Overview of the Origins of DIA
In l96l, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
made his decision to proceed with the concept of a central Defense
intelligence
organization to correct longstanding maladies in military intelligence.
Moreover, the need existed for a central Defense organization
that could satisfy effectively the foreign military and military-related
intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Commands, other Defense
components and, as appropriate, non-Defense agencies.
Two themes stood out prior to the establishment of DIA--the lack
of management efficiency and the often poor quality of the products.
They had been foremost of the many ills attributed to military
intelligence after World War II. Numerous studies throughout the
l950's had determined that to correct these deficiencies, the fundamental
concept under which military intelligence activities operated had
to be evaluated and a new organizational structure considered.
Those who puzzled over how best to accomplish this objective probably
would have been intimidated in their deliberations if the magnitudes
of the forthcoming technological achievement, information explosion,
and increase in world tensions had been known. Even before 1961,
indications existed that the Nation--and the Intelligence Community--were
embarking on a new and hazardous era. In one sense, this environment
spawned the DIA.
It was not a single event or decision which produced DIA, although
a few observers have claimed that the Agency owed its existence
to the post-Sputnik "missile gap" debate of the late
1950's. While this contributed, the "causes" which "effected" a
DIA were much more complex, producing an equally complex organization.
DIA not only was the fruition of a concept, but it represented
for Defense intelligence, i.e., military intelligence, a departure
from the past and the appointment of a standard-bearer for the
future. Critics doubts over efforts to define and develop a central,
efficient Defense intelligence authority and organization stemmed
from a failure to acknowledge the cause-and-effect relationship
that the changing political, military, and social environment had
on intelligence requirements, collection, production, and resources.
Traditionally, military leaders and theorists had acknowledged
only the tactical value of intelligence, which limited its products
to wartime use. World War II changed this notion by emphasizing
the strategic aspect of intelligence and the need for a peacetime
intelligence organization. While intelligence flourished in resources
and methods during wartime, these gains continued to be offset
by the waning of the same during the periods of peace.
The tragedy of Pearl Harbor and regret over what might never have
occurred had there been an adequate warning system gave impetus
more than any other event to this nation's long and vicissitudinous
search for an efficient, comprehensive intelligence system. The
development of an integrated community stemmed from inadequate
Service efforts in the pre-World War II days, and branched into
numerous trial-and-error reiterations of old functions in new organizational
frameworks as a result of the War. It then underwent a strained
process of consolidation and refinement in the l950's largely brought
about by advanced technologies in a realigned world. As so often
is the case, process ultimately spawns a system. Thus, the advent
of DIA should be considered a major evolutionary milestone in the
series of organizational and functional military intelligence events
as the Nation refined its overall national intelligence system
to meet new challenges.
The origins of the DIA generally are credited to the late-l950's;
however, the need for--and perhaps the conceptual and structural
precedents of--a unified military intelligence organization can
be traced to the early l940's. One of the earliest traces of formal
military intelligence cooperation was the Joint Intelligence Committee
(JIC) created in l94l as a coordinating mechanism of the fledgling
Joint Chiefs of Staff organization (although it can be argued that
the Joint Army-Navy Board established in l905 sought interservice
cooperation in intelligence matters as U.S. involvement in World
War I became imminent). The Committee consisted of the directors
and representatives of the intelligence organs of the Army, the
Navy, the State Department, the Board of Economic Warfare, and
the Coordinator of Information (COI).
The creation of the COI, and its redesignation by President Roosevelt
on 13 June l942 as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)--the
forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)--had not solved
the multitude of problems associated with military intelligence.
That was not intended, but it did add fuel to the post-war debate
over intelligence. The OSS fulfilled the wartime need for reliable,
integrated, national intelligence information, but competition
with the Military Departments hampered its efforts. When General
William Donovan of the OSS proposed that President Roosevelt establish
an independent intelligence agency responding directly to the President,
the issue was opposed by the Military Departments. After the war
ended and President Harry S. Truman had disbanded the OSS, the
Military Departments and State convinced the policy-makers that
each department should retain autonomy over its own intelligence
functions since each had independent needs. They acknowledged,
however, that greater coordination was necessary.
In January l946 the National Intelligence Authority, with its
staff arm, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), was established
by President Truman for the coordination, planning, evaluation,
and dissemination of intelligence. Its budget and staff were drawn
from the Military and State Departments. The Director of Central
Intelligence position was established to head the organization.
