chief of Staff to Field Marshal Haig in 1918.[72][75][91][92]
Field Marshal William Robertson, the British Army's Chief of the Imperial General Staff, set out his global military policy at this time in a letter to Murray of 16 October 1916, in which he stated "I am not intent on winning in any particular quarter of the globe. My sole object is to win the war and we shall not do that in the Hedjaz nor in the Sudan. Our military policy is perfectly clear and simple … [It] is offensive on the Western Front and therefore defensive everywhere else." [93]
In this climate of defensive military policy, Major–General Sir Charles Dobell, who had acquired a reputation for sound work in minor operations, was promoted to the rank of lieutenant–general, given the title of GOC Eastern Frontier Force and put in charge of all the troops on the canal and in the desert. His headquarters was established at Ismailia and he began to organised his command into two parts, the Canal Defences and Desert Column.[75][91][94] Also in October, Eastern Force began operations into the Sinai desert and on to the border of Palestine. Initial efforts were limited to building a railway and a waterline across the Sinai. The railway was constructed by Egyptian Labour Corps at the rate of about 15 miles (24 km) a month and the British front moved westward at the same speed.[75] By 19 October the Anzac Mounted Division Headquarters was at Bir el Abd where the 52nd Infantry Division joined them on 24 October.
[edit] Aerial Bombing and Reconnaissance Patrols
On 25 October 1916 an aerial patrol over El Arish discovered signs that the Ottomans were withdrawing, which was confirmed 2 days later. By this time the railway was well forward of Salmana where a new aerodrome was under construction.
On 30 October Masaid was photographed. On 4 November the whole El Arish to Magdhaba line was photographed and 2 days later Rafa was under aerial scrutiny. [Cutlack 1941, p.?]
[edit] Aerial bombing of Beersheba November 1916
On 11 November a Martinsyde and nine B E.’s, loaded with bombs and petrol, left the Kantara and Mahemdia aerodromes at dawn and assembled at Mustabig, just west of Bir el Mazar. There a raiding force of five B.E.’s and the Martinsyde formed the largest force yet organised by Australians or any other air squadron in the East, filled up with petrol and bombs and set off in formation towards Beersheba. Over Beersheba the anti–aircraft guns engaged them with high explosive and shrapnel, and the raiders flew through a flurry of white, black, and green bursts. The Martinsyde dropped a 100–lb. bomb fair in the centre of the aerodrome; two 20–lb. bombs hit tents; others made direct hits on the railway line and the station. A Fokker and an Aviatik took to the air but were decisively beaten. After photographing Beersheba and the damage caused by the bombs, the airmen returned, reconnoitering Khan Yunis and Rafa on the way. All machines arrived safely, after having spent seven hours in flight. Two days later a German aeroplane retaliated by bombing Cairo.[95]
[edit] Advance to Bir el Mazar
Bir el Mazar, formerly the forward base of the Ottoman Army was taken over by the Anzac Mounted Division on 25 November 1916 the day before railhead, the end of the most recently laid railway line, arrived.[92] The more complex construction of the water pipeline with associated pumping stations by Army Engineers and the Egyptian Labour Corps reached Romani on 17 November 1916.[92]
[edit] Battle of Magdhaba
After advancing 30 miles to occupy El Arish, the Anzac Mounted Division made a further overnight march to Magdhaba where a force of about Ottoman troops were strongly entrenched in a series of redoubts and linking trench systems. The entrenched positions were difficult to locate but an attack by three brigades of the Anzac Mounted Division and part of the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade commanded by Major General Chauvel won the strategically important position on 23 December 1916.
[edit] Battle of Rafa
On the evening of 8 January 1917, mounted units of Desert Column including the Anzac Mounted Division Imperial Camel Corps Brigade, 5th Mounted Yeomanry Brigade No. 7 Light Car Patrol and artillery, rode out of El Arish to attack the next day, a 2,000 to 3,000-strong Ottoman Army garrison at El Magruntein also known as the Rafa or Rafah.
The British had reclaimed the northern section of the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula from enemy occupation, virtually to the frontier with the Ottoman Empire but the new British government of David Lloyd George wanted more. The British Army in Egypt was ordered to go on the offensive against the Ottoman Army in part to support the Arab revolt which had started early in 1916, and to build on the momentum created by the victories won at Romani in August and Magdhaba in December 1916.[69][96][97]
This next strategic objective was on the border of the British Protectorate of Egypt and the Ottoman Empire some 30 miles distant, too far for infantry and so the newly formed Desert Column commanded by General Chetwode was to attack the enemy occupied position along the coast.[98][99][100]
The Allied troops captured the town and the fortified position by nightfall with the loss of 71 killed and 415 wounded.[101][102][103][104] The Ottoman garrison suffered heavily, with 200 killed and another 1,600 taken prisoner.[105][106]
[edit] End of Sinai Campaign
The first signs of a major reorganisation of the Ottoman Army's defences were observed after the capture of El Arish and Battle of Magdhaba, on 28 December 1916 when reconnaissance planes found Ottoman forces moving their headquarters from Beersheba. Days before the victory at Rafa, on 7 January air reconnaissance reported Ottoman forces still at El Auja and El Kossaima with the garrison at El Auja being slightly increased. But between January 14 and 19 Beersheba was bombed several times by No. 1 Squadron Australian Flying Corps in day and night raids; during one of these raids dropping twelve 20–lb. bombs directly on the biggest German hangar. After these raids the German airmen evacuated Beersheba and moved their aerodrome to Ramleh. And on 19 January air reconnaissance reported the enemy had evacuated El Kossaima and were in decreased strength at the major desert base at Hafir El Auja.[99]
One of many retaliatory air raids carried out by German/Ottoman airmen, occurred over El Arish on the same day, the 19 January when the horse lines were targeted. These were an easy and obvious targets which continued to suffer heavily from air raids right through the war.[107][108]
Also on 19 January the first air reconnaissance of the Ottoman army rear over the towns of Beit Jibrin, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, and Jericho was carried out by Roberts and Ross Smith, escorted by Murray Jones and Ellis in Martinsydes. Junction Station was also reconnoitred on 27 January.[109]
By the end of January both sides were carrying out heavy air attacks; dropping bombs on the stores depot at the main base at El Arish, and No. 1 and No. 14 Squadrons regularly retaliating on Beersheba, Weli Sheikh Nuran, and Ramleh. The Germans were also bombing the Egyptian Labour Corps and delaying the building of the railway now near El Burj half way between El Arish and Rafa with the wire road nearly at Sheikh Zowaiid. As a consequence on 3 February, Major General Chauvel was forced to order Allied bombing to cease in the hope that retaliations would also cease, so that the work on the rail line and pipeline could continue.[110] The Pipeline reached El Arish on 5 February.[111]
In February, 1917 the Ottoman Army was observed also building a light railway line from Tel el Sheria to Shellal, near Weli Sheikh Nuran, Sheria becoming the main Ottoman base midway along the Gaza-Beersheba defensive line.[112]
[edit] Raid on Nekhl
The final actions of the Sinai Campaign were ordered by General Murray against Nekhl and El Hassana.[113]
The raid on the garrison at Nekhl set out on 13 February 1917. Nekhl was centrally located in the Sinai desert south of the sand-hills which stretch across from near El Kossaima on the Ottoman frontier, to the vicinity of Suez – Gebel Helal, Gebel Yelleg and Gebel el Heitan extending sixty miles east of the Suez Canal to the large village of Nekhl and about forty miles due north of Nekhl, to the village of Bir el Hassana in a gap between Gebel Helal and the Gebel Yelleg. This central route between the Ottoman frontier and the Suez Canal had been used by the Ottoman Army during its earlier attacks on the canal. By the beginning of 1917 the repetition of such an attack was extremely unlikely, but an Ottoman force at Nekhl, a village of some 50 mud and stone houses, a mosque and a fort, was an important outpost which it was thought the Ottoman Army would attempt to hold so as to reinforce Ottoman authority over the Arabs and Bedouin in an area where sustained warfare by either side was impossible due to the harsh climate and lack of water.
Two mounted columns set out from the Suez Canal on 13 February 1917; one from Serapeum near Ismailia in the centre of the Canal consisting of 11th Light Horse Regiment and the other from Suez at the southern end of the Canal made up of British Yeomanry and Indian Lancers. These forces made the round trip of some 120 miles (190 km) in harsh desert conditions supported by three aeroplanes of No. 1 Squadron based at El Arish which worked from the aerodrome of No. 57 Reserve Squadron at Ismailia, during the raid. The planes kept contact with the two columns as they converged from the east and south on Nekhl, dropping messages from headquarters and scouting ahead when necessary. On 17 February when the columns were not far from Nekhl, air reconnaissance found the village abandoned and an extensive air reconnaissance the next day found no sign of the enemy in the area 17 miles (27 km) beyond Nekhl.[113][114]
Major Bassett commanding 2nd Battalion Imperial Camel Corps Brigade marched from Magdhaba on 17 February and surrounded Hassana at dawn the next morning when the Ottoman Army garrison surrendered without resistance.[113]
[edit] Summation of Campaign
The Sinai Campaign was a series of brilliantly fought actions by the Allies, beginning with the conclusion of the Defence of the Suez Canal Campaign; the victory at Romani. All the engagements which followed, from Bir el Abd to Rafa were fought at the extreme limits of lines of communications when the enemy was surprised, time after time by the audacity of large mounted forces to effectively operate so far from base, in extremely inhospitable country. These successful operations resulted in the Allied occupation of territory previously held by the enemy; in the capture and occupation of the Sinai Peninsula.
- “In this war we’re always moving,
- Moving on’
- When we make a friend another friend has gone …
- When the bravest and the best
- Of the Boys you know ‘Go West’,
- Then you’re choking down your tears and
- Moving on.”
