Organization Relationship of DIA and the JCS/J2
Origins: One of the earliest traces of formal military
intelligence cooperation was the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)
created
in l94l as a coordinating mechanism of the fledgling Joint Chiefs
of Staff organization. (It can be argued, however, that the Joint
Army-Navy Board established in l905 sought interservice cooperation
in intelligence matters as U.S. involvement in World War I became
imminent). The Committee consisted of the directors and representatives
of the intelligence organs of the Army, the Navy, the State Department,
the Board of Economic Warfare, and the Coordinator of Information
(later redesignated by President Roosevelt in 1942 as the Office
of Strategic Services, the foreunner of the Central Intelligence
Agency).
In January l946 the National Intelligence Authority, with its
staff arm, the Central Intelligence Group, was established by President
Truman for the coordination, planning, evaluation, and dissemination
of intelligence. Later that year, the congressional Joint Committee
on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack recommended the
integration of all Army and Navy intelligence organizations. "Operational
and intelligence work required centralization of authority and
clear-cut allocation of responsibility," the committee wrote.
By l947 a realization had emerged that increased integration of
Service intelligence and improved joint operations were essential
to maintain pace with the widening global nature of U.S. security
issues and technological progress. The National Security Act of
1947 was the first step toward reordering an outmoded system.
The National Security Act of 1947 left basically intact the JCS
arrangement of the Joint Intelligence Committee within the Joint
Staff. Thus, the JCS concept of part-time interservice committees
supported by a full-time staff under a single director (Director
of the Joint Staff) continued. During the War, the JIC's purpose
had been to furnish "agreed military intelligence" in
various forms to other agencies of the JCS and represent them on
the Allied wartime Combined Intelligence Committee. The JIC did
not unify military intelligence components, and it failed to produce
composite national intelligence estimates.
The working level of the JIC was called the Joint Intelligence
Subcommittee Staff. Officers from the Military Services were assigned
full-time to this body, later renamed the Joint Intelligence Staff.
Subsequently, the Joint Intelligence Staff became the Joint Intelligence
Group (JIG), or the J-2. The JIG responded to the Director of the
Joint Staff as well as the Joint Intelligence Committee. Reports
from the Joint Intelligence Committee went directly to the JCS;
the Director of the Joint Staff also reported directly to the JCS.
Thus, the JCS received intelligence from the working level through
two avenues.
The Joint Intelligence Committee alternated leadership between
the Deputy Director, Intelligence of the Joint Staff and the senior
military member of the Service intelligence organizations. Furthermore,
each of the members of the JIC was also a member of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee. The JIC composition included the Army G-2,
the Chief of Naval Intelligence, the Chief of the Directorate of
Intelligence of the Air Force, and the Chief of the JIG.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were responsible in their corporate
character for providing jointly agreed intelligence to the Secretary
of Defense and to the heads of the Unified and Specified Commands; "joint
intelligence" was actually a synthesis of departmental intelligence.
Thus, to carry out this mission, the Joint Intelligence Group (JIG)
in existence since 1948, had become the J-2 Directorate of the
Joint Staff. In reality, however, the size limitations of the J-2
forced it to delegate much of the support responsibility to the
Services. The major problem with this arrangement was that neither
the J-2 nor the Services could resolve the differences that developed
among the Military Departments.
In l948, President Truman appointed a commission under former
President Herbert Hoover to examine closely the national security
apparatus, especially the intelligence network. Concerning the
National Military Establishment, the Commission noted that it lacked "centralized
authority" which "should be placed firmly in the Secretary
of Defense." Moreover, "... the continuance of intense
interservice rivalries hampers and confuses sound policy at many
points. One of our greatest needs is to elevate military thinking
to a plane above individual service aims and ambitions." As
for the JCS, they were described as "... too remote from related
groups ..." such as the National Security Council and the
CIA. "... A spirit of teamwork must govern interagency intelligence
relationships."
The JIG had too small of an intelligence staff to effectively
coordinate Service intelligence efforts. As a result, several problems
developed:
a. Each Service prepared its own estimate of the threat to U.S.
security. These estimates were often self-serving in that they
supported the Service's positions on roles and missions, weapon
systems, etc. There was no single, authoritative military estimate.
b. There was considerable duplication of effort, not only in what
was being produced but also in the collection area.
c. Neither the JCS nor the Secretary of Defense had an accurate
picture regarding the total allocation of military intelligence
resources.