Thus, the Military and State Departments retained control over
their own resources, influenced the CIG, and maintained their direct
advisory relationships with the President.
In l946, the congressional Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack recommended the integration of all Army
and Navy intelligence organizations. "Operational and intelligence
work required centralization of authority and clear-cut allocation
of responsibility," the committee wrote. By l947 a realization
had emerged that increased integration of Service intelligence
and improved joint operations were essential to maintain pace with
the widening global nature of U.S. security issues and technological
progress. The National Security Act of 1947 was the first step
toward reordering an outmoded system.
The l947 Act consolidated the separate Military Services into
the National Military Establishment, created the National Security
Council (NSC) as an advisory group to the President, and established
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Act gave the CIA and
the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) responsibility for "coordinating
the intelligence activities of the several Government departments
and agencies in the interest of national security."
After the Central Intelligence Agency was established in 1947
the institutional claims of the Military and State Departments
continued to plague that Agency. The CIG precedent, in which the
Military and State Departments maintained control over their own
resources, resurfaced whenever centralized control over the fragmented
military intelligence apparatus was considered. Consequently, the
task of reordering an inveterate system was a monumental undertaking
that took until 1961 to achieve.
The National Security Act of l947 had been purposely vague in
defining CIA's responsibilities. The Military and State Departments
opposed centralized management, arguing that to be prepared to
conduct wartime operations they must exercise control over peacetime
intelligence activities. The result was essentially a compromise.
CIA became a "coordinator" in a confederation of departmental
intelligence organizations. (When DIA was established in l96l,
Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric specifically instructed
that DIA would not be a "confederation" for managing
Defense intelligence.)
To advise the DCI in discharging his duties, President Truman
in l948 instituted the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC)--a
predecessor of the United States Intelligence Board established
in l958. The IAC included each of the Military Services, the Department
of State, CIA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Atomic
Energy Commission. A major deficiency of the Committee was that
at this highest level of national intelligence deliberation, the
Department of Defense was not represented. Moreover, poor coordination,
insufficient involvement, and unclear authority hampered the IAC's
effectiveness.
The National Security Act left basically intact the JCS arrangement
of the Joint Intelligence Committee within the Joint Staff. Thus,
the JCS concept of part-time interservice committees supported
by a full-time staff under a single director (Director of the Joint
Staff) continued. During the War, the JIC's purpose had been to
furnish "agreed military intelligence" in various forms
to other agencies of the JCS and represent them on the Allied wartime
Combined Intelligence Committee. The JIC did not unify military
intelligence components, and it failed to produce composite national
intelligence estimates. It did, however, provide organizational
precedent for DIA.
The working level of the JIC was called the Joint Intelligence
Subcommittee Staff. Officers from theMilitary Services were assigned
full-time to this body, later renamed the Joint Intelligence Staff.
Subsequently, the Joint Intelligence Staff became the Joint Intelligence
Group (JIG), or the J-2. The JIG responded to the Director of the
Joint Staff as well as the Joint Intelligence Committee. Reports
from the Joint Intelligence Committee went directly to the JCS;
the Director of the Joint Staff also reported directly to the JCS.
Thus, the JCS received intelligence from the working level through
two avenues. The dual reporting chain proved to be a recurring
concept in Defense intelligence.
The Joint Intelligence Committee alternated leadership between
the Deputy Director, Intelligence of the Joint Staff and the senior
military member of the Service intelligence organizations. Furthermore,
each of the members of the JIC was also a member of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee. The JIC composition included the Army G-2,
the Chief of Naval Intelligence, the Chief of the Directorate of
Intelligence of the Air Force, and the Chief of the JIG.
In l948, President Truman appointed a commission under former
President Herbert Hoover to assess the organizational effectiveness
of the Executive Branch of Government. The purpose of the Commission
was to determine if the provisions of the National Security Act
established ". . . a comprehensive program for the future
security of the United States . . . ." Moreover, organizational
ties between departments and agencies required greater definition
since there existed structural overlap and incompatibilities, circuitous
reporting chains, and unclear authorities.
The Commission organized a special task force to examine closely
the national security apparatus, especially the intelligence network.
Concerning the National Military Establishment, the Commission
noted that it lacked "centralized authority" which "should
be placed firmly in the Secretary of Defense." Moreover, ".
. . the continuance of intense interservice rivalries hampers and
confuses sound policy at many points. One of our greatest needs
is to elevate military thinking to a plane above individual service
aims and ambitions." As for the JCS, they were described as ".