Egypt – A.B. Paterson.[115]
Yet the campaign literature is dominated by the idea of withdrawal; characterizing the campaign as a series of withdrawals, on both sides. The Allied force is described as withdrawing or threatening to withdraw at Romani, Bir el Abd, Magdhaba and Rafa.[73][116][117][118][119][120][121] And the Ottoman Army are not so much described as being beaten, captured and having to concede territory, but as withdrawing.[122][123]
[edit] Palestine campaign
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Popularly known as the Palestine campaign, the term refers to operations which took place during World War I from just north of the frontier between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, commencing early in 1917 and ending with the Armistice in 1918. These operations form a series of campaigns which stretched along the length and across the breadth of the geographic area known as the Levant; they were fought from Gaza to Jerusalem, in and around the Jordan Valley and to Es Salt and Amman, from just north of Jaffa to Damascus and on to Aleppo when the war ended.
With the victory at Rafa, General Murray had successfully accomplished all his and the War Office's objectives; he had secured the Suez Canal and Egypt from any possibility of a serious land attack and his forces controlled the Sinai Peninsula with a series of strongly fortified positions in depth, along a substantial line of communication based around the railway and pipeline, from Kantara on the Suez Canal to Rafa.[124]
However, within two days of the victory at Rafa on 11 January 1917, General Murray was informed by the War Office that, rather than building on the momentum created over the last two and a half weeks by the victories at Magdhaba and Rafa by encouraging him to further advances with promises of more troops, he was required to send the 42nd Infantry Division on 17 January, to reinforce the Western Front, the decisive theatre where the strategic priority was focused on planning for a spring offensive.[125]
But just a week after the 42nd Infantry Division departed, an Anglo–French conference at Calais on 26 February 1917, decided to encourage pressure to be placed on all fronts in a series of offensives to begin more or less simultaneously with the beginning of the spring offensive on the Western Front. And so the British War Cabinet and the War Office agreed to General Murray's proposal to attack Gaza but without replacing the departed infantry division or offering any other reinforcements and the attack could not take place until 26 March.[125][126][127][128]
While these political machinations were running their course, the Anzac Mounted Division returned to El Arish where troops settled into fairly comfortable bivouacs of tents brought up by train, in camps not far from the Mediterranean Sea, where there was easy access to plentiful fresh water and supplies. During this period of much needed rest and recuperation after the demanding desert campaign of the preceding ten months, sea bathing, football and boxing together with interest in the advance of the railway and pipeline were the main occupations of the troops from early January to the last weeks of February 1917.[129]
As the British war machine pushed on across the Sinai Peninsula the infrastructure and supporting British garrisons strongly held all the territory they occupied. By the end of February 1917, 388 miles of railway (at a rate of 1 kilometre a day), 203 miles of metalled road, 86 miles of wire and brushwood roads and 300 miles of water pipeline had been constructed.[130] The pipeline required three huge pumping plants working 24 hours a day at Kantara, near a reservoir of 6,000,000 gallons. For local use, the pumps forced the water through 5 inch pipe to Dueidar, through a 6 inch pipe to Pelusium, Romani and Mahemdia and through a 12 inch pipe the main supply was pushed across the desert from pumping station to pumping station. At Romani a concrete reservoir contained a further 6,000,000 gallons, at Bir el Abd 5,000,000 and at Mazar 500,000 and another of 500,000 at El Arish. And with railhead at Rafa, Gaza was by then just twenty miles away, five to six hours for infantry and mounted units at a walk and 2 hours distant for horses at a trot.[131][132][133][134][135]
[edit] Khan Yunas Raid
The 5th Mounted Yeomanry Brigade had moved on from El Arish along the coast a few miles to El Burj on 28 January, remaining there until 22 February when it joining the Anzac Mounted Division and General Mott's 53rd Infantry Division at Sheik Zowaiid. The next day, 23 February the 5th Mounted Yeomanry Brigade returned to El Burj from Sheikh Zowaiid being replaced by the 22nd Mounted (Yeomanry) Brigade which had recently arrived.[136]
On 23 February the when the New Zealand Mounted Rifles and 2nd Light Horse Brigades commanded by Brigadier General Chaytor, made a reconnaissance in force to Khan Yunus which was part of a line of strong posts held by the Ottoman Army to protect the southern Ottoman Empire. These posts, consisting of well dug trenches were located at Khan Yunus, at a particularly strongly fortified position at Shellal, at Weli Sheikh Nuran and at Beersheba (also referred to as the Hans Yonus–El Hafir line).[137]
Brigadier General Chaytor's troops surrounded Khan Yunus forcing enemy detachments from the area to retreat into the town. As a consequence of this action and the arrival of British railhead at Sheikh Zowaiid on March 5, the Ottoman Army garrisons realised this line was too weak to be defended against increasing Allied pressure. Enver Pasa, Kress von Kressenstein and Cemal Pasa decided to evacuate Khan Yunus and the system of defences stretching to Shellal on the Wadi Ghuzzeh. The Ottoman Army retiring 14 miles north to establish a defensive line between Gaza and Beersheba to cover any Allied advance up the coast or inland through Beersheba to Jerusalem. This withdrawal began in February and the Ottoman Fourth Army was in position in its new defensive line by mid–March 1917.[138][139][140][141]
[edit] The Southern Levant
Khan Yunis was one of several villages in this fertile area, located 6 miles north of Rafa and the Egyptian–Ottoman frontier on the main road to Gaza. In this village was found the largest and deepest well in the area and after the Engineers had installed a pumping machine, it gave an unlimited supply of water to both men and horses making the village an important forward site for supply depots and bivouacs.[142]
Surrounded by many acres of orchards, each with great hedges of prickly pear, it was here at Khan Yunas that the first of many relics of the Crusaders was found; the remains of an old castle. Another important village with extensive fresh water was found 6 miles further north on the sand hill strip where it narrowed to a half–mile; the wells of Deir El Belah with the great lagoon, surrounded by groves of date palms became another important base during the war. Each of the villages in this fertile region had its well, and underground water storage cisterns usually sealed by a close fitting stone to prevent evaporation which, when found by the troops were of great value.[143]
In stark contrast to the Egyptian desert country, this fertile Ottoman Empire territory in the southern Levant, was covered by grasslands and cultivated fields. The Wadi Ghuzzeh became the limit of reconnaissance and patrol work which was carried out among open and rolling–downs country, without fences and very few trees, spread with green crops showing well above the ground. And beautiful flowers everywhere; poppies, scarlet ranunculi, great stretches of irises both large and small, blue cornflower, pimpernels, anemones in endless variety and many beautiful gladioli, tulips, narcissi and many more unknown varieties, and even in the narrow strip of sand hills along the coast grew the perfumed desert lily.[136] At Khan Yunis gardens, orchards, fig plantations and grazing were carried on, in the Rafa and Sheikh Zowaiid areas barley and wheat were grown, and at Gaza an important depot for cereals with a German steam mill, barley, wheat, olives, vineyards, orange groves and wood for fuel were grown as well as many goats grazed. Barley was exported to England for brewing into English beer and in 1912 the 40,000 inhabitants of Gaza imported £10,000 of yarn from Manchester. Maize, millet, beans and water melon all harvested in early autumn were cultivated in most of these localities.[144][145]
Firmer ground meant it was possible for the infantry to play an active part in the planned engagements of this new campaign; it also made it possible to use wheeled vehicles and the pedrails came off the guns and their teams of eight and ten horses were reduced to six. General service and limber wagons drawn by horses or mules began to replace some of the camel–trains although they remained important throughout the war and were used together with pack mules and donkeys where roads were bad; in hilly trackless terrain where the horse and mule drawn wagons, motor lorries and tractors could not go. In difficult country the transport wagons of the regiments, the machine–gun squadrons and the field ambulances travelled together in a separate column on an easier less direct route. All these animals requiring vast quantities of food and water which had to be transported forward and although it had been found during the advance across the Sinai, that horses did better with two drinks a day rather than three; it was found that their condition improved, but they drank more doing nothing for the problems of supply.[146][147][148][149][150]
[edit] Eastern Force and Desert Column reorganisation
With the departure of the 42nd Infantry Division for the Western Front, its place at El Arish was taken by 53rd (Welsh) Infantry Division which transferred from garrison duties in Upper Egypt following the defeat of the Senussi. And the 54th (East Anglian) Infantry Division which had been in the Southern Section of the Suez Canal Defences also moved eastwards to El Arish, while the new 74th Infantry Division of 229, 230 and 231 Infantry Brigades was being formed from dismounted Yeomanry brigades in Egypt.[151][152][153][154]
The arrival of 6th and 22nd Mounted Brigades from the Salonika front prompted a reorganisation of Desert Column. Instead of grouping the two new brigades with the 4th Light Horse Brigade (in the process of formation) and the 5th Mounted Brigade to form the new Imperial Mounted division, (established 12 February 1917 at Ferry Post on the Suez Canal under the command of British Army Major General H.W. Hodgson) the Anzac Mounted Division's 3rd Light Horse Brigade was transferred and the newly arrived 22nd Mounted Brigade was attached to the Anzac Mounted Division.[155][156]
Thus by March 1917 General Dobell commander of Eastern Force had 52nd and 54th Infantry Divisions and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade directly in his command and Desert Column commanded by General Chetwode consisting of the 53rd Infantry Division commanded by Major General Dallas, Anzac Mounted Division commanded by Major General Chauvel now made up of 1st and 2nd Light Horse, New Zealand Mounted Rifles and 22nd Mounted Yeomanry Brigades and the Imperial Mounted Division commanded by Major General Hodgson now made up of the 3rd and 4th Light Horse commanded by J. B. Meredith from the 1st Light Horse Brigade, the 5th and 6th Mounted Yeomanry Brigades and two Light Car Patrols. The 3rd Light Horse Brigade rather resented the change, as they lost the connection with their service on Gallipoli via the old name of Anzac.[152][153][154][155][157][158][159][160][161]
