The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile): Ia Drang to Khe Sanh
by Al Berke

The Ia Drang Valley Campaign (continued)

The morning of 15th November opened up with a three-pronged NVA assault against LZ X-Ray. C Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry was hit hardest and partially overrun. The commitment of Battalion reserves and the arrival of another company from 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry restored the situation, but C Company lost 42 killed and 20 wounded in the fierce fighting. Once again, massive support from artillery and air forces inflicted severe casualties on the NVA and VC attackers. The massed fires of the battalion's weapons were just as significant, especially in Delta Company's sector, where nine M-60 machine guns swept the enemy away (Moore, 202). 

With the NVA attack broken and the arrival of 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, it was now possible to rescue the isolated platoon, which had suffered nine dead and thirteen wounded out of a total of 29 men (Moore, 228).

The last major attack took place early in the morning on 16th November. The US defenders, with two battalions, 24 105mm howitzers and air support to call upon, repulsed the assaults while inflicting heavy losses on the NVA and VC. This essentially ended the battle for LZ X-Ray. The 1st Cavalry had lost 79 men killed and 121 wounded in three days while inflicting an estimated 2000 killed and wounded on the NVA and VC (Moore, 258). But this was only the first act in the Ia Drang Valley campaign. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, which had borne the brunt of the fighting, was airlifted out after the rest of 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry arrived at the LZ. With B-52 heavy bomber strikes scheduled on the Chu Pong Massiff, LZ X-Ray was to be evacuated on 17 November. Both remaining battalions marched to a near by LZ, where 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry split off to go on to a new landing zone called Albany. Due to the urgency of displacing out of the way of the B-52 strike, the movement had been hurriedly planned and there appears to have been a lot of confusion as to the purpose of the movement (Moore, 279-280). There was also some complacency as to NVA forces and intentions due to the heavy casualties suffered in the previous days. Unknown to the US forces was the location of fresh forces in the vicinity of LZ Albany, to include the 8th Battalion, 66th NVA Regiment. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry marched towards the LZ in a long column through tall grass with limited visibility, with the attached Alfa Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry bringing up the rear. The column stopped when several prisoners were captured. Most of the companies took a break and did not put out much in the way of scouts and security. No supporting artillery fire had been registered. To make matters worse, all of the company commanders had been called up to the head of the column for a conference. The subsequent NVA attack hit a unit for the most part strung out and leaderless. At LZ Albany two platoons of A Company were overrun before the remnants, the command group and the recon platoon were able to form a perimeter. Charlie, Delta and the Headquarters Company were overrun, with the survivors either lying low or eventually joining either the troops at the LZ or the perimeter set up by Alfa Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry. It took over an hour for the situation to clarify enough to allow artillery and air support. The old propeller driven A-1E Skyraiders were especially effective, using napalm to break up NVA attacks. Each of the two perimeters was reinforced by a cavalry company that evening, rendering their situation fairly secure. This was not the case for the soldiers outside of the perimeters, who were faced with both friendly fire and NVA soldiers who killed any survivors they found. By the morning of the 18th, the NVA had withdrawn. The US suffered 151 killed, 121 wounded and four missing in action, whose bodies were later recovered by 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry. The NVA lost over 400 confirmed dead (Moore, 398, 411).

Comparing the two major engagements of the Ia Drang Valley campaign show more differences than similarities. Air and artillery support obviously played a crucial role in breaking up attacks both cases, but massed fire support cannot win the battle alone, especially when the forces are involved in close combat. One of the advantages of airmobility is the ability to rapidly reinforce an initial contact. This only works if sufficient reserves are available. One of the problems at both LZ X-Ray and LZ Albany was that the Division was spread out on other missions so it took too long to muster up reinforcements. Other than the lack of sufficient reserves, LZ X-Ray was a well-planned air assault that took advantage of both air mobility and fire support. Though not anticipating that they would be facing a regimental size force, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry reacted quickly to changing circumstances and successfully held the LZ perimeter against over three times their number. Despite the shortcomings revealed, the battle at LZ X-Ray and the engagements leading up to it showed that the doctrine of airmobility could work on the battlefield. By contrast, the events at LZ Albany resulted from a lack of planning and preparation, negating all the strengths of an Airmobile formation. Only the heroics of the soldiers on the ground and the belated arrival of air and artillery support saved 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry from a repeat of Custer's Last Stand. 

Stanton probably best summed up the lessons learned during the Ia Drang Valley campaign:

"Airmobile operations had to be characterized by careful planning and followed by deliberate, bold, and violent execution. While the division could helicopter its troops throughout the battle zone, regardless of terrain restrictions, faster than any other organization and decisively engage distant units by vertical air assault, this flexible striking power places a very high premium on thorough preparation and the availability of sufficient reserves." (65)

Quang Tri and Hue (Stanton, 117)

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