[A-List] France: ready to renege?

["Michael Keaney" <michael.keaney@xxxxxx>]

The value of this apparently hawkish article is its objective analysis of
the current Chirac position. It can be characterised as one of "constructive
ambiguity", to use the favoured Clinton technique of getting everyone to
agree to anything. It underlines the importance of supporting Schröder's
resistance to war, since his capitulation would result in the greatest loss
for all concerned. The German press is already convinced, has been for long
enough, that Chirac will renege and leave Schröder in the lurch, and there
is a strong element of that sentiment in British coverage also. The US
regime is simply livid that anyone should not immediately bow and scrape
before the madness of King Dubya, and Perle and co. will harbour grievances
to their respective graves. However Chirac is best understood as playing a
tactical game designed to enhance the French state, in best Gaullist
tradition, whilst Schröder is working frantically to shore up his position
any which way he can, knowing ultimately that, thanks to the permanently
burned bridges with Bush, Perle and co., his only real option is to play a
more nationalist card and engage in the sort of progressive nationalism that
Néstor refers to in connection with Rodriguez Sáa in Argentina. Most, I
suppose, will take offence at the drawing of parallels between Germany, a
member of the bourgeois metropolis and key player in the imperialist chain,
being compared alongside the very much subjugated Argentina. However, the
gift of the Bush administration, if it may be so described, is to have so
brazenly revealed the true state of relations within the imperialist chain,
which they have chosen to yank without due recourse to the diplomatic
niceties and liberal shibboleths that would have characterised a
Clinton/Gore approach to international relations. Thus Germany, in what will
become a growing list of states, is being forced to consider its position
within this chain.

On Marxmail, João Paulo Monteiro wrote:

"I think it is our duty to encourage, support and lock in any break up
between the imperialists, particularly a situation where EU (Paris-Berlin
axis) imperialism falls out definitely with the US, for which it will have
to seek the support of Russia, China, India, Latin America and Africa."

Néstor responded:

"This is very insightful. In fact, it is easy to see that whenever the
imperialist bloc splits, cracks or gets frayed opportunities arise for
semicolonial countries. The whole history of industrialization in South
America bears witness."

The Bush administration is making clear that it equates "ally" with
semicolonial status, and those regimes that don't fall into line risk
falling, period. Schröder's deeply precarious position domestically gives
added impetus to US efforts to unseat him, aided and abetted by a woefully
misunderstanding (or despicably treacherous) opposition quite sanguine about
restoring US sovereignty over Berlin, thereby strangulating any further
emergence of independent thought there and in Brussels.

The stupidity of the Bush administration, in particular people like Rumsfeld
and Perle, makes it more difficult for Schröder and even Chirac (though not
impossible in his case) to capitulate, given their previous depictions of
these leaders as undesirable, no longer allies, or (as in the case of
France, according to Perle) requiring to be "contained". It's difficult to
cosy up to people like that. Be thankful for Richard Perle.

------

A way for France to come back into the fold
By Lawrence Freedman
Financial Times: February 12 2003

One feature of the Gulf conflict of 1990-91 was a series of independent
French initiatives, usually launched with the minimum of consultation, to
provide Iraq with a diplomatic way out of its invasion of Kuwait. These
initiatives always petered out having satisfied nobody, normally because
they brought no real solution to the dispute.

Once again the French are arguing against a rush to war, this time with
Russia and Germany as allies. And once again there is less to the French
initiative than meets the eye. France accepts that Iraq is hovering close to
a fundamental "material breach" of United Nations Security Council
resolution 1441 but insists this has yet to be proved. Hence its call for
the reinforcement of UN weapons inspectors. But the suggested reinforcements
are modest, not least because the plan has been watered down since being
leaked at the weekend. And the plan offers no new diplomatic exit for Saddam
Hussein, only that more negotiations on inspections might steal him more
time.

As Hans Blix, the chief weapons inspector, has noted, the French plan does
not help him much. He has not asked for more inspectors but more
co-operation from the Iraqi regime. When he was head of the International
Atomic Energy Agency he was given the runaround by the Iraqis and he is not
inclined to let that happen again. Mr Blix keeps returning to the central
question left over from the 1990s inspections: the fate of the substantial
quantities of chemical weapons precursors, agents and munitions and also of
Iraq's biological weapons programme, the existence of which Baghdad only
grudgingly acknowledged in 1995.

The Iraqi leader has denied that these programmes still exist but has failed
to provide supporting evidence. Rather he has challenged the inspectors to
prove him wrong, after first seeing how far he can go to impede their work.
President Jacques Chirac appears ready to accept this challenge. Certainly
strengthened procedures, including those agreed last weekend, increase the
possibility of finding a "smoking gun". But better intelligence is also
required. So far the UK has been the main provider. The US is now stepping
up its intelligence co-operation. However, France and Russia, Iraq's two
main arms suppliers from the 1980s, have so far offered little. Here is one
way to demonstrate their commitment to strengthened inspections.

Resolution 1441 demands that the Iraqis show and tell and this has yet to
happen. Previous promises of concessions have been followed by
procrastination. If Mr Blix wants more time to assess any change of heart in
Baghdad, his report to the Security Council on Friday will be less
conclusive than expected. Either way, real progress will be needed for the
following report at the end of the month.

So in practice Dr Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, the IAEA chief, have the swing
votes in the Security Council. It is hard to see how Mr Chirac can insist on
more inspections if the inspectors themselves offer no hope of progress. But
if the inspectors are mildly hopeful, and a majority in the Security Council
concurs, it will be difficult for Britain and the US to use force without a
second resolution. They would have to demand that inspections be abandoned
abruptly so that war could begin.

During the 1990-91 conflict Mr Hussein found divisions among the big powers
good reason to drag his feet. For that reason, if this crisis is to be
resolved without war and without further lasting damage to Atlantic
relations, the current divisions must be tackled. The Americans and the
British need to restrain their irritation with French grandstanding and
reassure public opinion. Their sound argument that only a strong line can
extract Iraqi concessions is undermined if it appears that only war and
regime change will satisfy them. The fact that France and Russia are are now
prepared to contemplate a tougher inspections regime - whereas in 1998 they
were happy to leave Iraq alone - shows how far the hard US line has already
moved international opinion.

Although the French proposal amounts to a minor diversion, it could be used
as giving France, along with Russia and Germany, a greater stake in the
inspections process. The quid pro quo, however, must be a readiness to
accept the logic of enforcement. The big question remains unanswered: if
this plan can not serve as a third way, between tolerance of Iraq's
non-compliance and a disruptive war, which way will France then turn?

The writer is professor of war studies at King's College, London