The Imperial Mounted Division moved up from Ferry Post to join Desert Column at el Burj just past El Arish on the road to Gaza between 28 February and 9 March; the 3rd Light Horse Brigade coming under orders of Imperial Mounted Division on 2 March and the Imperial Mounted Division coming under orders of Desert Column on 10 March 1917. The 4th Light Horse Brigade, in the process of formation at Ferry Post, planned to leave on 18 March.[156][162]
Transport was also reorganised; the horse drawn supply columns were combined with the camel trains so that Eastern Force could operate for about twenty four hours beyond railhead.[163] This was a vast undertaking; one brigade (and there were six) of Light Horse at war establishment consisted of approximately 2,000 soldiers as well as a division of infantry; all requiring sustenance.[164]
[edit] Ottoman Army Units
During February British intelligence reported the arrival in the region, of two divisions of the Ottoman Army; the 3rd Cavalry Division (from the Caucasus) and the 16th Infantry Division (from Thrace). They joined three infantry divisions in the area; along the thirty–kilometre–long Gaza–Beersheba line, the Fourth Army had about eighteen thousand soldiers. Kress von Kressenstein allocated some troops to both Gaza and Beersheba, but held the majority in reserve at Tell esh Sheria and Jemmameh and by mid March the Ottoman Army's 53rd Infantry Division was on its way south from Jaffa to augment these troops. The garrison at Gaza consisting of seven battalions could muster 3,500 rifles, machine gun companies and five batteries of 20 guns, supported by a squadron of newly arrived German Halberstadt fighter aircraft, which outclassed Allied aircraft and gave the Ottomans local air mastery.[137][151][165]
It was believed the Ottoman Army had 7,000 rifles supported by heavy field and machine guns with reserves close by at Gaza and Tel el Sheria.[132]
[edit] Ottoman Retreat from Shellal
No. 1 Squadron Australian Flying Corps and No. 14 Squadron bombed Beersheba in mid February destroying 3 German planes and on 25 February assisted a French battleship which shelled Jaffa, by directing the ship's fire and the German aerodrome at Ramleh was bombed on the same day. On 5 March six planes bombed the enemy railway at Tel el Sheria and although the damage was not great this main enemy base continued to be bombed by relays of raiders in the moonlight of the night of 7 March and the following morning 6 planes bombed Junction Station an important railway junction and supply depot; it was also bombed on 9, 13 and 19 March.[166]
On 5 March the Ottoman Army retreated from Shellal to the north side of the Wadi Ghuzze to a line from Gaza not far from the Mediterranean Sea to Beersheba just as the British railway reached Sheikh Zowaiid. At this time General Murray, the Commander-in-Chief EEF, agreed to Lieutenant General Dobell commander of Eastern Force, planning to attack Gaza at the end of March.[167] Despite this delay its claimed Lieutenant General Dobell considered 'an early surprise attack was essential ... otherwise it was widely believed the enemy would withdraw without a fight.' [168][169] By the middle of March the railway had reached Rafa, 12 miles from Deir el Belah and within range for an attack on Gaza by mounted troops as well as infantry.[132]
On March 20 Lieutenant General Dobell moved his headquarters to Rafa.[170] The next day, complete with an enclosed paddock, totalizator, jumps and a marked course, the Rafa Race Meeting was held when each race was contested by Yeomanry, Australians and New Zealanders. Trophies were ordered from Cairo and a programme printed.[171][172] On 22 March preliminary moves prior to the attack on Gaza began, and all roads and tracks possible for wheels were carefully reconnoitred as far as Belah and allotted to the different formations.[172] On 24th Lieutenant General Dobell issued orders for the battle.[170]
[edit] First Battle of Gaza
The Ottoman Army gave up a small area of the southern Ottoman Empire to retire to Gaza on the shore of the Mediterranean Sea, holding large garrisons in the area to the north east, east, and south east at Hareira, Tel el Sheria, Jemmameh, Tel el Negile, Huj and Beersheba.[173][174][175] Desert Column's Anzac and Imperial Mounted Divisions were to stop reinforcements from these Ottoman garrisons reinforcing the Gaza garrison, on 26 March while the 53rd Infantry Division supported by a brigade of 54th Infantry Division attacked the strong entrenchments to the south of the town.[170][176][177][178] The mounted units succeeded in keeping the columns of Ottoman reinforcements away from the town but the British infantry attack was failure. After being reinforced by the Anzac Mounted Division the attack began to succeed, however night stopped this renewed attack before it could succeed.[179][180][181][182][183]
The government in London believed reports by General Dobell and General Murray indicating a substantial victory had been won and ordered Murray to move on and capture Jerusalem. The British were in no position to attack Jerusalem as they had yet to break through the Ottoman defensive positions.[184][185]
[edit] Second Battle of Gaza
The entrenchments at Gaza were rapidly improved and credit for the Ottoman defence is given to the German chief of staff Baron Kress von Kressenstein.
A second attack on Gaza was launched one month later on 17 April 1917. This attack, supported by naval gunfire, chlorine gas and even a few early tanks, was also a failure. It was essentially a frontal assault on a fortified position, and its failure was due more to inflexibility in operations than to faults in planning; yet it cost some 6,000 British casualties. As a result both General Dobell and General Murray were removed from command.
[edit] General Allenby
The new man put in charge was General Sir Edmund Allenby and his orders were clear: take Jerusalem by Christmas.
After personally reviewing the Ottoman defensive positions, Allenby requested reinforcements: three more infantry divisions, aircraft, and artillery. This request was granted and by October, 1917, the British were ready for their next attack.
The Ottoman army had three active fronts at this time: Mesopotamia, Arabia, and the Gaza front. They also had substantial forces deployed around İstanbul and in the (now quiet) Caucasus front. Given all these demands, the army in Gaza was only about 35,000 strong, led by the Ottoman General Mustafa Kemal and concentrated in three main defensive locations: Gaza, Tel Es Sheria, and Beersheba. Allenby's army was now much larger, with some 88,000 troops in good condition and well-equipped.
[edit] Battle of El Buggar Ridge
The occupation of Karm by the Allies on 22 October 1917 created a major point for supply and water for the troops in the immediate area. For the Ottoman forces, the establishment of a railway station at Karm placed the defensive positions known as the Hureira Redoubt and Rushdie System which formed a powerful bulwark against any Allied action under threat.
To forestall this threat, General Erich von Falkenhayn, the Commander of the Yildirim Group, proposed a two phase attack. The plan called for a reconnaissance in force from Beersheba on 27 October, to be followed by an all out attack launched by the 8th Army from Hureira. This second phase was ironically scheduled to occur on the morning of 31 October 1917, the day when the Battle of Beersheba began.
[edit] Battle of Beersheba
A key feature of the British plan was to convince the Ottomans (and their German leaders) that once again, Gaza was to be attacked. This deception campaign was extremely thorough and convincing. The Battle of El Buggar Ridge, initiated by the Ottomans, completed the deception. When the Allies launched their attack on Beersheba, the Ottomans were taken by surprise. In one of the most remarkable feats of planning and execution, the Allies were able to move some 40,000 men and a similar number of horses over hostile and inhospitable terrain without being detected by the Ottomans. The climax of the battle was one of the last successful cavalry charges of modern warfare, when two Australian Light Horse regiments (4th and 12th) charged across open ground just before dusk and captured the town.
The Ottoman defeat at Beersheba on 31 October was not a complete rout. The Ottomans retreated into the hills and prepared defensive positions to the north of Beersheba. For the Allies, the following days were spent fighting a difficult and bloody battle at Tel el Khuweilifeh, to the north east of Beersheba.
To break through the Ottoman defensive line, the Allied forces attacked the Ottoman positions at Tel Es Sheria on 6 November, and followed this up with a further attack at Huj the following day. With the imminent collapse of Gaza at the same time, the Ottomans quickly retreated to a new line of defence.
[edit] Third Battle of Gaza
On 7 November the Ottoman held Gaza - Hareira/Sheria - Tel el Khuweilfe line taken up after the capture of Beersheba on 31 October 1917, was abandoned. They were concerned about being cut off and retreated in the face of continued British pressure. Gaza was finally captured and the once formidable Ottoman defensive positions were lost.
[edit] 50 mile fighting advance
From 1 to 6/7 November strong Ottoman rearguards at Tel el Khuweilfe in the Judean Hills, at Hareira and Sheria on the plain and at Sausage Ridge and Gaza on the Mediterranean coast held the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in heavy fighting. During this time the Ottoman Armies were able to withdraw in good order. And the rearguard garrisons themselves, were able to retire under cover of darkness during the night of 6/7 or 7/8 November. General Allenby ordered the Egyptian Expeditionary Force to advance and capture the retreating Ottoman VII and VIII Armies but they were delayed by strong rearguards.[186][187]
An attempt on 12 November by four divisions of the Ottoman 8th Army to counterattack and stop the British advance in front of the vital Junction Station (Wadi Sara) on the Jaffa to Jerusalem railway, was held by the Australian Mounted Division reinforced with two additional brigades.[188][189][190]
On 13 November the Egyptian Expeditionary Force attacked a 20,000 strong Ottoman force deployed on a hastily constructed but naturally strong defensive line. The main attack was carried out by the XXIst Corps's 52nd (Lowland) and 75th Infantry Divisions in the centre with the Australian Mounted Division on the right flank and the Anzac and Yeomanry Mounted Divisions on the left.[191][192] The infantry in the centre prevailed supported by a cavalry charge by 6th Mounted Brigade (Yeomanry Mounted Division).[193] And on 14 November the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade defeated a substantial rearguard; the 3rd Ottoman Infantry Division at Ayun Kara.[194][195] The combined effects of this series of devastating failures by the Ottoman Army was to see their 8th Army give up Jaffa and retire across the Nahr el Auja while their 7th Army withdrew into the Judean Hills to defend Jerusalem. They had withdrawn approximately 50 miles (80 km), losing 10,000 prisoners and 100 guns and suffering heavy casualties.[196][197]
[edit] Capture of Jerusalem
Jerusalem operations began with the Battle of Nebi Samwill fought between 17 and 24 November, were continued by the subsidiary Battle of Jaffa between 21 and 22 December and ended with the Defence of Jerusalem from 26 to 30 December 1917.[198] These battles were ultimately successfully fought by the XX Corps, the XXI Corps and Desert Mounted Corps against the Ottoman 7th Army in the Judean Hills and their 8th Army. Battle lines extended from north of Jaffa on the Mediterranean Sea across the Judean Hills to Bireh and east of the Mount of Olives.