. . too remote from related groups . . ." such as the National
Security Council and the CIA. ". . . A spirit of teamwork
must govern interagency intelligence relationships."
The task force pointed out that research and development elements
within the Government required specialized intelligence just as
each of the Services collected data peculiar to their interests.
Scientific and medical intelligence was of special concern since
it had been neglected in the past.
Wasteful duplication, personnel problems, unsatisfactory coordination,
and conflicting intelligence estimates were also singled out as "disturbing
inadequacies." In regards to estimates, the task force was:
. . . convinced that too many disparate intelligence estimates
have been made by the individual departmental intelligence services;
that these separate estimates have often been subjective and
biased, that the capabilities of potential enemies have frequently
been interpreted as their intentions, and that a more comprehensive
collection system, better coordination and more mature experienced
evaluation are imperative.
To address these problems, the task force suggested that, ".
. . a better mechanism than now exists for coordinating the service
intelligence agencies in the Secretary's office should be established
. . . and that the Secretary must be, per se, the coordinator of
intelligence and all other activities within the military establishment." Furthermore,
it recommended a joint committee on foreign intelligence to improve
coordination, assure the public of the essential need for intelligence,
and promote awareness of the significance of intelligence by highlighting
its accomplishments.
The findings of the Commission led to the l949 amendments to the
National Security Act and the Central Intelligence Act of l949.
Better coordination and control resulted, and the intelligence
responsibilities of the JCS were better defined. Perhaps the
most noteworthy aspect of the Commission's report was that deficiencies
the task force identified in l948 were the same ones for which
the Defense Intelligence Agency was established in 1961 to correct.
The concept of strategic intelligence and the development of multi-source
collection which emerged from World War II signalled a new age
in intelligence operations for the military establishment. Advances
in technology had much to do with this change. For example, intelligence
collected on foreign technical developments was vital in order
to prevent technological surprise, to identify weaknesses in foreign
weaponsystems, and to study foreign technological developments
and weapons as indications of strategic intent. In addition, U.S.
research and development efforts benefitted from foreign technology.
The start of the "Cold War" saw the growth of competition
between the U.S. and Soviet Union in the development of weapons--first
the atomic bomb (replicated by the Soviets in l949) and then in
ICBM and space programs in the l950's. Remote-sensing techniques
and extensive engineering analysis added what was not available
through direct means of intelligence collection. In l948, the Air
Targets Division, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters USAF,
initiated Project Treasure Island which was an effort to determine
certain economic information concerning the Soviet Union which
might be utilized in the event of war. In fact, each Service formulated
intelligence missions according to their needs, often duplicating
or competing against one another in their efforts.
Mushrooming military technological capabilities served to inhibit
cooperation between the Service intelligence organizations and
to undermine the credibility of their products. Technological change
was expensive, and available resources were diminishing. This resulted
in keen competition for these resources and bias in the intelligence
products as each Service sought to acquire and apply the new technologies.
The "bomber gap" and "missile gap" theories
of the l950's perhaps illustrate this phenomenon best.
In l949 the Defense Department formed the jointly manned Armed
Forces Security Agency (AFSA) to administer strategic communications
and intelligence functions, cryptology, code development and code
breaking, and coordination of similar activities by other Defense
organizations. On 4 November 1952, AFSA became the National Security
Agency (NSA), by classified Presidential directive, with similar
duties as the AFSA. On the surface, it appeared that a model for
jointly manned, centralized intelligence activity under DoD had
been established. When DIA was established in 1961, however, its
mission would include all aspects of Defense intelligence activities
and cut at the heart of the traditional military organization.
From its inception in 1947, the Directorate of Intelligence of
the Air Force included an element in which there was joint-service
participation. It had inherited as the nucleus of its air-targeting
function the remnants of the Joint Air Targets Group in which there
was still Army and Navy participation. Although the new element
included several functions, it was called the Physical Vulnerability
Branch and was comprised of personnel from all Services, military
and civilian, who contributed according to their particular backgrounds,
training, and experience.
In June 1952, the Air Force Director of Intelligence reorganized
the activity, and placed the targeting function in a separate sub-directorate
with Air Force personnel heading each major element. The other
Services took strong exception, claiming that they held vested
rights in parts of the element, and without participation in some
of the controlling positions their interests in targeting would
not be protected.
