[A-List] US imperialism: Brzezinski speaks

["Keaney Michael" <Michael.Keaney@xxxxxx>]

If we fight, it must be in a way to legitimize global U.S. role

Opinion Zbigniew Brzezinski

Zbigniew Brzezinski

There is a right and a wrong way for America to wage war. Obviously, if
it is attacked, America must respond with all its might. The same is
true if an ally is attacked. But the issue becomes much more complex if
a threat, but not an attack, is involved. America must consider
carefully the consequences of its actions, for itself as the world's
preeminent power and for the long-term evolution of the international
system as a whole.
The United States may have to go to war to oust Saddam Hussein from
power in Iraq because the potential nexus between conspiratorial
terrorism and the weapons of mass destruction Hussein is said to be
producing cannot be blithely ignored. But war is too serious a business
and too unpredictable in its results to be undertaken because of a
personal peeve, demagogically articulated fears or vague factual
assertions.
If it is to be war, it should be conducted in a manner that legitimizes
U.S. global hegemony and, at the same time, contributes to a more
responsible system of international security. Accordingly, several
essential steps should be followed:
(1) The president himself has to make, in a speech addressed to the
nation, a careful, reasoned case, without sloganeering, on the specifics
of the threat. Detailed evidence needs to be presented that the threat
is both grave and imminent. An explanation is also needed as to why one
member of "the axis of evil" is seen as more menacing than others. The
president's 
 case should serve as the basis for serious and searching consultations
with Congress and key allies as well as other interested states.
(2) Iraq's defiance of the international community is the central issue
that should concern the world. Hence the focus of the U.S. concern must
be on weapons of mass destruction that Iraq may be surreptitiously
seeking to produce in contravention of U.N. resolutions, and not on
Saddam Hussein personally.
Insofar as Iraqi weapons of mass destruction are concerned, a persuasive
case needs to be made as to why, in the U.S. view, deterrence no longer
suffices. The often cited formula that Hussein used weapons of mass
destruction (specifically gas) against his own people ignores the fact
that he did not use such weapons in 1991 against U.S. troops or Israel,
both of which had the capacity to retaliate and thus to deter.
(3) The United States should itself take the lead in formulating
detailed plans for a genuinely intrusive and comprehensive inspection
regime, one that would define the rules of the game for Iraq's
compliance with the will of the international community. America's
European allies would find it difficult not to go along with this, while
Iraq's recalcitrance - either by outright refusal or efforts to sabotage
the inspection process - would then 
 provide a highly legitimate casus belli for military action.
(4) As the United States positions itself for war, it must become more
active in pacifying the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by pressuring both
sides. The standoff between Ariel Sharon and Yasser Arafat has undone
much of the progress achieved after Oslo, while inflicting massive
suffering on the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. In the absence of any
serious effort by the Bush administration to push the Israelis and
Palestinians toward peace, there is a high risk that a U.S. assault on
Iraq will be perceived as part of an American-Israeli effort to impose a
new order on the Middle East without regard for either Iraqi or
Palestinian civilian casualties.
(5) The United States should soon begin discussions with its allies as
well as other concerned powers, including Arab friends, regarding
possible postwar arrangements for Iraq, including a prolonged collective
security presence and plans for international financing of the social
rehabilitation of the country. Doing so would reinforce the credibility
of the U.S. determination to use force in the event that a nonviolent
resolution of the issue proves to be impossible.
It follows from the above that there is also a wrong way for America to
initiate a war. That can be stated very briefly:
(1) The initiation of a war should not be decided in camera by the
president alone with just a few of his own appointees, without regard
for either American or global public opinion.
(2) Public support should not be generated by fear-mongering or
demagogy, with some of it encouraged 
 by parties with a strategic interest in fostering American-Arab
hostility. Particularly disturbing has been the news report that some
members of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board have been pushing, in
addition to war with Iraq, a confrontation in U.S.-Saudi Arabian
relations.
(3) War should not start with a bolt from the blue but be the
consequence of demonstrated Iraqi unwillingness to accept international
rules. A sudden launching of war could prompt many to justify any
subsequent Iraqi retaliation against America or Israel, even with a
weapon of mass destruction, while setting a dangerous example of an
essentially Darwinian international system characterized by sudden,
preemptive attacks.
War should be waged with meticulous attention to minimizing civilian
casualties, given the widespread view abroad that U.S.-sponsored
sanctions have already badly and unfairly hurt the Iraqi population.
Ultimately what is at stake is something far greater than Iraq: It is
the character of the international system and the role in it of the most
powerful state. Neither the White House nor the American people should
ignore the fact that America's enemies will do everything possible to
present the United States as a global gangster. Yet without a respected
and legitimate law-enforcer, global security could be in serious
jeopardy. America must thus walk a fine line in determining when, in
what circumstances and how it acts as such in initiating the use of
force.
 Zbigniew Brzezinski was national security adviser to President Carter 

The Guardian Weekly 22-8-2002, page 26