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Customer Review
Reviewed in the United States on December 1, 2010
This is a stand alone book, but it builds on the work Colonel Macgregor did in his earlier book. "Breaking the Phalanx." The first book dealt with tactical and operational issues of command and control (C2) and force structure in the Information Age. This book builds the case that information technology enables the creation multi-service, joint military commands and operations. And that the threat environment of the 21st Century makes the use of joint commands a necessity.
As in his previous book, Macgregor demonstrates his understanding that Command, Control, Computers, Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Systems. C4ISR Systems are information driven and allow battlefield awareness to be pushed to the top of the command structure while allowing decision making to pushed down to the tactical level of a command structure. This is brought about by the fact that functioning C4ISR systems simultaneously provide near real time information (situational awareness) to all levels of a military force.
This availability of information allows force structures to be both more flexible and to execute rapid maneuver warfare using dispersed tactical units. Also Macgregor believes that common or at least inter-operable C4ISR Systems make joint operational commands feasible. He argues that warfare in the 21st Century will require multi-service joint operations using small mission oriented modules of air, ground, and naval units. Again such joint operations are made possible by sharing a common and timely information base.
Perhaps most importantly, Macgregor discusses the cultural change that must take place among the Officer Corps of the U.S. Armed Forces to take advantage of the transformational opportunity offered by information technology, especially the ease with which information can be transmitted and processed. He is especially concerned to break the culture of what he refers to as the garrison mentality which encourages risk aversion, strict adherence to command hierarchies, and discourages initiative and creativity especially by junior officers. The qualities found in wartime combat leadership he feels should replace that of peacetime garrison thinking which now pervades the armed forces.
In the end Macgregor builds a good case for the fact that military transformation is not about new technology, but is cultural and structural change in response to new technologies or new threats to national security.
Most of Macgregor's ideas especially about cultural change have proved too radical for the Army, although the Army is replacing its divisional structures with the smaller, "more agile" brigade group concept. What is surprising is the resistance of all the services to adopting a single compatible C4ISR system that would all for inter-operability and make joint operations a reality. This resistance is caused by parochialism, lack of effective leadership by the Joint Chiefs, and the simple fact that the services don't really want to conduct joint operations.
As in his previous book, Macgregor demonstrates his understanding that Command, Control, Computers, Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Systems. C4ISR Systems are information driven and allow battlefield awareness to be pushed to the top of the command structure while allowing decision making to pushed down to the tactical level of a command structure. This is brought about by the fact that functioning C4ISR systems simultaneously provide near real time information (situational awareness) to all levels of a military force.
This availability of information allows force structures to be both more flexible and to execute rapid maneuver warfare using dispersed tactical units. Also Macgregor believes that common or at least inter-operable C4ISR Systems make joint operational commands feasible. He argues that warfare in the 21st Century will require multi-service joint operations using small mission oriented modules of air, ground, and naval units. Again such joint operations are made possible by sharing a common and timely information base.
Perhaps most importantly, Macgregor discusses the cultural change that must take place among the Officer Corps of the U.S. Armed Forces to take advantage of the transformational opportunity offered by information technology, especially the ease with which information can be transmitted and processed. He is especially concerned to break the culture of what he refers to as the garrison mentality which encourages risk aversion, strict adherence to command hierarchies, and discourages initiative and creativity especially by junior officers. The qualities found in wartime combat leadership he feels should replace that of peacetime garrison thinking which now pervades the armed forces.
In the end Macgregor builds a good case for the fact that military transformation is not about new technology, but is cultural and structural change in response to new technologies or new threats to national security.
Most of Macgregor's ideas especially about cultural change have proved too radical for the Army, although the Army is replacing its divisional structures with the smaller, "more agile" brigade group concept. What is surprising is the resistance of all the services to adopting a single compatible C4ISR system that would all for inter-operability and make joint operations a reality. This resistance is caused by parochialism, lack of effective leadership by the Joint Chiefs, and the simple fact that the services don't really want to conduct joint operations.