Interservice rivalry over the control of targeting intelligence
resulted during the next few months, and it was necessary for the
JCS to intercede to resolve the problem. Ironically at one point
the Air Force Chief of Staff reportedly proposed to his colleagues
that since the Services could not agree on the control of intelligence,
perhaps all intelligence activities should be pooled and given
to the Secretary of Defense to manage.
From the targeting controversy there emerged in the spring of
l953 an arrangement for joint participation in certain areas of
air intelligence production, under the cognizance of a new activity
in the Joint Intelligence Group, first called the Joint Intelligence
Policy Review Group, and later, the Gold Team. Actual joint participation
continued in the Air Force Intelligence Center until the formation
of DIA in l96l.
Also in l953, a limited central point for the control of intelligence
emerged when the Secretary of Defense established the position
of Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations.
This office (OSO) recommended policies, reviewed and provided guidance
on planning and program development to DoD intelligence components,
developed DoD positions on intelligence problems, and made recommendations
to the Secretary on the actions necessary to provide more efficient
and economical operations. Moreover, the reasons for establishing
the position included providing intelligence staff support to the
Secretary of Defense in his role as a member of the National Security
Council, and improving coordination within the Defense intelligence "community." The
office did not produce intelligence but served primarily as a coordination
point for DoD intelligence and intelligence community liaison.
Significantly, the position was weakened by the lack of authority
to function as the focal point for DoD intelligence resource management--a
dilemma later faced by DIA. Moreover, it was the first DoD effort
to place Defense intelligence management under a single, high-level
entity.
The JIG, the small intelligence staff of the Joint Chiefs, could
not effectively coordinate Service intelligence efforts either.
As a result, several problems developed:
a. Each Service prepared its own estimate of the threat to U.S.
security. These estimates were often self-serving in that they
supported the Service's positions on roles and missions, weapon
systems, etc. There was no single, authoritative military estimate.
b. There was considerable duplication of effort, not only in what
was being produced but also in the collection area.
c. Neither the JCS nor the Secretary of Defense had an accurate
picture regarding the total allocation of military intelligence
resources.
In 1955, President Dwight D. Eisenhower created another commission
headed by Herbert Hoover to evaluate Government efficiency. A task
force was established under its auspices to study and make recommendations
as to the structure and administration of the intelligence community.
They looked at 22 Government agencies directly or indirectly engaged
in intelligence "in one form or another" using the guideline
that, "Intelligence deals with all the things which should
be known in advance of initiating a course of action."
The Commission's report prompted considerable debate in Congress
over strengthening and increasing the effectiveness of the U.S.
defense posture. The intelligence portion received much attention.
It warned of the need to collect more intelligence information
about Russia, her satellites, and Communist China.
The task force is deeply concerned over the lack of adequate intelligence
data from behind the Iron Curtain. Proper directional emphasis,
aggressive leadership, boldness and persistence are essential
to achieve the desired results.
The report noted the "apparent lack of accountability" in
the intelligence community and the need for better organizational
mechanisms. The report added that,
Our early philosophy of peace still prevails, but within our generation
and for our own protection, organized intelligence has been forced
upon us by the rapidly shrinking world of electronics, nuclear
weapons, and planes which travel at supersonic speed.
The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 stemmed from
a widespread belief in the 1950's that the Defense Department
needed major revision to provide for more effective, efficient,
and economical administration, to eliminate duplication, and
to encourage more comprehensive policies and programs. In preparing
the legislation, the drafters sought to improve management and
streamline channels of authority in DoD, yet did not wish to
disrupt unduly the authority of the Military Departments by excessive
consolidation. While the Act did not specifically call for a
consolidated DoD intelligence organ, in amending the National
Security Act of 1947 it instigated the ensuing Defense intelligence
reforms.
The Act proved far-reaching in that it lifted much of the decision-making
out of the Military Departments and into the hands of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. It also confirmed
and strengthened the central channel of military command over U.S.
combatant forces from the President to the Secretary of Defense,
thence through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (as his military advisers)
to the commanders-in-chief of the Unified and Specified Commands.
Even if the 1958 legislation had not been enacted, the Defense
intelligence system inevitably would have undergone an overhaul.