The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 stemmed from
a widespread belief in the 1950's that the Defense Department needed
major revision to provide for more effective, efficient, and economical
administration, to eliminate duplication, and to encourage more
comprehensive policies and programs. The intelligence system was
not "in consonance with the objectives of the 1958 Act" which
specified strengthening the channels of command from the President
to the "combatant forces." Thus, the 1958 Act resolved
several asymmetries concerning the "vague authority" of
the Secretary of Defense. The Act removed all doubts about the
Secretary's authority and placed the JCS in the chain of command,
particularly in terms of responsibility for intelligence support
to the Unified and Specified Commands. Subsequently DoD Directive
5100.1 (31 December 1958) was published assigning functional responsibility
to the JCS and Military Departments for the provision of adequate,
timely and reliable intelligence. Overall, the Act extended the
centralization processes underway in DoD since 1947.
In November 1959, seven directorates (J-1--J-6, plus a directorate
for military assistance) had been established in the JCS--including
J-2, Directorate for Intelligence. The Joint Staff expanded from
210 to 400 officer billets for the seven directorates as one of
the provisos of the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act.
Upon taking office in 1961, Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara,
conveyed his decision to establish a Defense Intelligence Agency
in an 8 February memorandum to the Chairman of the JCS. Significantly,
his deputy's recommended method of implementation, that is, an "evolutionary
process," was incorporated into the final plan for activating
DIA. This included assuming all responsibilities of the J-2 of
the JCS.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric reiterated Secretary
of Defense McNamara's concept for establishing the DIA in a 5 July
l961 memorandum to the JCS, Military Departments, et al. Briefly,
he stated that the new agency would report to the Secretary of
Defense through the JCS; it would not be a confederation; and DIA
would not add an additional layer of administrative control. He
described the principal objectives of DIA as facilitating unity
of effort among all intelligence components of DoD as well as strengthening
the overall capacity of DoD for intelligence.
On 1 August 1961 DoD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence
Agency," was published with an effective date of 1 October
1961. DIA's primary operational responsibilities fell within nine
general areas. DIA's requirements were to:
1) produce and provide all DoD estimative and current intelligence,
and establish and maintain the DoD indications center;
2) provide the Secretary of Defense, his assistants, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, DoD agencies, the Unified and Specified Commands,
the Military Departments, and other organizations in the National
intelligence community with military intelligence;
3) Manage the DoD intelligence requirements and collection activities;
4) Develop DoD intelligence research and development requirements;
5) cooperate with and mutually support the Central Intelligence
Agency and other intelligence organizations;
6) provide DoD representation on the United States Intelligence
Board, its committees and on all other intergovernmental intelligence
committees;
7) give guidance to the DoD components on the public release of
Defense intelligence information;
8) integrate DoD intelligence automation and automatic data processing
plans and programs; and,
9) prepare and submit a consolidated DoD budget for intelligence
activities.
DIA and the J-2--1961-1991: The J-2, until its abolishment on
28 June 1963, depended fully upon DIA's Office of Estimates to
provide substantive intelligence. During this period, formal JCS
actions (such as the review of the operations and contingency plans
of the Unified and Specified Commands) continued to be staffed
by the J-2, while the Office of Estimates directly received spot
intelligence requirements from the commands. Moreover, the Office
of Estimates became immediately responsible (in 1961) for producing
Defense estimates which were forwarded to the Board of National
Estimates. Before DIA, the J-2 had merely coordinated the Services'
contribution. Reluctant to break with long established procedures,
the Services continued to independently submit some of their estimates
directly to the Board of National Estimates until 1963, when the
practice was ended.
Thus, the DIA estimating mission was to provide the Secretary
of Defense and his principal staff assistants, the JCS, the military
Departments, and the Unified and Specified Commands with military
intelligence estimates. The scope of DIA's responsibilities was
more controlled and inclusive than the Services' former relationship
with J-2's Estimates Division had been. The DIA mission emphasized
the Secretary of Defense relationship and dropped that part of
the J-2 estimates mission that provided for "the policy direction
of joint target studies and projects." The DIA Estimates Office
provided a central control point for the production of finished
intelligence by "reviewing and coordinating as directed, the
intelligence estimative functions retained by, or assigned to,
the military departments," and providing intelligence for
OSD contractors.
