The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile): Ia Drang to Khe Sanh
by Al Berke

Tet 1968

Let's move forward about two years. The First Team spent most of this time in the coastal province of Binh Dinh, clearing NVA and VC forces out of fortified locations and attempting to pacify the region. Due to the policy of limiting Vietnam tours to one year and rotating commanders every six months, personnel in the First Cavalry Division had turned over several times. It still maintained the reputation of an elite division, helped not only by a high espirit de corp, but also by having priority on quality replacements and logistics support.

Increased NVA activity in the northern part of South Vietnam had risen to the point where Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) directed the First Cavalry Division (Airmobile) to shift its base of operations 200 miles north to the I CTZ. The 2nd Brigade stayed behind to safeguard Binh Dinh Province and was replaced by the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division (Stanton,113). Assigned the mission to guard the area between Quang Tri and Hue, the First Cavalry had been unknowingly put into what was to become some of the fiercest fighting of the Tet offensive. On 31 January 1968 heavy fighting broke out all over Vietnam as the Tet offensive got underway. The 1st Brigade's base camp was at LZ Betty, located close to Quang Tri, which was under heavy attack by NVA and VC forces. A counterattack was quickly put together that maximized the advantages of airmobility. Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry conducted an air assault directly on top of the heavy weapons of the 812 NVA Regiment while B Company landed behind the enemy position. After hours of heavy fighting the NVA abandoned the field. In a separate attack, one company from 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry attacked the rear of the K-6 Battalion, 812 NVA Regiment while another company took up a blocking position. Caught between the Cavalry and the ARVN defenders and pounded by gunships, the NVA battalion was soundly defeated. With much of its combat power rendered ineffective, the NVA and VC force gave up the attack and withdrew in disorder (Stanton, 116-119). This was only the first of several battles over the next few months were the cavalry truly came to the rescue. 

To the south, the 3rd Brigade was committed to the much larger battle surrounding the city of Hue, parts of which were held by around 7000 NVA and VC. This was much more of a straight up infantry fight centered around the struggle to recapture the town of Thon La Chu. Poor weather limited the availability of air support and the airlifting of artillery for support. The 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry was stopped and then cut off by a regimental level counterattack. Taking a page from the NVA's book, the battalion successfully withdrew by slipping away under cover of darkness (Stanton, 123-124). The fortified NVA defenses were so strong that it eventually took a bunker-by-bunker attack by four battalions on 21 February to clear Thon La Chu. Its capture was significant as it not only allowed the cutting of the NVA supply lines to Hue, but opened up the US supply lines from Quang Tri. The Brigade continued to advance on Hue from the north, slowly overcoming several lines of fortified positions and finally reaching the city on 25 February. (Stanton, 128) 

Operation PEGASUS Phase One (Tolson, 173)

The Relief of Khe Sanh

The US Marines at Khe Sanh had been under siege since 21 January 1968. After the Tet Offensive had been halted a relief expedition was put together and the 1st Cavalry Division was chosen to be the spearhead (Summers, 217). The plan, code named Operation PEGASUS, was to mount a division sized cavalry raid designed to slice through to Khe Sanh and open up the highway for the rest of the road bound relief force. Planning and preparation for the operation was intense. Landing Zone Stud was quickly turned into a major logistics and operational hub. On 25 March, the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry began scouting the planned route of attack. As enemy targets, especially Anti-Aircraft concentrations, were spotted, they were either destroyed on the spot or noted for follow on attacks by aircraft and artillery. 

Khe Sanh and Vicinity (Stanton, 137)

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