Numerous studies since 1947 had recommended change, and the reasons
abounded. Until the 1958 Act and its subsequent McCormack-Curtis
Amendment, the general structure of military intelligence within
the Defense Department had remained essentially unchanged since
the de facto creation of DoD in l947. Each Military Department
maintained a separate vertical intelligence organization in which
the general intelligence functions of collection, production, dissemination,
and management were performed in support of their respective intelligence
headquarters and component commands. The offices of theAssistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Army and the Air Force,
and the Office of Naval Intelligence provided their products directly
to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the commanders-in-chief
of the Unified and Specified Commands, and to other governmental
agencies. The ACS/I position in USAF was established in 1957; it
formerly was the Director of Intelligence under DCS Operations.
In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were responsible in their
corporate character for providing jointly agreed intelligence to
the Secretary of Defense and to the heads of the Unified and Specified
Commands; "joint intelligence" was actually a synthesis
of departmental intelligence. To carry out this mission, the Joint
Intelligence Group (JIG) in existence since 1948, had become the
J-2 Directorate of the Joint Staff. In reality, however, the size
limitations of the J-2 forced it to delegate much of the support
responsibility to the Services. The major problem with this arrangement
was that neither the J-2 nor the Services could resolve the differences
that developed among the Military Departments. Important issues
suffered, such as the optimal design of the national military posture
and the military intelligence estimate contribution to the development
of foreign policy.
Thus, the system was not "in consonance with the objectives
of the 1958 Act" which specified strengthening the channels
of command from the President to the "combatant forces." The
Department of Defense intelligence assets and efforts were divided
among the three Military Departments and the JCS. They were inherently
duplicative, cumbersome, poorly distributed, costly, and did not
provide for unified (or even coordinated) military intelligence
estimates at any echelon. The system originally had been designed
to work along departmental channels in response to each Service's
internal needs. In practice it was ineffective because it failed
to provide timely and credible estimates.
The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 did resolve several asymmetries
concerning the "vague authority" of the Secretary of
Defense. The Act removed all doubts about the Secretary's authority
and placed the JCS in the chain of command, particularly in terms
of responsibility for intelligence support to the Unified and Specified
Commands. Subsequently, DoD Directive 5100.1 (31 December 1958)
was published assigning functional responsibility to the JCS and
Military Departments for the provision of adequate, timely and
reliable intelligence. Overall, the Act extended the centralization
processes underway in DoD since 1947.
In an action related to the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958,
the National Security Council by directive created the United States
Intelligence Board (USIB), effective 15 September 1958. The directive
dissolved the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) and the United
States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) and ascribed to
the new USIB the general responsibilities and functions previously
discharged by the IAC and the USCIB. The USCIB was established
in 1946 to advise and make recommendations on communications intelligence
to the Secretary of Defense. The Board consisted of the Secretaries
of State and Defense, the Director of the FBI, CIA, and NSA, and
representatives from the Services.
The membership of the USIB included the former members of the
IAC and USCIB. Thus, at the Nation's highest level of intelligence
deliberation the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army, Navy, Air Force,
Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, Atomic Energy
Commission and Federal Bureau of Investigation had co-equal representation.
The inclusion of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and the Director of the National Security Agency
(as former members of the USCIB) placed representatives of the
Department of Defense--with no JCS or Service affiliation--in the
senior national intelligence body for the first time. However,
the procedures prescribed by the USIB frequently required the Secretary
of Defense to review the dissenting opinions of the Service intelligence
chiefs in order to achieve a consensus from Defense. Consequently,
the longstanding problem of who spoke for Defense remained as before.
The USIB finally resolved the problem in 1964.
To ensure that the DoD general intelligence organization would
be sufficiently responsive to a centralized system of decision
and command, detailed and repeated studies followed the adoption
of the Defense Reorganization Act. As the impact of DoD reorganization
became clear, a concomitant need for a focal organization for the
Defense intelligence effort emerged. Secretary of Defense Thomas
S. Gates underscored the urgency for some form of action by pointing
out that intelligence requirements of the Unified and Specified
Commands, the JCS, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense had
increased substantially.
By 1959, DoD was seeking to put its house in order. The Secretary
directed the JCS to study the intelligence requirements of the
military departments to identify for elimination any duplication,
and to establish some order of priority for those requirements
that remained. (In the sense employed, "requirements" embraced
collection, production, and dissemination.)
Thus, under the chairmanship of the Chief of Plans, J-2, a Joint
Chiefs of Staff/Military Departments Task Force began work in December
1959. The Task Force concluded, in part, that some 37 separate
intelligence products, all addressing substantially the same information
but for different consumers, could not be justified. Accordingly,
their initial determination was that a joint requirements facility
should be established under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However,
before this proposal could be staffed and discussed adequately
by the JCS, a meeting on 6 May 1960 between the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget, the Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, and the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign
Intelligence Activities resulted in a decision to establish an
ad hoc Joint Study Group (JSG) to review specified aspects of the
foreign intelligence effort of the United States.