The battlefield over which the Battle of Nebi Samwil was fought continued to be subject to attacks and counterattacks until early December when Jerusalem was occupied by the British. Fighting also continued in the vicinity Bireh and the main Ottoman supply line running along the Jerusalem to Nablus road north of the city.
After the Ottoman Army had evacuated Jerusalem, the city was occupied on 9 December 1917.[199] This was a major political event for the British government of David Lloyd George, one of the few real successes the British could point to after a year of bitter disappointments on the western front.
On the Ottoman side, this defeat marked the exit of Djemal Pasha, who returned to Istanbul. Djemal had delegated the actual command of his army to German officers such as von Kressenstein and von Falkenhayn more than a year earlier, but now, defeated as Enver Pasha had been at the Battle of Sarikamis, he gave up even nominal command and returned to the capital. Less than a year remained before he was forced out of the government. General Falkenhayn was also replaced, in March 1918.[citation needed]
[edit] Report on condition of animals
During the lull in operations after the end of the Jerusalem campaign, the Director of Veterinary Services, Egyptian Expeditionary Force requested the General Officer Commanding Desert Mounted Corps (Lieutenant General Chauvel) details regarding the condition of animals between 1 November and 31 December 1917 –
- 1. The longest period they were continuously without water: (a) One cable wagon team from DHQ was without water for a period of 84 hours. (b) Several regiments in the two Australian Brigades were without water for a period of 60 hours. (c) The New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade was without water for 72 hours.
- 2. The work performed during this period: By (a) above, almost continuous work, cable laying, which entailed heavy work partly over rough country. By (b) above, fast travelling and reconnaissance, averaging about 20 miles each day. By (c) above, first two days reconnaissance, averaging about 20 miles per day, remainder of period practically no movement.
- 3. Whether they fed well when they were thirsty: Yes, up to 36 hours; after that, in most cases, they refused to eat.
- 4. The average number of times they were watered daily during the period specified or during any intermediate period: During the period of advance, once per day i.e. to 15 November, after that twice daily.
- 5. The smallest amount of grain and fodder they received at any time and for what period: 4 lbs grain and no bulk fodder for 24 hours
- 6. The average amount of grain and fodder they received during the whole or any intermediate period: An average of 9 lbs. grain with average 4 lbs Tibbin requisitioned from inhabitants up to 17 December. From 17 to 31 December, 12 lbs. grain and average 4 lbs haystuffs.
- 7. The maximum amount of grain and fodder they received at any time and for what period: As shown in last period in para. 6.
- 8. To what extent were units able to supplement their forage locally, by grazing or otherwise: An average of 4 lbs haystuff per horse was obtained from the inhabitants throughout the whole period of operations. Grazing nil.
- 9. When was there any noticeable change in their condition and vigour as a result of work and privation: Decided falling off in condition and vigour after 36 hours without water. With good food and water horses picked up remarkably, though it is to be observed that all units report that issue of grain on five consecutive days caused serious trouble, the horses suffering from diarrhoea and laminitis and losing vigour. With reference to the cable wagon team which was without water for 84 hours, though much distressed at the end of that period, these horses quickly recovered. It is to be remembered that the horses of the Division commenced operations about 26 October 1917 in excellent condition, which is largely responsible for the fact that evacuations on account of debility have been extremely small, both during operations and afterwards.
- Note – The horses of one Brigade had an indifferent watering on morning of 6 November and watering next during action on the 8th November, no more water until during the night of 10/11 November. They were greatly distressed on the 10th, but by the 13th November were, with the good water and rest, fit for work again, though they lost considerably in condition.[200]
[edit] The final year: Palestine and Syria
The British government had hopes that the Ottoman Empire could be defeated early in the coming year with successful campaigns in Palestine and Mesopotamia but the Spring Offensive by the Germans on the Western Front delayed the expected attack on Syria for nine full months. General Allenby's army was largely redeployed to France and most of his divisions were rebuilt with units recently recruited in India. His forces spent much of the summer of 1918 training and reorganising.[citation needed]
Because the British achieved complete control of the air with their new fighter planes, the Ottomans, and their new German commander, General Liman von Sanders, had no clear idea where the British were going to attack. Compounding the problems, the Ottomans, at the direction of their War Minister Enver Pasha withdrew their best troops during the summer for the creation of Enver's Army of Islam, leaving behind poor quality, dispirited soldiers. During this time, the Ottomans were distracted by raids against their open desert (eastern) flank by forces of the Arab Revolt commanded by the Emir Feisal and coordinated by T. E. Lawrence and other British liaison officers, which tied down thousands of soldiers in garrisons throughout Palestine, Jordan, and Syria.[citation needed]
[edit] Westerners versus Easterners
By the end of 1917 all the objectives of the campaign to capture Jerusalem had been achieved; Ottoman-German operations against Baghdad had been frustrated, the last reserves of Ottoman soldiers were engaged and the British nation's morale had been boosted.[201]
The Prime Minister of England Mr. Lloyd George wished to knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war in 1918. Already the 7th Indian Division from Mesopotamia was ordered to Palestine and there were many who were worried that if significant forces were diverted from the Western Front to Palestine, England might protect her colonies but loose the war.[202][203]
The Westerners argued that the real heart of the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul still lay hundreds of miles from an advance to Damascus or even Aleppo and if the Ottoman Empire saw at the same time Germany overrunning France, it would not be enough to force the Ottoman Empire from the war. With Russia out of the war the Dardanelles were no longer an objective for the British Empire as access to the Russian fleet was no longer of any importance.[204]
The Easterners accepted that it was essential to maintain the forces in France and Belgium on the Western Front, but that they were already sufficient to keep the front intact. They argued that 'to surrender the initiative everywhere and to concentrate on a policy of purely passive defence along the whole battle line was a counsel of despair.'[205] Germany would have a brief window of opportunity thanks to the armistice between Russia and Germany, to attack the Allied forces on the Western Front before the United States, which had already entered the war could bring sufficient numbers to end Germany's war.[206] But the Easterners asserted that during two years of war the Allies had superiority in numbers and material greater than the numbers the Germans could bring from the Russian front and they had failed to break the German lines. They argued that the Palestine theatre might be wasteful of shipping but the Western Front was wasteful of lives; that it would be folly to take seasoned troops from Palestine where a decisive victory could be won to die in the stalemate.[205]
On 13 December 1917 the War Cabinet instructed the General Staff to consider two policies; the conquest of Palestine involving an advance of about 100 miles (160 km) or an advance to Aleppo to cut the Ottoman communications with Mesopotamia.[207] On 14 December General Allenby reported that the rainy season would prevent any further attacks for at least two months.[208]
Qualified approval from the Supreme War Council for a decisive offensive to annihilate Ottoman armies and crush resistance was contained in Joint Note No. 12. It was claimed that the destruction of the Ottoman Empire 'would have far-reaching results upon the general military situation.' Early in February, 1918 General Smuts was sent to confer with General Allenby regarding the implementation of the Joint Note.[209][210] The French imposed an important qualification on the Joint Note; that no British troops in France could be deployed to the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. Smuts informed Allenby the intention was to reinforce the Egyptian Expeditionary Force with one and possibly a second Indian cavalry division from France, three divisions from Mesopotamia and more artillery and aeroplanes. Smuts also suggested crossing the Jordan, capturing the Hedjaz railway and using it to outflank Damascus.[211][Note 3]
[edit] 1918 begins
When General Allenby first assumed command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force he quickly joined the army in the field leaving the political and administrative problems related to the Egyptian Mandate to a Government appointee with a suitable staff. The area of formerly Ottoman territory now under occupation also required management, and with the approval of the Government, Allenby appointed a Chief Administrator for Palestine. He divided the country into four districts: Jerusalem, Jaffa, Majdal and Beersheba, each under a military governor. Under this administration the immediate needs of the people were provided for, seed grain and live–stock were imported and distributed, finance on easy terms was made available through the Army bankers, a stable currency was set up and postal services restored.[212]
On 15 January 1918 Allenby reported to DMI regarding attitudes to the occupation of Jerusalem. The Moslems were for the most part non–committal, partisans of Sheriff are genuinely pleased but worried by Jewish influence. The attitude of Bedouin from East of Jerusalem to Bir El Saba (Beersheba) varies some are unsatisfactory but the protection of the sacred Moslem places is generally accepted as satisfactory. The Jews are overjoyed by the support contained in the Balfour Declaration for Zionism and Christians are happy with the occupation.[213]