DIA revised its charter, DoD Directive 5105.21, on 24 June 1963,
to provide for the continuation of intelligence staff support to
the JCS following the J-2 disestablishment on 28 June 1963. While
the J-2 had existed, DIA had been charged with providing the JCS
with military intelligence and discharging such intelligence functions
as the JCS assigned.
The disestablishment of the J-2, Joint Staff, on 28 June 1963
and assignment of its staff support functions to DIA on 1 July
required relatively little readjustment by DIA. Two-thirds of the
J-2 staff (the Current Intelligence Division and the Estimates
Division) already had transferred to DIA when the Agency was activated.
As had been previously envisioned in the original planning, DIA
had reached a point in its evolution by the summer of 1963 where
it had begun to overlap the remaining responsibilities and functions
of the J-2. The general functional responsibilities of the J-2
elements assumed by DIA in 1963 included: plans and policy responsibility
for COMINT, ELINT, and non-SIGINT functions; target intelligence
support; security support of the Joint Staff; and Secretariat functions.
The internal functioning of the Defense Intelligence Agency was
structured into three categories: l) Those which reported directly
to the Command Element and either primarily supported the headquarters
or served as liaison for the headquarters. 2) The management-oriented
support functions whose mission extended throughout Defense intelligence
as well as providing services for the Agency. 3) Those activities
which were operational. Within the Command Element, the Secretariat
contained a JCS and U&S Commands support group.
A Special Assistant for JCS Matters office was formed on 29 July
l965 as a result of l963 exploratory reorganization studies which
stressed that greater priority be assigned to improving DIA responsive
intelligence support and increased DIA visibility within the JCS
organization. The nucleus for this activity initially was under
the Assistant Chief of Staff Plans and Programs reporting directly
to the DIA Chief of Staff. An inspection by the JCS in l967 indicated
that, "its efforts have contributed to improved support to
the JCS and the Joint Staff." DIA benefitted also in that
it facilitated its participation in Joint Staff actions. The Agency
had made significant strides forward since 1961--including the
continuing improvement in production quality and the ability to
meet the requirements of the Services, the JCS, and OSD.
By 1970, successive years of internal and external critiques,
inspections, and conjecture concerning the DIA raison d'etre had
nurtured the presumption that a DIA charter revision was necessary.
Central to the arguments for charter revision was the chain-of-command
issue. In his 23 December l970 memo, Secretary of Defense Laird
believed it necessary to clarify the relationship of DIA to the
Secretary of Defense and the JCS:
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency will report directly
to the Secretary of Defense in the conduct and performance of his
duties. The chain of command shall run from the Secretary of Defense
to the Director, DIA. Guidance to the Director, DIA, shall be furnished
by the Secretary of Defense and the United States Intelligence
Board. The Director, DIA, will support the intelligence and counterintelligence
requirements of the JCS as in the past. A separate J-2 organization
within the OJCS will not be established.
On 24 December l970, the Chairman of the JCS in a memorandum to
the Secretary of Defense wrote: "I note that your memorandum
preserves the present role of Director, DIA, in support of the
JCS . . . and that he will report directly to you in the conduct
of his duties involving domestic investigative and counterintelligence
activities, while in matters involving operational intelligence
and foreign intelligence/counterintelligence activities, the chain
of command would continue to run from the Secretary of Defense,
through the JCS as prescribed in DoD Directive 5l05.2l . . ."
In 1974, the former Special Assistant for JCS Matters had become
the JCS Liaison Division (JS). Manpower for the element was increased
by 10 billets. Then, on 25 November 1974, JS became the J-2 Support
Office, and its duties were expanded to emphasize DIA's JCS support
role and the role of the Director, DIA, as the J-2 of the Joint
Staff. In the words of the Director, Lieutenant General Daniel
Graham:
"
To place greater emphasis on my role as the J-2, OJCS, I have expanded
the size of my J-2 Support Office which now reports directly to
my chief of staff. This office serves as the DIA focal point for
all Joint Staff matters and maintains a close relationship with
the OJCS to insure prompt and responsive DIA support".