The Joint Study Group (JSG), appointed by President Eisenhower
as a special task force under the chairmanship of Lyman Kirkpatrick
(formerly CIA Inspector General), concentrated on revamping the
existing organizational and management structure of U.S. foreign
intelligence. Foremost among the subjects to be reviewed was military
intelligence coordination:
United States intelligence must be a community effort in fact
as well as name, which means that effective coordination of intelligence
as a truly national effort must be achieved. By far the preponderant
part of U.S. intelligence in terms of manpower and money is that
undertaken by the DoD. Great strides toward a more closely integrated
community would result from improved intelligence coordination
within the DoD.
Service intelligence channels still followed the chain of command
used since World War II from Service headquarters to Service
components in the field, although the Reorganization Act of 1958
had established a new operational chain of command from Secretary
of Defense through the JCS to the CINCs. If coordination was
to be improved, it must have a central, control point.
The "Final Report" of the JSG advanced the concept of
a new intelligence organization which would act as a primary point
of contact for the military intelligence community and have broad
managerial powers over the intelligence programs and activities
of DoD components. Thus, the notion of a "Defense Intelligence
Agency" was conceived. But the JSG anticipated opposition
to the idea and included their reservations when broaching it:
It has been suggested to the Study Group that a positive solution
would be to establish one intelligence service for the whole
DoD, reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense. Although
this proposal has considerable merit, it is our view that on
balance it would be unwise to attempt such an integration of
intelligence activities so long as there are three Military Services
having specialized skills and knowledge.
Nonetheless, intelligence management within the DoD must be organized
in such a way as to provide adequately for intelligence as a
coordinated system of highest priority. Besides increasing JCS
responsibility in coordinating over-all defense substantive matters,
there is need to establish and maintain cognizance of the over-all
program in terms of resources of manpower and money allocated,
and to eliminate waste, duplication, and inefficiency. For this
there should be an authoritative focal point within the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, which should also be the primary
point of contact with the rest of the community.
As expected, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reacted strongly to several
portions of the final 43 recommendations in the JSG report submitted
to the Secretary of Defense on 15 December 1960. Especially unpalatable
to the JCS was the following portions of the "Final Report" recommending
that,
The Secretary of Defense take appropriate action to bring the military
intelligence organizationwithin the Department of Defense into
full consonance with the concept of the Defense Reorganization
Act of 1958. Toward this end:
a. There should be established within the Office of the management
review authority over military intelligence programs and providing
over-all coordination of all foreign intelligence activities
conducted by various Defense components.
b. The authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in intelligence
coordination and operations should be strengthened in support of
their assigned mission by such means as:
(1) Placing under the Joint Chiefs of Staff in intelligence coordination
at operations should be strengthened in support of their assigned
mission by such means as:
(2) Requiring the Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate the intelligence
views on substantive intelligence matters within the Department
of Defense, notably for estimates;
(3) Requiring the Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate the intelligence
activities of the unified and specified commands and be the primary
channel to these commands for guidance and direction of intelligence
matters originating with the Department of Defense.
c. National Security Council Intelligence Directives, Department
of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff directives should be revised
in accordance with the above.
. . . The increased intelligence resources required by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the unified commands should be drawn from the
existing resources of the military departments and component commands
as appropriate.
Intelligence guidance and instructions to components of unified
commands originating in military departments should be transmitted
to these commands through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-2).
. . . Unified commanders should exercise control and command over
the intelligence activities of their component commands and be
the primary channel to them for guidance and direction on intelligence
matters including any instructions that originate in the Service
departments.