Allenby was under pressure to set up foreign administrations in Palestine. Already the French representative in Palestine, Picot was pressuring for a share in the administration of a French Protectorate in the Holy Land by pushing to assume the rights and dignities in church which the French representative enjoyed before the war. His presence and behaviour was resented by the Italians and the churches became angry. Allenby was aware that in Jerusalem angry priests came to blows in the Holy Places from time to time. He insisted that while military administration is required it must be under the British Commander in Chief alone.[214]
[edit] The Ottoman Army
The Ottoman Army had been weakened by considerable losses suffered between 31 October and 31 December 1917. The 7th Ottoman Army lost 110 officer and 1,886 men killed, 213 officer and 5,488 men wounded, 79 officers and 393 men captured and 183 officers and 4,233 men were missing. This army had also lost 7,305 rifles 22 light and 73 heavy machine guns and 29 guns. During the same period the 8th Ottoman Army the British reported 70 officers and 1,474 men killed, 118 officers and 3,163 men wounded, 95 officers and 5,868 men captured and 97 officers and 4,877 men missing. The 8th Army reported 2,384 wounded but no rifles, machine guns or artillery guns missing. Total Ottoman casualties for the period were 25,337 killed, wounded, captured or missing while British losses for the same period amounted to 18,000 men. This was in spite of odds in favour of the British of well over two to one in infantry and eight to one in cavalry as well as a massive artillery, logistical and naval superiority. It is therefore remarkable that any Ottoman units survived the onslaught and made the Ottoman fighting withdrawal under pressure a great accomplishment.[215]
The Ottoman Army was still a competent fighting force at the beginning of 1918. Every infantry division which had fought at Beersheba on 31 October was intact and still fighting, although some were considerably reduced in strength. To make up for these losses reinforcements had arrived in December 1917. The 2nd Caucasian Cavalry Division and the 1st Infantry Division had been transferred to Palestine from the Caucasus.[216] But German air superiority ended with the arrival of Bristol fighters, one of which on 12 December destroyed three German Albatros scouts, and the S.E.5.a. From January 1918 these British planes increasingly dominated the skies.[217] But one assessment states that the end of the Jerusalem campaign the Ottoman soldiers appeared the toughest, most obdurate and most professional of fighters.[218] And another assessment confirms the Ottoman Army was still aggressive and confident while Enver Pasa and the Ottoman General Staff remained focused on the offensive.[219]
But the Ottoman high command were dissatisfied with General von Falkenhayn the commander of the Ottoman Army in Palestine. He was seen to have been responsible for the defeat at Beersheba and his refusal to allow Ottoman staff officers to participate in planning combat operations rankled.[220] Enver Pasa replaced him on 19 February with Marshall Liman von Sanders and Sanders changed the established 'active, flexible defence' style to a more unyielding defence.[221]
[edit] Mounted divisions move back to rest camps
Allenby's forces were paralysed by a breakdown in logistics and he had to send two mounted divisions and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade south of Gaza. He wrote: "I can't feed them, with certainty, and even now, a fortnight's heavy rain would bring me near starvation."[222]
On 1 January the Australian Mounted Division started its trip back to Deir el Belah with 5th Mounted Brigade began moving back through the rain and slush followed by the 4th Light Horse Field Ambulance.[223] Led horses arrived on 5 January and the division moved on in continuous rain back to Ramle at noon and Deiran in the afternoon of 6 January. The trip the next day took them through a wadi with 5 feet (1.5 m) of water; all the floors of carts were awash and the mud had to be cut from the wheels. They moved on again the next day to Mejdel on 9 January eventually reaching Gaza on 11 January; 70 miles (110 km) in 11 days.[224]
On 12 January the Anzac Mounted Division moved back; the 1st and possibly 2nd Light Horse Brigades to Esdud (where Frank Hurley took 'mud pictures' on 7 January) with its New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade in its old bivouac near Ayun Kara (Rishon le Zion).[225][226]
While conscription in New Zealand kept the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade up to strength numbers of volunteers from Australia for the Anzac and Australian Mounted Divisions did not.[227] The shortfall of reinforcements after the Somme on the Western Front threatened the breakup of the 3rd Australian Division forcing the Australian Prime Minister William (Billy) Hughes to go to the people in October 1916 and again in December 1917. At both failed referenda the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) favoured conscription but the people did not.[228] By 1918 Australian formations were desperate for recruits.[229]
[edit] The Jordan campaigns
The weather was beginning to improve and railways and roads were being repaired and developed. A lateral line of communication north of the Jaffa to Jerusalem road required the complete reconstruction of the track from Amwas through Beit Sira by the Egyptian Labour Corps. The standard gauge line reached Ludd and was within .25 miles (0.40 km) of Allenby's headquarters 2 miles (3.2 km) west of Ramleh. He wrote on 25 January: "I want to extend my right, to include Jericho and the N. of the Dead Sea."[230][231] The whole British advanced base of operations had moved from Deir el Belah to the new railhead including the Director of Medical Services, whose headquarters at Ramleh were also the headquarters of the Motor Ambulance Convoy. Thirteen casualty clearing stations and stationary hospitals had been established along the lines of communication from Jaffa and Jerusalem to Kantara and by March 1918 ambulance trains ran to Kantara from Ludd.[232]
Allenby's next strategic move was to extend his right to include Jericho, then to cross the Jordan River and advance to Amman and destroy 10–15 miles (16–24 km) of the Hedjaz railway to isolate Ottoman forces near Medina and encourage further Arab uprisings.[210][211][Note 4]
[edit] Jerusalem to Jericho
The pursuit from Beersheba came to a halt in December with the Ottomans occupying the "Wilderness;" the rough, barren rocky country between Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley.[233][234] Smuts (see 'Westerners and Easterners above) was still on his way back to London when an adjustment to the Jaffa to Jerusalem line was made in February. Logistics had sufficiently developed to enable Jericho to be captured by the 1st Light Horse and New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigades of the Anzac Mounted Division attached to the XX Corps.[231][233][235][236] Allenby put Lieutenant General Chetwode in charge of the capture of Jericho and attached the Anzac Mounted Division to Chetwode's XX Corps with the operation timed to begin as soon as the weather cleared.[237] The attack on Jericho was to be made by the 60th (London) Infantry and the Anzac Mounted Divisions on 19 February.[232]
Chetwode and Chauvel watched operations begin from the Mount of Olives more than 2,000 feet (610 m) above sea level. By the time Chetwode's force reached Jericho they were nearly 1,200 feet (370 m) below sea level.[238] The main attack was made by the British infantry on the Ottoman 26th and 53rd Infantry Divisions' positions in the hills on the western edge of the Jordan Valley.[220][232] The 60th (London) Infantry Division was directed towards Jericho, the 53rd Infantry Division with one brigade of the 74th Infantry Division on the left moved towards the Wady el Auja which flowed into the Jordan River (not to be confused with the Wadi el Auja which flowed into the Mediterranean Sea).[239][240] The Anzac Mounted Division were on the right moving towards Rujm el Bahr.[239] The mounted troops moved further east and south in a flanking movement towards Nebi Musa.[232]
The eastern side of the Judean Hills tumble headlong into the Jordan Valley in a tangle of stony ridges and deep narrow gorges.[241] The descent is very steep; all the main wadis run from west to east often with precipitous banks making any crossing impossible. Tributaries join the main wadis from all directions breaking up the ridges into a tumbled mass of hills. Further north at Jebel Kuruntul the mountains end abruptly in a 1,000 feet (300 m) cliff.[242] Ottoman soldiers held a series of hill tops from Tubk el Kaneiterah, near the Dead Sea through Talat ed Dumm to the Wady Fara; dividing these rocky precipitous heights were deep valleys along which tracks ran in the beds of the ravines. Movement forwards was only possible in single file; the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade was strung out to about 5 miles (8.0 km).[239][243] In order to attack the heights it was necessary for these soldiers to haul themselves and each other over abrupt cliffs to be in a position to fight at close quarters.[239]
On 20 February the infantry captured their objective of Talat ed Dumm on the road from Jerusalem which overlooked Jericho. In the afternoon considerable Ottoman reinforcement were seen to arrive at Shunet Nimrin east of the Jordan and a raiding formation from No. 1 Squadron bombed troop tents, marquees and a supply dump. By the evening the hills dominating Wady Fara were captured and the Ottoman defenders at Nebi Musa evacuated the same day. The mounted division occupied Jericho the next day.[244]
During the night the advance guard formed by Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiment had moved from Bethlehem along an ancient road down the Wadi en Nar to the valley near El Muntar hill followed by their brigade and the 1st Light Horse Brigade. They zig-zagged down 1,250 feet (380 m) to the valley floor while Ottoman soldiers on the height of El Muntar watched their approach. It was some hours before the 8 miles (13 km) long column could deploy for the attack.[245] The Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiment attacked Hill 306 and the Canterbury and Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiments attacked Hill 288. At 10:00 the British infantry were reported to have captured Jebel Ektief a dominating position on the Jerusalem to Jericho Road but a strong counterattack drove them off; it was not finally captured until heavy artillery assisted much desperate fighting about 12:30.[246]