In 1976, a DIA-wide reorganization, established a bicameral organization
and recast the Deputy Director's position as Vice Director for
Plans, Operations and Support (VO). The J-2 Support Office (JS),
a former CS/DP function, was subordinated under VO.
The J-2 Support Office (JS) continued unchanged in structure and
function throughout 1976, and included a Control Branch (JS-1)
and Intelligence Support Branch (JS-2). A Systems Planning Office
(SP) was established under VO which provided for the planning and
coordination of a cohesive, integrated Defense intelligence information
handling system. According to the SP mission, "The specific
objectives of such a system were: to provide better and more timely
support to commanders of combat forces; improve the quality and
timeliness of the intelligence input to the decision-making process;
and to reduce undesirable duplication and promote efficiency and
economy while providing for necessary survivability and redundancy."
DIA Director Lieutenant General Samuel Wilson characterized organizational
changes in 1977 as "refinements to increase effectiveness." Consequently,
the Deputy Director and Chief of Staff positions were reestablished
to enhance command and control, and coordination of Agency activities.
The J-2 Support Office was realigned and the Director's Staff Group
was expanded to provide improved support to OSD and JCS consumers.
Another reorganization in August 1979, consolidated the Assistant
Vice Directorate for Current Intelligence (DN), the Strategic Warning
Staff (SWS), and the J-2 Support Office (JS) into a new Assistant
Directorate for JCS Support (JS). The new directorate reported
directly to the Command Element. This realignment was intended
to enhance DIA support to the JCS by combining current intelligence
production with the more traditional liaison and support functions
generally provided by the J-2. The changes enabled DIA to focus
on the operational intelligence needs of the JCS and satisfy them
on a more timely basis.
By 1982, two charter revisions and considerable examination and
revision of chain-of-command relationships had occurred. In conjunction
with the establishment in DIA of the Directorate for JCS Support(JS)
in August 1979, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved a clarification
and enumeration of the responsibilities of the Defense Intelligence
Agency in its role as the J-2 of the Joint Staff. DIA had overcome
the "too many masters" problem cited by the Blue Ribbon
Defense Panel in 1971 by concentrating on upgrading intelligence
support to the JCS and Secretary of Defense. Emphasis in DIA production
essentially had shifted from basic intelligence to current intelligence.
The Agency's progress in improving intelligence support to the
Unified and Specified Commands had been placed in balance with
its role as a producer of national intelligence. Lieutenant General
James A. Williams, following his first year as Director, summed
up the progress in an open letter to the Agency:
" For the past 12 months we have worked hard to improve our support
to tactical commanders, to increase counterterrorism/counterintelligence
support and to enhance our initiative reporting and overall
cooperation between analysts and policymakers. New efforts are underway in
space warfare and in the exchange of high technology data as
well as policy-related efforts to support the Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff in Continuity of Government and Tactical Intelligence
and Related Activities. These have received wide acclaim .
. ."
Throughout the 1980's, DIA continued to provide intelligence support
to joint military operations. For example, tailored intelligence
production in support of the Joint Special Operations Command
and the US Central Command, development of a C3 data base to
support nuclear targeting, establishment of the Central American
Joint Intelligence Team (CAJIT), development of the Military
Intelligence Integrated Data System (MIIDS), development of the
National Military Intelligence Support Terminal (NMIST) concept,
management and communications architectures, and establishment
of a crisis support center to provide centralized crisis management--were
a few of the areas of the expanded relationship with JCS elements.
In retrospect, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger had told
Congress in 1974, "As a Defense agency, DIA had a responsibility
to provide intelligence support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Abolishment
of the J-2 organization, per se, had no effect on DIA's clearly
defined role to support the Joint Chiefs. However, it eventually
raised some doubt in regard to DIA's role within the Joint Staff
itself. I am happy to say that this functional uncertainty has
been removed, and that the Director, DIA, is so fully involved--personally
and organizationally--as the J-2 of the Joint Staff." In 1991,
the JS organization was redesignated J-2.
Deane J. Allen, DIA Historian
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