On 30 December 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a memorandum
to the Secretary of Defense stating the JCS position with respect
to each recommendation of the JSG. The JCS, addressing the recommendations
listed above, expressed their reservations about certain proposals
having to do with organizational realignments:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are gravely concerned over the far-reaching
impact that the implementation of certain of the recommendations
could have on the entire structure, operational methods and effectiveness
of the military intelligence activities of the various elements
of the Department of Defense.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that the military intelligence
organization within DoD should be brought into full consonance
with the concept of the Reorganization Act of 1958. The nature,
timing, and scope of actions which are required to realize this
should, of course, be the result of careful planning and of an
evolutionary process. There would otherwise be the hazard of losing
valuable intelligence during the realignment process and hastily
conceived alterations in the military intelligence structure which
would require continuous overhaul as experience was gained. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore recommend that the Secretary of
Defense support the principle embodied in this introductory paragraph
. . ., but that he take the position . . . that these are specific
implementing suggestions which should not be decided upon until
a detailed study is made and submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum to the Director
of Central Intelligence on 6 January 1961, acknowledged that the
JSG recommendations were well-taken in "principle," expressed
reluctance "to endorse the methods of implementation," and
suggested that additional study was required since the "implementation
... must be an evolutionary process."
Meanwhile, two of the Services reacted to the JSG report by submitting
to the JSC for approval their own concept papers for the "control
and coordination of military intelligence." The Army and Air
Force Chiefs of Staff papers were submitted on 6 and 17 January
1961, respectively. The JCS directed the J-2 to meet with the Service
intelligence chiefs and prepare a unified concept paper, since
the Services held divergent views in the matter. This was overtaken
by events when an 8 February memorandum from the new Secretary
of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, to the Chairman of the JCS, conveyed
his decision to establish a Defense Intelligence Agency. Significantly,
his deputy's recommended method of implementation, that is, an "evolutionary
process," was incorporated into the final plan for activating
DIA.
In Secretary McNamara's 8 February memo to the JCS, he directed
that they submit within 30 days a concept for a Defense Intelligence
Agency which embodied the extensive integration of the military
intelligence efforts of all DoD elements. The proposed concept
should include a five-phased implementation schedule and a draft
DoD Directive for the organization's authorization. The Secretary
cited several guidelines to be accomplished in establishing the
new agency. These included the elimination of duplication in intelligence
collection, processing, production, estimating, and publication;
limiting Service intelligence functions to training, personnel,
and support responsibilities; restricting Service headquarters
levels to no more than a small intelligence staff; and precluding
the policy and planning staff of the Joint Staff from assuming
any intelligence function which could be handled by DIA.
Upon learning of the Secretary of Defense's direction, the Director
of the J-2 recommended to the JCS that the requested "concept" be
prepared within the Secretary's guidelines, but to include the
following provisos: "the Director for the Agency will be a
military officer on active duty; and the Agency will be responsible
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff." He cautioned:
In some specific areas of intelligence activity, such as counterintelligence
and technical intelligence, it is possible that the Joint Chiefs
of Staff would desire to minimize the integration. Accordingly,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff may wish to submit a reclama on certain
aspects of the concept enunciated by the Secretary of Defense in
his memorandum. However, the risks inherent in making any reclama
should be carefully considered, since efforts to minimize the degree
of integration contemplated might well result in a decision to
place the DIA outside the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
By 2 March 1961, the JCS had completed the concept paper requested
by Mr. NcNamara in his 8 February memo. The JCS proposed a Military
Intelligence Agency (MIA) to include estimating, targeting, and
basic intelligence functions " . . . in those areas where
economies and increased efficiency can be achieved." The paper
offered to reduce the Military Departments "to operating with
minimum essential headquarters intelligence staff." On the
other hand, the JCS reserved for the Services the mission of continuing "to
acquire,produce, and disseminate military intelligence and counterintelligence
as required in fulfillment of their assigned departmental missions,
and shall participate in joint intelligence activities as required." Moreover,
the military departments would continue " . . . production
of those elements of military intelligence and counterintelligence
and security which have not been integrated into the Military Intelligence
Agency." Hence, the JCS envisioned a Military Intelligence
Agency which would, " . . . not necessarily imply complete
integration of the military intelligence and counterintelligence
activities of the DOD under the MIA. It should be noted that the
use of "Military" instead of "Defense" by the
JCS was intentional, indicating their perception of the status
and role of the new agency; a lengthy debate ensued over the name
which ended upon the Secretary's insistence of the use of the word "Defense."
On 5 July 1961, the Secretary of Defense approved the concept
for a DIA and on 1 August 1961, the Department of Defense made
a public announcement that the Defense Intelligence Agency had
been established. Upon approval of the new Agency's activation
plan by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency became operational
on 1 October 1961. Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll (USAF)
was appointed Director, DIA, and in this capacity, the principal
staff advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of
Defense for substantive intelligence matters.
Deane J. Allen, DIA Historian, November 1995
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