Shortly after 12:00 a mounted advance of an Auckland squadron took Hill 288 and Hill 306 was also soon captured but Ottoman soldiers on the Neby Musa position made it impossible to move on. At dusk the 1st Light Horse Brigade began the descent of the Wadi Kumran following a goat track which fell 1,300 feet (400 m) in 2 miles (3.2 km); this journey was successfully completed by midnight. The New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade turned north along a very rough track and by daylight had reached just east of Neby Musa.[246] They made a dismounted attack while British infantry attacked from the rear.[247] The Canterbury Mounted Rifles Regiment occupied Nebi Musa at daylight crossing the gorge on foot; the surviving Ottoman soldiers had withdrawn taking their guns.[248] Meanwhile, the 1st Light Horse Brigade reached the floor of the Jordan Valley near the Dead Sea, 400 metres below sea level and turned north towards Jericho. A single troop of 3rd Light Horse Regiment entered Jericho about 08:00 to find the garrison had withdrawn.[247][248] Five hundred and ten casualties were suffered during these operations.[249] The 1st Light Horse Brigade advanced up the Jordan Valley as far as the Wady el Auja while a detachment of New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade occupied a post on the northern shore of the Dead Sea.[250][Note 5]
During the three days of operations No. 1 Squadron's aeroplanes bombed and machine gunned Ottoman positions, reporting to headquarters on progress and estimates of Ottoman dispositions and strength. Messages were dropped on troops in the front line when urgent reports of surprise attacks etc. were required. It was considered remarkable that these aerial operations were not interrupted by German airmen.[239]
When Divisional Headquarters Staff set up their report centre about 1 mile (1.6 km) behind Jericho and were sitting down to a morning cup of tea, Chetwode and Chauvel joined them. Major General Chaytor was sitting on the step of his car when shells fired from the other side of the Jordan River started to explode. One hit the front of his car and he narrowly escaped injury. This gun continued shelling the area at a range of over 10,000 yards (9,100 m) but the British 13-pounders could get no further than 6,000 yards (5,500 m).[248]
On 22 February the Anzac Mounted Division started their journey to Richon leaving the Auckland Mounted Rifle Regiment, a subsection of machine guns and an artillery battery in a strong position where the road falls into the Jordan Valley.[251][252] They carried out patrols of the captured area under direct observation and attracted artillery firing from Ottoman field guns.[232] These patrols found Ottoman strong positions at the Ghoraniyeh bridge and the fords at Makhadet Hajlah.[253]
By 25 February all Ottoman troops, guns and a pontoon bridge had been removed from locations near the Ghoraniye bridge to the west of the river and Shunet Nimrin was held in force; being rapidly entrenched by the Ottoman 7th Army.[220][244]
The occupation of Jericho protected Jerusalem from Ottoman attack from the east but it did not provide the hoped for secure base to mount operations on the Hedjaz railway.[254] In the face of the inexorable force that was the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, Enver Pasa lost confidence in von Falkenhayn and on 1 March 1918 replaced him with General Otto Liman von Sanders.[255]
Ottoman Army garrisons held the Hedjaz railway from Dera to Medina (although the line was harassed and cut by insurgent Arab units) and Cemal's VIII and XII Corps guarded the Levant coast with four infantry divisions.[256]
By 6 March the War Cabinet gave Allenby leave to advance 'to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the safety of the force under his orders.' While the Germans concentrated before launching their 'Spring Offensive' Allenby created a third infantry corps - the XXII commanded by Barrow with Wavell as his chief of staff as the first Transjordan operations began.[211]
[edit] Infantry operations 8–10 March
Allenby's right flank was secure but was not sufficiently broad to support the planned operations across the Jordan to the Hedjaz railway.[242] A general advance on a front of 14–26 miles (23–42 km) and up to a maximum of 5–7 miles (8.0–11 km) in depth by both the XX and XXI Corps pushed Ottoman forces beyond the River Auja in the Jordan Valley, northwards from Abu Tellul and Mussallabeh with advances up the Nablus road and to capture Ras el Ain.[257][258]
The XX Corps (60th (London) Infantry Division) pushed Ottoman units back from high ground on the north bank of the Wadi Auja, well beyond the valuable water supply in the river.[242][257] Whilst the XXI Corps secured a commanding position near Abu Tellul and Musallabeh which overlooks the Jordan Valley and the Beisan to Jericho road. The 53rd, 74th and 10th Divisions advanced north up both sides of the Nablus road from Kefr Malik to Nebi Saleh cutting off all tracks and roads leading to the lower Jordan Valley. The XXI Corps moved its right forward from the Wadi Deir Ballut to Ras el Ain.[242][257] XX Corps began its advance during the night of 8 March at the same time as the Ottoman XX Corps began to arrive on the Auja. A division joined the defences astride the Nablus road giving the defences an unexpected strength.[258]
The infantry advanced up and down precipitous cliffs and through deep gorges with each Ottoman machine gun in cleverly sighted defensive position. These had to be located by careful reconnaissance on foot as the country was very rough as low cloud and mist stopped aerial reconnaissance. Artillery was severely hampered by the rough terrain making it virtually impossible to produce effective artillery fire support.[258]
The line established by these infantry corps, at a high cost, remained almost the same until the general advance in September 1918 and the success of these operations, particularly in the northern end of the Jordan Valley provided the base required for the first Transjordan operations to Amman.[242][258][259]
[edit] Jericho to Es Salt
Before Jericho had been captured General Allenby was already planning to push across the Jordan and 'throw a big raid past Salt against the Hedjaz railway.'[230] This raid would first require a passage of the Jordan.[260]
[edit] Further fighting
On the night of 12/13 August the 10th Infantry Division Division attacked Ottoman defences on the 5,000 yards (4,600 m) long Burj–Ghurabeh Ridge just west of the Jerusalem to Nablus road and about 2,000 yards (1,800 m) from our front line. The British and Indian infantry force made a descent of several hundred feet before climbing up steep rocky ground. The Ottoman defences were strongly held and well wired but were attacked from both flanks with complete success. Heavy losses were inflicted on the Ottoman units and 250 prisoners captured.[261]
[edit] Battle of Megiddo
As the dry season approached General Allenby had intended to advance to secure Tiberias, Haifa and the Yarmuk Valley towards Hauran and the Sea of Galilee towards Damascus.[210][211]
General Allenby finally launched his long-delayed attack on 19 September 1918. The campaign has been called the Battle of Megiddo (which is a transliteration of the Hebrew name of an ancient town known in the west as Armageddon). Again, the British made major efforts to deceive the Ottomans as to their actual intended target of operations. This effort was, again, successful and the Ottomans were taken by surprise when the British attacked Meggido in a sudden storm. The Ottoman troops started a full scale retreat, the British bombed the fleeing columns of men from the air and within a week, the Ottoman army in Palestine had ceased to exist as a military force.
The ultimate goal of Allenby's and Feisal's armies was Damascus. Two separate Allied columns marched towards Damascus. The first, composed mainly of Australian and Indian cavalry, approached from Galilee, while the other column, consisting of Indian cavalry and the ad hoc militia following T.E. Lawrence, travelled northwards along the Hejaz Railway. Australian Light Horse troops marched unopposed into Damascus on 1 October 1918, despite the presence of some 12,000 Ottoman soldiers at Baramke Barracks. Major Olden of the Australian 10th Light Horse Regiment received the Official Surrender of the City at 7 am at the Serai. Later that day, Lawrence's irregulars entered Damascus to claim full credit for its capture.
The war in Palestine was over but in Syria lasted for a further month. The Ottoman government was quite prepared to sacrifice these non-Turkish provinces without surrendering. Indeed, while this battle was raging, the Ottoman Empire sent an expeditionary force into Russia to enlarge the ethnic Turkish elements of the empire. It was only after the surrender of Bulgaria, which put Ottoman Empire into a vulnerable position for invasion, that the Ottoman government was compelled to sign an armistice on 30 October 1918, and surrendered outright two days later. Six hundred years of Ottoman rule over the Middle East had come to an end.
[edit] In popular media
This campaign has been depicted in several films. The most famous is Lawrence of Arabia (1962), though it focused primarily on T.E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt. Other films dealing with this topic include Forty Thousand Horsemen (1941), and The Lighthorsemen (1987), with Peter Phelps and Nick Waters, both of which focused on the role of the ANZAC forces during the campaign.
[edit] Summary
The British suffered a total of 550,000 casualties: more than 90% of these were not battle losses but instead attributable to disease, heat and other secondary causes. Total Ottoman losses are unknown but almost certainly larger: an entire army was lost in the fighting and the Ottomans poured a vast number of troops into the front over the three years of combat.
Despite the uncertainty of casualty counts, the historical consequences of this campaign are hard to overestimate. The British conquest of Palestine led directly to the British mandate over Palestine and the Trans-Jordan which, in turn, paved the way for the creation of the states of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.
[edit] See also
- Media related to Sinai and Palestine Campaign at Wikimedia Commons
[edit] Notes
- Footnotes
- ^ The actual size of the Ottoman force von Kressenstein lead across the Sinai in January 1915 is difficult to gauge from the numbers provided; 50,000 became 25,000 then 20,000 and finally between 10,000 and 12,000 but it may have in fact been 25,000 strong.
- ^ War Office policy in March 1916 was to withdraw as many troops as possible from Salonika, remain disengaged in the Balkans, keep Egypt secure and 'to keep a reserve in Egypt for India as long as it seems likely to be required' and get everyone else to France. [Bruce 2002, pp. 35-6]
- ^ The Hedjaz railway stretched 800 miles (1,300 km) from Medina to Damascus with connections to Istanbul and Baghdad. [Woodward 2006, p. 162]
- ^ Allenby wrote to Robertson on 25 January 1918: "If I could destroy 10 or 15 miles of rail and some bridges and get touch with the Arabs under Feisal - even temporarily - the effect would be great." [Allenby letter to Robertson 25 January 1918 in Hughes 2004 p.127] Fifteen miles of railway including all bridges were destroyed on 23 May 1917 on the railway from Beersheba to Auja. [Wavell 1968, p. 90 & Powles 1922, pp. 110, 113] For a description of the procedure used to destroy the rails see Powles 1922, p. 112.
- ^ Frank Hurley was attached to the 1st Light Horse Brigade; he describes the brigade's movements at this time in his diary. [Hurley & O'Keefe 1986, pp. 108-110]
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- ^ Powles 1922, p. vii
- ^ Wavell 1968, p. 27
- ^ a b Erickson 2001, p. 69
- ^ Erickson 2001, pp. 69-70
- ^ Erickson 2001 p. 70
- ^ Carver 2003, p. 8
- ^ Erickson 2001, p. 70
- ^ Wavell 1968, p. 28
- ^ Bruce 2002, pp. 29-30
- ^ Duguid 1919, p. 2
- ^ a b Keogh 1955, p. 21
- ^ Wavell 1968 p. 29
- ^ a b c Keogh 1955, p. 20
- ^ Wavell 1968, pp. 26–7
- ^ a b Carver 2003, pp.192–3
- ^ a b Battles Nomenclature Committee 1922, p. 31
- ^ Erickson 2001, pp. 70–1
- ^ Bruce 2002, pp. 20–1
- ^ Wavell 1968, pp. 30–1
- ^ Carver 2003, pp. 8–9
- ^ Bruce 2002, pp. 23–4
- ^ Wavell 1968, p. 33–4
- ^ Erickson 2001, p. 71
- ^ Bruce 2002, pp. 26–7
- ^ Wavell 1968, p. 40
- ^ Keogh 1955, p. 34
- ^ Downes 1938, pp. 552–4
- ^ Keogh 1955, p. 32
- ^ Wavell 1968, p. 41
- ^ Bruce p. 35
- ^ Keogh 1955, pp. 36-7
- ^ a b Bruce 2002, pp. 36-7
- ^ a b Keogh 1955, p. 37
- ^ Powles 1922, p. 17
- ^ Keogh 1955, p. 38
- ^ 3rd LHB War Diary 10 April 1916 AWM 4,10/3/15
- ^ 3rd LHB War Diary AWM web site AWM 4,10/3/17
- ^ Wavell 1968, pp. 43–5
- ^ Erickson 2001 p. 155
- ^ Bowman–Manifold 1923, p. 21
- ^ a b Keogh 1955, p. 44
- ^ Keogh 1955, p. 47
- ^ Keogh 1955, p. 46
- ^ Downes 1938, p. 599
- ^ Downes 1938, p. 572
- ^ Bruce 2002, p. 42
- ^ Kinloch 2007, p. 76
- ^ Pugsley 2004, p. 133
- ^ Downes 1938, pp. 568–71
- ^ Powles 1922, pp. 18–9
- ^ Powles 1922, p. 24
- ^ 1st LHB War Diary AWM 4,10/1/23
- ^ 2nd LHB War Diary AWM 4, 10/2/18
- ^ Cutlack 1941, p. 36
- ^ Bruce 2002, pp. 46–47.
- ^ Carver 2003, pp. 190–191.
- ^ Keogh 1955, pp. 54–56.
- ^ Powles 1922, pp. 29–35.
- ^ Woodward 2006, pp. 48–49.
- ^ Bruce 2002, pp. 46 & 47
- ^ Carver 2003, pp. 190–1
- ^ Keogh 1955, pp. 54–6
- ^ Powles 1922, pp. 33–5
- ^ Woodward 2006, pp. 48–9
- ^ Downes 1938, p. 581.
- ^ Wavell 1968, pp. 51–5
- ^ Hughes 1999, pp. 71 & 73
- ^ Keogh 1955, p. 48
- ^ a b Wavell 1968, pp. 57–9
- ^ Downes 1938, p. 587
- ^ a b Hill 1978, pp. 84–5
- ^ a b Keogh 1955, p. 60
- ^ a b Bou 2009, p. 158
- ^ Woodward 2006, pp. 52–3
- ^ a b c d Bruce 2002, p. 80
- ^ a b c d Keogh 1955, p. 62
- ^ Powles 1922, pp. 44–5
- ^ 20 August 1916 Letter, Capt. H. Wetherell, Personal Records AWM quoted in Hill 1978, p. 84
- ^ Duguid 1919, pp. 2 & 18
- ^ Bruce 2002, p. 81
- ^ 12th LHR War Diary AWM4–10–17–2 page 21
- ^ Cutlack 1941, p. 40
- ^ Downes 1938, pp. 588–9
- ^ Powles 1922, p. 46
- ^ War Diary of 2nd LH Brigade AWM4–10–2–20 page 5
- ^ 3rd LH Brigade AWM4–10–3–20 pages 18–20
- ^ Cutlack 1941, pp. 40–1
- ^ Cutlack 1941, p. 43
- ^ Cutlack 1941, pp. 43–4
- ^ 12 ALH Regiment October 1916 War Diary AWM 4–10–17–2 page 29
- ^ a b Hill 1978, p. 85
- ^ a b c Downes 1938, p. 589
- ^ Robertson, Military Correspondence, p. 96 in Bruce 2002, p. 79
- ^ Keogh 1955, pp. 60–1
- ^ Cutlack 1941, pp. 44–5
- ^ Carver 2003, p. 194
- ^ Keogh 1955, p. 48 pp. 71–2
- ^ Coulthard-Clark 1998, p. 122.
- ^ a b Cutlack 1941, pp. 49–51
- ^ Gullett 1941, p. 230
- ^ Bruce, 2002, pp. 86–7
- ^ Carver 2003, p.195
- ^ Coulthard-Clark 1998, p. 123.
- ^ Gullett 1941, p. 242
- ^ Hill 1978, pp. 93–4
- ^ Powles 1922, p. 79
- ^ McPherson, et.al. 1985, pp. 184-186
- ^ Wavell 1968, p. 70
- ^ Cutlack 1941, pp. 51–2
- ^ Cutlack 1941, p. 52
- ^ Keogh 1955, p. 77
- ^ Cutlack 1941, pp. 49–51, 52
- ^ a b c Gullett p. 1941, p. 246
- ^ Cutlack 1941, pp. 53–55
- ^ Duguid 1919, p.75
- ^ Hill 1978, p. 74, p. 81, pp. 84–5, p. 89 pp. 91–2
- ^ Moore 1920, p. 32
- ^ Dennis et al 2008, p. 405
- ^ Bruce 2002, pp. 84 & 86
- ^ Downes 1938, p. 594
- ^ Grainger 2006, p. 4
- ^ Bruce 2002, pp. 48, 83 & 85
- ^ Bou 2009, pp. 156–7
- ^ Keogh 1955, p. 80
- ^ a b Bruce 2002, p. 88
- ^ Keogh 1955, pp. 80–1
- ^ Woodward 2006, p. 58
- ^ Downes 1938, pp. 615–6
- ^ Powles 1922, p. 81
- ^ Gullett 1941, pp. 337–8, 347
- ^ Powles 1922, pp. 86–7
- ^ a b c Blenkinsop et al 1925, p.184
- ^ Gullett 1941, pp. 257/8
- ^ Secret Military Handbook 23/1/17, pp.38-47 notes pp. 54–5
- ^ Mounted Service Manual, 1902, p.272
- ^ a b Powles 1922, p. 82
- ^ a b Erickson 2001, p. 161
- ^ Powles 1922, pp. 83–4
- ^ Keogh 1955, pp. 78–9
- ^ Bruce 2002, pp. 90–1
- ^ Downes 1938, p. 616
- ^ Blenkinsop et al. 1925, p.184
- ^ Powles 1922, pp. 82–3
- ^ Secret Military Handbrook 23/1/17 Supplies pp. 38–49 Water pp. 50-3 Notes pp. 54-5
- ^ Moore 1920, p.68
- ^ Preston 1921, p. 315
- ^ Gullett 1941, pp. 244–5
- ^ Downes 1938, p. 615
- ^ Moore 1920, p. 82
- ^ Lindsay 1992, pp. 346, 379
- ^ a b Keogh 1955, p. 78
- ^ a b Bruce 2002, pp. 89–90
- ^ a b Wavell, 1968, p. 69
- ^ a b Woodward 2006, pp. 58–9
- ^ a b Bou 2009, pp. 162–3
- ^ a b Imperial Mounted Division War Diary AWM4-1-56-1part1
- ^ Bostock 1982 p.62
- ^ Downes 1938, p. 589 & 593–4
- ^ Hill 1978, pp. 96–7
- ^ Keogh 1955, pp. 78, 80
- ^ Pugsley 2004, p. 135
- ^ 3rd Light Horse Brigade War Diary AWM4-10-3-26
- ^ Hill 1978, pp. 99–100
- ^ Mounted Service Manual 1902 p.10
- ^ Bruce 2002, pp. 90 & 91
- ^ Cutlack 1941, pp. 56–9
- ^ Downes 1938, pp. 616
- ^ Bruce 2002, p. 90
- ^ Carver 2003, pp.196–7
- ^ a b c Downes 1938, p. 618
- ^ Hill 1978, pp. 100–1
- ^ a b Powles 1922, p. 84
- ^ Bruce 2002, pp. 92-3
- ^ Keogh 1955, pp. 83-4
- ^ Gullett 1941, p. 254
- ^ Moore 1920 p.65
- ^ Powles 1922, p. 87
- ^ Bruce 2002, pp. 92–3
- ^ Anzac MD WD AWM4-1-60-13 Appendix 54
- ^ Blenkinsop et al. 1925, p. 185
- ^ Downes 1938, p. 619
- ^ Hill 1978, pp. 103-4
- ^ Powles 1922, pp. 90-3
- ^ Keogh 1955, p. 102
- ^ Moore 1920, p.67
- ^ Grainger 2006, p. 159
- ^ Preston 1921, p. 58
- ^ Falls 1930, pp. 148-52
- ^ Grainger 2006, pp. 158-9, 161-5, 170
- ^ Preston 1921, pp.66, 72-3, 76
- ^ Carver 2003, p. 219
- ^ Falls 1930, p. 175
- ^ Wavell 1968, pp. 154-5
- ^ Falls 1930, pp. 177–8
- ^ Powles 1922, pp. 146–7, 150
- ^ Carver 2003, p. 222
- ^ Wavell 1968 p. 156
- ^ Battles Nomencalture Committee 1922, p. 32
- ^ Erickson 2007 p. 128
- ^ Powles 1922, pp. 152–3
- ^ Wavell 1968 p. 173
- ^ Wavell 1968, p. 174
- ^ Woodward 2006, p. 158
- ^ Wavell 1968, pp. 174-5
- ^ a b Wavell 1968, pp. 175-6
- ^ Wavell 1968 p. 174
- ^ Woodward 2006, p. 159
- ^ Grainger 2006, p. 218
- ^ Woodward 2006, p. 161
- ^ a b c Wavell 1968, pp. 176-7
- ^ a b c d Woodward 2006, p. 162
- ^ Keogh 1955, p. 202–3
- ^ Telegram Allenby to DMI 15 January 1918 in Hughes 2004 pp. 126–7
- ^ Allenby to Robertson 25 January 1918 in Hughes 2004 p.128
- ^ Erickson 2001 pp. 174-5
- ^ Erickson 2001, p. 174
- ^ Cutlack 1941, p. 87-8
- ^ Grainger 2006, pp. 226-7
- ^ Erickson 2001 p. 160
- ^ a b c Erickson 2001, p. 193
- ^ Erickson 2001, pp. 194-5
- ^ Allenby to Robertson 25 January 1918 quoted in Woodward 2006, p. 160
- ^ Hamilton 1996, p. 99
- ^ Hamilton 1996, pp. 99-100
- ^ Powles 1922, p. 171
- ^ Hurley 1986, p. 112
- ^ Kinloch 2007, p. 33
- ^ Palazzo 2001, pp. 69-70
- ^ Pugsley 2004, p. 126
- ^ a b Allenby to Robertson 25 January 1918 in Hughes 2004, p. 127
- ^ a b Falls 1930, p. 303
- ^ a b c d e Downes 1938, pp. 679-81
- ^ a b Bou 2009, p. 185
- ^ Powles 1922, pp. 172-3
- ^ Hill 1978, p. 142
- ^ Gullett 1919, p. 17
- ^ Kinloch 2007, p. 249
- ^ Hill 1978 p. 142
- ^ a b c d e Cutlack 1941, p. 102
- ^ Powles 1922, p. 173
- ^ Wavell 1968 pp. 177-8
- ^ a b c d e Blenkinsop 1925, p. 223
- ^ Moore 1921, p. 98
- ^ a b Cutlack 1941, p. 103
- ^ Powles 1922, pp. 176-7
- ^ a b Powles 1922, p. 178
- ^ a b Moore 1921, p. 101
- ^ a b c Powles 1922, p. 179
- ^ Wavell 1968, pp. 177-8
- ^ Powles 1922, p. 182
- ^ Moore 1921, p. 103
- ^ Powles 1922 p. 184
- ^ Powles 1922, p. 183
- ^ Bruce 2002, p. 188
- ^ Erickson 2007, p. 130
- ^ Erickson 2001 p. 174
- ^ a b c Bruce 2002, p. 189
- ^ a b c d Keogh 1955, p. 208
- ^ Bruce 2002 p.190/1
- ^ Cutlack 1941, p. 92
- ^ Wavell 1968, p. 190
[edit] Bibliography
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- "1st Light Horse Brigade War Diary". First World War Diaries AWM4, 10-1-23. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. June 1916. http://www.awm.gov.au/collection/war_diaries/first_world_war/subclass.asp?levelID=1468.
- "2nd Light Horse Brigade War Diary". First World War Diaries AWM4, 10-2-10 & 20. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. November 1915 & September 1916. http://www.awm.gov.au/collection/war_diaries/first_world_war/subclass.asp?levelID=1467.
- "3rd Light Horse Brigade War Diary". First World War Diaries AWM4, 10-3-15, 17, 20, 26. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. April, June, September 1916 & March 1917. http://www.awm.gov.au/collection/war_diaries/first_world_war/subclass.asp?levelID=1469.
- "Anzac Mounted Division General Staff War Diary". First World War Diaries AWM4, 1-60-13PART1. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. March 1917. http://www.awm.gov.au/collection/war_diaries/first_world_war/subclass.asp?levelID=1338.
- "Imperial Mounted Division General Staff War Diary". First World War Diaries AWM4, 1-56-1PART1. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. February to March 1917. http://www.awm.gov.au/collection/war_diaries/first_world_war/subclass.asp?levelID=1367.
- Intelligence Section, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, Army of Great Britain. Military handbook on Palestine (1st provisional ed.). Cairo: Government Press. OCLC 220305303.
- Mounted Service Manual for Mounted Troops of the Australian Commonwealth. Sydney: Government Printer. 1902.
- The Official Names of the Battles and Other Engagements Fought by the Military Forces of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914–1919, and the third Afghan War, 1919: Report of the Battles Nomenclature Committee as Approved by The Army Council Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty. London: Government Printer. 1922. OCLC 29078007.
- Blenkinsop, L.J. & J.W. Rainey, ed (1925). History of the Great War Based on Official Documents Veterinary Services. London: H.M. Stationers. OCLC 460717714.
- Bou, Jean (2009/2010). A History of Australia's Mounted Arm. Australian Army History. Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521197083.
- Bowman-Manifold, M. G. E. (1923). An Outline of the Egyptian and Palestine Campaigns, 1914 to 1918 (2nd ed.). Catham. OCLC 224893679.
- Bruce, Anthony (2002). The Last Crusade: The Palestine Campaign in the First World War. London: John Murray Ltd. ISBN 9780719554322.
- Carver, Michael, Field Marshal Lord (2003). The National Army Museum Book of The Turkish Front 1914–1918: The Campaigns at Gallipoli, in Mesopotamia and in Palestine. London: Pan Macmillan. ISBN 9780283073472.
- Coulthard-Clark, Chris (1998). Where Australians Fought The Encyclopaedia of Australia's Battles. St.Leonards, Sydney: Allen and Unwin. ISBN 9781864486117.
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- Dennis, Peter; Jeffrey Grey, Ewan Morris, Robin Prior with Jean Bou (2008). The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History (2nd ed.). Melbourne: Oxford University Press, Australia & New Zealand. OCLC 489040963.
- R. M. Downes (1938). "The Campaign in Sinai and Palestine". Gallipoli, Palestine and New Guinea of Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services, 1914-1918 Part II in Volume 1. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/first_world_war/volume.asp?levelID=67898.
- Duguid, Charles Scotty's Brother; Department of Repatriation Australia (1919). Desert Trail with the Light Horse through Sinai to Palestine. Adelaide: W. K. Thomas & Co. OCLC 220067047.
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- Esposito, Vincent (ed.) (1959). The West Point Atlas of American Wars - Vol. 2. Frederick Praeger Press.
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- Henry Gullett (1941). "The Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine, 1914–1918". Canberra: Australian War Memorial. http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/first_world_war/volume.asp?levelID=67893.
- Hurley, Frank; Daniel O'Keefe (1986). Hurley at war: the photography and diaries of Frank Hurley in two world wars. Sydney: Fairfax Library in association with Daniel O'Keefe. OCLC 16709045.
- Hill, A. J. (1978). Chauvel of the Light Horse A Biography of General Sir Harry Chauvel, GCMG, KCB. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. ISBN 9780522841466.
- Hamilton, Patrick M. (1996). Riders of Destiny The 4th Australian Light Horse Field Ambulance 1917–18: An Autobiography and History. Gardenvale, Melbourne: Mostly Unsung Military History. ISBN 9781876179014.
- Hughes, Matthew, ed (2004). Allenby in Palestine: The Middle East Correspondence of Field Marshal Viscount Allenby June 1917 – October 1919. Army Records Society. 22. Phoenix Mill, Thrupp, Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing Ltd. ISBN 9780750938419.
- Keegan, John (1998). The First World War. Random House Press.
- Keogh, E. G.; Joan Graham (1955). Suez to Aleppo. Melbourne: Directorate of Military Training by Wilkie & Co. OCLC 220029983.
- Kinloch, Terry (2007). Devils on Horses in the words of the Anzacs in the Middle East 1916–19. Auckland: Exisle Publishing. ISBN 9780908988945.
- Lindsay, Neville (1992). Equal to the Task Volume 1 The Royal Australian Army Service Corps. Kenmore: Historia Productions. OCLC 28994468.
- Moore, A. Briscoe (1920). The Mounted Riflemen in Sinai & Palestine The Story of New Zealand's Crusaders. (Christchurch: Whitcombe & Tombs Ltd. OCLC 561949575.
- McPherson, Joseph W. (1985). Barry Carman, John McPherson. ed. The man who loved Egypt Bimbashi McPherson. London: Ariel Books BBC. ISBN 9780563204374.
- Palazzo, Albert (2001). The Australian Army A History of its Organisation 1901-2001. South Melbourne: Oxford University Press. OCLC 612818143.
- Powles, C. Guy; A. Wilkie (1922). The New Zealanders in Sinai and Palestine. Official History New Zealand's Effort in the Great War, Volume III. Auckland: Whitcombe & Tombs Ltd. OCLC 2959465.
- Preston, R. M. P. (1921). The Desert Mounted Corps: An Account of the Cavalry Operations in Palestine and Syria 1917–1918. London: Constable & Co. OCLC 3900439.
- Pugsley, Christoper (2004). The Anzac Experience New Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War. Auckland: Reed Books. ISBN 9780790009414.
- Wavell, Field Marshal Earl (1968). E.W. Sheppard. ed. The Palestine Campaigns. A Short History of the British Army 4th edition (3rd 13th printing ed.). London: Constable & Co.
- Woodward, David R. (2006). Hell in the Holy Land World War I in the Middle East. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 9780813123837.
- Woodward, David R. (2006). Forgotten Soldiers of the First World War - Lost Voices from the Middle Eastern Front. (Tempus Publishing).
[edit] External links
- First World War.com. Defence of the Suez Canal, 1915. Retrieved 19 December 2005.
- Australian Light Horse Studies Centre
- Palestine pages of 'Turkey in WW1' web site
- Sinai campaign (NZHistory.net.nz)
- Palestine campaign (NZHistory.net.nz)
- The Photographs of Palestine Campaign
- Library of Congress's American Colony in Jerusalem's Photo Album
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